DocketNumber： 93-2017
Filed Date： 9/28/1994
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 93-2017
HOGAR AGUA Y VIDA EN EL DESIERTO, INC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JORGE SUAREZ-MEDINA, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
______________
and Pieras,* District Judge.
______________
____________________
Nora Vargas Acosta, with whom Sabana Litigation & Civil Rights
__________________ __________________________________
Project, Ruth E. Harlow, William B. Rubenstein and American Civil
_______ _______________ ______________________ _______________
Liberties Union Foundation were on brief for appellants.
__________________________
David W. Roman, with whom Ramon A. Alfaro was on brief for
_______________ _________________
appellee Suarez.
Peter J. Porrata for appellee Dolittle.
________________
____________________
September 28, 1994
____________________
____________________
*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
CYR, Circuit Judge. Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto,
CYR, Circuit Judge.
_____________
Inc. ("HAVED"), a nonprofit organization which operates group
homes for persons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV"), brought a civil action in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging discriminatory
conduct by defendants-appellees in violation of the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3617 (1993) ("FHA"). The district court
ruled that the principal defendants, Jorge Suarez Medina and
Baudilla Albelo Suarez (hereinafter: "Suarez" or "Suarezes"),
were exempt from liability under the FHA by virtue of the "pri-
vate individual owner" provision which applies to persons who own
less than four "single-family houses," see id. 3603(b)(1). For
___ ___
the reasons discussed in this opinion, we vacate the district
court judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I
I
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
__________
In September 1992, appellant HAVED entered into an oral
agreement with Suarez to rent, with option to buy, two houses
located on an undivided lot in the Los Llanos section of Corozal,
Puerto Rico. Upon learning that HAVED intended to use the site
as a group home for persons infected with HIV, defendants Milton
Dolittle and Antonio Padilla organized neighborhood opposition
and threatened and coerced Suarez into reneging on the rental-
sale agreement. HAVED, along with its directors and a prospec-
tive resident of the proposed group home, initiated the present
action charging defendants Suarez, Dolittle and Padilla with
violations of FHA 3604 and 3617, and Suarez with breach of
contract under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 3371-3589 (1993).1
HAVED demanded declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.
Suarez moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, citing FHA 3603(b)(1):
(b) Nothing in . . . [section 3604 of this title]
(other than subsection (c)) shall apply to
____________________
1Section 3604 of the FHA provides, in pertinent part:
[E]xcept as exempted by sections [3603(b) and 3607], it
shall be unlawful ---
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after making a bona
_____ ______ _ ____
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
____ _____
sale or rental of, or otherwise make un-
__ _________ ____ ___
available or deny, a dwelling to any person
_________ __ ____
because of race, color, religion, sex, famil-
ial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. 3604(a) (emphasis added). The FHA amendments enacted
in 1988 extended comparable protection to persons with a "handi-
cap," see, e.g., id. 3604(f), including persons infected with
___ ____ ___
HIV. See Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and
___ ___________________________________ ______________
Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1209-10 (D. Conn. 1992) (citing
_____________
H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in
_____________
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179). Section 3617 makes it unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protect-
ed by [section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606].
42 U.S.C. 3617.
3
(1) any single-family house sold or rented by an
_____________ _____
owner:
[1] Provided, That such private individual owner
________ _______ __________ _____
does not own more than three such single-family
____ _____________
houses at any one time:
______
[2] Provided further, That in the case of the sale
________ _______ ____
of any such single-family house by a private indi-
vidual owner not residing in such house at the
___ ________ __ ____ _____
time of such sale or who was not the most recent
__ ___ ___ ____ ______
resident of such house prior to such sale, the
________
exemption granted by this subsection shall apply
only with respect to one such sale within any
twenty-four month period:
[3] Provided further, That such bona fide private
________ _______ ____ ____ _______
individual owner does not own any interest in, nor
__________ _____ ___ ________
is there owned or reserved on his behalf, under
__ ___ ______
any express or voluntary agreement, title to or
___ _______ __ _________ _________
any right to all or a portion of the proceeds from
________
the sale or rental of, more than three such sin-
gle-family houses at any one time:
[4] Provided further, That after December 31,
________ _______
1969, the sale or rental of any such single-family
house shall be excepted from the application of
this title only if such house is sold or rented
____ __
(A) without the use in any manner of the
sales or rental facilities or the sales or
rental services of any real estate broker,
agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or
services of any person in the business of
selling or renting dwellings . . . and
(B) without the publication, posting or mail-
ing, after notice, of any advertisement or
written notice in violation of [section 3604-
(c) of this title] . . . .
