DocketNumber： 94-2057
Filed Date： 5/12/1995
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015
May 12, 1995
[Not for Publication] [Not for Publication]
United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 94-2057
GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
RICHARD E. POULOS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 94-2058
GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ET AL.
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
RICHARD E. POULOS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
____________________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Allen S. Rugg, with whom Alan D. Strasser, Kutak Rock, John S. ______________ ________________ __________ _______
Whitman, and Richardson & Troubh, were on brief for appellants. _______ ___________________
Terry A. Fralich, with whom Peter J. DeTroy, and Norman, Hanson & _________________ _______________ ________________
DeTroy, were on brief for appellees. ______
____________________
____________________
STAHL, Circuit Judge. After appellants obtained STAHL, Circuit Judge. _____________
substantial relief in their lawsuit alleging illegal
wiretapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) and Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15 710(1), the district court, pursuant to
the statutory schemes, ordered appellees to pay appellants'
attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $283,950.58.
Appellants now argue that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding as little as it did; appellees
maintain in their cross-appeal that the abuse of discretion
occurred in awarding appellants anything at all. After
careful review of the record, we conclude that the district
court's basic approach is sound but that on certain matters
it failed to provide a sufficient basis to justify certain of
its deductions and made computational errors; thus we modify
the district court order accordingly.
I. I. __
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________
We have previously recited in detail the factual
background to the underlying, substantive lawsuit, Williams ________
v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. 1993) (the "Williams" ______
lawsuit), and we therefore provide only a brief summary here.
Appellants (plaintiffs in the Williams lawsuit) were
defendants in a RICO lawsuit stemming from the demise of
Consolidated Auto Recyclers, Inc. ("CAR"), Bowers v. Allied ______ ______
Capital Corp., Civ. No. 91-0021-B (D. Me. filed January 1991) _____________
-2- 2
(Brody, J.) (the "Bowers" lawsuit). In the course of
discovery in the Bowers litigation, appellants learned from
Richard Poulos, counsel for CAR's principals (the Bowers
plaintiffs) that he had secret tapes of some of their
conversations. After further discovery, appellants initiated
the Williams lawsuit, seeking, inter alia, declaratory and _____ ____
injunctive relief, under federal and Maine wiretap laws,
forbidding Poulos and the Bowers plaintiffs from using the
tapes in the Bowers lawsuit. On February 3, 1993, following
a six-day bench trial, the district court granted in large
part appellants' requested relief, and we affirmed.
Williams, 11 F.3d at 274. ________
Appellants then filed an application for attorney
fees with the district court, pursuant to the federal and
Maine wiretap statutes, both of which provide for the
recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs from
defendants in successful civil actions. 18 U.S.C. 2520(a)-
(b)(1); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, 711(2). The
application, as amended, sought $715,202.12 in attorney fees
and costs.1 In its Order and Memorandum of Opinion dated
____________________
1. Appellants' initial application for fees and expenses on
January 13, 1994, requested a total of $734,389.62. After
appellees filed a memorandum with the district court opposing
the application, appellants filed an amended application (the
Application), deducting $6,600 in computer research charges,
$2,125 in telephone surcharges, and $10,462.50 in charges for
attorney travel time, reducing the total amount requested to
$715,202.12. This amended figure comprised approximately
$616,349 in attorney fees and $78,253 in expenses from the
-3- 3
September 2, 1994, the district court stated that the
Application was "unreasonable on its face and grossly
inflated" and that it contained "exorbitant costs and
numerous instances of inefficient allocation of the law
firms' resources." The district court awarded appellants
$283,950.58 -- about 40% of the amount requested.2 The
court arrived at this figure in the following manner:
(1) In calculating reasonable fees for services
rendered by Kutak Rock, the court used local billing rates,
rather than the Washington, D.C., rates requested.
