Lynch v. Christie

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-2172
ROBERT P. LYNCH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
JOAN L. CHRISTIE,
Defendant, Appellant,
POSITIVE DESIGN, INC.; STEVEN SCHWARTZ,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Andrea S. Batchelder, with whom Michael W. Gallagher, Paul
Schor, and Gallagher & Cavanaugh, LLP, were on brief, for
appellant.
Holly R. Jones, with whom Daniel P. Rapaport, Jonathan G.
Mermin, Adam J. Shub, and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP,
were on brief, for appellee.
June 25, 2012
Per Curiam. This case involves an appeal from the denial
of two motions to dismiss by the federal district court in Maine.
Lynch v. Christie, 815 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Me. 2011). The presence
of interlocutory federal appellate jurisdiction is contested.
The suit in Lynch v. Christie, based on diversity
jurisdiction, is brought by Robert Lynch, a chiropractor, against
a former patient, Joan Christie. The Lynch suit alleges that an
earlier lawsuit brought by Christie against Lynch, and dismissed,
constituted an actionable wrongful use of civil proceedings under
Maine law and that Christie had defamed Lynch in internet postings.
The details of Christie's suit may be found in the district court
opinion. See id. at 344-45.
Christie filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was denied, and is the first denial
from which an appeal is taken. There is ordinarily no appellate
jurisdiction over the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, In re TJX
Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 2009),
and we need not, under these circumstances, consider an alternative
pendent appellate jurisdiction rationale, see Lopez v.
Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 82 (1st Cir. 2009).
Christie also responded by filing a special motion to
dismiss under Maine's anti-SLAPP law, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14,
§ 556. The operations of that law are described in Godin v.
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2010). See also Morse
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Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001). The district
court denied that motion for reasons explained in its decision.
Lynch, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 49-53. Both this court and the district
court denied Christie's motion for a stay. The case is currently
scheduled to be trial-ready by September 4, 2012.
The question of whether there is interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction over the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion is difficult
and complex. In Godin, we reserved on "the question of whether an
order addressed to the merits of a ruling under an anti-SLAPP
statute is immediately appealable." 629 F.3d at 84. We also
outlined the four-part requirement established by the Supreme Court
for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Id. (citing Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
What is neither difficult nor complex is the practical
outcome of this dispute -- it is the same, regardless of whether we
have interlocutory jurisdiction or we do not. If we do have
jurisdiction, the panel has determined that the appropriate
resolution would be to remand the case to the district court to
consider whether reconsideration of the anti-SLAPP motion to
dismiss was warranted. That is because of the new and intervening
Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision in Nader v. Maine Democratic
Party, 41 A.3d 551 (Me. 2012). There, the Law Court decided
clearly for the first time the standards to be applied in deciding
such motions. In doing so, the court "announce[d] a change in the
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parties' burdens at the preliminary anti-SLAPP dismissal stage."
Id. at 563. The federal court did not have the benefit of this
controlling statement of Maine law when it decided the motion. And
we cannot say with any certainty that application of this new
articulation by the Maine Law Court to the facts of this case would
not prove to be material.
If, on the other hand, there were no interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction, the appeal would be dismissed and the case
would continue to proceed in the trial court. There, counsel for
Christie would (as she informed us at oral argument) ask the court
to consider whether in light of Nader it should reconsider the
result it reached.
That decision would then be a matter for the district
court, under either course of action. We are reluctant to decide
issues of law which are not necessary, or may be premature, and
particularly so as to issues which may have constitutional
dimensions. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011);
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 511 (1st Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 526017 (U.S. May 21, 2012); Buchanan
v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 172 (1st Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, and without deciding the difficult issue of
whether there is interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, we remand to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion, and dismiss the appeal. No costs are awarded.
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