42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(1) (emphasis added; clause numbers added;
indentation altered from original).
4
A. The Suarez Properties
A. The Suarez Properties
_____________________
At the time of the September 1992 rental-sale agreement
with HAVED, Suarez owned four separate parcels of land on which
were located five structures. First, the "Los Llanos Property,"
_____
the subject of the abortive rental-sale agreement, consists of
one undivided lot containing two unattached residences. Suarez
holds undisputed title to the entire lot and one residence (House
A) where the Suarezes once resided. Their son built the second
house on the lot (House B) as a residence for his own family.
However, Mr. Suarez, Sr., was robbed while residing in House A,
and the Suarezes and their son moved away from Los Llanos.
Houses A and B remained unoccupied at the time of the HAVED-
Suarez rental-sale agreement.
Second, the "Guarico Residence," located in the Guarico
______
section of Corozal, was designed as a two-story house with a
separately equipped, single-family apartment on each floor.
Suarez held title to the lot and the house. At the time of the
rental-sale agreement, the Suarezes resided primarily in the
second-floor apartment, and the son and his family resided in the
first-floor apartment. Due to his physical impairments, however,
Mr. Suarez, Sr., sometimes lived "interchangeably" with his son's
family in the first-floor apartment. The district court ruled
that the Guarico Residence constituted one single-family house.
Third, the "Guarico Rental" is a two-story, single-
_____
family structure located near the Guarico Residence but on a
5
separate lot. At the time of the rental-sale agreement, Suarez
held title to the house and the lot, and the house was being
rented to a single family.
The fourth real estate parcel, the "La Aldea Rental,"
______
is a single lot in the La Aldea section containing a one-story
structure which Suarez purchased in April 1991, and rented to a
single family (Apartment 1). Prior to the rental-sale agreement,
however, Suarez renovated the basement of the building into a
separate apartment (Apartment 2), and it was rented to another
tenant.
B. The District Court Proceedings
B. The District Court Proceedings
______________________________
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
dismissed the HAVED complaint for lack of "subject matter juris-
diction," citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Pursuant to
Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1), the court ruled that at the
time of the rental-sale agreement with HAVED in September 1992,
Suarez had a bona fide ownership interest in only three "single-
_____
family houses" (hereinafter: "SFH" or "SFHs"): (i) the Guarico
Rental, (ii) the La Aldea Rental (Apartment 1), and (iii) the La
Aldea Rental (Apartment 2).2
____________________
2The district court also found, under Proviso 4 and 42
U.S.C. 3603(c), that Suarez did not qualify as a "person in the
business of selling or renting dwellings," id., because he had
___
not participated in more than two real estate transactions
between September 1991 and September 1992. Because Suarez must
satisfy all four provisos in order to qualify for the 3603(b)-
(1) exemption, we need not reach this issue.
6
Thus, the district court explicitly declined to treat
three abodes as SFHs. First, the court ruled that the Guarico
Residence is not a SFH under FHA 3603(b)(1) because only SFHs
that are "sold or rented" can be counted toward the four-SFH
threshold. In other words, in the district court's view a defen-
dant's current residence is not counted as an SFH under Provisos
_______ _________
1 and 3 unless it is the subject of the sale or rental transac-
tion giving rise to the cause of action under the FHA, or it is
__
"on the market" at the time of the challenged transaction. See
___
Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto, Inc. v. Suarez, 829 F. Supp.