Appellants, in defense of this request, claim they could
locate no available, qualified local counsel willing to sue
Poulos, and therefore Kutak Rock's out-of-town rates were
reasonable. The court, however, found that appellants chose
____________________
three law firms that represented appellants, with expert fees
and court reporter costs accounting for the balance. The
lion's share of the fees and expenses -- approximately
$491,749 in fees and $59,589 in expenses -- requested in the
Application were billed by Kutak Rock, the Washington, D.C.,
law firm that served as appellants' lead counsel. The
Application includes fees and expenses totalling
approximately $96,777 billed by Richardson & Troubh,
appellants' Maine counsel, and approximately $46,463 billed
by Murray, Plumb & Murray, counsel for Ralph Dyer, intervenor
in the Williams lawsuit. Dyer did not appeal from the
district court's order awarding reduced fees. However,
because the district court based its decision on the
propriety of the entire Application, and because appellees
contend that the entire Application should be denied, we
consider the fees and expenses billed by Dyer's counsel in
our analysis.
2. The total award comprised $246,741.58 in attorney fees
and $37,209 in costs.
-4- 4
Kutak Rock as lead counsel in the wiretap case because Kutak
Rock already represented them in the underlying Bowers
lawsuit. This adjustment resulted in a reduction of
approximately $159,000.
(2) The court found that appellants had overstaffed
the case, stating that it had "found numerous occasions when
Plaintiffs' counsel duplicated efforts" and offering as an
example bills from three lawyers for time spent in preparing
for and attending Poulos's deposition. The court found that
such duplicative billing reflected bad faith and subtracted
an additional $100,000 to correct for overstaffing and as a
penalty for appellants' bad faith request.
(3) On its own, the court calculated reasonable
travel expenses from Washington, D.C., to Bangor, Maine, and
cut $8,524 from appellants' request. It also declined to
allow reimbursement for meal expenses altogether ($1,245),
and, citing the inherent cost of coordinating work between
law firms, allowed just $11,000 of $34,088 in requested
photocopy charges and $6,000 of $16,312 in requested postage,
telephone and fax charges. These cuts reduced appellants'
requested expense award by a total of $43,169.
(4) Noting that appellants had agreed not to seek
reimbursement for attorney travel time and computer research
charges, the court subtracted $13,575 from the requested
total.
-5- 5
(5) Finally, apparently to correct for what it
called a "misallocation of resources," the court stated that
it would divide the tasks performed by appellants' lawyers
into three categories and, in accordance with the relative
expertise demanded by each task, allow compensation for those
services at 50%, 75% or 100% of each lawyer's local rate.3
Stating that it had "determined to the extent possible based
on the information made available by counsel, how many hours
fall within each category for each lawyer," the court
subtracted an additional $115,000 from the requested fee.
Appellants argue that the method the district court
used to arrive at a reasonable fee was not in accordance with
applicable law and that the court provided insufficient
explanations for the cuts that it made. Appellees maintain
that, because the district court found, inter alia, that the _____ ____
fee request was "unreasonable on its face and grossly
inflated" and at least in part reflected bad faith, it
therefore had no discretion to do anything but deny the fee
request in its entirety.
____________________
3. Services compensated at 50% included: "conferences with
co-counsel and opponents; proofreading and copyreading;
notification and preparation for depositions; review of
documents; telephone conversations."
Services compensated at 75% included: "general
research; taking and attendance at depositions; letter
drafting; drafting and reading of memoranda; preparation for
hearings and court conferences; discovery activity."
Services compensated at 100% included: "court
appearances, in-chambers conferences, and the preparation and
drafting of motions and briefs."
-6- 6
II. II. ___
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________
A. Standard of Review ______________________
We review a district court's fee award for mistake
of law or abuse of discretion. Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d _______ ______
934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992). A district court's discretion in
calculating a reasonable fee is particularly broad; this
tribunal "lacks the means to replicate the trial court's
first-hand knowledge of the litigation and its nuances."
Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). _____ ______________
Our review, however, is not without bite. We
require that the trial court "make concrete findings [and]
supply a `clear explanation of its reasons for the fee
award.'" United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 ______________ __________________________
F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (omitting internal citation and
quoting Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 950 (1st ___________________ ______
Cir. 1984)). While these demands should not be so great as
to cause a district court to "drown in a rising tide of fee-
generated minutiae," id., we do expect a court making ___
substantial reductions in a prevailing party's fee request
"to spell out the whys and wherefores." Brewster v. Dukakis, ________ _______
3 F.3d 488, 493 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Metropolitan Dist. __________________
Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 18). Otherwise, judicial review is next ______
to impossible.
