The Estate of Edward Brian Hal v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 09-1950
10-1766
PATRICIA DONAHUE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY
AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL J. DONAHUE;
MICHAEL T. DONAHUE; SHAWN DONAHUE; AND THOMAS DONAHUE,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
Nos. 09-1951
09-1952
THE ESTATE OF EDWARD BRIAN HALLORAN, BY PATRICIA MACARELLI, IN
HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE,
Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
____________________
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Selya, Boudin, Lipez, Howard and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
____________________
ORDER OF COURT
Entered: October 6, 2011
The petition for rehearing having been denied by the
panel of judges who decided the case, and the petition for
rehearing en banc having been submitted to the active judges of
this court and a majority of the judges not having voted that the
case be heard en banc, it is ordered that the petition for
rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc be denied.
LYNCH, Chief Judge, BOUDIN and HOWARD, Circuit Judges,
statement on denial of rehearing en banc. Under the Constitution,
federal courts may not make decisions based on sympathy to parties
and may not displace the judgments made by Congress in non-
constitutional matters. The legal issue presented by these cases
is not whether the conduct of the FBI was shameful; it was. It is
not whether plaintiffs are victims of that conduct; they are.
However wronged the plaintiffs, the issue is whether
these plaintiffs have complied with the stringent limitation period
set by Congress for claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28
U.S.C. § 2401(b). Because the money to pay victims comes from the
United States, those time limits as a matter of law are required to
be strictly construed. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
117-18 (1979). Whether the federal courts even have jurisdiction
over the claim depends upon the timely filing of an administrative
notice of claim. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a); Kubrick, 444 U.S.
at 117. Our case law requires that the point of view of an
objectively reasonable person be used, not the point of view of the
particular plaintiffs. Cascone v. United States, 370 F.3d 95, 104
(1st Cir. 2004); McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38, 52 (1st
Cir. 2004).
There were many well-publicized admissions --
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particularly those of FBI Agent Morris whose dramatic courtroom
disclosures specifically about the FBI's role in the May 11, 1982,
double murder of Halloran and Donahue were corroborated by several
other witnesses -- which put objectively reasonable persons on
notice of these claims. Despite this, plaintiffs did not act
within the required time limits to file the required claims. It is
an easy step to file a claim. A majority of a panel of this court,
which took these claims very seriously, concluded that the
plaintiffs did not file a timely claim, in light of the arguments
made and evidence presented by plaintiffs. The courts cannot
assume the role of advocates and create arguments never made. Nor
was there any error in the legal standards used in making that
decision.
That the courts have no jurisdiction to hear a law suit
for damages under the FTCA because of plaintiffs' delay does not
mean that the two other branches of government are precluded from
providing a remedy. That is a decision for the Congress and for
the Executive, not for the federal courts, which have no
jurisdiction to award relief.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, concerning the denial of en
banc review. Some cases are of "exceptional importance"1 because
of the potential they have to affect the lives of millions of
people. See, e.g., Igartúa, et al. v. United States, No. 09-2186,
1
See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2).
-3-
__F.3d __, 2011 WL 3340120, *2 (1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2011) (Torruella,
J., dissenting). Other cases are of exceptional importance because
of the light they cast on our public institutions. The latter,
while not always directly affecting as broad a segment of the
population, are nevertheless exceptionally important by virtue of
what they demonstrate about the trust that we -- for better or
worse -- place in those institutions. This is one of those cases.
Yet barely a month since a divided vote in Igartúa denied 4 million
United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico review of
constitutional issues of exceptional importance, this court
continues this noxious pattern and once again prevents
consideration by the full court of questions of exceptional
importance. By this action it allows the government's outrageous
conduct to remain free of any consequence, and as in Igartúa,
perpetrates a monstrous injustice on another, albeit smaller, but
no less worthy, group of hapless citizens.
This is not the appropriate occasion for revisiting in
any detail my disagreement with the panel's majority opinion. I
indicate here only the grounds for my belief that the error
presented in this case is sufficiently important to merit en banc
review.
Beyond its implications for the Donahue and Halloran
families, this case has thrust renewed attention on the FBI's
reliance on confidential criminal informants, and the obvious ways
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in which this relationship can become too cozy for comfort. Public
trust in our institutions requires that when these institutions
stray, they be held accountable and made to absorb the costs of
their conduct. They ought not be perceived as operating with de
facto impunity. Although it is hoped that these agencies will
learn from these dreadful examples of government gone amuck, future
reform is of little consolation to those injured by official
malfeasance.
