DocketNumber： 97-1032
Filed Date： 10/7/1997
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/3/2016
United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 97-1032
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
IRA W. DAMON, III,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge, _____________
Hill* and Gibson,** Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________
____________________
F. Mark Terison, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Jay P. _________________ _______
McCloskey, United States Attorney, and James Moore, Assistant U.S. _________ ____________
Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
Jeffrey Silverstein, with whom Billings & Silverstein was on ____________________ ________________________
brief, for defendant-appellant.
____________________
October 6, 1997
____________________
____________________
* Hon. James C. Hill of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
** Hon. John R. Gibson of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Under the U.S. Sentencing LYNCH, Circuit Judge. ______________
Guidelines, punishment for an offense is, at times, increased
when the defendant was previously convicted of unrelated
crimes. This case presents serious issues of both substance
and procedure in this "enhancement" process. The substantive
issue is whether the crime of aggravated criminal mischief
under state law is categorically a "crime of violence" under
U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1), thus warranting an increase in sentence.
The outcome of the substantive question is determined by
resolution of the procedural issue. The procedural issue
concerns when a trial court may look beyond the statutory
offense and focus on the actual prior criminal conduct in the
face of the Supreme Court's admonitions that federal
sentencing courts should prefer a categorical approach over
an examination of the actual facts of the prior crime. At
stake for defendant Damon, an experienced felon caught
possessing several firearms, is whether his sentence should
be roughly two years shorter than the 84 months he received.
We hold, under Supreme Court precedent, that it was
error for the district court to look beyond the categorical
nature of the crime, which was revealed in the state charging
document. Thus the district court here could not inquire
further to discover the reality of the defendant's prior
crime as revealed in the Presentence Investigative Report:
that the defendant attempted to set fire to his house to
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collect insurance. Such acts certainly would be a crime of
violence, if that information could properly have been
considered by the district court. Nevertheless, the decision
of the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. ______ _____________
575, 600-02 (1990), and the decisions of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission embodied in amendments to 4B1.2(1) preclude this
inquiry.
I. Background
Ira Damon was stopped while driving his car on
February 28, 1996 by officer Brent Beaulieu of the Newport,
Maine police. Beaulieu patted-down Damon and found pistol
and shotgun ammunition in Damon's pockets. Damon's car held
a shotgun, a pistol, two rifles, and a loaded clip of pistol
ammunition.
Damon pled guilty to the federal charge of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(1). On December 6, 1996 the district court sentenced
Damon, inter alia, to 84 months in prison.
Damon has been afoul of the law before. We go
through the sentencing calculations that resulted from this
history of illicit activity. Damon's unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle gained him one criminal history point, and his
crimes of negotiating several worthless instruments added
three more points. Damon's convictions for assault on an
officer, aggravated criminal mischief, criminal threatening,
-3- 3
and operating a motor vehicle as an habitual offender added
two more points each. It is the aggravated criminal mischief
conviction which raises the serious issue in this appeal.
Because Damon was under a "criminal justice
sentence" at the time of the offense, the federal sentencing
judge added two criminal history points under U.S.S.G.
4A1.1. Damon's score of fourteen criminal history points
placed him in Criminal History Category VI of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
The sentencing court determined that the offense
level for Damon's crime was twenty-two, by setting the base
offense level at twenty under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), and
adding two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4) because
the serial numbers on the Colt .45 pistol found in Damon's
car were obliterated. The sentencing range for a category VI
offender who commits a level twenty-two offense is 84 to 105
months of imprisonment.
In this appeal, Damon primarily argues that his
prior conviction for criminal mischief should not have been
classified as a "crime of violence," that the court should
not have awarded him additional criminal history points for
related offenses, and that the court erred in determining
that he was under a criminal justice sentence at the time of
his arrest. We conclude that Damon's first argument has
merit, unlike the second and third.
-4- 4
II. The Standard of Review
Questions of law concerning interpretation of the
Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and the factual conclusions
of the sentencing court, which must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, are reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Grant, 114 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 1997). _____________ _____
III. The "Crime of Violence" Determination
Because it classified Damon's prior conviction for
aggravated criminal mischief as a crime of violence, the
sentencing court determined that the base offense level was
20 under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Had the court not
characterized this previous conviction as a crime of
violence, the base offense level would have been 14.