-7- 7
Even when we cannot affirm an attorney fees award,
however, we need not always remand for more detailed
findings. "A request for attorney's fees should not result
in a second major litigation." Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d ______ _______
559, 562 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 _______ _________
U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). When the record provides us with
ample resources, then, "much as we dislike the task that has
been put upon us," id., we may set forth our own findings and ___
amend the award accordingly. We have done so in the past,
see, e.g., id.; Rogers v. Okin, 821 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. ___ ____ ___ ______ ____
1987); Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1986); ____ _______
Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 951, and we do so here. _____________
B. The District Court's Methodology ____________________________________
Appellants argue that the district court erred in
its failure to use the lodestar framework to determine a
reasonable fee. Where the applicable statutory scheme
prescribes no alternative method, "we have customarily found
it best to calculate fees by means of the [lodestar] time-
and-rate-method . . . ." Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 ___________________________ ___
Acres of Land, 32 F.3d 632, 634 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting ______________
Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 526 (1st __________ ______________________
Cir. 1991) (alterations in Tennesee Gas)). A court employing ____________
this method multiplies the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate to
arrive at the lodestar figure. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; _______
-8- 8
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 15. To determine a __________________________
reasonable number of hours, a court may begin with the number
of hours actually spent and then subtract "hours which were ________
duplicative, unproductive, excessive, or otherwise
unnecessary." Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 15. __________________________
(quoting Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 950). This is, in fact, _____________
essentially what the district court did. It began with the
total number of hours appellants' attorneys spent on the
litigation, and made deductions for duplicative, excessive
and unnecessary billing. While it performed this exercise in
an unorthodox manner -- deducting lump sums, rather than
hours -- this was in large part undoubtedly necessitated by
appellants' failure to specify the amount of time spent on
each task billed and to summarize the hours spent by each
attorney on different parts of the litigation. In any event,
we have never required that district judges "march in
lockstep, following an unyielding, essentially wooden
approach in all fee award cases." Id. In fact, we "have ___
left reasonably open the question of precisely how the judge
ascertains the number of hours reasonably expended."
Tennessee Gas, 32 F.3d at 634 (quoting Metropolitan Dist. ______________ __________________
Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 15.). While we take issue with some ______
aspects of the manner in which the district court implemented
its methodology, we find no error in its choice of
methodology per se.
-9- 9
C. Use of Local Rates ______________________
Appellants maintain that, in order to obtain
meaningful relief from appellees' illegal wiretapping,
exigent circumstances left them with no choice but to assign
the lion's share of the wiretap litigation to its Washington,
D.C., counsel, Kutak Rock. Appellants' local firm in the
Bowers litigation, Berman & Simmons, refused to sue Poulos,
appellants claim, forcing them to begin an expensive search
for new local counsel. After interviewing thirty lawyers,
appellants finally found a Maine lawyer -- John Whitman, of
Richardson & Troubh -- willing to take the case, but whose
involvement in other litigation prevented him from ever
taking over the primary role in the Williams lawsuit. Thus,
appellants claim, because they were unable to find suitable
local counsel, their decision to use Kutak Rock was entirely
reasonable, and the district court erred in limiting
reimbursement for Kutak Rock's services to prevailing Maine
rates.
In general, "the proper rate to apply to the work
of out-of-town counsel is that of the forum community, rather
than that which the attorney charges in the community in
which she practices." 2 Mary Frances Derfner & Arthur D.
Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees 16.03[8] (1994); see ___________________________ ___
Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983) ("The _______ _____
reasonable hourly rate is usually stated to be `that
-10- 10
prevailing in the community for similar work.'" (quoting
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en ________ ________
banc))). Nevertheless, out-of-town rates may be applied if
the complexities of a particular case require the particular _______
expertise of non-local counsel, Maceira, 698 F.2d at 40, or _______ __
"when the case is an undesirable one which capable attorneys
within the forum community are not willing to prosecute or
defend," 2 Derfner & Wolf 16.03[8] (1994) (citing cases).
