Decologero v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 13-1938, 13-1945, 13-1946
PAUL A. DECOLOGERO, PAUL J. DECOLOGERO, and
JOHN P. DECOLOGERO, JR.,
Petitioners, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Matthew D. Thompson, with whom Butters Brazilian LLP was on
brief, for appellant Paul A. DeCologero.
Jeanne M. Kempthorne for appellant Paul J. DeCologero.
Mark W. Shea, with whom Jean C. LaRocque and Shea and
LaRocque, LLP were on brief, for appellant John P. DeCologero, Jr.
Jennifer Hays Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
September 21, 2015
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellants Paul A. DeCologero
("Paul A."), Paul J. DeCologero ("Paul J."), and John P.
DeCologero, Jr. ("John Jr.") were members of a Boston-based
criminal organization known as the "DeCologero crew." In 2006,
all three were convicted of violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and a number of related
crimes. Appellants have now moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate
their convictions. Their motions are based on two Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI") reports that they claim are exculpatory
evidence that the prosecution should have produced before trial
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court
denied the motions, finding that the prosecution team was not aware
of the reports prior to the trial and that the reports were not
material for Brady purposes. We only address the materiality issue
and affirm on that basis.
I.
We recite the pertinent facts in the light most favorable
to the verdicts. Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 20 (1st
Cir. 2011). The facts are described in greater detail in our
opinion on the direct appeals. See United States v. DeCologero,
530 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2008) ("DeCologero I").
In the 1990s, Paul A. ran the "DeCologero crew" criminal
enterprise out of a gym he operated in Woburn, Massachusetts. His
nephews Paul J. and John Jr., and other associates, assisted Paul
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A. in his efforts to control part of Boston's drug trade. The
crew traded in guns and drugs, and used force to compete with rival
criminal factions.
A. The Silva Murder
In 1996, members of the crew, acting on orders from Paul
A., murdered a 19-year-old woman named Aislin Silva, because Paul
A. was afraid that she would betray the crew to the police. The
testimony at trial regarding Silva's killing came primarily from
Stephen DiCenso, a former member of the DeCologero crew who was
closely involved in the murder. According to DiCenso, in November
1996, the police found a stash of guns that the DeCologero crew
had hidden in Silva's apartment. Paul A. decided to kill Silva
because he was afraid that she would implicate him and his
associates if the police interrogated her about the guns.
Initially, Paul A. planned to get Silva to overdose on
heroin, and he instructed Paul J. to acquire some high-grade heroin
for that purpose. DiCenso and another DeCologero crew member,
Kevin Meuse, then gave Silva the heroin and told her that it was
good cocaine. She took the heroin but did not overdose. When
that plan failed, Paul A. ordered Meuse to kill Silva by force.
DiCenso testified that Meuse brought Silva to DiCenso's father's
apartment and killed her by breaking her neck. DiCenso and Derek
Capozzi, another DeCologero crew member, subsequently arrived at
the apartment to help Meuse dispose of the body. The three of
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them dismembered her body in a bathtub, stuffed her body parts
into plastic garbage bags and gym bags, and then drove to Home
Depot to purchase a shovel and other items to assist with Silva's
burial. Then, they drove to a wooded-area on the North Shore of
Massachusetts and buried her remains there. They disposed of the
garbage bags and gym bags in a dumpster in Danvers, Massachusetts.
DiCenso's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of
two other former members of the DeCologero crew, John P. DeCologero
("John P.") and Thomas Regan. As a crew member, Regan took orders
from Paul A. and robbed a number of Boston-area drug dealers with
other associates. John P. was the brother of crew leader Paul A.
and father of Paul J. and John Jr. John P. testified that he had
heard Paul A. say that the heroin intended to kill Silva did not
work. He also testified that John Jr. told him that Meuse had
killed Silva and that DiCenso and Capozzi had helped Meuse dispose
of her body. Regan testified that Paul A. told him that Meuse and
DiCenso had killed Silva and cut up her body.