This concern would be important even if our cases
required the panel's result. But they do not. The government's
claim that the Donahue and Halloran estates filed their claims too
late rests on an astonishingly one-sided understanding of what
reasonableness requires. The panel majority pins the accrual date
as September 2, 1998, based upon publicity arising from FBI Agent
Morris's revelations about the leak of Halloran's identity to
Bulger. I cannot see in what way it is "reasonable" to expect
surviving family members to credit prima facie outrageous
speculation in the papers that high-level and systemic FBI
corruption may have contributed to their injury, particularly when
-- as here -- the government had repeatedly assured them over the
years that someone else was responsible. Is it so unreasonable for
citizens to rely on what their government was repeatedly asserting
as the truth? Can the government be allowed to benefit from its
own perfidious conduct in duping its own citizens with stonewalling
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and outright lies? Are citizens to be held to such a standard of
cynicism in their dealings with government, especially with such
hallowed agencies as the FBI?
Moreover, as the parties have represented, even if the
publicity surrounding Morris's revelations triggered a duty to
inquire, that alone is not sufficient for accrual. See McIntyre v.
United States, 367 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that
although a "mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or rumor of a claim" may
"give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible existence of a
claim," a claim "does not accrue" on that basis) (first emphasis in
original, second emphasis added). What triggers accrual is having
enough information at one's disposal to file a claim -- in other
words, accrual occurs at the rational endpoint of inquiry, not at
its outset. Cf. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784,
1797 (2010) (rejecting argument that limitations period under 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1), which runs from "discovery" of violation,
begins to run "when a plaintiff would have begun investigating")
(emphasis in original). It is hard to see how it could be
otherwise, as I can see no reason to think there is a usefully
general answer to the question of what the period of time should be
between when inquiry begins and when it will yield sufficient
evidence to support filing an FTCA claim. Given that the
government was actively stonewalling as late as 2005 -- some seven
years after Morris's testimony -- even if the parties were on
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inquiry notice, they would not have discovered anything useful and
reliable until, at the earliest, the publication of Judge Wolf's
decision in Salemme in September of 1999.2
Taken individually, these concerns -- individual
injustice, loss of public trust, and substantial legal error --
might not by themselves justify en banc review. Taken together, I
believe they do.
As in Igartúa, the underpinning for this outcome is an
anachronistic judicially invented legal theory that has no validity
or place in American law -- in this case, sovereign immunity. Two
hundred and thirty-five years after we rid ourselves of King George
III and his despotic ascendancy over colonial America, we cling to
a doctrine that was originally based on the Medieval notion that
"the King can do no wrong." This maxim was blindly accepted into
American law under the assumption that it was incorporated as part
of the common law in existence when our Nation separated from
England. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 645
n.28 (1980). However, this assumption does not withstand
historical scrutiny. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort (pt. VI), 36 Yale L. J. 1, 17-41 (1926).
Furthermore, the present case is the quintessential example of the
fact that at times the government can, and does, do wrong.
2
See United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass.
1999).
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More importantly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
cannot be sustained in the face of our constitutional structure.
Although its language is far from specific in many parts, the
Constitution nevertheless contains nothing, specific or implied,
adopting the absolutist principal upon which sovereign immunity
rests. Furthermore, the record of the debates preceding the
adoption of the Constitution are bare of any language or
asseveration that might serve as a basis for support of this
monarchist anachronism. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Against
Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201 (2001); Susan Randall,
Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 812 Neb. L. Rev. 1(2002). In fact, the establishment in this country of a republican
form of government, in which sovereignty does not repose on any
single individual or institution, made it clear that neither the
government nor any part thereof could be considered as being in the
same infallible position as the English king had been, and thus
immune from responsibility for harm that it caused its citizens.
Not only is sovereign immunity inconsistent with a
central tenet of American government that no one, including the
government, is above the law, it also runs contrary to specific,
fundamental provisions of the Constitution: the Supremacy Clause3
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4 Even assuming
3
U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
4
U.S. Const. amend. V.
-8-
arguendo that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was part of
English common law, its transference to our legal system would have
been prevented, and was trumped, by the Constitution and its
Supremacy Clause, and especially by the Due Process Clause, which
requires that the tortuous deprivation of the lives of citizens by
the government's felonious agents and partners be duly compensated.
Many jurisdictions have recognized the incompatibility of
sovereign immunity with democratic principles. In the United
States, many state high courts have rejected sovereign immunity as
fundamentally unjust. See, e.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist.,
359 P.2d 457, 458 (Cal. 1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ill. 1959); Barker v. City of Santa Fe,
136 P.2d 480, 482 (N.M. 1943). As a result of judicial and
legislative action, "only a handful of States still cling to the
old common-law rule of immunity for governmental functions." Owen,
445 U.S. at 645 n.28. Globally, there is a trend among major
democratic nations towards the abolition of sovereign immunity.