While the district court, in its sound discretion,
might have found that appellants' lawsuit against Poulos was
one that no capable attorney in Maine was willing to
prosecute, it did not do so. Instead, it found that
appellants were using Kutak Rock in the Williams suit because
it already represented them in the underlying Bowers
litigation. The same district judge presided over both
lawsuits, and his familiarity with the litigants and their
counsel, and with the willingness of the local bar to sue one
another, far exceeds ours. This was not a ruling on summary
judgment; nothing required the district judge to take
appellants' self-serving explanations as true. Apparently,
he believed that appellants' difficulty in finding suitable
local counsel was far less a factor motivating their
retention of Kutak Rock than was Kutak Rock's familiarity
with the case and its client: this is both an entirely
logical conclusion and a finding supportable on the record,
-11- 11
given that two local law firms did in fact join the fight ___
against Poulos and the other appellees. Therefore, we do not
fault the district court's decision to use prevailing local
rates in determining a reasonable fee.
That said, the district court's calculation of a
reasonable local hourly rate contains a mathematical error of
some consequence.4 To arrive at this rate, the district
court divided what it thought was the total requested fee of
Kutak Rock -- $569,775.24 -- by the total number of hours
Kutak Rock billed -- 2,867 -- to arrive at a weighted average ________
billing rate for all Kutak Rock employees of $198.11. The
actual average billing rate of all Kutak Rock employees ______
(i.e., the sum of their hourly rates divided by the number of
employees who billed) was $131.82. The court noted that the
weighted average was approximately 50% greater than the
actual average, reflecting that higher-paid lawyers billed
the bulk of the hours. It then assigned a local hourly rate
to each Kutak Rock employee (roughly equivalent to the rates
commanded by the two local firms on the application),
computed their average -- $95.45 -- and increased this figure
by 50% to arrive at a weighted local average of $143.10.
Finally, it multiplied this latter figure by 2,867 hours to
____________________
4. To their credit, appellants directed our attention to
this error, even though correcting it results in a lower
local hourly rate.
-12- 12
arrive at an adjusted local fee request for Kutak Rock of
$410,267.70.
In fact, the $569,775.24 figure with which the
district court began included $68,014 in expenses and did not
reflect the adjustments appellants made in their amended
Application. Kutak Rock's portion of the adjusted attorney
fee request was actually $491,749, and its total adjusted
hours were 2,818. Using these figures, and employing the
district court's methodology, the adjusted local fee request
for Kutak Rock is $356,054.5
D. Reductions for Duplicative Billing and Misallocation of _____________________________________________________________
Resources _________
In deducting $100,000 to compensate for duplicative
billing and to penalize appellants for bad faith in
requesting such compensation, the district court stated that
it had "found numerous occasions when Plaintiffs' counsel
duplicated efforts." It provided only one example: bills by
three lawyers for time spent in preparing for and attending
Poulos's deposition.6 Appellants argue that, because Poulos
____________________
5. We arrived at this result as follows:
1) $491,749 2,818 = $174.50
(weighted average rate)
2) $95.45 x ($174.50/$131.82) =
$126.35
3) $126.35 x 2,818 =
$356,054.30
6. In fact, the Application includes billing entries from
five lawyers who attended at least part of Poulos's ____
deposition: two from Kutak Rock, one from Richardson &
-13- 13
was the most important deponent in the case, their deployment
of lawyers in the taking of his deposition was entirely
reasonable, and, moreover, that this single example cannot
possibly sustain a finding of bad faith and a deduction of
$100,000.
Assuming for the moment that sending three lawyers
to a deposition constitutes overstaffing, we agree with
appellants that this single example, along with the district
court's reference to other, unspecified "numerous occasions"
of similar overstaffing, do not constitute a sufficient basis
for a finding of bad faith and a combined penalty and
deduction of $100,000. Our own scrutiny of the fee
application, however, persuades us that the district court's
concerns were not entirely unjustified. In addition to the
Poulos deposition, for example, two, three or four attorneys
attended depositions on May 27-29 and June 11-12, 1992. Four
attorneys -- two partners from Kutak Rock, one from
Richardson & Troubh and one from Murray, Plumb & Murray --
billed time for attendance at the preliminary injunction
hearing on June 29, 1992. Four lawyers attended -- and, we
assume, participated in -- the trial.
We do not mean to underestimate the importance of
key depositions or hearings in the course of litigation, or
the possible value of employing more than one lawyer at
____________________
Troubh, and two from Murray, Plumb & Murray.