DiCenso's testimony was also corroborated by physical
evidence, including the bloody trash bags and gym bags found in
the dumpster in Danvers. DNA from the blood, hair, and tissue on
the bags belonged to Silva. A security video from Home Depot
showed Capozzi and Meuse leaving the store with a shovel and other
items; a receipt from the Home Depot included the purchase of a
shovel, gloves, and flashlights. Packaging for the flashlights
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and gloves was found in the Danvers dumpster. Meuse's fingerprint
was also found on an item in the dumpster.
At trial, appellants attempted to argue, with little
success, that another Boston-based criminal organization led by
Vincent Marino, also known as Gigi Portalla, was responsible for
Silva's murder. First, appellants contended that DiCenso was
actually a member of Portalla's crew, not the DeCologero crew,
because DiCenso had allegedly told a government informant that he
worked for Portalla. However, on cross-examination, DiCenso
denied that he made the statement and said that he had not worked
for Portalla. Second, Portalla was seen at Silva's apartment a
few weeks before her murder. However, the evidence demonstrated
that Portalla was there with Paul A. to inspect the guns stored at
the apartment to see if he wanted to purchase any guns from the
DeCologero crew's stash. Finally, appellants argued that Regan
was lying because he was not a member of the DeCologero crew, but
in fact was a member of the rival Salemme faction.
Appellants' case was hurt by their failure to get
Portalla and his associates to testify at trial. Paul A.'s initial
witness list included Portalla and Portalla's crew members Charles
McConnell and Robert Nogueira. However, Nogueira had died years
earlier, and McConnell was never subpoenaed. Portalla was
subpoenaed during trial, but he was in federal custody at the time,
and could not be transferred quickly enough to testify. Paul A.
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appealed the district court's refusal to expedite Portalla's
transport from a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania or to provide
a continuance until Portalla had arrived. We affirmed the district
court's decision, faulting Paul A. for waiting until the middle of
trial to make his request and stating that Portalla's proffered
testimony was "tangential and potentially cumulative." DeCologero
I, 530 F.3d at 75.
For his part in ordering Silva's death, Paul A. was
convicted of witness tampering conspiracy, witness tampering by
misleading conduct, witness tampering by attempting to kill, and
witness tampering by killing. Several predicate acts underlying
his substantive RICO conviction also stemmed from his role in
Silva's death. Paul J. was convicted of witness tampering
conspiracy, witness tampering by misleading conduct, and witness
tampering by attempting to kill; the latter two crimes were also
predicate acts for his RICO conviction. John Jr. was not charged
with any offenses relating to the Silva killing. All three were
also convicted of other crimes not directly relevant to this
appeal. Paul A. received a life sentence, Paul J. was sentenced
to 25 years, and John Jr. was sentenced to 210 months. On direct
appeal, we affirmed their convictions and sentences. See id. at
79.
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B. The FBI Reports
In September 2010, more than four years after
appellants' convictions, Paul J.'s former attorney received a fax
containing two FBI reports describing interviews with a woman named
Michelle Noe (the "Noe reports"). According to the reports, the
interviews with Noe took place in the fall of 1999, about two years
before appellants were indicted by a federal grand jury1 and three
years after Silva was killed. The first report is three pages and
describes two interviews that Noe had with Lt. Eugene A. Kee Jr.
of the Massachusetts State Police and Detectives Thomas J. Romeo
and Michael P. Murphy of the North Reading Police soon after she
was arrested on an outstanding warrant for an unarmed bank robbery
on September 10, 1999. Noe reported that, in mid-November 1996,
McConnell -- her then-boyfriend -- came home in a panic with his
clothes and arms covered in blood. After washing the blood off
his arms, McConnell put the bloody clothes in a green garbage bag,
and left the house. About 30 minutes later, Noe looked outside
the window and saw McConnell talking to Portalla on the sidewalk.
When McConnell returned to the house, he initially told Noe that
Portalla would kill her if he told her what had happened.
