DocketNumber： 93-1496
Filed Date： 12/23/1993
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015
December 23, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1496
BEVERLY GILLIS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Lawrence P. Cohen, Magistrate Judge]
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Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
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Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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Frank J. Ciano for appellant.
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George B. Henderson, II, Assistant United States Attorney,
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with whom A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, was on
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brief for appellee.
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BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant,
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Beverly Gillis, sued the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. Summary judgment on
liability was granted to plaintiff without opposition by the
defendant-appellee, United States. After trial, a magistrate
judge found that plaintiff's damages amounted to $12,000.
Dissatisfied with that sum, plaintiff appealed. There are
two issues before us: whether the trial court's finding of
damages was erroneous; and whether the trial court erred in
allowing defendant's expert witness to testify.
I.
I.
It is beyond cavil that findings of fact by the
trial court are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard
of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City,
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470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); American Title Ins. Co. v. East
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West Fin. Corp., 959 F.2d 345, 345-46 (1st Cir. 1992);
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LoVuolo v. Gunning, 925 F.2d 22, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1991);
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Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 152
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(1st Cir. 1990).
We recapitulate the pertinent findings of the trial
court. Plaintiff was injured on May 10, 1988, when the rear
bumper of a mail truck "hooked" the front bumper of the
parked car in which she was sitting. Plaintiff testified
that she felt neck pain at the time. After driving her
brother home and picking up her daughter at school, plaintiff
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went to the hospital, was treated and discharged. Her pain
increased two or three weeks after the accident, and she was
referred to an orthopedic specialist.
In 1978 plaintiff injured her back at work. In
1984 or 1985 she fell down some stairs, injuring her back
again. In 1985 she experienced "severe" neck pain, without
any trauma, and was treated by a chiropractor.
Plaintiff offered the expert testimony of her
neurologist, Dr. Fullerton, via a videotape deposition. Dr.
Fullerton was her last treating physician. He ordered an
electromyogram (EMG) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).
Based on these procedures, Dr. Fullerton found that there was
no significant nerve defect, but that there was a slight
herniation of the C-4/C-5 disc. It was Dr. Fullerton's
opinion that the herniation and consequent pain was caused by
the accident involving the mail truck. Dr. Fullerton had not
been informed by plaintiff of the two prior accidents
involving her back or the trauma-absent neck pain she
experienced in 1986.
Defendant's expert witness was Dr. Logigian. He
had examined plaintiff, the EMG, and MRI reports, and was
advised of plaintiff's three prior injuries. It was Dr.
Logigian's opinion that plaintiff's pain was caused by the
herniated disc and the herniation was not caused by the mail
truck accident.
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The magistrate judge credited the testimony of
defendant's expert over that of plaintiff's. That, of
course, was a decision entirely within the court's
discretion.
The trial court stated:
In the circumstances, this court
cannot fairly conclude that all of
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plaintiff's medical bills, lost income,
or pain and suffering, [were] caused by
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the negligence of the government. To be
sure, as argued by counsel for plaintiff,
a "wrongdoer [is] responsible for the
harmful results of the combined effects
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of his wrongful act and a preexisting
disease or condition." McGrath v. G. &
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P. Thread Corp., 228 N.E.2d 450, 453
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(Mass. 1967). (Emphasis added). That is
a correct statement of the law so far as
it goes. But the corollaries to the rule
also [apply] - i.e., that a wrongdoer is
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not liable for damages suffered by a
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plaintiff which that plaintiff would have
suffered solely on account of the
preexisting condition, or for damages for
a worsening of that preexisting condition
which was bound to occur even if no
further injury was suffered.
(Footnotes omitted.)
The court pointed out that plaintiff did not try
her case on an "aggravation" theory, "at least [not] by or
through her expert." Our examination of the pleadings
reveals that neither the first nor the amended complaint
states or implies that the accident aggravated an underlying
injury. Count 5 of the amended complaint states:
As a result [of the accident] the
plaintiff sustained serious injury,
suffered pain of body and mind, incurred
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medical bills and has been unable to
perform her usual duties and activities.
The court held:
In short, this court finds and
concludes that, although the accident did
cause some "aggravation" of a preexisting
injury immediately after the injury, the
pain and suffering about which plaintiff
now complains, and most of the medical
bills incurred by plaintiff, was and is
the sole result of either a disc
herniation which preceded the accident in
question, or a condition which would have
occurred even in the absence of that
accident. (Footnote omitted.)