Counting the two additional offense levels for the
obliterated serial number on the pistol, Damon's sentencing
range would have been 46 to 57 months instead of 84 to 105
months. More than two years of prison time depends upon
whether Damon's prior conviction for aggravated criminal
mischief qualifies as a crime of violence under the
Guidelines.
The Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1), set out a
multi-part definition of the term "crime of violence":
The term "crime of violence" means any
offense under federal or state law punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
that --
-5- 5
(i) has an element of the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves the use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.
Under Taylor, whether a predicate offense qualifies ______
as a crime of violence requires a "categorical" examination of
the statutory crime. Taylor considered whether the defendant's ______
predicate offenses were "burglary" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
924(e), a sentencing enhancement statute.3 Taylor had been
convicted of "burglary" in Missouri state courts at a time when
Missouri had seven different statutes under which a person could
be charged for that crime. The Supreme Court held that, rather
than examine the particular circumstances of the crimes for which
the defendant was convicted, a sentencing court should look only
to whether the statute of conviction contained the elements of a
____________________
3. Taylor involved the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), ______
18 U.S.C. 924(e). Under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), "the
term 'violent felony' means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that -- (i)
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another." We
have noted that authority for interpreting the term "violent
felony" as it is defined in the ACCA constitutes authority
for interpreting U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, given the similarity in
definitions. See United States v. Meader, 1997 WL 375003, at ___ _____________ ______
*8 n.8 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, _____________ ______
18 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994). Cases involving the interpretation
of each provision are helpful in deciding this case.
-6- 6
"generic" burglary and should not inquire whether the specific
crime committed was especially dangerous to others. Taylor, 495 ______
U.S. at 598. The Court defined generic burglary as a crime that
consists of: "unlawful and unprivileged entry into, or remaining
in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id. ___
Taylor noted that in some situations the statute of ______
conviction may include elements beyond those of a generic
burglary (e.g., entry into places other than buildings). Id. at ____ ___
599-600. To address that issue, and other problems of
interpretation of 924(e), sentencing courts should employ a
"formal categorical approach," and generally "look only to the
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense." Id. at 602. A sentencing court may go beyond the fact ___
of conviction in those cases where the statute encompasses both
violent felonies (e.g., generic burglary) and non-violent ____
felonies (e.g., burglary of a vehicle rather than of a building). ____
In such a situation, the sentencing court may examine the
indictment or information and jury instructions in order to
discern which type of crime the offender was convicted of
perpetrating. Id. The Court remanded the case so that this ___
determination could be made with respect to Taylor's prior
convictions.
After Taylor, this court's analysis of predicate ______
offenses has followed this categorical approach. See United ___ ______
States v. Meader, 1997 WL 375003, *5-*6 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he ______ ______
-7- 7
standard approach for determining whether a particular crime fits
within the 'crime of violence' rubric is a generic one, in which
inquiry is restricted to the statutory definitions of prior
offenses, without regard to the particular facts underlying
them.") (citations omitted); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, _____________ ______
18 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. De Jesus, 984 F.2d 21, 23 _____________ ________
(1st Cir. 1993) ("[R]ather than examining the actual
circumstances underlying the earlier conviction, we examine only
the statutory formulation of the crime charged . . . to see if
that crime is a crime of violence . . . .").
The state statute, defining aggravated criminal
mischief under 17-A M.R.S.A. 805, is the starting point for our
inquiry:
1. A person is guilty of aggravated criminal
mischief if that person intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly:
A. Damages or destroys property of another
in an amount exceeding $2,000 in value,
having no reasonable ground to believe that
the person has a right to do so;
B. Damages or destroys property in an amount
exceeding $2,000 in value, to enable any
person to collect insurance proceeds for the
loss caused;
C. Damages, destroys or tampers with the
property of a law enforcement agency, fire
department or supplier of gas, electric,
steam, water, transportation, sanitation or
communication services to the public, having
no reasonable ground to believe that the
person has a right to do so, and thereby
causes a substantial interruption or
impairment of service rendered to the public;
or
-8- 8
D. Damages, destroys or tampers with
property of another and thereby recklessly
endangers human life.