Eventually, McConnell said, "I did something, I can't believe I
did. She was your age. I'm not going into details. Remember the
1
Appellants, and several co-defendants, were indicted as part
of a 23-count indictment on October 17, 2001.
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girl I used to take you by the house with [Portalla]. She worked
at MVP. We did something to her, she ratted." McConnell stated
that Portalla and Nogueira were with him at the time, and if the
police talk to Noe, she should say that McConnell was with her the
entire evening. Although the report does not identify Silva by
name, the parties do not dispute that Noe was referring to Silva
as the girl who "worked at MVP," a sporting goods store.
Later (Noe was not sure of the time frame), when the
news reported that human remains were found in a dumpster,
McConnell told Noe, "They’re going to put the puzzle together. I
had to get rid of the knife in salt water." Noe also stated in
the interview that she had visited Silva's apartment in Medford,
Massachusetts with McConnell and Portalla at least ten times over
several months, and had seen Nogueira at the apartment at least
twice. Noe added that McConnell had told her that Silva would
purchase cocaine from Portalla and that Silva had been storing
guns for Portalla in exchange for cocaine.
Only one page of the second FBI report is in the record.
It describes an October 7, 1999 interview of Noe with Lt. Kee,
along with Lt. Vincent Martin and FBI Special Agent Charles
Gianturco. Noe reported that in mid-November 1996, McConnell and
Portalla came to her apartment and tortured her by drugging her
and burning her back. The one page of the report does not explain
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why they tortured her, or whether this event was related to the
Silva killing.
C. The § 2255 Motions
In 2011, all three appellants filed § 2255 motions,
arguing that the government violated their Fifth Amendment due
process rights under Brady by failing to disclose the two Noe
reports before trial. The motions were handled by the same
district court judge who presided over appellants' trial in 2006.
She denied appellants' § 2255 motions without holding an
evidentiary hearing. See United States v. DeCologero, No. 01-
10373-RWZ, 2013 WL 3728409, at *10 (D. Mass. July 11, 2013)
("DeCologero II"). The court provided two independent reasons for
its decision. First, it held that appellants "have not shown any
Brady violation" because they "have not shown that the prosecution
team or any of its agents knew of the [Noe] exculpatory reports"
before trial. Id. at *5. Second, the court held that, even if
the prosecution team had been aware of the Noe reports, "the
reports were not material for Brady purposes" because they "do not
raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome on the counts
related to the Silva killing [or] on unrelated counts." Id. at
*6-*7. The district court granted a certificate of appealability
"as to petitioners' Brady claims based on the FBI reports," id. at
*10, and appellants timely filed this appeal.
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II.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by
denying their § 2255 motions without holding an evidentiary
hearing. They challenge the court's findings that (1) the
prosecution team was not aware of the Noe reports, and (2) the
reports were not material under Brady. We only address the
materiality issue and do not consider whether the district court
erred with regard to the government's knowledge of the Noe reports.
Appellants make two arguments on materiality. First,
they contend that the district court should have granted their
§ 2255 motions and vacated their convictions based solely on the
disclosure of the two Noe reports. Second, in the alternative,
they contend that the district court erred by deciding the
materiality issue without holding an evidentiary hearing. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Materiality
We ordinarily review the district court's dismissal of
a Brady claim raised in a § 2255 motion de novo. See Moreno–
Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 2003).
However, "[t]he materiality question under Brady . . . is a mixed
question of law and fact." Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183,
188 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Ouimette v. Moran, 942 F.2d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 1991)). For this reason, we accord some deference to
the district court's resolution of the materiality issue. See
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Conley, 415 F.3d at 188 n.3 ("Some deference to the district
court's resolution of fact-dominated questions in the Brady
context is . . . due, even on collateral review."); United States
v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 618 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Due to its
'inherently fact-bound nature,' the district court's determination
on the materiality of newly discovered evidence in prosecutorial
nondisclosure cases is ordinarily accorded deference." (quoting
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring))). Deference is particularly warranted where, as
here, the district court judge reviewing the § 2255 motions was
the same judge who presided over the trial. Cf. United States v.