The court then awarded plaintiff $12,000 as damages.
We have fully considered all of plaintiff's
arguments and have read the record carefully. Viewing the
evidence and findings through the lens of the clearly
erroneous standard of review, we find no basis for a
challenge to the trial court's findings and holding.
II.
II.
The next issue is whether the court erred in
allowing defendant's expert to testify at the trial.
Plaintiff's argument is based on a claimed violation of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1),1 which states:
A party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement the response with respect to
any question directly addressed to (A)
the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of discoverable matters,
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1. Rule 26(e) has been changed, effective December 1, 1993,
but the change neither affects subsection (1) nor plaintiff's
argument.
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and (B) the identity of each person
expected to be called as an expert
witness at trial, the subject matter on
which the person is expected to testify,
and the substance of the person's
testimony.
Sometime prior to trial, plaintiff submitted an
interrogatory to defendant that requested the following
information: "State the names and addresses of all persons
defendant intends to call as a witness in the trial of the
within matter, and the substance of said testimony."
Appellant's Brief at 19. Two weeks prior to trial, defendant
identified Dr. Logigian as an expert expected to testify.
Plaintiff contends that this interrogatory was not answered
seasonably and therefore the testimony of defendant's expert
should have been excluded. Plaintiff so moved in the trial
court prior to the start of trial.
The question is whether the answer was made
seasonably.2 The facts are not as stark as plaintiff
suggests. The best way to explain the trial court's ruling
is to quote directly from its opinion.
On or about March 25, 1993, plaintiff
filed a motion in limine to preclude the
testimony of Dr. Logigian on the grounds
that he was not listed as a witness by
the government.
Given, however, that no pretrial order
as such, fixing witnesses, was entered by
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2. Although the interrogatories and answers thereto were not
part of the record below, we reject defendant's contention
that we, therefore, should not consider this issue.
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this court, and given, as reported in the
motion, that the plaintiff was - and had
been - in possession of Dr. Logigian's
full report in February, this court
denied that motion on March 25, 1993.
When trial began, counsel for
plaintiff was apparently unaware of this
court's action on the motion. The motion
was renewed. At that time, this court
again denied the motion, but made clear
that the court would revisit the matter
if, after direct examination, plaintiff
could establish any prejudice.
Direct examination proceeded, and Dr.
Logigian was adequately and competently
cross-examined by counsel for plaintiff.
The matter was not again brought to the
attention of this court.
App. 187A, n.5.
Immediately prior to the start of trial,
plaintiff's counsel admitted, in reply to a question by the
court, that the report furnished him contained all the
information that an answer to the interrogatory would have
disclosed. And, although arguing that disclosure of the
expert's report came too late for necessary in-depth
preparation for cross-examination, plaintiff's lawyer did not
request a continuance.
It is universally accepted that review of discovery
sanctions must be made in light of the "abuse of discretion"
standard. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
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Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976); Thibeault v. Square D Co.,
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960 F.2d 239, 243 (1st Cir. 1992); Freund v. Fleetwood
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Enters., Inc., 956 F.2d 354, 359 (1st Cir. 1992). Although
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the usual sanction is preclusion of testimony, we see no
reason not to apply an abuse of discretion standard when
evidence is admitted. And we have done so. In Smith v.
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Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 877 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir.),
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cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965 (1989), we held that the trial
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court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike an
expert's testimony. Id. at 1112. In that case, we pointed
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out:
"Courts have looked with disfavor upon
parties who claim surprise and prejudice
but who do not ask for a recess so they
may attempt to counter the opponent
testimony."
Id. at 1111 (quoting Johnson v. H.K. Webster, Inc., 775 F.2d
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1, 8 (1st Cir. 1985)). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing defendant's expert to testify.
Affirmed, costs to appellee.
Affirmed, costs to appellee.
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american-title-insurance-company-v-east-west-financial-corporation , 959 F.2d 345 ( 1992 )
Wilma Cumpiano A/K/A Wilma Cumpiano Sanchez v. Banco ... , 902 F.2d 148 ( 1990 )
Kevin Lovuolo and Antonio Musto v. John Gunning and Elaine ... , 925 F.2d 22 ( 1991 )
Charles M. Thibeault v. Square D Company , 960 F.2d 239 ( 1992 )
Daniel Freund v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. , 956 F.2d 354 ( 1992 )
National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. , 96 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1976 )
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 105 S. Ct. 1504 ( 1985 )