-14- 14
trial. Nor do we question the appellants' contention that
this was particularly hard-fought litigation, with appellees
raising many time-consuming, frivolous arguments. This was
not, however, complex antitrust litigation between two
Fortune 500 companies. And, in assessing the reasonableness
of a fee request, a court should "ordinarily greet a claim
that several lawyers were required to perform a single set of
tasks with healthy skepticism." Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d _______ ______
934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992). Appellants' arguments that the
demands of this case were so great as to warrant extensive
work by four partners, and occasional work by additional
partners and associates, from three different law firms --
and that this strike force of lawyers always divided tasks
efficiently -- apparently did not persuade the district
court. Thus, giving due deference to the district court's
general sense that the case was overstaffed, and having
scrutinized the fee request ourselves and concluded -- as
indicated by the above examples -- that there was at least
some duplication of effort, we will modify this portion of
the district court's order and deduct $40,000 for
overstaffing.
The district court's decision to deduct $115,000
for misallocating resources suffers from a similar lack of
specific examples as well as an analytical flaw. The
principle that legal work demanding differing levels of skill
-15- 15
and expertise may be compensated differently is firmly
established. See, e.g., Jacobs 825 F.2d at 561 n.3 ("Within ___ ____ ______
reason, the court may establish . . . multiple hourly rates
to reflect differences in the types of services performed for
the client."). Here, however, the district court appears to
have deducted twice for this differential. First, in _____
calculating the overall fee for Kutak Rock's work, the
district court calculated the weighted average of all of ___
Kutak Rock's attorneys at $143.10 per hour, which we have
corrected to $126.35. This calculation, however, already
accounts for the fact that some work was performed by
associates and paralegals. Work that was actually and
appropriately performed by these lower-paid employees --
i.e., work that falls into the district court's lower-
compensated categories -- should not then be subject to a
further deduction of 25% or 50% of their billing rates. Yet, _____
the district court stated that it arrived at its $115,000
deduction after "determin[ing] to the extent possible based
on the information made available by counsel, how many hours
fall within each category for each lawyer" and "then ____
reduc[ing] that lawyer's local rate according to the
[tripartite] framework." (emphasis added). This was
analytically incorrect.
As was the case with the deduction for duplicative
billing, however, we think the district court's instincts
-16- 16
were correct. Of the 3,734 hours billed, partners' time
accounted for approximately 80% of that total. This would at
least place a court on notice that close scrutiny of resource
deployment was necessary. The manner in which the bills were
presented, however, made such scrutiny virtually impossible.
An entry for a lawyer's work on any given day typically
includes several different tasks, but only a single figure
reflecting the total number of hours spent on the case that
day.7 Thus, the bills provide no indication of how much
time was spent on each task, making it extremely difficult to
determine if the lawyers' time was allocated efficiently.
Appellants' plaints that, had the district court
asked for further explanations, they could have supplied
them, are unavailing. We have stated previously that "[i]n
order for litigants to receive fee awards . . . they [must]
submit `a full and specific accounting of the tasks
performed, the dates of performance, and the number of hours
____________________
7. As an example, we cite the billing entry for Kutak Rock
partner Ronald Massumi for March 15, 1993, totalling 6.25
hours at a cost of $1,093.75:
Conference with Mr. Rugg regarding
appellate procedure; telephone conference
with Mr. Murray's office; correspondence
to Mr. Whitman; research regarding
injunctions pending appeal, federal rules
of civil and appellate procedure, 1st
Circuit caselaw on stays/injunctions
pending appeal, notice of appeal
procedure; draft motion for injunction
pending appeal, and memorandum in support
of motion for injunction pending appeal.
-17- 17
spent on each task.'" Tennessee Gas, 32 F.3d at 634 (quoting ____ _____________
Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 527). The bills submitted do not __________
contain this level of detail. Attorneys preparing bills in
fee-shifting cases in the District of Maine have been
specifically warned to account for time spent on each task. ____________ ______
Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp. 804, 816 __________ _______________________
n.21 (D. Me. 1992) (determining appropriate fee award despite
denying request on other grounds and stating that "[i]n
future, the Court admonishes counsel to separate different
activities by the discrete amount of time devoted to each
activity"), aff'd sub nom, BTZ, Inc. v. Great N. Nekoosa _____ ___ ___ __________ _________________
Corp., 47 F.3d 463 (1st Cir. 1995). _____
It has long been the law of this Court that "the
absence of detailed contemporaneous time records, except in ________
extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial
reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance."