Paladin, 748 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting, in an appeal
of the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a Brady claim,
that "[t]he trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses at
first hand, has a special sense of the ebb and flow of the recently
concluded trial. Thus, [her] views about the likely impact of
newly disclosed evidence deserve considerable deference."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Under Brady, "[a] defendant's right to due process is
violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence that is both
favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or
innocence." Moreno-Morales, 334 F.3d at 145 (citing Brady, 373
U.S. at 87). To demonstrate that exculpatory evidence is material,
appellants must show "a reasonable probability that, had the
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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 433 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682) (Souter, J.). A
"reasonable probability" is one that "undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. We must consider
the favorable, undisclosed evidence along with the evidence
presented at trial, and determine whether it "could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see
also id. at 434 ("The question is not whether the defendant would
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence."). Withheld information is material under Brady only
if it would have been admissible at trial or would have led to
admissible evidence. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2003).
Because the Noe reports are relevant in different ways
to each appellant, we first analyze the materiality question
separately for each of them, and then address the arguments that
are applicable to all three.
1. Paul A.
The jury convicted Paul A. for his part in overseeing
and directing the conspiracy to kill Silva. He contends that the
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Noe reports are material because they contradict the government's
theory of the case that the DeCologero crew killed Silva. Instead,
the reports support Paul A.'s theory that Portalla stored the guns
at Silva's house and his crew (including McConnell and Nogueira)
murdered Silva. Paul A. further argues that, if he had been aware
of the reports before trial, he would have called Noe to testify
at trial, and her testimony would have corroborated his version of
Silva's murder.
The government counters that the Noe reports themselves
are inadmissible hearsay and appellants have failed to demonstrate
how their disclosure would have led to material admissible
evidence. Therefore, the government argues, and the district court
found, that "given the overwhelming weight of the trial evidence,
the FBI reports do not raise a reasonable probability of a
different outcome." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at *6.
At trial, multiple witnesses testified that Paul A. led
the DeCologero crew, that he stored guns at Silva's apartment,
that he instructed his crew members to kill Silva because she could
not be trusted if interrogated by the police, and that his crew
members DiCenso, Capozzi, and Meuse killed Silva and disposed of
her body. The witnesses who implicated Paul A. in Silva's murder
included DiCenso, John P. (Paul A.'s brother), and Regan.
Furthermore, as the district court stated, "the witnesses'
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testimony was consistent and corroborated by the physical evidence
discovered by police." Id.Paul A. counters that much of the witness testimony
cannot be trusted because it was solicited from former members of
the DeCologero crew, many of whom were testifying pursuant to
cooperation agreements with the government. Furthermore, Paul A.
argues that none of the physical evidence at trial directly
implicated him in the murder. The physical evidence consisted of
bloody bags containing Silva's DNA in a dumpster in Danvers, a
security video and Home Depot receipt showing that Capozzi and
Meuse had purchased items to assist in disposing of Silva's body,
and Meuse's fingerprint on an item in the Danvers dumpster. While
none of this evidence directly connects Paul A. to the crime, it
does provide support for DiCenso's testimony that Meuse had killed
Silva and that DiCenso and Capozzi had helped Meuse dispose of her
body. Notably, no physical evidence supports the theory of the
crime found in the Noe reports that Portalla, McConnell, and
Nogueira were responsible for Silva's murder.
Paul A. responds that even if DiCenso and Meuse were
involved in Silva's murder, evidence supports his theory that they
were actually members of Portalla's crew and were ordered by
Portalla, not Paul A., to kill Silva. Regarding DiCenso, in a
discovery letter before trial, the government disclosed to
appellants' counsel that DiCenso had told a confidential informant
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that he worked for Portalla and would collect money and distribute
cocaine and heroin for him. Regarding Meuse, his cell phone
records demonstrated that Meuse had made multiple phone calls to
Portalla and his girlfriend around the time of Silva's murder in
November 1996. According to Paul A., "[t]hese phone calls provided
a strong connection between Portalla and Meuse right around the
time of Silva's murder." Paul A. Br. at 41-42.
