Casiano-Jimenez v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1496
JOSÉ LUIS CASIANO-JIMÉNEZ,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
David Ramos-Pagán for petitioner.
Tiffany V. Monrose, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for respondent.
March 29, 2016
SELYA, Circuit Judge. A criminal defendant's right to
testify in his own behalf — or, conversely, not to testify — is a
critically important right. Given the salience of the right, a
defendant is entitled to be fully briefed so that he may make an
informed choice. In this case, the defendant did not receive his
due. Consequently, the district court erred in denying the
defendant's petition for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
I. BACKGROUND
We sketch the factual and procedural terrain in broad
strokes. The reader who thirsts for more exegetic details may
slake that thirst by consulting our opinion rejecting the
petitioner's direct appeal. See United States v. Angulo-
Hernández, 565 F.3d 2, 4-7 (1st Cir. 2009).
In 2009, petitioner-appellant José Luis Casiano-Jiménez
was convicted of conspiring to smuggle narcotics by ship into the
United States. At trial, the petitioner's defense was based on
lack of knowledge: he maintained that he was unaware that any
contraband was clandestine aboard the ship. None of the seven
defendants (including the petitioner) took the stand to testify.
Rather, they presented a joint defense through a single expert who
examined the vessel and opined that — based on the hidden location
of the contraband — it was possible that none of the crew members
were aware that drugs were on board.
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The jury found the captain and the engineer, along with
the petitioner (whom the government characterized as the ship's
first officer) and one other crew member, guilty of conspiring to
possess controlled substances with intent to distribute and aiding
and abetting.1 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1),
70506(b). The jury acquitted three other crew members (all
ordinary seamen). The district court proceeded to sentence the
convicted defendants (including the petitioner) to lengthy prison
terms.
On direct review, the convicted defendants challenged
the jury verdicts on various grounds, including the alleged
insufficiency of the evidence. We affirmed, though one member of
the panel dissented on the basis that the evidence, though
sufficient to support the verdicts against the captain and the
engineer, did not suffice to show that the other two convicted
defendants (including the petitioner) were aware of any drugs being
on board. See Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d at 13-18 (Torruella, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The petitioner
unsuccessfully sought both rehearing en banc and a writ of
certiorari, and his conviction and sentence became final.
1
The jury also found this group of defendants guilty of aiding
and abetting the possession of a machine gun. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2(a), 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The district court, however, wiped out
this portion of the jury verdict, granting judgments of acquittal
across the board. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c).
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The petitioner filed a timeous section 2255 petition for
post-conviction relief that raised, inter alia, a claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his
right to testify in his own behalf.2 The district court denied
the petition and refused to grant a certificate of appealability
(COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This court granted a COA,
however, limited to the plaint that the petitioner was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. By unpublished order, we then remanded the case to the
district court for such an evidentiary hearing. See Casiano-
Jiménez v. United States, No. 11-2049 (1st Cir. Nov. 30, 2012)
(unpublished order).
The district court held the evidentiary hearing in March
of 2013. The petitioner and his trial counsel, Frank Inserni,
both testified. They agreed that Inserni had never explained to
the petitioner either that he had a right to testify in his own
behalf or that the decision to do so belonged exclusively to him.
Inserni added that the lawyers for all the defendants collectively
decided that "it would be detrimental" to have any of the
defendants testify. They chose instead to retain a single expert
to present a "lack of knowledge" defense on behalf of all the
2 The petitioner also put forth other grounds for section 2255
relief, but those grounds have been abandoned and need not concern
us.
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defendants. The lawyers proceeded to communicate this strategy to
the defendants at a group meeting.
The petitioner's testimony fit seamlessly with Inserni's
testimony. The petitioner acknowledged that he had spoken to
Inserni about testifying, but confirmed that Inserni had not
advised him of his right to testify. He likewise corroborated
Inserni's version of what was said at the group meeting.
In a three-page unpublished order, the district court
again rejected the section 2255 petition. It also declined — as
it had before — to issue a COA. The petitioner nevertheless filed
a notice of appeal. He then requested and received a COA from
this court. Briefing and oral argument followed,3 and we took the
matter under advisement.
II. ANALYSIS
Our analysis begins with an overview of the legal
landscape and then proceeds to the merits of the petitioner's
appeal.
A. The Legal Landscape.
"[T]he appropriate vehicle for claims that the
defendant's right to testify was violated by defense counsel is a
3Shortly before oral argument in this court, the government
informed us that the petitioner had completed his prison term and
had been returned to Colombia. He remains subject, however, to a
5-year term of supervised release, and the government concedes
that his appeal is not moot.
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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." United States v.
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). Such a claim may
properly be raised by a petition for post-conviction relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 56
(1st Cir. 2007).
Prevailing on an ineffective-assistance claim
necessitates two showings: the defendant "must demonstrate that
counsel's performance fell below an objective threshold of
reasonable care and that this deficient performance prejudiced
him." United States v. Caramadre, 807 F.3d 359, 371 (1st Cir.