This state statute, on its face, covers many types of
activities, some actually or potentially violent, depending on
the subsection involved, some not. Through its subsections,
805 is the equivalent of four statutory crimes. The government
concedes that 17-A M.R.S.A. 805(1)(D) involves a serious risk
of harm to others but that 17-A M.R.S.A. 805(1)(A), (B) and (C)
do not.
Under such circumstances, Taylor instructs that it is ______
appropriate to look to the charging document to see which
subsection of the statute is involved. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; ______
see also Winter, 22 F.3d at 21 (parsing 18 U.S.C. 1952(a) into ___ ____ ______
subsections that criminalize primarily violent conduct versus
those that criminalize primarily non-violent conduct); United ______
States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 1992) (additional ______ ___
inquiry into indictment and jury instructions authorized by
Taylor when a statute covers both violent and non-violent conduct ______
"means only that, where a single statutory provision defines
several different crimes . . . a court may have to look at the
indictment . . . to see which of the several different statutory
crimes . . . was at issue").
We turn to the crime with which Damon was charged.
It is clear that he was not charged under subsection D, which
necessarily involves harm to others, but rather under subsection
-9- 9
B, which does not. Damon was charged in an information which
recited:
That on or about January 8, 1994, in the town
of N. Anson, County of Somerset and State of
Maine, Ira Damon III did intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly damage or destroy
property in an amount exceeding $2,000.00 in
value, to wit, his own house, in order to
enable himself to collect insurance proceeds
for the loss caused.
The inquiry is whether the elements of subsection B
fit the definition of a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
4B1.2(1). The answer is that they do not, with the possible
exception of the "otherwise" clause in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1)(ii).
See De Jesus, 984 F.2d at 24-25 (larceny from the person falls ___ _________
within the "otherwise" clause because the statute requires theft
from the victim's person or immediate vicinity, and thus involves
the risk of a violent struggle).
Damon's prior conviction for aggravated criminal
mischief qualifies as a crime of violence if and only if a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another is a
"normal, usual, or customary concomitant" of the predicate
offense of aggravated criminal mischief as set forth in
805(1)(B). See Winter, 22 F.3d at 20. In conducting this ___ ______
inquiry, we examine whether the "mine run of conduct," De Jesus, ________
984 F.2d at 24, which subsection B was intended to cover
constitutes a crime of violence.
The government vociferously argues that causing
damage to a house of $2,000 or more in order to collect insurance
-10- 10
proceeds normally involves "a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." We think not. We note that arson, which
does pose a great risk to fire department personnel and others,
is a separate crime and that simply causing damage to property,
including a house, does not require the damage be done by arson.
There are many easy ways to cause $2,000 in property4 damage
which do not risk physical injury to other people. Exposing the
interior of a house to the elements by opening windows or doors
could cause such damage. Leaving a few windows open on a frigid
night or, to give a New England example, during a Nor'easter,
will readily lead to such damage to a house. Furthermore, it is
more typically true that people defrauding insurance companies by
damaging property will not want other persons to be present who
could give witness to the misdeeds. And so, ironically, the
intent to defraud the insurer reduces any potential risk of harm
to others.
This contrasts markedly with the risks associated
with the typical burglary of a dwelling. Burglary has "an
inherent potential for harm to persons. The fact that an
offender enters a building to commit a crime often creates the
possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and
____________________
4. "Property" as it is used in the aggravated criminal
mischief statute means "anything of value," 17-A M.R.S.A.
352, thus homes are just one of many forms of property that
may be damaged or destroyed by offenders who violate 17-A
M.R.S.A. 805(1)(B).
-11- 11
an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to
investigate." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588. ______
Examining just the statutory language and the
charging document,5 we conclude that the typical conduct
reachable under subsection B does not involve a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another. Our inquiry in reaching this
conclusion is limited to the "usual type of conduct that the
statute purposes to proscribe," and does not explore "the outer
limits of the statutory language or the myriad of possibilities
girdled by that language." Winter, 22 F.3d at 20. See also Doe, ______ ___ ____ ___
960 F.2d at 224-25 (holding that crime of being a felon in
possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence because
typical firearm possession is not violent, even though Doe
possessed his gun while waiting to ambush an enemy).