________________________________________ ______
19, 22 (D.P.R. 1993) (citing Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282,
____ ______
285 (E.D. Ky. 1976)). Second, since Suarez, Sr., had been forced
to vacate House A at the Los Llanos Property after the robbery,
and to acquire the Guarico Residence, the district court conclud-
ed that it would be "inequitable" to treat House A as a SFH under
either Proviso 1 or 3. Id. at 22-23. Finally, relying on the
___
same equitable grounds noted in relation to House A, the district
court ruled that House B on the Los Llanos Property should not be
treated as a SFH. The court ruled, in the alternative, that
House B should not be treated as a SFH because the Suarezes's
son, who constructed House B, was its bona fide owner under
____ ____
Puerto Rico law; whereas the Suarezes simply held an unexercised
"right of accession" based on their ownership of the land on
which House B is situated. Id. at 23 (citing Castro Anguita v.
___ ______________
7
Figueroa, 103 P.R. Dec. 847, 850-51, 3 Official Translations
________ ______________________
1188-89 (1975)).3
II
II
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
__________
Since the only dispute on appeal concerns the legal
sufficiency of undisputed jurisdictional facts, we review the
Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo. See Heno v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 1204,
__ ____ ___ ____ ____
1205 (1st Cir. 1994). We conclude, as a matter of law, that the
Suarezes's claim to exemption is precluded by the FHA. See FDIC
___ ____
v. Keating, 12 F.3d 314, 316 (1st Cir. 1993) (statutory interpre-
_______
tations reviewed de novo).
__ ____
We employ traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion, particularly the presumption that ambiguous language in a
remedial statute is entitled to a generous construction consis-
tent with its reformative mission. See, e.g., Cia. Petrolera
___ ____ ______________
Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428-29 (1st
____________ _____________________
Cir. 1985) (noting that this canon of construction represents an
"especially reliable and legitimate" indicator of congressional
intent); see generally 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statuto-
___ _________ ______________________
ry Construction 60.01 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Sutherland].
_______________ __________
____________________
3The district court implicitly concluded as well that
HAVED's claims against codefendants Dolittle and Padilla under
FHA 3617 should be dismissed because the Suarezes are exempt
from liability under FHA 3604. See supra note 1. Although
___ _____
this ruling is contested by HAVED, we need not reach it.
8
This presumption has been relied on consistently by the courts in
interpreting the omnibus remedial provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, which prominently include the Fair Housing Act
itself. See Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico,
___ _________________ ______________________________
988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Trafficante v.
___________
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972)); see
___________________________ ___
also City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18
____ _______________ ____________________________________
F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994). An important corollary for
present purposes is that ambiguous exemptions from FHA liability
are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., id.; Elliott v. City of
________ ___ ____ ___ _______ _______
Athens, Georgia, 960 F.2d 975, 978-79 (11th Cir.) cert. denied,
_______________ _____ ______
113 S. Ct. 376 (1992); United States v. Columbus Country Club,
_____________ _____________________
915 F.2d 877, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases), cert.
_____
denied, 501 U.S. 1205 (1991).
______
From this appellate perspective we consider which
Suarez properties were "single-family houses" within the meaning
of Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1). The parties agree that
two properties the Guarico Rental and the La Aldea Rental
qualify as "single-family houses" within the meaning of the
exemption.4 Thus, given the four-SFH limen established in
____________________
4Absent appellate briefing, we hazard no view on the cor-
rectness of their stipulation. The burden of proving entitlement
to an FHA exemption rested with Suarez. See Massaro v. Mainlands
___ _______ _________
Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir. 1993)
___________________________
(FHA); Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882 (FHA); Singleton v.
_____________________ _________
Gendason, 545 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1976) (FHA); see also 2A
________ ___ ____
Sutherland 47.11, at 165 (general rule of construction).
__________
Whatever its legal elements, entitlement to an FHA exemption
9
section 3603(b)(1), the FHA exemption cannot stand if the Suar-
ezes were bona fide "owners" of two SFHs in addition to the
___
Guarico Rental and the La Aldea Rental.
A. Los Llanos Property, House A
A. Los Llanos Property, House A
____________________________
First, HAVED argues that the district court exceeded
its authority by fashioning an "equitable" exception which
resulted in the exclusion of Los Llanos, House A, from the four-
SFH calculus on the ground that the Suarezes had been forced to
vacate the Los Llanos area due to neighborhood crime. See In re
___ _____
Shoreline Concrete Co., 831 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1987)
________________________
("Courts of equity are bound to follow express statutory commands
to the same extent as are courts of law.") (citing Hedges v.