While DiCenso denied at trial that he had worked for
Portalla, Paul A. further argues that DiCenso's testimony should
not be trusted. He notes that we have previously acknowledged the
"strong incentive" DiCenso had "to testify in support of the
government's theory of the case." United States v. Capozzi, 486
F.3d 711, 724 (1st Cir. 2007). In Capozzi's direct appeal, we
stated:
DiCenso had pled guilty to a crime punishable
by life imprisonment, and . . . DiCenso's
cooperation allowed him to be sentenced to a
much lower sentence. DiCenso was shown [at
trial] to have had a powerful motive --
avoidance of a life sentence and possibly of
prison altogether -- to cooperate with the
government and to testify falsely if
necessary.
Id.Despite DiCenso's incentive to lie, his testimony that
Paul A., and not Portalla, ordered Silva's killing was corroborated
by a considerable amount of more reliable evidence. For example,
numerous witnesses identified both DiCenso and Meuse as members of
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the DeCologero crew, and both men were implicated in a variety of
illegal activities tied to Paul A.'s criminal enterprise,
including the robberies of drug dealers Albert Sapochetti, Michael
"Slim" Stevens, and Jeff North. Although Paul A. presents a
modicum of evidence that DiCenso and Meuse might have worked for
Portalla, he fails to account for Capozzi, who, according to the
physical evidence, also had a direct role in Silva's killing and
was identified as a member of the DeCologero crew. Furthermore,
a law enforcement officer involved in the investigation into
Silva's death expressly disavowed any link between Portalla and
the killing, stating that, besides the one occasion where Portalla
was seen with Paul A. at Silva's apartment, he "really didn't have
any connection between Portalla and Miss Silva."
In addition to DiCenso, Regan and John P. also implicated
Paul A. in Silva's murder. Regan testified that, after law
enforcement had discovered the weapons at Silva's apartment, Paul
A. stated in a meeting with DeCologero crew members that "[w]e got
to get the girl away from the law." John P. testified that, around
the same time, Paul A. told him that he was debating whether to
"get rid of [Silva]" because the police were at her apartment.
Moreover, after Silva was murdered, Paul A. told Regan that Meuse
and DiCenso had "killed the girl and chopped her up." Paul A.
told John P. that "she had to go. Kevin Meuse knew what time it
was. He did what he had to do."
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In contrast to the physical evidence tying DiCenso,
Meuse, and Capozzi to Silva's murder and multiple witnesses
testifying that Paul A. ordered the killing, the evidence
supporting Paul A.'s alternative explanation for Silva's death
found in the Noe reports consists of little more than hearsay and
rumors. As the district court stated, the Noe reports "represent
a hearsay account by a single witness." DeCologero II, 2013 WL
3728409, at *6. In addition to DiCenso's alleged hearsay statement
to a confidential informant that he worked for Portalla and Meuse's
multiple calls to Portalla, the total sum of evidence supporting
the theory that Portalla ordered Silva killed includes "some early
news reports indicating that Portalla and his crew were suspects
in the Silva murder," id., testimony that Portalla had been seen
at Silva's apartment, and another hearsay report that a
confidential informant told an inspector with the Stoneham Police
Department that "s/he heard that the girl from Medford that is
missing was holding guns for 'Portella.'"
Because the Noe reports themselves are hearsay, they
would not have been admissible at trial for the truth of the
matters asserted, and "by definition [are] not material, because
[they] never would have reached the jury and therefore could not
have affected the trial outcome." United States v. Ranney, 719
F.2d 1183, 1190 (1st Cir. 1983). Thus, Paul A. has the burden of
demonstrating how the disclosure of the reports would have led to
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admissible material exculpatory evidence. Paul A. argues that the
reports would have prompted him to call Noe to testify at trial,
and her testimony would have verified the allegations made in the
Noe reports. However, Paul A. has not submitted any evidence to
support this argument. For example, he has not provided an
affidavit from Noe or any other evidence that Noe would have been
available at trial and, furthermore, that she would have testified
in accordance with the reports. See DeCologero II, 2013 WL
3728409, at *7 (noting that Paul A. has "made no showing that Noe
would have testified in accordance with [the Noe] reports if she
had appeared at trial."). In fact, he makes no representation
that, after the disclosure of the Noe reports, he made any attempt
to contact or locate Noe, nor does he contend that Noe would have
refused to cooperate with him if he indeed had contacted her.