The government nonetheless argues that the inquiry
should not stop there, Taylor notwithstanding. At the ______
government's insistence, and relying on this court's 1992
decision in United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234 (1st Cir. ______________ ______
1992), the district court engaged in further inquiry. It turned
to the PSI and learned that Damon had attempted to "sell his
____________________
5. This case does not raise the question of what documents
beyond the charging document or the jury instructions may be
examined to determine which subsection of the multi-faceted
crime is involved. The question about what subsection or
type of statutory crime is involved is resolved here by the
charging document. The parties' vigorous argument about
whether a PSI may ever be a source of information is simply
not germane.
-12- 12
house to the insurance company" (as this activity is commonly
described)6 by burning it. The district court sensibly concluded
that this was the equivalent of arson, and that, under explicit
mandate of the Guidelines and our precedent, arson is undeniably
a crime of violence, not the least of which for the threat it
poses to firefighters. See United States v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1 ___ _____________ ________
(1st Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the court concluded that the
actual aggravated criminal mischief here was a crime of violence
and so increased Damon's sentence.
In light of Taylor and changing definitions from the ______
Sentencing Commission, we think the district court was precluded
from looking so deeply into the nature of the predicate offense.
That the court thought it permissible to do so under our decision
in Harris was not unreasonable, but as we now clarify, was wrong. ______
In Harris and in United States v. Bregnard, 951 F.2d ______ _____________ ________
457 (1st Cir. 1991), this court held that it was proper for the
sentencing court, in determining whether a prior guilty plea was
to a crime of violence where the statute typically included both
generally violent and non-violent crimes, to examine the
description in the offenders' uncontested presentencing reports
of the prior indictment and plea. In both Harris and Bregnard, ______ ________
the defendant had been previously convicted of assault and
battery. Because the state crime of assault and battery, Mass.
____________________
6. In some parts of the country, but not New England, the
phrase is colorfully put as "sell his house to the Yankees."
-13- 13
Gen. Laws ch. 265 13A, encompassed both violent and non-violent
conduct, this court said that it was proper for the sentencing
court to determine of which variety of the offense the defendant
had been convicted, and to look to the uncontested portions of
the presentencing report to do so. Harris at 1236; Bregnard at ______ ________
459-60.
We noted in Harris that Taylor establishes that ______ ______
"sometimes, looking to the 'statutory definition' alone will not
establish whether or not the prior offense was a 'violent
felony,' for some statutes contain language in a single section
that covers several separate crimes, some of which are 'violent'
and some of which are not." Harris, 964 F.2d at 1235. ______
Harris stated that the proper inquiry under the ______
categorical approach does not concern what the defendant actually
did, but rather examines whether the defendant was convicted of a
"generically violent crime" or a "generically non-violent crime."
Id. at 1236. Harris held that when a trial court is faced with a ___ ______
past conviction for violating a single statute that covers both a
violent and a non-violent crime it may decide which crime was
involved by looking to an uncontested presentencing report. The
Harris court noted the availability of other sources of ______
information, such as the indictment or guilty plea, to make this
determination. Id. at 1236 ("A sentencing court, faced with a ___
prior conviction under a statute that makes it unlawful to break
into a 'building' or into a 'vehicle,' might simply read the
-14- 14
indictment or the guilty plea . . . to see if it says 'building'
or 'vehicle.'").
Later cases have clarified that a sentencing court
faced with a prior conviction under a broad statute should first
resort to the jury instructions or charging instrument, and only
if these are not instructive may the court turn to other
documents for information. See Meader, 1997 WL 375003 at *6 ___ ______
(noting that Application Note 2 for 4B1.2 "explicitly
identifies the defendant's charged conduct . . . as the focus of
the 'otherwise' clause"); Winter, 22 F.3d at 20 & n.8 ("Taylor ______ ______
demands that a court . . . consult a limited array of materials -
- principally the indictment and jury instructions -- in
determining if the offense can be classified as a crime of
violence."). In these later cases, the courts were persuaded
that amendments to the Guidelines which emphasized the
defendant's charged conduct mandated that inquiry should begin
with the charging instrument.7 See United States v. Palmer, 68 ___ _____________ ______
F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); United States v. ______________
Fernandez, 940 F. Supp. 387, 391-92 (D. Mass. 1996), aff'd, 1997 _________ _____
____________________
7. Application note two to 4B1.2 now reads: "Other
offenses are included [as crimes of violence] where . . . the
conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of ____ _________________
which the defendant was convicted . . . by its nature,
presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another. Under this section, the conduct of which the ___________________________
defendant was convicted is the focus of inquiry." (emphasis _______________________
added). We must accord the application notes and commentary
controlling weight if they are not clearly erroneous nor
inconsistent with the Guidelines. Stinson v. United States, _______ _____________
508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).