______
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)).
____________
Although courts have on occasion engrafted equitable
exceptions where rigid adherence to literal legislative language
clearly would disserve legislative intent, see, e.g., Zipes v.
___ ____ _____
Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (equitable tolling
____________________
of filing deadlines), generally courts are loath "to announce
____________________
turns on highly fact-dependent inquiries (e.g., the structural
____
design or usage of each dwelling), such that Suarez is bound to
these stipulations for purposes of the present litigation. Cf.
___
Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 322, 327 (1874) ("Con-
___________ ______
sent of parties cannot give the courts of the United States
[subject matter] jurisdiction, but the parties may admit the
existence of facts which show jurisdiction, and the courts may
act judicially upon such an admission."). By the same token, no
precedential significance should be ascribed to our acceptance of
these stipulations.
10
equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions
that are unqualified by the statutory text." Guidry v. Sheet
___________ ______ _____
Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)
___________________________________
(emphasis added). Moreover, "[w]here Congress explicitly enumer-
__________ _______
ates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
____
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of contrary
___
legislative intent." Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S.
______ __________________
608, 616-17 (1980) (emphasis added). Further, exemptions from
the requirements of a remedial statute like the FHA are to
________ _______
be construed narrowly to limit exemption eligibility. See
___
Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) (rejecting
_________ ____________
taxpayer plea for "nonliteral reading" of tax statute "on grounds
of equity to the repentant taxpayer," and noting that, faced with
a statute "which must receive a strict construction," "[c]ourts
are not authorized to rewrite [the] statute because they might
deem its effects susceptible of improvement."); supra pp. 8-9.
_____
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to endorse the
equitable exception adopted by the district court, especially
since Congress elected not to do so when it undertook to narrow
FHA liability in 42 U.S.C. 3603(b). Nothing in section 3603-
(b), nor in its legislative history, manifests a congressional
intent to temper either the inflexible four-SFH formula or the
categorical "ownership" standard. Thus, we believe these FHA
provisions reflect the sort of "considered congressional policy
choice" that elevates the "effectuation of certain broad social
11
policies . . . over the desire to do equity between particular
parties." Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. Guidry cautions against
______ ______
creating equitable exceptions to comprehensive remedial statutes
in an effort to protect individual defendants from occasional
inequities, even inequities attributable to misfeasance by the
plaintiffs. Id. (holding that the district court had no equita-
___
ble power to contravene ERISA's unqualified anti-garnishment
___________
provision by imposing a constructive trust upon pension benefits
payable to a former union official who embezzled union funds).
The Guidry admonition holds even stronger sway where, as here,
______
defendant-Suarez's misfortunes were in no sense due to HAVED's
conduct. The Court recognized in Guidry that any attempt to
______
calibrate the precise point at which an individual defendant's
vicissitudes are so "'especially' inequitable" as to outweigh the
__________
broad prophylactic policies underlying the congressional decision
to protect the plaintiff class would immerse the courts in an
inappropriate and "impracticab[le]" task. Id. (emphasis add-
___
ed).5
____________________
5The cases Suarez cites in support of the equitable excep-
tion fashioned by the district court, see, e.g., FTC v. Security
___ ____ ___ ________
Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991),
__________________________
concerned the equitable remedies a district court may impose
after a defendant has been found in violation of a statutory
_____
prohibition. For example, if the statute empowers the court to
restrain violations, and neither expressly nor "by a necessary
and inescapable inference [] restricts the court's jurisdiction
in equity," Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
______ ___________________
(1946), the court could utilize all its traditional equitable
powers or even desist from extending any equitable relief to the
plaintiff where the equities warrant. See Williams v. Jones, 11
___ ________ _____
12
B. The Guarico Residence
B. The Guarico Residence
_____________________
HAVED next contends that the district court committed
reversible error in not treating the Guarico Residence as a SFH
under Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1). HAVED argues that
nothing in FHA 3603(b)(1) excludes "owner-occupied" houses from
the term "single-family house." Furthermore, HAVED notes,
Proviso 2 explicitly qualifies the term SFH ("any such single-
family house by a private individual owner not residing in such
___ ________ __ ____
house at the time of such sale"), a qualification that would be
_____
entirely unnecessary if the term "SFH" itself excluded owner-
______
occupied houses.