2015); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The prejudice prong requires a defendant to establish that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. See Turner v. United States, 699 F.3d 578, 584 (1st
Cir. 2012).
In any trial, a defendant's right to testify in his own
defense is a "fundamental constitutional right" and is "essential
to due process of law in a fair adversary process." Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 53 n.10 (1987) (quoting Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)). The defendant's
lawyer, rather than the trial judge, bears the primary
responsibility of informing and advising the defendant of this
right, including its strategic ramifications. See Teague, 953
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F.2d at 1533. Similarly, the defendant's lawyer bears the primary
responsibility of explaining that the choice of whether or not to
testify belongs to the defendant. See id. It follows inexorably
that "[t]he right to testify may not be waived by counsel acting
alone." Owens, 483 F.3d at 58 (citing cases). If the defendant
is unaware of his right to testify and counsel, without
consultation, unilaterally declines to call the defendant as a
witness in his own behalf, the defendant's right to make an
informed decision has been nullified. See id. at 59.
Viewed against this backdrop, it is not surprising that
we have held that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of
his right to testify comprises constitutionally deficient
performance. See id. at 58; see also Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534
(explaining that such a failure amounts to an attorney's neglect
of a "vital professional responsibility"). In determining whether
a lawyer has adequately apprised his client of this fundamental
right, no particular formulation is required. See Owens, 483 F.3d
at 60 n.10. There are no magic words; the inquiry is whether "some
sort of conversation" has occurred between the attorney and his
client, such that "the client can make a knowing and informed
decision" regarding whether to testify in his own defense. Id.
B. The Case at Hand.
We now move from the general to the specific. Where, as
here, a petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief
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following an evidentiary hearing, we review the district court's
findings of fact for clear error. See Owens, 483 F.3d at 57.
Under this rubric, credibility determinations are entitled to
equal or greater deference. See Awon v. United States, 308 F.3d
133, 141 (1st Cir. 2002); Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16, 25
(1st Cir. 1994). Questions of law, however, engender de novo
review. See Owens, 483 F.3d at 57.
We start with an appraisal of trial counsel's
performance. At the evidentiary hearing, Inserni was asked point-
blank whether he had advised the petitioner of his right to
testify. The attorney admitted unequivocally that he had not
informed the petitioner about this right. Rather, a group meeting
transpired at which counsel for all of the defendants "explained
to them . . . that it would not be advisable for any of them to
take the stand" and that the attorneys had collectively agreed
that a single expert would present the rudiments of a "lack of
knowledge" defense on behalf of all the defendants. The
petitioner's testimony on these points echoed that of his trial
counsel.
In a terse rescript, the district court concluded that
the petitioner's claim was "inherently incredible." The court
made no explicit credibility findings — yet it refused to credit
Inserni's and the petitioner's statements that the petitioner had
never been apprised of his right to testify. Focusing instead on
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Inserni's description of the joint meeting among the defendants
and their counsel, the court held that the petitioner had been
sufficiently notified of his fundamental constitutional right to
testify.
Although we recognize that the standard of review is
deferential, see Awon, 308 F.3d at 141, the foundation upon which
the district court's holding rests is as insubstantial as a house
built upon the shifting sands. The holding assumes that the
discussion at the group meeting served as a sufficient surrogate
both for the explanation of the right to testify that Inserni owed
to the petitioner and for the petitioner's informed decision about
whether to testify in his own defense. For aught that appears,
those assumptions are plucked out of thin air: their frailty is
made readily apparent by a careful examination of the testimony
about the joint meeting.
Inserni testified that the assembled defense lawyers
told the assembled defendants that the lawyers "thought an expert
would be the best way . . . to testify on all their behalf" and
explained to them that "it was a consensus . . . it would not be
advisable for any of [the defendants] to take the stand." But
that consensus was a consensus only among the lawyers. During the
meeting, no one told the petitioner, in words or substance, that
he had a right to testify; and no one bothered to obtain his
informed consent to remaining silent. Plainly, then, the testimony
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about the meeting cannot support the district court's finding that
there was a collective and informed decision, reached by all the
defendants (including the petitioner), that none of them would
testify. The most that can be said is that the defense lawyers
unilaterally decided that none of the defendants would testify and
presented that decision to the defendants as a fait accompli.
We have admonished that "[t]he right to testify may not
be waived by counsel acting alone." Owens, 483 F.3d at 58. There
must be a focused discussion between lawyer and client, and that
discussion must — at a bare minimum — enable the defendant to make
an informed decision about whether to take the stand. See id. at
60 n.10. Here, there is simply no evidence that Inserni shouldered
even this modest burden.
Inserni's failure to discuss the right to testify with
the petitioner is especially troubling given the petitioner's
profile. After all, the petitioner was an alien who had limited
proficiency in English and no experience with the American criminal
justice system. Seen in this light, trial counsel's omission
verged on the egregious — and there was nothing "inherently
incredible" about either the petitioner's or Inserni's testimony
at the section 2255 hearing.
