Garcia-Tatupu v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 17-2179
LINNEA GARCIA-TATUPU,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN;
NFL PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Edward J. McCormick, III, with whom McCormick & Maitland was
on brief, for appellant.
Michael L. Junk, with whom Groom Law Group, Grace V.B. Garcia,
and Morrison Mahoney LLP were on brief, for appellees.
January 14, 2019
Per Curiam. We have carefully considered the parties'
briefs and the record on appeal and conclude that the district
court's judgment should be affirmed essentially for the reasons
articulated by the district court and argued by appellees.
In summary, our de novo review of the pertinent state
court domestic relations orders, in light of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended, and
the Tatupus' marital separation agreement, demonstrates that the
orders impermissibly sought to "require the [NFL retirement] plan
to provide increased benefits." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D)(ii).
Appellant has provided us with no legal authority to support her
contention that these nunc pro tunc, postmortem orders should be
treated as Qualified Domestic Relations Orders ("QDROs") under
ERISA. Unlike in Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478
(3d Cir. 2005), the primary case cited by appellant, she is not
"seek[ing] to enforce an interest created prior to [her ex-
husband]'s death," id. at 489, but is instead attempting to rewrite
the separation agreement to posthumously create new interests in
his retirement benefits.
Given this disposition, we do not opine upon the
circumstances in which nunc pro tunc state court domestic relations
orders entered after the death of a plan beneficiary may be treated
as QDROs. We merely hold that, on the specific facts of this case
-- in particular, the language of the separation agreement and the
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status of Mr. Tatupu's election and receipt of benefits at the
time of his death -- the domestic relations orders at issue may
not be so treated.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Rule 27.0(c).
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