________
On the other hand, Suarez says that the Guarico Resi-
dence is excluded from consideration under Provisos 1 and 3
because the prefatory clause in FHA 3603(b)(1) (exempting "any
single-family house sold or rented by the [defendant]" in a
____ __ ______
discriminatory manner) suggests that Congress did not intend that
any property of the defendant count toward the four-SFH threshold
unless that property itself was up for sale or rent at the time
____ __ ____
____________________
F.3d 247, 256 (1st Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, the latter rubric
provides no basis for extending an FHA exemption by withholding
_________
from HAVED all relief against Suarez's alleged discriminatory
___ ______
refusal to sell or rent the Los Llanos Property. Moreover, even
if the court were permitted to withhold injunctive relief, Suarez
would be answerable for legal damages (actual and punitive) for
_____ _______
any FHA violation. See 42 U.S.C. 3613(c). More importantly,
___
however, Suarez could have asserted no cognizable equitable
defense in light of the fact that his misfortunes while residing
_______
in Los Llanos were in no sense attributable to HAVED.
13
of the allegedly discriminatory transaction.6 Suarez argues
that this must be so because the references to "such [SFHs]" in
____
Provisos 1 and 3 can only relate back to the prefatory clause,
and incorporate the requirement that only "sold or rented" SFHs
are to be included in calculating the four-SFH threshold. Thus,
Suarez says, a defendant's residence normally would not be
included as a SFH unless it were on the market at the time of the
alleged discriminatory sale or rental. Suarez discounts the
value of Proviso 2 as a tool for interpreting the prefatory
clause in FHA 3603(b)(1), since Proviso 2 creates a
considerably "narrower" and altogether independent exemption that
allows one discriminatory sale (but not a rental) of an owner-
___ ____ ___ ______
occupied SFH to be excluded within any two-year period. Proviso
________
1, on the other hand, creates a "broader exemption" for owners
who own no more than three SFHs that are either for sale or rent
__ ____
by the owner.7
____________________
6As with his other concessions, see supra note 4, Suarez
___ _____
stipulates that the Guarico Residence would qualify as a "single-
family house" in all respects, but for its status as his current,
___ ___
off-market residence. We take no position respecting the basis
for Suarez's stipulation, but confine our consideration to the
two issues briefed by the parties.
7Alternatively, Suarez argues that the Guarico Residence is
excluded under the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemption in FHA
3603(b)(2), which exempts "rooms or units in dwellings contain-
ing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no
more than four families living independently of each other, if
__
the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living
___ _____ ________ _________ ___ ________ ___ __ ____ ______
quarters as his residence." 42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(2) (emphasis
________ __ ___ _________
added). The "Mrs. Murphy" exemption is totally inapposite,
however. It provides an exemption from section 3604 liability.
____ _______ ____ _________
14
The present dispute prompts two inquiries. The first
is whether a defendant's current residence is excluded from the
________
threshold four-SFH calculus under Provisos 1 and 3 simply because
it is his primary or current residence, even though all other
SFHs owned but not occupied by the defendant are included without
________
regard to whether they were concurrently "on the market." The
second inquiry is whether Congress meant to exclude from the
threshold four-SFH calculus all SFHs owned by the defendant
(including the primary residence) not on the market at the time
the defendant for discriminatory reasons refused to sell or
rent a different SFH to the plaintiff. We turn to these ques-
tions.
1. Exclusion for Residence Qua Residence
1. Exclusion for Residence Qua Residence
_____________________________________
As its prefatory clause makes clear, the FHA 3603-
(b)(1) exemption assuming its four provisos are satisfied
applies to any "single-family house sold or rented by the owner"
_______ __
in a discriminatory manner. For section 3603(b)(1) purposes,
therefore, the relevant SFHs in this case are Houses A and B,
located on the Los Llanos Property Suarez refused to rent or sell
to HAVED. Section 3603(b)(1) neither defines the term "SFH," nor
____________________
It does not exclude a structure from the Proviso 1 and 3 analyses
___ _________
under FHA 3603(b)(1). See id. 3604(b) ("nothing in section
___ ___
[3604] . . . shall apply to . . . rooms and units . . . .").