It is also unclear exactly what Noe would have been able
to say if she had been called to testify at trial as much of the
Noe reports consists of her recounting McConnell's incriminating
statements, which would be hearsay. Paul A. argues that "[a]
defendant has the right to present evidence of a third party
culprit, including calling witnesses that would testify to out-
of-court admissions of the third party." Paul A. Br. at 39.
On the one hand, we agree that Noe would have been able
to testify to relevant information within her personal knowledge
that would challenge the government's theory that the DeCologero
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crew killed Silva, such as seeing McConnell come home with his
clothes and arms covered with blood in mid-November 1996, observing
McConnell and Portalla talking outside of her house that same day,
and visiting Silva's apartment with McConnell and Portalla at least
ten times. See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 328
(2006) (recognizing a defendant's right to introduce evidence of
third-party guilt).
On the other hand, Paul A. has failed to demonstrate how
Noe could have testified to McConnell's statements themselves.2
While McConnell's statements would likely qualify as statements
against penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3)(B), the declarant must "be unavailable as a witness" for
that hearsay exception to apply. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Paul A.
has made no showing that McConnell would have been unavailable at
trial. In fact, none of the appellants argue that they would have
called McConnell as a witness at trial, or that, if he had
testified and denied killing Silva, they would have impeached
2 Paul A.'s reliance on Mendez v. Artuz, 303 F.3d 411 (2d Cir.
2002), is misplaced. In Mendez, the Second Circuit never addressed
the admissibility of hearsay statements of a third-party culprit.
The court affirmed the district court's decision granting habeas
on Brady grounds because the government had suppressed evidence of
a third-party culprit. The court did not address the admissibility
of that evidence but simply stated that "the suppressed information
would have allowed [the defendant] to challenge the state's motive
theory . . . either through cross-examination or the presentation
of contradictory testimony [which] . . . would have allowed the
defendant to create reasonable doubt that he was the shooter."
Id. at 414.
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McConnell by introducing his statements in the Noe reports as prior
inconsistent statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 613.3
Paul A. asks us to vacate his conviction based solely on
the disclosure of two hearsay reports. Given the strength of the
trial evidence against him, the inadmissibility of the Noe reports
themselves, the failure to demonstrate that the reports would have
led to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence, and
according "[s]ome deference" to the district court's fact-
intensive analysis, Conley, 415 F.3d at 188 n.3, Paul A. has not
"establish[ed] a reasonable probability of a different result" at
trial. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 291 (1999).
2. Paul J.
Paul J.'s materiality claim is weaker than Paul A.'s.
Unlike Paul A., Paul J. was not convicted of playing a role in
Silva's murder itself. Instead, his witness tampering convictions
stem from his role in the failed attempt to kill Silva by
overdosing her with heroin. While the Noe reports provide an
alternative explanation for how Silva was actually killed, the
reports do not directly contradict the evidence that Paul J. was
ordered by Paul A. to buy the heroin needed to kill Silva, that
3Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) permits "[e]xtrinsic
evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement . . . if the
witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement
and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness
about it, or if justice so requires."
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Paul J. bought the heroin, and that Meuse and DiCenso gave Silva
the heroin but she did not die.