See Denise Gillman, Calling the United States' Bluff: How Sovereign
Immunity Undermines the United States' Claim to an Effective
Domestic Human Rights System, 95 Geo. L. J. 591, 636-46 (2007).
Even the United Kingdom, from which it is believed (wrongly, see
Borchard, supra) the American notion of sovereign immunity derived,
abrogated the government's immunity from suits in tort through the
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. See James E. Pfander, Government
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Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assessment, 35 Geo. Wash.
Int'l. L. Rev. 611, 615-17 (2003).
The Donahue and Halloran cases are an unfortunate but
vivid example that even in the United States, with all our legal
and constitutional safeguards, the government can go rogue.
Although it is my belief and hope that our system is normally self-
corrective, there are times when the courts have a duty to
intervene to keep our system within the bounds of decency. This is
such a time, but sadly, this court has failed in its duty. The
concept of sovereign immunity may be beyond the power of this court
to challenge. However, this court had other valid grounds to
correct the injustice of the panel opinion. We have in the past
tolled the Federal Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations when
the government deliberately concealed evidence of its wrongdoing,
and there was no reason for us not to do so here. See Attallah v.
United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779-80 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding FTCA
statute of limitations tolled when government deliberately
concealed evidence of murder by Customs employees). Moreover, even
if we must respect the notion of sovereign immunity, that respect
did not require the harsh and unjust result in this case. The FTCA
waives the United States' sovereign immunity for a claim presented
within two years after the claim "accrues," 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), and
it was within this court's power to interpret the accrual
requirement broadly enough to allow the claims in this case to
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proceed. See United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S.
366, 383 (1949) ("We think that the congressional attitude in
passing the [FTCA] is . . . accurately reflected by [the] statement
. . . : 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its
rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been
announced.'") (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28,
29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)). I believe this court should have
granted en banc review to petitioners, reversed the decision of the
panel, and reinstated the judgment of the district court granting
damages to petitioners against the government for its felonious
part in the murder of their loved ones.
James "Whitey" Bulger has finally been apprehended, and
is now being haled into the federal courthouse in Boston to answer
for the crimes he allegedly committed years ago. But unlike Bulger
himself, thanks to the panel majority's decision and the full
court's refusal to reverse it, Bulger's most trusted associate --
the Boston FBI office -- has gotten away with murder. This is the
wrong outcome, and most importantly, our law does not require it.
Cf. Attallah, 955 F.2d at 779-80. The moral of this outcome seems
to be that crime does pay, at least for the government. This case
cries for redress, either by the Supreme Court, or by a special
bill of Congress.
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc. There is nothing more hollow than expressions
of sympathy by judges over an injustice that the law permits them
to redress. There was no compelled outcome here. Instead, there
was a serious misjudgment that perpetuates a grave injustice. The
en banc process permits us to remedy such an injustice by
acknowledging the obvious: this is a case of "exceptional
importance" that requires deliberation by the full court. See Fed.
R. App. P. 35(a)(2).5 I therefore am once again disheartened that
three members of the court have voted to prevent en banc review.
See Igartúa v. United States, No. 09-2186, 2011 WL 3340120, at *10
(1st Cir. Aug. 4, 2011) (Lipez, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
It is true that en banc review is reserved for the
exceptional case. It is also true that not every "unjust" decision
will be a matter of exceptional importance under Rule 35(a). But
the denial of en banc review here raises the obvious question: if
this case does not warrant the full court's attention, what case
does? Two families were tragically harmed by an institution of the
federal government. The betrayal of the public trust could not be
more egregious. Two district judges and a member of the panel
5
Although en banc rehearing is "not favored," exceptions exist
where "en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of the court's decisions" or "the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance." Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
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first hearing this case have found a basis in law to redress this
betrayal. Three members of our court have voted to reconsider the
panel's unfortunate decision. Given these circumstances, it is
frustrating in the extreme to witness the aversion to en banc
review play out again.
This institutional bias against en banc review goes
beyond the language of the rule emphasizing that en banc rehearing
is generally disfavored. It is grounded, in part, in the human
dynamics of an appellate court. The en banc process is deeply
divisive. It requires colleagues to review the work of colleagues
and sometimes judge that work negatively. There is also a fear
that line drawing will become too difficult. If en banc review is
granted here, the worry goes, how can we deny it there? These
feelings and fears have no place in the en banc calculus. We can
move beyond the hard feelings of the en banc process. We can draw
distinctions in principled ways. Our job requires us to do these
things.