Tennessee Gas, 32 F.3d at 634 (quoting Grendel's Den, 749 ______________ ______________
F.2d at 952). Given the significant deficiencies in the
Application, and the fact that billing by partners accounted
for the vast majority of hours -- giving rise at least to a
suspicion that resources might have been misallocated, which
is unprovable because of the manner in which the bills were
prepared -- we do not think that a deduction of $115,000 is
unreasonable and we will not disturb this portion of the
district court's order.
-18- 18
E. Deductions for Excessive Expenses, Travel Time and _____________________________________________________________
Computer Time _____________
We will also leave intact the district court's
deduction of about half of appellants' requested expenses.
The district court's explanations for these cuts were
satisfactorily clear and reasonable.
The district court did, however, incorrectly deduct
$6,975 in travel time charges and $6,600 in computer research
costs. Appellants' requested total of $715,202.12 already
reflected the removal of these costs, so they should not have
been deducted a second time. We will therefore add back
$13,575 to the award to correct for this error.
F. Appellees' Cross-Appeal ___________________________
Appellees devoted virtually all of their brief and
reply brief to arguments explaining why the district court
had no discretion to do anything but deny the fee request in
its entirety. We will devote considerably less space to this
contention. Even assuming arguendo that the district court ________
would have been within its discretion if it had denied the
request entirely because of the Application's deficiencies,
nonetheless we are extremely hesitant to instruct the court,
after it had sifted through hundreds of pages of bills and
decided to grant part of the request despite its deficiencies
and excesses, that it had no discretion to do so. In Lewis _____
v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 956 (1st Cir. 1991), we reversed a ________
-19- 19
district court award of attorney fees of approximately
$49,000 and held that the plaintiff was entitled to nothing.
In that case, however, the district judge had retired, making
remand to the trial judge impossible, id. at 954, the ___
plaintiff obtained minimal relief, and the requested fees and
costs were approximately 140 times the worth of the damages
award, id. at 956. We held in that case that counsel had ___
purposefully defied the caselaw regarding attorney fee
requests. Id. This is not such an extreme case. Appellants ___
obtained substantially all the relief that they sought and,
while opinions may differ as to what is a "reasonable" fee in
this case, we do not think that the record remotely supports
a finding of overreaching and bad faith in the Application
sufficient to justify the denial of any award at all.
Nor do we find merit in appellees' contention that
we should remand to allow them to conduct discovery and
further contest the propriety of the Application.
Appellants' award is substantially less than their original
request; discovery in this case would simply be another
example of litigious waste.
G. Recalculation _________________
We now recalculate the award in light of our
rulings. The district court awarded $283,950.58. We reduced
the adjusted amount for Kutak Rock's fees by $54,213.70. We
reduced the deduction for duplicative billing from $100,000
-20- 20
to $40,000 and reinstated $13,575 in incorrect deductions.
These adjustments result in a net increase in the total award
of $19,361.30. Thus, the total award for appellants'
reasonable attorney fees and expenses is $303,311.88.
III. III. ____
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________
For the foregoing reasons, the district court order
is
affirmed in part and modified in part. No costs. affirmed in part and modified in part. No costs. _________________________________________________
-21- 21
Jean Hart as Administratrix of the Estate of Levi Hart v. ... , 798 F.2d 519 ( 1986 )
Brewster v. Dukakis , 3 F.3d 488 ( 1993 )
Efrain MacEira v. Luis Enrique Pagan, Local 901, ... , 698 F.2d 38 ( 1983 )
Grendel's Den, Inc. v. John P. Larkin, Cambridge License ... , 749 F.2d 945 ( 1984 )
Michael J. Foley v. City of Lowell, Massachusetts, Michael ... , 948 F.2d 10 ( 1991 )
William Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. , 925 F.2d 518 ( 1991 )
Dolores J. Copeland, Individually and on Behalf of the ... , 641 F.2d 880 ( 1980 )
BTZ, Inc. v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. , 47 F.3d 463 ( 1995 )
Rubie Rogers v. Robert Okin , 821 F.2d 22 ( 1987 )
tennessee-gas-pipeline-company-v-104-acres-of-land-more-or-less-in , 32 F.3d 632 ( 1994 )
Williams v. Poulos , 11 F.3d 271 ( 1993 )
Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. , 801 F. Supp. 804 ( 1992 )