Thus, the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption could have relevance only if,
for example, Suarez had refused to sell or rent one unit in the
___
Guarico Residence to HAVED.
_______ _________
15
does its prefatory clause expressly limit the term "SFH" to
structures in which the defendant does not reside. Conversely,
as Suarez acknowledges, if the Suarezes had refused to rent or
sell their Guarico Residence to HAVED, the prefatory clause would
_________ ______
not have debarred the Suarezes from a section 3603(b)(1) exemp-
tion merely because the property being rented or sold was their
residence.
The statutory context in which the prefatory clause
appears undermines the Suarez contention as well. See Skidgel v.
___ _______
Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1993)
____________________________
(meaning of particular statutory language assessed in light of
entire statute). The four FHA 3603(b)(1) provisos do not give
rise to four independent exemptions, as Suarez suggests, but
represent four cumulative preconditions to the single exemption
__________ ______
set out in the prefatory clause. If any of the four provisos is
not satisfied, no section 3603(b)(1) exemption is appropriate.
Proviso 2 refers specifically to a discrete subset of
the "discriminatory" SFH sales focused upon in the section
3603(b)(1) prefatory clause, namely, sales of SFHs in which the
defendant is not residing. If the unqualified term "SFH" in the
___ ________
prefatory clause were intended to embrace only SFHs in which the
defendant is not residing, no such further qualification would be
needed in Proviso 2. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556
___ ______________ ___
(1st Cir. 1993) (court should avoid interpretations which render
any part of statute meaningless). Thus, if the term "SFH," as
16
used in the prefatory clause, applies to residences and non-
___
residences, the pendent references to "such [SFHs]" in Provisos 1
and 3 also necessarily encompass the Suarezes's Guarico Residence
qua residence.
___
Finally, the legislative history discloses no basis for
second-guessing the "plain language" of section 3603(b)(1). See
___
Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.
__________ _____________________
1989) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, the plain language of the statute is conclusive."). As
initially introduced in Congress, the FHA contained few signifi-
cant exemptions from liability, see, e.g., supra note 7 (describ-
___ ____ _____
ing "Mrs. Murphy" exemption), and the breadth of the FHA's
coverage caused vigorous Senate opposition. See generally Jean
___ _________
E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspec-
____________________________________________________
tive, 8 Washburn L.J. 149 (1969). Senator Everett M. Dirksen
____
proposed to assuage opposition by exempting sales and rentals of
"any single-family house sold or rented by an owner residing in
such house at the time of such sale or rental, or who was the
most recent resident of such house prior to such sale or rental."
See 114 Cong. Rec. 4571 (1968). Yet even the "Dirksen substi-
___
tute," later modified and enacted as Proviso 2, failed to gain
enough Senate support. To break the deadlock, Senator Robert C.
Byrd proposed the expanded four-part exemption, later codified as
present section 3603(b)(1). During floor debate, Senator Byrd
offered two illuminating hypotheticals to demonstrate the cover-
17
age which would be provided under his proposal, but not under the
Dirksen substitute:
A widow owns and lives in a single-family
_____ __
dwelling. She also owns a single-family
dwelling across the street, the tenant there-
in being her daughter. The daughter moves to
another State. The widow cannot qualify for
exemption under the Dirksen substitute be-
cause she neither resides in the house across
the street of which she is the owner
nor is the "most recent resident" of such
dwelling prior to a subsequent sale or rent-
al.
An individual lives in his own single-family
_____ __
dwelling located on a three-quarter-acre lot.
He decides to build a second house on the
lot. Ten years later misfortune forces him
to parcel the lot and sell the house thereon.
____ ___ _____ _______
He does not qualify under the Dirksen substi-
tute exemption because he is neither "resid-
ing in" the adjacent dwelling nor was he the
"most recent resident" thereof.