This case is moored deeply in its facts and, ultimately,
requires a judgment about when the families should have been on
notice of the FBI's "reprehensible" role in their decedents'
murders. Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 616 (1st Cir.
2011) (using that term to describe the FBI's conduct). In urging
en banc review, I acknowledge that the panel majority's conclusion
reflects careful thought and a good-faith attempt to deal with
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difficult facts. It is, however, palpably wrong. The majority
correctly observes that "courts must apply legal rules even-
handedly," id. at 629, and they purport to apply a "rule" that
requires rejection of appellants' claims as time-barred. But the
issue here does not turn on a bright-line rule; rather, the
question is one of reasonableness. See id. at 623 ("[T]hese
appeals involve only the objective reasonableness of the
plaintiffs' failure to discern at an earlier time both their injury
and its likely cause."). Determining whether conduct was
reasonable requires us to make a judgment call. In making that
call, we fail in our responsibility if we do not test its
correctness by applying what our late First Circuit colleague,
Judge Frank M. Coffin, called "the justice nerve." See Frank M.
Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate
Bench 222 (1980).
To be sure, we may not disregard applicable legal
doctrine simply to accomplish justice. No matter what the
equities, we may not "take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver
[of sovereign immunity] beyond that which Congress intended,"
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979). "Neither,
however, should we . . . narrow the waiver that Congress intended."
Id. In opening the federal courts to tort claims against the
United States, Congress made plain its objective to treat fairly
individuals harmed by the conduct of government actors. See Feres
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v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) (describing the FTCA as
"the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences
of sovereign immunity from suit"); id. at 140 ("The primary purpose
of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without it
. . . ."). Although we are not "free to construe [the FTCA statute
of limitations] so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to
encourage the prompt presentation of claims," Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
117, we also should not make the reasonableness judgment in a
particular case without regard for the FTCA's objective "to
mitigate unjust consequences," Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
Here, even without taking into account the egregiousness
of the government's conduct, the facts favor the Hallorans and the
Donahues. Our earlier precedent had carved out a path that should
have led the panel majority to conclude that the Hallorans' and
Donahues' suits against the United States were timely. As I shall
explain, the circumstances here are readily distinguishable from
those of other, related cases in which we have found the
plaintiffs' actions to be late. Moreover, when measured against
the only just outcome in this case, the majority's rejection of the
Halloran and Donahue claims as time-barred is not only wrong, but
inexcusably so.
The panel majority concludes that the plaintiffs
reasonably should have known the factual basis for their claims by
September 2, 1998, based solely on "information that was generally
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available at the time of the Salemme hearings." Donahue, 634 F.3d
at 625. The critical information was "the avalanche of publicity"
surrounding John Morris's testimony in April 1998, id.,
supplemented by subsequent publicity about the ongoing hearings,
most notably publicity on September 2 surrounding Stephen Flemmi's
admission that he had been told of Brian Halloran's tip to the FBI
about Roger Wheeler's murder. Undoubtedly, these press reports
concerning Morris and Flemmi were a significant development in
unwrapping the relationship between the FBI and Bulger/Flemmi. In
none of our other cases, however, were these early-stage reports
the only basis for attributing knowledge of the relationship to the
plaintiffs. Among other factors, we have emphasized Judge Mark L.
Wolf's decision in September 1999 – a year after the cutoff date
imposed by the majority in this case – as an important piece of the
puzzle.
As examples of other approaches to the accrual date, in
the Roger Wheeler case (the other plaintiff in McIntyre v. United
States, 367 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2004)), where the cut-off date for
accrual was May 1999, one family member had spoken publicly on 60
Minutes suggesting actual knowledge of a connection between the FBI
and Bulger/Flemmi before the cut-off date, and other family members
were aware of that broadcast, among other news reports. Id. at 49.
In Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006), where the
cutoff also was in May 1999, the panel referred to the
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"speculation" before September 1998 about John Connolly's
protection of Bulger and Flemmi, which triggered a duty to inquire.