-15- 15
WL 432249 (1st Cir. 1997). Also, Taylor specifically refers to ______
the charging instrument and jury instructions as acceptable
sources of information under the categorical approach. Taylor, ______
495 U.S. at 602.
Under Taylor, when the predicate statutory crime has ______
been determined to be typically non-violent, the inquiry ends.
In this case, the charging document makes it clear that Damon was
convicted under 17-A M.R.S.A. 805(1)(B) and we find that the
typical run of conduct for this property damage crime does not
constitute a crime of violence. It was error to look beyond.
Our society has decided to enhance the punishment for
those who have a history of crimes of violence, and it may appear
a strange system which reverses a sentencing judge for
determining whether the defendant's past criminal actions were in
fact violent. Such a result is compelled by Taylor8 and by the ______
Guidelines. We pause to explain some of the reasons, as we
understand them, which motivated the choice to prefer the
categorical approach.
The first reason, as Taylor observed, is that ______
Congress intended that the Guidelines take a categorical approach
to sentencing. The language of 4B1.2, like the almost
____________________
8. We note that a petition for certiorari is pending in
United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 1997), ______________ _______
petition for cert. filed, (July 14, 1997) (No. 97-5326), a _________________________
case which also concerns the proper application of the
categorical approach. Even if certiorari is granted,
however, the Supreme Court's resolution of Shannon would not _______
necessarily affect the outcome of this case.
-16- 16
identical provisions of 924(e), requires that the sentencing
court should "look only to the fact that the defendant had been
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to
the facts underlying the prior convictions." Taylor, 495 U.S. at ______
600. Such categorical sentencing procedures for implementation
of the Guidelines, it is hoped, will lead to like cases receiving
like sentences. See Doe, 960 F.2d at 225 ("uniform ___ ___
interpretation of similar language is itself desirable"); United ______
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 547 (11th Cir. 1990) ______ ______________
(citation omitted) ("The guidelines . . . constitute an effort by
the Commission to design a sentencing system that reduces
disparities in the sentences of defendants convicted of similar
crimes. Taking into account the myriad of subtle differences in
the commission of every recognized crime of violence would result
in as many different sentences.").
Second, using a categorical approach makes more sense
administratively than conducting a fact-intensive inquiry. The
categorical approach usually requires the sentencing court to
look only to a few readily available sources of undisputed
information. The sentencing court is thus spared from mini-
trials on prior offenses, which have already been once
adjudicated, when deciding the appropriate punishment. See ___
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (noting "practical difficulties" of fact- ______
intensive inquiry). As we said in United States v. Correa, 114 _____________ ______
F.3d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1997), "[c]riminal history, by
-17- 17
definition, deals with bygone events which often happened in the
distant past, or in a remote jurisdiction, or both. Requiring a
federal judge to go behind the formal record and excavate the
details of what transpired in each instance would impose an
onerous burden, freighted with unusual evidentiary difficulties."
Such an inquiry, as Taylor recognized, would be time-consuming ______
and could be unfair.
Third, this approach honors the choice of the state
in its decisions concerning which crimes to prosecute and how
plea bargains should be negotiated. It respects the autonomy of
the state system. To give an example, the state here did not
charge Damon with arson, clearly a crime of violence. It charged
him with aggravated criminal mischief. To the extent that
enhancement provisions are "intended to supplement the States'
law enforcement efforts against 'career' criminals," Taylor, 495 ______
U.S. at 581, it is more fundamentally fair to act in ways
"consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their
own offenses." Id. at 582 (quoting from the Senate Report for ___
the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982).
