DocketNumber: 99-1317
Filed Date: 11/29/1999
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/21/2015
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<pre> United States Court of Appeals <br> For the First Circuit <br> <br> <br> <br> <br>No. 99-1317 <br> <br> AMILCAR GUILLOTY-PEREZ, <br> <br> Plaintiff, Appellee, <br> <br> v. <br> <br> JOSE FUENTES-AGOSTINI, ET AL., <br> <br> Defendants. <br> <br> <br> <br> PEDRO J. PIERLUISI and LYDIA MORALES, <br> <br> Defendants, Appellants. <br> <br> <br> <br> APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <br> <br> FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO <br> <br> [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge] <br> <br> <br> <br> Before <br> <br> Lynch, Circuit Judge, <br> Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, <br> and O'Toole, District Judge. <br> <br> <br> <br> Roberto Mrquez-Snchez and Law Offices of Benjamin Acosta, <br>Jr. on brief for appellants. <br> Irma R. Valldejuli on brief for appellee. <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> November 19, 1999 <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a 1983 <br>suit filed by Amilcar Guilloty-Perez in which he alleged that he <br> was subjected to adverse employment actions in retaliation for <br> exercising his First Amendment rights to complain about public <br>mismanagement and corruption. Guilloty-Perez claimed that various <br>individuals at the Special Investigations Bureau of the Puerto Rico <br>Department of Justice (SIB), where he was employed as a special <br> agent, responded to his reports of operational irregularities <br>(including his being a source for news articles about the SIB's <br>poor handling of a drug investigation) by retaliating and punishing <br>him. They did this by issuing negative performance evaluations, <br>lodging disciplinary complaints against him, refusing to give him <br>status as a permanent employee, and taking other actions. Three of <br>the defendants, Jos Fuentes-Agostini, Lydia Morales, and Pedro <br> Pierluisi, filed a motion for summary judgment on qualified <br>immunity and other grounds. Morales is the former director of the <br>SIB; Pierluisi is the former Secretary of Justice. The district <br>court granted the motion as to Fuentes-Agostini, the Commonwealth's <br> present Secretary of Justice, but denied it as to the other <br>defendants. Morales and Pierluisi appeal the qualified immunity <br> portion of the district court's denial of summary judgment. <br> We have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The <br> district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity <br>grounds because there were material "factual issues both as to the <br> nature of the involvement of Morales and Pierluisi, as well as <br>their motivations for their involvement." At least facially, this <br>brings the appeal within the rule that "a district court's pretrial <br> rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not immediately <br>appealable to the extent that it turns on either an issue of fact <br>or an issue perceived by the trial court to be an issue of fact." <br>Stella v. Kelley, 63 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1995). In this case, <br>the district court's decision was based on the existence of genuine <br>issues of material fact concerning the actions and motives of the <br>defendants, what government interests were served by how the SIB <br>handled these matters, and whether the SIB would have taken the <br> same actions irrespective of plaintiff's speech. Further, the <br>court found the evidence sufficient to raise an inference as to <br> defendants' personal involvement or at least acquiescence in <br> retaliatory activities. These issues are relevant to a First <br>Amendment retaliation claim. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. <br>of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Stella, 63 F.3d at 74- <br> 75. <br> The defendants' argument that Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 <br>U.S. 299 (1996), authorizes this appeal is to no avail. Behrens <br>allowed for interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment <br> only where the district court "determines that certain conduct <br> attributed to a defendant, if proven, will suffice to show a <br>violation of clearly established law." Daz v. Daz Martnez, 112 <br>F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). That was clearly not the basis for the <br> holding of the district court in denying summary judgment. <br> Because we have no jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.</pre>
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