DocketNumber： 95-2032
Filed Date： 8/7/1996
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 2/19/2016
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 95-2032
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT M. JOOST,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Cummings,* Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Thomas G. Briody for appellant. ________________
Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom ___________________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Kenneth P. Madden, __________________ __________________
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
____________________
August 7, 1996
____________________
____________________
*Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendant Robert Joost ______________________
appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). He
raises four issues: (1) whether the court erred in refusing to
give an entrapment instruction, (2) whether the felon-in-
possession statute exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority,
(3) whether the court properly relied on three convictions as
predicates for application of an enhanced penalty under the Armed
Career Criminal Act, and (4) whether the court erred in
dismissing a challenge to the jury composition and selection
procedures.
Only the first issue merits extended discussion in this
opinion. We discuss briefly our reasons for affirming the
court's handling of the second and third issues, and we uphold
the court's action on the jury challenge for the reasons set
forth in an unpublished opinion issuing simultaneously with the
present one, see United States v. Joost, No. 95-2031 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ _____
July x, 1996). After careful consideration, we conclude that the
evidence merited a jury instruction on entrapment. We therefore
reverse and remand for a new trial.
Entrapment __________
The Record. Whether an instruction on entrapment should __________
have been given here presents both a close and an unusual issue.
While most entrapment cases focus on the question whether,
assuming improper inducement, the defendant carried the burden of
showing an unreadiness to commit the crime at issue, the ruling
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here was the threshold one that there had been, as a matter of
law, no showing of improper inducement. Moreover, the conduct of
the law enforcement officers did not involve any single incident
that could be said to be overbearing. And the defendant, while
no stranger to criminal activities, was pursuing them in a field
unrelated to dealing in firearms when this saga begins.
This, therefore, is a case out of the ordinary. Since an
entrapment instruction was refused, we must have before us all of
the significant evidence that the jury heard. While we shall
condense as much as we fairly can, we recognize that sometimes
"the devil is in the details" and that too skeletal a summary
risks overlooking something that could have persuaded a rational
jury. Here is our effort.
(1) The first month - a counterfeiting investigation. ______________________________________________________
Government efforts in this case occupied a period of four months,
from March 23 to July 24, 1994. One Tracy had been caught
passing counterfeit tokens at the Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut;
he turned informant and volunteered to give information to Rhode
Island authorities about the counterfeiting activities of his
partner, defendant. Tracy introduced defendant to Rhode Island
State Police detectives DelPrete and O'Donnell, who pretended to
be petty thieves, one of them having a cousin strategically
employed in the cashier's cage at the casino.
Defendant had been convicted thirty years earlier of three
breaking and entering felonies and had been imprisoned during
most of the 1970's and 1980's. Since his release in 1987, he had
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held jobs for only short periods. He had commenced his
counterfeiting activity in February 1994. His only current
legitimate source of income, and a poor one at that, was helping
to fabricate costume jewelry components.
His counterfeiting enterprise had suffered a setback when
slot machines at the casino were altered so that they rejected
the fraudulent tokens. When the detectives offered to pay fifty
cents for each dollar token after they supposedly cashed in the
tokens at the cashier's cage, defendant was delighted. Over the
next four months he realized between $5,000 and $6,000 from this
activity.
(2) The Second Month - The Focus Changes. The detectives ______________________________________
began to extend their visits to defendant, in the words of
DelPrete, "because he was bringing up other things for us to do."
Defendant talked of many criminal ventures, some past, and others
future possibilities. They included a vault robbery that
defendant said he had helped plan while in prison, a warehouse-
tractor/trailer job in Pennsylvania, and robberies of
supermarkets, a novelty shop, a Ground Round restaurant, an
armored car, a UPS truck, a VFW hall, and a night club ("Mustang
Sally's").
The detectives said that they had broken into houses, and
defendant spoke of being a safecracker in the 1960's and early
1970's. But, the detectives acknowledged, defendant represented
that he himself did not do armed robberies. Defendant exhibited
considerable criminal know-how as he critiqued various plans the
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detectives brought forward and demonstrated how to use weapons in
a robbery.
Defendant testified that most of the stories he told were
just stories, that they sprang from his imagination, his reading,
or fiction he had written in prison, that he "talked tough"
because he was dealing with "tough people" and wanted to sustain
their interest in him because they were his only means to realize
income from his counterfeiting.