Fourth, the categorical approach is more or less
evenhanded in its imperfections. In this case and in Doe, the ___
categorical approach has resulted in a less severe sentence than
would result were sentencing court permitted to examine the
actual circumstances of the predicate offense. In other cases,
however, the sentence could be harsher than if the actual conduct
-18- 18
could be examined. For example, in United States v. Fernandez, ______________ _________
1997 WL 432249 (1st Cir. 1997) this court held that the
Massachusetts crime of assault and battery on a police officer
is, categorically, a crime of violence. Despite the fact that
the crime could theoretically include both violent and non-
violent variants, the usual case was violent. Id. at *3 & n.2. ___
Thus a defendant who actually did commit the offense in a non-
violent manner would be subjected to a harsher sentence.9
Finally, we are dealing with sentencing enhancements. ____________
Defendants have already been punished once for their earlier
offenses. Those who do not receive enhancements they might if
the court were allowed to examine the actual conduct underlying
the predicate offense have not escaped punishment for these prior
bad acts.
The choice of a categorical procedure for the
evaluation of predicate offenses could easily be made
differently. But arguments in favor of a different process are
better addressed elsewhere. We are bound by Taylor and the ______
Guidelines.
IV. The Criminal History Calculation
Damon argues that the sentencing court improperly
tallied criminal history points for related offenses and that he
____________________
9. The Fernandez court did note, however, that in this _________
situation the defendant would be free to seek relief by
filing a departure motion. Id. at *4 n.3. ___
-19- 19
was not under a criminal justice sentence at the time of the
instant offense. These arguments are without merit.
Damon claims that his two prior state law convictions
for aggravated criminal mischief and criminal threatening were
"related" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. and so must be treated
as a single sentence under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2).10 The crimes
were related, he says, because sentencing occurred on the same
day in the same court for both offenses. It is clear that the
offenses are unrelated. The aggravated criminal mischief offense
occurred on January 8, 1994, and the criminal threatening offense
on January 5, 1995. One involved Damon damaging his own house,
while in the other Damon threatened another man with a .45
caliber handgun. Damon's argument that these crimes are related
fails under United States v. Correa, 114 F.3d 314, 317 (1st Cir. _____________ ______
1997), where this court expressly held that:
at least in respect to offenses that are
temporally and factually distinct (that is,
offenses which occurred on different dates
and which did not arise out of the same
course of conduct), charges based thereon
should not be regarded as having been
consolidated (and, therefore, "related")
____________________
10. Section 4A1.2, comment n.3 provides:
[P]rior sentences are considered related if
they resulted from offenses that (1) occurred
on the same occasion, (2) were part of a
single common scheme or plan, or (3) were
consolidated for trial or sentencing. . . .
[When this does] not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal
history or the frequency with which he has
committed crimes . . . an upward departure
may be warranted.
-20- 20
unless the original sentencing court entered
an actual order of consolidation or there is
some other persuasive indicium of formal
consolidation apparent on the face of the
record which is sufficient to indicate that
the offenses have some relationship to one
another beyond the sheer fortuity that
sentence was imposed by the same judge at the
same time.
There was no formal order of consolidation of these two offenses,
and we conclude that they are unrelated for sentencing purposes.
Damon also argues that the district court should not
have assessed two criminal history points for his conviction for
operating a motor vehicle as an habitual offender. He claims
that this conviction is related to the instant offense, as he was
stopped with the guns in his car. The mere fortuity that one
offense led to the discovery of a second crime is not sufficient
to make the offenses "related" within the meaning of the
Guidelines. See United States v. Troncoso, 23 F.3d 612, 616 (1st ___ _____________ ________
Cir. 1994) (drug selling charges unrelated to violation of
federal immigration laws, even though former led to discovery of
latter), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1116 (1995); United States v. _____ ______ _____________
Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1338-39 (6th Cir. 1992) (conviction for ______
carrying a concealed weapon not part of federal money laundering
offense, even though gun was found at time of arrest for money
laundering); United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349, 353 _____________ ___________
(10th Cir. 1991) (state conviction for possession of a stolen car
severable from federal offense of being a felon in possession,
-21- 21
even though firearm was found in car's trunk at time of arrest on
stolen vehicle charge).