Id. at 23. We then concluded that the claim accrued "by late 1998"
after Rakes's own trial and the publication of articles surrounding
Flemmi's. Id. (emphasis added). Adopting that same timeline based
on the same publicity would save the Hallorans' claim. As for
Michael Donahue, whose claim was filed a bit later, it is
significant that he was an innocent bystander while Rakes was
immersed in the Bulger/Flemmi history as a result of his own trial
in late May and June 1998 (for perjury, because he lied to the
grand jury about whether Bulger forced him to sell his – Rakes's –
liquor store). If "late 1998" was the appropriate accrual date
for the Rakes family, it would be appropriate to conclude that the
accrual date for the Donahues was months later (arguably as late as
Judge Wolf's decision in September 1999). In addition, much of the
publicity cited in Rakes referred to the FBI's acquiescence to
criminal activity other than murder – which would not have alerted
the plaintiffs to the much more outrageous link between the FBI and
the killings of their family members. Id. at 22-23.
In Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444 (1st Cir.
2005), where the cutoff date was May 2000, we noted the April 1998
publicity surrounding Morris's testimony but also emphasized
newspaper articles that were published in 1999 and Judge Wolf's
opinion. The panel wrote: "Agent Morris's testimony and Judge
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Wolf's opinion easily provide the requisite knowledge that the FBI
protected Bulger and Flemmi from prosecution and emboldened them to
commit crimes, including the murder of Callahan." Id. at 454.
Moreover, we said that "Judge Wolf's statement [suggesting that
Bulger and Flemmi may have played a role in the Wheeler, Halloran,
and Callahan murders] would prompt a reasonable person to further
investigate the matter." Id. (emphasis added). By no means did
we suggest that the publicity surrounding Morris's testimony more
than a year earlier was enough on its own to start the running of
the clock. Likewise, in Patterson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268(1st Cir. 2006), the plaintiffs' claims were rejected "most
importantly" because one of the plaintiffs had been interviewed
about the FBI's possible role in the murder at issue before the
cutoff date – not because of the news accounts. Id. at 273.
It is noteworthy that, in all of these cases, the accrual
cutoff date was later than the dates in the present case (September
25, 1998 and March 1999). As more time passed – particularly with
the publication of Judge Wolf's opinion in September 1999 –
Morris's sensational testimony about the FBI's complicity became
more plausible. As Judge Torruella points out in his dissent from
the panel majority opinion, there was no good reason in the early
stages of the publicity for these particular plaintiffs to pay
attention to facially outrageous allegations concerning the FBI's
relationship with Bulger and Flemmi. See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 633
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(Torruella, J., dissenting). Halloran had identified Flynn as his
assailant, and the government thought that allegation sufficiently
reliable to try Flynn for the crime. By September 1998, it may
have been reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffs here should
have had a "'hunch, hint, [or] suspicion'" of a claim, McIntyre,
367 F.3d at 52 (citation omitted), at most imposing a duty of
inquiry. But that inquiry cannot be presumed to have had
instantaneous results and, indeed, the government was still
unwilling in 2005 to concede that Connolly had disclosed Halloran's
conduct to Bulger and Flemmi. See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 637
(Torruella, J., dissenting). At a minimum, the claims here should
not have been found to accrue, as in Rakes, before "late 1998" and,
in light of the unique scenario involving Jimmy Flynn, and
Donahue's bystander status, the plaintiffs were entitled to a more
generous view of the timing.
I can safely say that no one on our court is happy with
the result reached by the panel majority in this case. All of us
recognize the injustice that has been done to the Donahue and
Halloran families. But we could have remedied this injustice. The
en banc process is designed for just this situation, where the
flawed application of precedent by a panel majority should be
corrected. I deeply regret that we have failed to do so. I
therefore dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc. For the reasons so well articulated by my
dissenting colleagues, I agree with them that our precedent does
not compel the conclusion reached by the majority and that this
case -- whose core question, simply put, is at what point should a
reasonable person believe that the government is lying to them6 --
presents an issue of exceptional importance to be considered by the
full court. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). Accordingly, I readily
join my colleagues in dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.
I write separately to profess the following: assuming our precedent
does indeed mandate the outrageous conclusion reached by the
majority, the grave injustice seething from such a result surely
provides more than enough reason for us to reexamine the precedent
that currently restrains us. I dissent.
By the Court:
/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk
cc: Hon. William G. Young, Ms Sarah Thornton, Clerk, United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Mr. Meier, Mr.
Matthews, Mr. George, Mr. Mazzone, Ms. Lipscomb, Mr. Eiser, Mr.
Mullane, Mr. Weigand, Ms. Leach, Mr. Hinchey, Mr. Morris, Mr. Levy,
Mr. Schieffelin, Mr. Bondy and Mr. Christie.
Q:\TO_ABBS\wp\09-1950O.01a.wpd
6
This is not a question of sympathy, but rather, American
civics.
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