On April 24, a month after the first meeting, defendant,
according to the detectives, introduced the subject of firearms
in discussing the possibility of doing an armored car robbery,
which might require them to shoot guards. According to
defendant, the detectives had been introduced to him as "guys
doing stick-ups," but he acknowledged that he was the first to
talk about doing a specific robbery. He also mentioned the
warehouse-tractor/trailer job possibility.
During the month following this conversation, the detectives
visited defendant on May 10 and May 13 and obtained counterfeit
tokens. Defendant said there were from twenty to thirty phone
calls during the entire four-month period. On May 20, defendant
once again mentioned the use of firearms in connection with
robbing an armored car facility.
(3) The Third Month - Dialogue and Diversion. The third ___________________________________________
month of defendant's interactions with the detectives was
characterized by a number of unavailing requests by the
detectives that defendant procure a gun for use in Fall River,
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attempted dissuasion on the part of defendant, and numerous trips
to look over scenes of possible crimes.
On May 27 the detectives told defendant that one of them had
been harassed by a man in Fall River. They wanted defendant to
find them a gun so that they could shoot out some windows in the
assailant's house. Defendant responded that this was not a good
idea; bullets could be traced to firearms. A better idea would
be to burn or blow up the person's car. He also advocated use of
a shotgun, which would be harder to trace, and said he had one
"stashed."
On June 2, O'Donnell reminded defendant of his need for a
gun for the Fall River matter; defendant replied that he had seen
one person, but that that person did not have a gun. On June 11,
DelPrete, sporting a black eye from playing basketball, told
defendant that the Fall River assailant had given it to him and
again asked for a firearm. The request was repeated on June 16,
defendant replying that he had unsuccessfully approached two
people. Finally, on June 27, defendant was told that the Fall
River project was off; DelPrete told defendant that he had gotten
his revenge by smashing his adversary's car with a bat.
Meanwhile, defendant and the detectives took a number of
automobile trips. They drove to Pennsylvania to rob a
tractor/trailer, defendant having brought along some burglar's
tools. The operation was aborted when, as planned by the
detectives, they were stopped but not arrested by police. On
another occasion they followed a UPS truck but did not stop it.
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On still another occasion. they drove to southern Rhode Island to
look over a VFW hall that supposedly had a safe to be cracked.
And on the night of June 29-30, they spent hours in the woods
near the Meehan Armored Car facility.
Defendant described the "pattern" that he said he followed
in almost any conversation with the detectives:
I would first tell them the story, flush [sic] out
the details, then I would find perhaps some fault with
it and say, "We would have to go up there and check it
out." Ride, stall, talk, stall and then get them off
on to something else.
(4) The Fourth Month - Denouement. The record reveals no _______________________________
action or talk about firearms between the end of June and July
21. DelPrete testified that the detectives kept in contact with
defendant, who was still producing counterfeit coins, and that he
apparently had only limited resources and expected an imminent
foreclosure on his house.
On Thursday, July 21, the detectives visited defendant at
his home, where he was soldering some costume jewelry. Defendant
said he made three dollars an hour but that his supplier, to whom
he owed money, was not going to pay him. O'Donnell interjected,
"By Monday you could have - - we owe you, Bob. We really do."
Then the detectives told defendant that their casino contact was
quitting the following month, but that he would make one last
exchange of money for 2500 counterfeit coins.
The conversation then turned to the detectives' plans to rob
a nightclub on Cape Cod, where they expected to get "12 grand
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easy." Since they understood that the bartender carried a gun,
they wanted defendant to obtain a firearm for them.
Then followed lengthy discussion about the planning.
Defendant asked when the detectives would accost the bartender
and how they would make their getaway. He also suggested a trip
to the nightclub. O'Donnell replied that this would delay the
heist for two more weeks. They did not want to wait that long
since they needed the money. Defendant then suggested making the
trip the following night. O'Donnell said they would stay down on
the Cape since the robbery would take place only a day or so
after such a trip. They recognized that defendant had to return
and decided to go without him. At this point, after some nine
pages of transcribed taped conversation in which the detectives
mentioned their need for a gun some six times, defendant said
that he could probably obtain a "piece."
They then discussed how to share the proceeds of the
robbery. They asked what defendant thought was fair. Defendant
said they did not have to give him anything, then said "I think I
can get a 38, 38." O'Donnell said that they would give him "a
piece of it" but if he came along he would get "33" [i.e., a
third]. Defendant replied that he was so broke that he couldn't
pay his bills and would take something. Once again, however,
defendant suggested driving down to look at the nightclub. Once
again the detectives refused, saying that the bartender was "ripe
for the picking." After more speculation from defendant about
what could go wrong, O'Donnell finally reaffirmed their intent to
-8-
do the job on Sunday. Defendant then said he could "get you a
piece." O'Donnell wondered if defendant were "serious about it."