As with the evidence incriminating Paul A. in Silva's
murder, DiCenso's testimony implicating Paul J. in the attempted
overdose was also supported by other testimony. For example,
Antonio Centeno, a heroin dealer, testified that Paul J. had
requested heroin from him "strong enough for an overdose," and
Centeno sold him 30 bags. A few days after the purchase, Paul J.
returned and told Centeno that the heroin "wasn't strong enough"
to "take care of someone out of the way." Additionally, John P.
testified that he had heard Paul A. tell his son that the heroin
intended to kill Silva "didn't work." In another conversation,
John Jr. told John P. that Meuse had given Silva the heroin and
that it had failed to kill her.
Paul J. contends that, despite this evidence, the Noe
reports are "core exculpatory evidence sufficient in weight to
alter the entire balance of the case against [him]." Paul J. Br.
at 39. He argues that, if the jury had heard testimony indicating
that McConnell was involved in Silva's murder, it could have
concluded that Portalla's crew was behind the entire conspiracy to
kill Silva and would have discounted any testimony implicating
Paul J. in the attempted heroin overdose. However, like Paul A.,
Paul J. fails to recognize that the reports themselves are
inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, he fails to demonstrate how
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the reports would have led to admissible evidence. He has not
provided any evidence to demonstrate that the jury would have heard
any testimony implicating McConnell in Silva's death. He simply
assumes that Noe (or someone else) would have testified in
accordance with the allegations made in the Noe reports.
Considering that the Noe reports have less relevance to Paul J.'s
conduct than to Paul A.'s, and we have already found that the
reports do not "undermine confidence in [Paul A.'s] verdict,"
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, we also find that, providing some deference
to the district court, Paul J. has failed to establish a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial.
3. John Jr.
John Jr. has the weakest materiality claim of all the
appellants. He was not charged with any offense related to Silva's
killing. Instead, he argues that the murder of Silva "loomed over
the entire trial and was critical to the credibility of the key
witnesses against John Jr.: Stephen DiCenso and Tommy Regan." John
Jr. Br. at 7. Specifically, he contends that the Noe reports are
material for their "ability to impeach Regan and DiCenso as to
their testimony surrounding the Silva murder [and] would have cast
doubt on their testimony as a whole." Id. at 30. Yet, John Jr.
never explains how he could have introduced the reports at trial
to impeach Regan and DiCenso. The reports do not purport to repeat
any statements made by Regan or DiCenso. In fact, neither of them
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is even mentioned in the reports. Therefore, it is doubtful that
the reports could have been used at trial to impeach their
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Fed. R.
Evid. 608, 613.
Moreover, as explained above, Regan and DiCenso's
testimony regarding the Silva murder was corroborated by physical
evidence and testimony of other witnesses. This corroboration
significantly lessens any impeachment effect of the Noe reports,
especially regarding John Jr.'s convictions, which are unrelated
to the Silva killing. As the district court stated, because the
Noe reports "do not raise a reasonable probability of a different
outcome on the counts related to the Silva killing . . . [a]
fortiori, they do not raise a reasonable probability of a different
outcome on unrelated counts." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at
*7.
4. Arguments applicable to all appellants
All appellants contend that the Noe reports are material
for two additional reasons. First, they argue that, if the Noe
reports were disclosed before trial, the district court would have
granted their pre-trial discovery motions to obtain additional
information regarding the connection between Portalla and Silva's
murder, in particular Paul A.'s motion for the identities of two
confidential informants, one who stated that DiCenso said that he
worked for Portalla and the other who stated that Silva was holding
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guns for Portalla. However, the district court judge who denied
the discovery motions is the same judge who denied their § 2255
motions, and she rejected appellants' argument that the Noe reports
would have made any difference. See DeCologero II, 2013 WL
3728409, at *7 (stating that "[w]hatever further evidence there
might have been about Portalla, McConnell, and Nogueira, Paul A.
did not need the FBI reports to find it").
Second, appellants contend that they could have used the
Noe reports at trial to demonstrate that law enforcement failed to
sufficiently investigate the connection between Portalla's crew
and Silva's murder and were biased by focusing their investigation
on the DeCologero crew. Given the considerable evidence tying the
DeCologero crew to Silva's death, we agree with the district court
that, even if the Noe reports could have been introduced for this
purpose, there would not be a reasonable probability of a different
outcome at trial. See id. at *6.