114 Cong. Rec. 5640 (1968) (emphasis added).
Asked why "it was necessary to raise the number of
houses owned by one party to three," Senator Byrd referred to
_____
these two hypotheticals, and noted that he had "already discussed
situations in which there would be at least two [single-family]
___
houses involved." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, both
___ ______________ ____
hypotheticals assumed that the houses in which the seller cur-
_____________ _______ ____ ___ ______ __ _____ ___ ______ ____
rently resided would be counted toward the four-SFH threshold in
______ _______ _____ __ _______ ______ ___ ________ _________ __
Provisos 1 and 3. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728 (1983)
________ _ ___ _ ___ ____ ______
(noting that interpretation of statute by sponsor is "'authori-
_______
tative guide to the statute's construction'") (citation omitted);
see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986)
___ ____ _____ ______ ______
18
(sponsor's statements credited if consistent with statutory
language). Other senators likewise recognized that the "more
than three" threshold would include houses in which the seller
resided. See 114 Cong. Rec. 5641 (1968) ("I know we have people
___
who have a summer home or a winter home. . . . One could easily
have three homes.") (statement of Senator Jordan). Since this
_____
legislative history, at the very least, precludes our finding "a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,"
Laracuente, 891 F.2d at 23, we must conclude that a defendant's
__________
residence, qua residence, is not to be excluded under Provisos 1
___
and 3 of section 3603(b)(1).8
2. Exemption for "Off Market" SFHs
2. Exemption for "Off Market" SFHs
_______________________________
____________________
8The legislative history contains a reference arguably
supportive of the Suarez interpretation of Provisos 1 and 3.
Senator Byrd suggested that he chose "three" as the threshold
figure under Provisos 1 and 3 to match the "Mrs. Murphy exemp-
tion," see supra note 7, which provides an exemption to a resi-
___ _____
dent landlord of multi-family quarters (containing not more than
four family quarters) who refuses to rent any family quarters in
the building. Senator Byrd noted that "Mrs. Murphy" must live in
one of the four family quarters, so as to confine the "protective
reach" of the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption "to three units other than
_____ ____
the one in which she lives. In my amendment, therefore, I use
___ ___ __ _____ ___ _____
'three' as the number, in order to have parallel construction."
114 Cong. Rec. 5640.
We note two sound reasons for devaluing this statement.
First, as noted, see supra p. 19, inconsistent expressions of
___ _____ ____________
sponsor intent are insufficient to override the plain import of
the statutory language. Second, Senator Byrd's more generalized
statements concerning a rough numerical symmetry in statutory
construction were preceded by his detailed recitation of the two
________
fact-specific hypotheticals discussed above. See supra p. 18.
___ _____
19
Suarez proposes to exclude the Guarico Residence under
Provisos 1 and 3 because it was neither for rent nor sale at the
time he refused to sell the Los Llanos Property to HAVED. See
___
Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E.D. Ky. 1976). The
____ ______
theory is that the term "such [SFHs]" in Provisos 1 and 3 unam-
____
biguously relates back to the complete phrase "single-family
house sold or rented by an owner" in the section 3603(b)(1)
____ __ ______
prefatory clause. The language of the statute is not dispositive
on this issue, and the interpretation proposed by Suarez is at
least plausible.
Although it is conceivable that Congress's choice of
the indeterminate modifier "such" was intended only to require
the counting of residences qua residences under Provisos 1 and 3
___
in direct contrast to the more constricted scope of the term
"SFH" under Proviso 2 Provisos 1 and 3 reasonably might be
read to impose the additional, distinct requirement that any SFH,
regardless whether it is the defendant's "residence," be counted
under Provisos 1 and 3 only if it is a "single-family house sold
____
or rented by an owner." Indeed, Congress's choice of words
__ ______ __ __ _____
"sold or rented" in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause is
a most curious usage. In order for liability to attach under FHA
3604, a defendant need never have consummated the discriminato-
___________
ry rental or sale of the SFH to which the section 3603(b)(1)
prefatory clause adverts. Rather, FHA liability attaches as soon
as the defendant "refuses to sell or rent after [the plaintiff
20
makes] a bona fide offer," see supra note 1, without regard to
___ _____
whether the SFH is ever "sold" or "rented" to anyone. With these
____ ______
linguistic difficulties in mind, it seems arguable at least, in
keeping with the structure and language of the statute, that the
term "such," as used in Provisos 1 and 3, imports the same "on
the market" qualification necessarily implicit in the section
3603(b)(1) prefatory clause.