Defendant at this point spoke without any qualification, "I'll
get you a piece."
All of the above discussion was recorded on tape. Defendant
testified at trial that, on learning of the imminent departure of
the casino contact, he "panicked" at the prospect of losing the
only income he could get. He said that he wanted to delay so
that he could "talk [the detectives] back into trying to talk
this guy out of leaving the casino until we could do something
else." He added, "I was afraid I was going to lose them and lose
the opportunity to get some more money out of them."
Defendant testified that the next day, Friday, July 22, he
"ran into someone and mentioned to him that [he] was looking for
a gun." The "person," who turned out to be informant Tracy,
supplied defendant with a gun. On the same day the detectives
called defendant, who said, "All set. No problem." The
detectives called again on Saturday and defendant said he had the
weapon. On Sunday, the day of the supposed robbery, the
detectives went to defendant's house, where he handed them a 25-
caliber Barretta, which he said he had borrowed, together with a
clip and seven rounds of ammunition.
Defendant was arrested and subsequently indicted and tried
before a jury.
The Court's Rulings. At the end of the case, defendant ____________________
moved for an entrapment instruction. The court orally and
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succinctly summarized the evidence, not failing to identify five
occasions on which the government initiated discussion of
firearms. It did not, however, make mention of any financial
difficulty facing defendant or defendant's testimony as to his
"pattern" or strategy in dealing with the detectives.
The gist of her ruling is as follows:
Even if I were to take into account the cumulative
effect of the four contacts between May 27th and June
16th and the fifth contact on July 21st, I do not
believe that those conversations, those promptings,
those fabrications as stated by the detectives, rise to
the level of an improper inducement. That is not what
the case law stands for.
I think I cited [United States v.] Gendron[, 18 _____________ _______
F.3d 955, 960 (1st Cir. 1994),] wherein then Judge, now
Justice Brier [sic] enumerates the types of things that
the First Circuit considers to be improper Government
inducement. I do not see the sort of urgency. I do
not see the insistence. I do not see intimidation or
threats, even taking all of those statements in the
light most favorable to the defendant.
In short, given the Defendant's criminal
proclivities which were announced by him and admitted
to by him as being in place even prior to the May 27th
initiation by the detectives, of discussion of guns and
given my finding that the Government's through the
state troopers['] actions in this case do not amount to
improper or undue influence, I do not believe that the
evidence in this case shows anything more [than] that
the Government created an opportunity for Mr. Joost to
become criminally involved and to possess the weapon in
question.1
The court made a second ruling in response to a jury
request. The jury had left the courtroom at 2:40 p.m. At 3:10
____________________
1 In fairness, we must acknowledge the anomalous situation
confronting the judge, who had previously presided over United ______
States v. Joost, No. 95-2031 (1st Cir. July xx, 1996), in which ______ _____
defendant consistently invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to
answer questions about the statements that he was now saying were
merely "stories."
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it returned with a note saying, "Is entrapment a legal defense in
this case? And if so, could you please define it?" This
request, as the court acknowledged, was entirely understandable.
Counsel for defendant had devoted his entire opening to picturing
the defendant as concededly a felon who had knowingly possessed a
firearm but who had been led into the crime by the blandishments
of the detectives. He had concluded his remarks with the
statement that he would ask for an instruction on entrapment.
The court again refused to instruct on entrapment and simply
notified the jury that that defense did not apply in this case.
The jury finally reported its verdict at 4:30 p.m. In view of
the stipulation and concessions of defendant, made in conjunction
with his entrapment defense strategy, it is a matter of some
wonder what the jury had to consider after receiving the court's
ruling.
Legal Discussion. The principles governing entitlement to ________________
an entrapment instruction are well known. The standard of review
is plenary. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st _____________ _________
Cir. 1988). The policy behind the entrapment defense seeks to
deter the government from such zeal in pursuing a conviction that
its efforts result in the commission of a crime that likely would
not have occurred if the suspect had been left to his own
devices. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992). ________ _____________
The principle protects both citizens who are completely law
abiding and those who have violated laws but whose unreadiness to
commit a particular type of crime was overcome by excessive
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governmental efforts. The question is whether the government
"induced the defendant to perform a criminal act that he was not
predisposed to commit." Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 814. _________
There are two elements to the entrapment defense: improper
government inducement to commit the offense and a lack of
predisposition on the part of defendant to commit such an
offense. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 960 (1st Cir. _____________ _______
1994). In order to be entitled to an entrapment instruction, the
defendant has the burden of producing "some evidence" on both
elements "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he
`was an "unwary innocent" rather than an "unwary criminal."'"