Damon next argues that he was not under a "criminal
justice sentence" at the time he committed the instant offense,
February 28, 1996, because while the Maine Superior Court imposed
a sentence for his aggravated criminal mischief and criminal
threatening offenses on February 22, 1996, the court stayed
execution of these sentences until March 21, 1996.
There is no question that Damon was required to
surrender to prison to serve his sentence at the time he was
found with firearms in his possession. The application note for
4A1.1(d) specifically states that "active supervision is not
required for this item to apply." Because Damon was under a
requirement to serve this sentence at the time of the instant
offense, we hold that he was under a criminal justice sentence.
See United States v. Martinez, 931 F.2d 851, 852 (11th Cir. 1991) ___ _____________ ________
("[A] defendant who has been sentenced, regardless of whether he
has surrendered for service of that sentence, must be considered
'under [a] criminal justice sentence' within section 4A1.1(d).")
Damon's offenses of negotiating worthless instruments
occurred over a period of eight days in October of 1989. Damon
was sentenced for these three offenses on January 3, 1990, on May
14, 1990, and on June 11, 1991. Sentencing for the latter two
crimes occurred in a different court than for the first offense.
-22- 22
Different sentences were imposed for each offense. We find none
of the factors necessary to implicate a common scheme or plan
present in the record of this case. See United States v. Correa, ___ _____________ ______
114 F.3d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Patasnik, 89 _____________ ________
F.3d 63, 74 (2nd Cir. 1996); United States v. Letterlough, 63 _____________ ___________
F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 406 _____ ______
(1995); United States v. Yeo, 936 F.2d 628, 629 (1st Cir. 1991). _____________ ___
V. Conclusion
Under the categorical approach, sentencing courts
must determine, first, which statutory offense the defendant was
convicted of committing and, second, whether this type of offense
is usually violent. When the statute of conviction for a
predicate offense is broad enough to cover both generic violent
crimes and generic non-violent crimes, the sentencing court may
examine the charging instrument and/or jury instructions to
determine whether it was the violent or non-violent type of crime
for which the defendant was convicted. Only if these sources do
not yield this information may the sentencing court look to other
accurate, judicially noticeable sources. At each stage, the
purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether the type of crime ____
the defendant committed was violent or non-violent. In this
case, based on the charging papers, we hold that Damon violated
17-A M.R.S.A. 805(1)(B), and that the typical offense
punishable under this statute is not a crime of violence.
-23- 23
The violent crime enhancement to Damon's sentence is
vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
-24- 24
Hill, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in Hill, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. ____________________
the judgment and in all of the opinion of Judge Lynch except that
portion commencing on page 15, remarking upon the fact that the
law forbids a sentencing judge from ascertaining the existence,
vel non, of pertinent facts and shouldering the burden "to _______
explain why."
The reason for my concurrence is that Taylor v. ______
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and decisions of this court, _____________
interpreting Taylor, upon which the opinion relies, require this ______
result. Being bound, I do not dissent from our requiring a
sentencing judge "to ignore the reality of the prior offense in
determining whether that offense is a crime of violence." We
import instructions -- "Don't ask. Don't tell."
-25- 25
United States v. Troncoso ( 1994 )
United States v. Fernandez ( 1996 )
United States v. Grant ( 1997 )
United States v. Gerald Harris ( 1992 )
United States v. Stephen Martin Beddow ( 1992 )
United States v. Winter ( 1994 )
United States v. Arthur L. Doe, A/K/A "Butchy" ( 1992 )
United States v. Rosalio Correa ( 1997 )
United States v. Dale M. Bregnard ( 1991 )
United States v. Mitchell ( 1994 )
United States v. Carlos De Jesus ( 1993 )
United States v. Michael S. Patasnik and James Cecere ( 1996 )
United States v. Kenneth John Banashefski ( 1991 )
United States v. Scott Palmer ( 1995 )
United States v. Ramon Gonzalez-Lopez ( 1990 )
United States v. Kenneth Yeo ( 1991 )
United States v. Vincent Jay Letterlough ( 1995 )
United States v. Jesus Martinez ( 1991 )
Taylor v. United States ( 1990 )