B. Evidentiary Hearing
In the alternative, appellants argue that the district
court erred by making its materiality determination, and denying
their § 2255 motions to vacate their convictions, without holding
an evidentiary hearing. We review a district court's decision not
to hold an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Owens v.
United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007).
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), a district court
"shall . . . grant a prompt [evidentiary] hearing" "[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Despite this
seemingly petitioner-friendly standard, we have stated that
"[e]videntiary hearings on § 2255 petitions are the exception, not
the norm," Moreno-Morales, 334 F.3d at 145, and "the petitioner
bears the burden of establishing the need for an evidentiary
hearing." United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir.
1993).
When reviewing a district court's denial of an
evidentiary hearing, "we take the petitioner's credible
allegations as true." Owens, 483 F.3d at 57. A district court
may deny an evidentiary hearing when "the movant's allegations,
even if true, do not entitle him to relief, or . . . [when] the
movant's allegations need not be accepted as true because they
state conclusions instead of facts, contradict the record, or are
inherently incredible." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, the judge who presided at the petitioners' trial
is the same judge who decided the § 2255 motion, "the judge is at
liberty to employ the knowledge gleaned during previous
proceedings and make findings based thereon without convening an
additional hearing." McGill, 11 F.3d at 225; see also United
States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 24 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("A district
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judge's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying
a § 2255 motion is generally respected as a sound exercise of
discretion when the judge denying the § 2255 motion also presided
over the trial in which the petitioner claims to have been
prejudiced." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In their § 2255 motions, all appellants allege that if
the prosecution had disclosed the Noe reports, they would have
called Noe as a witness, and she would have testified consistently
with the reports that Portalla, McConnell, and Nogueira were
involved in Silva's murder. In its ruling denying the motions,
the district court did not take this allegation as true, and
instead found that appellants had "made no showing that Noe would
have testified in accordance with [the Noe] reports if she had
appeared at trial." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at *7.
Because the district court denied their request for an
evidentiary hearing, appellants contend that the court should have
taken this allegation as true. However, appellants did not present
any evidence to the district court to support their conclusory
claim that Noe would have testified consistently with the
statements that she had made in the reports. For example, they
did not submit an affidavit from Noe, nor did they make any
representation to the district court that they had located Noe or
that she would have been available to testify at trial if called
as a witness. Instead, they argue that an affidavit from Noe was
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unnecessary because the Noe reports "sort of speak[] for
[them]sel[ves]."4 However, as explained above, the reports are
inadmissible hearsay, and appellants have the burden of
demonstrating how the reports would have led to admissible
evidence. See Ellsworth, 333 F.3d at 5. Because appellants have
4 At oral argument, counsel for Paul A. conceded that
appellants never submitted an affidavit from Noe describing what
she would have said if called at trial:
Justice Souter: Is it correct that in the
habeas proceeding you did not either call Noe
as a witness or present an affidavit from Noe
as to what she would testify?
Counsel for Paul A.: We did not present an
affidavit. . . . The Judge never ordered
affidavits. . . .
Justice Souter: You are the one who is
bringing habeas. The Judge doesn't have to
order it.
Counsel for Paul A.: That could have been
developed in an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Lipez: But you are trying to make the
case that there has to be an evidentiary
hearing. Wouldn't the submission [of an
affidavit] enhance your case that there should
have been an evidentiary hearing? . . . You
had an opportunity to convince the judge that,
at an evidentiary hearing, [Noe] might be
prepared to testify in conformity to that 302
report . . . but you never made the effort to
do that.
Counsel for Paul A.: No, that is correct. .
. . We did not present that to the district
judge, and I have no explanation for it, other
than that the report sort of speaks for
itself. . . .
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provided no factual basis to support their conclusory allegation
that Noe would have testified in accordance with the reports, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying their
motions without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Owens, 483
F.3d at 57.
Affirmed.
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