United States v. Hernandez, 995 F.2d 307, 313 (1st Cir. 1993) _____________ _________
(citations omitted).
A court assessing the sufficiency of a defendant's showing
must be able to find more than a scintilla of evidence, more than
mere creation of an opportunity for criminal activity. See United ___ ______
States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987). A "sting" ______ _____
operation is not improper inducement if it merely provides an
opportunity to commit a crime, but proof of opportunity plus
"something else" may be adequate to meet a defendant's burden.
Examples found sufficient by courts include threats, forceful
solicitation and dogged insistence, playing upon sympathies or
the past relationship of a war buddy, and repeated suggestions at
a time when defendant had lost his job and needed money.
Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. _______
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Moreover, while conclusory and self-serving statements by a
defendant are not sufficient, Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 813, a _________
defendant's account, though self serving, may have weight if it
"is interlaced with considerable detail and has some
circumstantial corroboration in the record." Id. at 815. __
Indeed, as we stated in Rodriguez, "[W]e recognize that _________
Rodriguez's soliloquy was self-serving -- but realistically, how
better than through his own testimony can a defendant meet his
entry-level burden?" Id. __
In applying the above principles to this case, we emphasize
that we are not considering the sufficiency of a verdict for the
government on this record, if an entrapment instruction had been
given, but the closer question whether a rational jury could have
found entrapment if allowed to consider that defense. We first
review the most relevant precedents in this circuit.
In Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 811, 815-16, a government agent _________
had designed a lucrative drug deal, made the initial approach to
defendant, and solicited forcefully with "dogged insistence,"
making four calls in one day. The defendant had testified in
what the court characterized as a self-serving soliloquy, but one
in considerable detail and with some corroboration. We held it
error for the district court to have refused to give an
entrapment charge. A year later, in United States v. Campbell, ______________ ________
874 F.2d 838, 845 (1st Cir. 1989), where the government had set
up a drug deal through an informant who had been befriended by
defendant, we upheld the language of the entrapment charge and
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rejected the government's suggestion that the charge need not
have been given.
In Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961, then Chief Judge Breyer listed _______
the various examples of improper inducement we have mentioned
above, including a reference to Rodriguez's "dogged insistence," _________
and also noted United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th _______________________
Cir. 1993). In Kessee, defendant, after initially refusing an ______
informant's request to enter an illegal drug deal, yielded to
further requests after he lost two jobs and needed money for food
and rent. Defendant had initiated several calls and had proposed
selling drugs to the informant, and had claimed to have engaged
in over fifty drug deals. He testified that he lied to obtain a
sentence reduction for cooperation, that he carried a gun because
of fear, and that he had tried to impress the informant. The
court reversed the trial court, holding that an entrapment
instruction should have been given, because only the jury should
have assessed the truth of defendant's testimony. Id. at 1003-4. __
Most recently, in United States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334, 338 _____________ ______
(1st Cir. 1995), an informant, seeking to obtain a firearm from
defendant, engaged in "a campaign of persistent calls . . .
before [defendant] responded, apparently several weeks later."
There were no threats, appeals to sympathy, relentless trickery,
or extravagant rewards. While we held the evidence withstood a
challenge to sufficiency, we observed that the facts occupied the
"middle ground between what is plainly proper and what is plainly
-14-
improper." We said that if the issue had not been submitted to
the jury, we would have reversed.
In the light of these precedents, we now consider some of
the evidence favorable to an entrapment defense. First, there is
the extended period of time, three months, before the defendant
produced a firearm, the latter two months consisting of active
solicitation by the detectives following their requests for a
weapon. A jury might have believed that what began as an
investigation of counterfeiting was transformed into an effort at
entrapment once the detectives perceived that possibility. When
defendant failed to take the bait the first time, they repeated
their effort with even more urgency.
Second, the jury could have found that the detectives, with
full knowledge of the dire financial straits in which defendant
found himself, deliberately created a dependency relationship in
their continuing practice of paying substantial sums for his
counterfeit tokens. The lure of continuing payment could be
looked on as more than the "`greed or . . . lure of easy money'"
found unpersuasive as evidence of entrapment in United States v. _____________
Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Coady, _____________ _____
809 F.2d at 121).
A third factor that the jury could consider as evidence of
"urgency" and "insistence," contrary to the district court's
reaction, is the number, frequency, and immediacy of the
detectives' contacts, involving both personal visits and phone
calls. A fourth factor, which might well have been considered
-15-
the "plus" added to "opportunity," was the detectives' renewal,
in a context of urgency (the insistence on robbing the nightclub
on Cape Cod within several days' time), of their request for a
firearm, conjoined with the jolting news of the imminent
departure of their casino contact source of funds. In denying
the request for an entrapment charge, the district court made no
mention of defendant's financial stringency or the arguable
impact of the news of this formidable threat to continued income.
