Canty v. LaRhette

USCA1 Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

                                 No. 98-1671



                           JOHN CANTY,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



                 JANIS M. LARHETTE, ETC., ET AL.,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



         [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



 Stahl, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.









     John Canty on brief pro se.

     Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General, and Daniel J. Mullen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees Janis Larhette and Howard Zibel.

     James B. Kazan and Normand & Shaughnessy, P.A. on brief for appellees L. David Vincola and N.L. Vincola.









February 25, 1999











            Per Curiam. Having carefully reviewed the record in

    this case, including the briefs of the parties, we affirm the

    dismissal of appellant's claims, although for reasons somewhat

    different from those relied upon below.

              First, we find all of Canty's claims for damage

    relief to be barred by the doctrine of Rooker-Feldman.  Each of

    these claims is predicated on an alleged injury which arises

    out of Canty's eviction.  Since that eviction was upheld by the

    judgment of the state court, Canty's "federal claim [for damage

    relief] succeeds only to the extent that the state court

    wrongly decided the issue before it and hence is "inextricably

    intertwined" with the state court judgment. Pennzoil Co. v.

    Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (Marshall, J., concurring); see,

    e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1996)

    ("defendant who has lost in state court and sues in federal

    court . . . asserts injury at the hands of the court and . . .

    suit therefore is an effort to obtain collateral review");

    Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (suit

    against deputy for enforcing court order is "just a way to

    contest the order itself" and thus barred by Rooker-Feldman).

              Arguably, Canty is correct in his contention that his

    claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are general

    constitutional challenges to a state statute and hence not

    barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Schneider v.

    Colegio de Abogodos de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir.

    1990) (Rooker-Feldman does not bar facial challenges to state

    statutes).  Nevertheless, absent an allegation of injury from

    the eviction--allegations as we have just indicated which are

    barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine--Canty fails to show the

    concrete injury necessary to establish his standing to seek

    injunctive or declaratory relief.  See Berner v. Delahanty, 129

    F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1997) (party seeking solely injunctive or

    declaratory relief only has standing to pursue his claim if he

    can show, inter alia, invasion of legally protected concrete

    interest), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1305 (1998); see alsoLanders Seed Co., Inc. v. Champaign Nat. Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732

    (7th Cir.) (absent claim for damages, plaintiff lacks standing

    to sue for declaratory and injunctive relief; however, pursuing

    damages essentially asks court to invalidate state court

    judgment and hence is barred by Rooker-Feldman), cert. denied,

    513 U.S. 811 (1994).

              Finally, even if we assume arguendo that Canty was

    able to reserve his federal claims in state court under the

    doctrine of England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical

    Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), we nonetheless find,

    essentially for the reasons given by the court in Szoke v.

    Carter, 974 F. Supp. 360, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), that the Englandreservation does not overcome a Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional

    bar in this case.

              Affirmed.  See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.