As noted earlier, however, normally latent ambiguity in
a statutory modifier like "such" should be construed in further-
ance of the statute's remedial goals. See Cia. Petrolera, 754
___ ______________
F.2d at 428. ("When Congress uses broad generalized language in
a remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by
authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the
provision generously so as to effectuate the important congres-
sional goals.") Not only does the authoritative legislative
history not contravene the HAVED interpretation, see supra
___ _____
Section II.B.1, it contradicts the Suarez contention. Most
importantly, neither hypothetical advanced by Senator Byrd
assumed or intimated that the seller's residence was "on the
market" at the time the discriminatory sale of the second house
took place, yet Senator Byrd included both these SFHs under
Provisos 1 and 3. Notwithstanding a conceivable vestige of
literal ambiguity, therefore, we are persuaded to the view that
the Guarico Residence must be included in the four-SFH calculus
21
under section 3603(b)(1) consistent with the FHA's legislative
history and its broad remedial design.9
____________________
9The only case to address this precise issue, see Lamb v.
___ ____
Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), reached the opposite
______
conclusion, without reference to the legislative history and
without analysis. Id. at 285 ("The Court has found no authority
___
construing [section 3603(b)(1)] and counsel for the respective
parties have cited none.").
22
III
III
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
__________
At the time HAVED was denied the opportunity to acquire
the Los Llanos Property, allegedly on discriminatory grounds,
Suarez held an undisputed ownership interest in "more than three"
"single-family houses": the Guarico Rental, the La Aldea Rental,
the Los Llanos Property, House A, and the Guarico Residence.
Since Suarez cannot satisfy either Proviso 1 or Proviso 3, the
alleged discriminatory refusal to proceed with the HAVED rental-
sale agreement relating to the Los Llanos Property did not
qualify for exemption under FHA 3603(b)(1).
The district court judgment is vacated. The case is
The district court judgment is vacated. The case is
___ ________ _____ ________ __ _______ ___ ____ __
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
________ ___ _______ ___________ __________ ____ ____ _______
Costs to appellant.
Costs to appellant.
_____ __ _________
23
Brock v. Pierce County , 106 S. Ct. 1834 ( 1986 )
In Re Shoreline Concrete Company, Inc., Debtor. Shoreline ... , 831 F.2d 903 ( 1987 )
Mosquera-Perez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service , 3 F.3d 553 ( 1993 )
john-d-elliott-c-leonard-davis-the-atlanta-union-mission-dba-the , 960 F.2d 975 ( 1992 )
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund , 110 S. Ct. 680 ( 1990 )
Lamb v. Sallee , 417 F. Supp. 282 ( 1976 )
Dorothy Singleton v. Hilda Gendason and Edward Gendason , 545 F.2d 1224 ( 1976 )
federal-trade-commission-v-security-rare-coin-bullion-corp-a-minnesota , 931 F.2d 1312 ( 1991 )
casa-marie-inc-v-superior-court-of-puerto-rico-for-the-district-of , 988 F.2d 252 ( 1993 )
Jenna Skidgel v. Maine Department of Human Services v. ... , 994 F.2d 930 ( 1993 )
joseph-w-massaro-patricia-ann-massaro-plaintiffs-counterclaim-joseph-p , 3 F.3d 1472 ( 1993 )
Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc. , 77 A.L.R. Fed. 465 ( 1985 )
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance , 93 S. Ct. 364 ( 1972 )
Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning ... , 790 F. Supp. 1197 ( 1992 )
Porter v. Warner Holding Co. , 66 S. Ct. 1086 ( 1946 )
FDIC v. Keating , 12 F.3d 314 ( 1993 )
Floyd v. Heno v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation , 20 F.3d 1204 ( 1994 )
Andrus v. Glover Construction Co. , 100 S. Ct. 1905 ( 1980 )
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 102 S. Ct. 1127 ( 1982 )
Hogar Agua Y Vida en El Desierto v. Suarez , 829 F. Supp. 19 ( 1993 )