A fifth factor entering our assessment is defendant's
testimony about his motive, strategy, and "pattern" of "stall,
talk, ride, and change the subject." The district court included
defendant's "discussion of guns" in her reasons for finding no
basis for a rational conclusion of improper inducement. But
defendant's story of inventing escapades, finding holes in them,
suggesting exploratory trips, and inventing excuses for not
producing a gun is both detailed and corroborated by the
evidence. It may well be that a jury would dismiss all of this
as a pack of lies, but it seems to us that this was a task for
the jury, not the judge.
We therefore conclude that enough evidence of inducement was
introduced to meet defendant's burden on this first prong of the
entrapment defense. As for the absence of predisposition prong,
much of what we have pointed to is relevant. We must acknowledge
that defendant was certainly predisposed to commit the crime of
counterfeiting, but the question is whether he was predisposed to
commit the crime of procuring and possessing a firearm before the ______
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government intervened. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549. The span ___ ________
of time that elapsed before a gun was produced, the excuses,
delays, and defendant's explanation of his strategy persuade us
that defendant met his burden on this prong as well. He
therefore must be retried.
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Remaining Issues ________________
Constitutionality. Defendant challenges the district _________________
court's denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) exceeded Congress's
Commerce Clause authority under the reasoning of United States v. _____________
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). This issue is no longer open in _____
this circuit. See United States v. Abernathy, 83 F.3d 17, 20 ___ ______________ _________
(1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 49 (1st ______________ _______
Cir. 1996). The district court ruled correctly.
Validity of predicate convictions. Defendant challenges the _________________________________
court's imposition of an enhanced thirty-year sentence under the
authority of 18 U.S.C. 924(e), claiming error in its holding
valid three 1964 Rhode Island convictions for breaking and
entering. Although discussion of sentencing at this time is
unnecessary in light of our conclusion that defendant's
conviction must be vacated, we briefly respond.
Defendant offered his own signed, but unsworn, statement
that he did not have counsel when he entered nolo contendere
pleas on the three state convictions. The government, however,
introduced docket cards maintained by the Attorney General, each
indicating, following the printed word "Counsel," the name of Leo
McGowan, now deceased, then a part-time public defender. Police
records also showed representation by McGowan in the complaints
and warrants. In addition, the face sheets accompanying the
convictions bore, in pencil, the name "Bevilacqua," then a
prominent criminal defense lawyer.
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The district court found nothing in the records to hint of
invalidity and viewed defendant's statement to be completely
incredible. The court noted, as well, that the convictions had
been entered more than a year after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 ______ __________
U.S. 335 (1963), had required counsel in felony cases and that
Rhode Island had, for more than twenty years before the
convictions, followed the practice of appointing counsel in such
cases. We detect no error in the court's ruling that defendant
failed to produce sufficient credible evidence to rebut the
presumption of constitutional validity that arose from
introduction of certified copies of the convictions. See United ___ ______
States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 197 (1st Cir. 1994). ______ _____
For reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the case is ____________________________________________________________
remanded for a new trial. _________________________
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United States v. Andrews Bruce Campbell , 874 F.2d 838 ( 1989 )
United States v. Felix Rodriguez , 858 F.2d 809 ( 1988 )
United States v. Tracy , 36 F.3d 187 ( 1994 )
United States v. Pablo Panet-Collazo, United States v. ... , 960 F.2d 256 ( 1992 )
United States v. Acosta , 67 F.3d 334 ( 1995 )
United States v. Bennett , 75 F.3d 40 ( 1996 )
United States v. Harold Kessee , 992 F.2d 1001 ( 1993 )
United States v. Abernathy , 83 F.3d 17 ( 1996 )
United States v. Neil Patrick Coady , 809 F.2d 119 ( 1987 )
United States v. Jose Hernandez, United States of America v.... , 995 F.2d 307 ( 1993 )
Gideon v. Wainwright , 83 S. Ct. 792 ( 1963 )
Jacobson v. United States , 112 S. Ct. 1535 ( 1992 )