The short of it is that the record contains no evidence
sufficient to ground a finding either that the petitioner knowingly
waived his right to testify or that he was even aware that such a
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right existed. To the contrary, it appears that trial counsel
took the bit in his teeth: he decided that the petitioner should
not testify and then foisted his decision upon the petitioner
without any meaningful dialogue. This usurpation transgressed
both the lawyer's professional responsibility to his client and
the petitioner's constitutional rights.
The record contains nothing that would suggest a
justification for such a gross dereliction of duty. We hold,
therefore, that counsel's omission represented constitutionally
deficient performance of his duty to his client.
This brings us to the prejudice prong of the ineffective-
assistance inquiry. The court below did not address this issue
except to state that the petitioner's testimony would have been
"the same" as that of the defense expert. We do not agree.
The defense expert testified, based on his experience
generally and the concealed placement of the contraband on board
the ship,4 that it was "possible" that none of the defendants knew
that the ship contained drugs. Although this testimony aligned
with the theme of the defense, it fell far short of what the
petitioner, had he testified, could have added. A party's explicit
4 The contraband was secreted in a cache below the crew's
quarters, covered by multiple layers of plywood and placed
underneath a metal hatch. See Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d at 6.
The concealment was so artfully done that, after the vessel was
intercepted and seized, it took the Coast Guard almost a week to
discover the drugs. See id.
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disclaimer of knowledge may well have more weight than an expert's
theoretical conclusion. Cf. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (observing that
"the most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases
is the defendant himself"). That appears to be the case here.
The petitioner's testimony at the evidentiary hearing
revealed that he would have been able to tell the jury:
 prior to the voyage, he had never met either the captain or
any of the other crew members;
 he had never before set foot on that particular ship;
 he signed on to the voyage only as an "able-bodied seaman";
 he had no knowledge of drugs being brought onto the ship; and
 it was not until he was aboard the ship that (to fill a
vacancy) he was pressed into service as "first officer."
Contrary to the district court's avowal, the petitioner's
testimony was not "the same" as the expert's testimony, but was
materially different (and far more exculpatory). Though the expert
testified to the petitioner's hypothetical lack of knowledge, the
petitioner would have testified as to what he actually knew. So
viewed, the petitioner's testimony could have been a game-changer.
Cf. Owens, 483 F.3d at 59 (explaining that "[a] defendant's
testimony as to non-involvement should not be disregarded
lightly").
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The bottom line is that a third party's testimony as to
what a defendant may have known cannot fairly be equated with the
defendant's own first-hand account of what he actually knew. Here,
moreover, the petitioner's testimony would have been significant
even beyond his direct denial of culpable knowledge. He would
have explained away his status as "first officer" of the ship, and
made pellucid that he was a stranger to the captain and the crew.
These facts would have bolstered the petitioner's claim that he
was unaware of the presence of any contraband on the ship.
Given this tableau, prejudice is obvious. The
petitioner's conviction depended, in material part, on the
government's ability to persuade the jury that he knew the ship
was ferrying drugs. See Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d at 8. The
petitioner's testimony would have hit this issue head-on and could
very well have turned the tide.
Nor does the record offer any basis for believing that
the petitioner, properly informed of his rights, would have made
a tactical decision not to take the stand. Nothing in the record
militated against the petitioner's testifying in his own defense.
He had no criminal history, and Inserni testified that when it was
related to him by the petitioner, he found the petitioner's story
to be credible. What is more, the petitioner's account was
consistent with that of the defense expert and it would not have
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been necessary to alter the joint defense strategy had the
petitioner elected to testify.
Last — but far from least — the government's case was
thin.5 The government's proof was almost entirely circumstantial,
and three of the petitioner's codefendants — all ordinary seamen
— were acquitted. We think that this mixed verdict raises a
substantial question as to whether the petitioner's conviction
resulted from the government's portrayal of him as the "first
officer." The petitioner's explanation of how this status came
about may well have had decretory significance.
We conclude, without serious question, that there is a
reasonable probability that the petitioner's testimony could have
tipped the scales in his favor. See Owens, 483 F.3d at 59 (noting
that "[a] defendant's testimony could be crucial in any trial").
Had the petitioner been appropriately informed of his right to
testify and had he in fact testified and been found credible by
the jury, exoneration was a likely prospect.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Because the record shows with
conspicuous clarity both that the petitioner received
5
Even without the petitioner's testimony, this court divided
two-to-one on whether the evidence against the petitioner was
sufficient to convict. See Angulo-Hernández, 565 F.3d at 14-18
(Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, notes sent to the court during jury deliberations
indicated strong divisions among the jurors.
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constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at his criminal
trial and that he was prejudiced as a result, the district court
ought to have granted his section 2255 petition. Its failure to
do so was reversible error. Consequently, we reverse the judgment
below and remand with instructions to vacate the petitioner's
conviction and sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
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