Thomas v. Town of Salisbury

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1102
MARK THOMAS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CORNELIUS J. HARRINGTON, a/k/a Neil Harrington;
TOWN OF SALISBURY; ROBERT ST. PIERRE,
Defendants, Appellees,
DANIEL MCNEIL; EUGENE SCIONE; RICHARD MERRILL; STEVEN
SFORZA; MICHAEL ADLER; THOMAS FOWLER; KEVIN SULLIVAN;
DAVID L'ESPERANCE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Judith G. Dein, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Lynch, Stahl, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Cary P. Gianoulis, with whom John F. Tocci was on brief, for
appellant.
Adam Simms, with whom John J. Cloherty III was on brief, for
appellees.
November 28, 2018
STAHL, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of an
alleged conspiracy to terminate plaintiff-appellant Mark Thomas
from his position as an officer at the Salisbury Police Department
("SPD"). In 2010, Cornelius Harrington, the Salisbury town
manager, hired Robert St. Pierre to investigate allegations of
misconduct by the then-police chief, David L'Esperance. During
the investigation, St. Pierre also uncovered evidence of alleged
wrongdoing by Thomas, resulting in a follow-up investigation.
Harrington terminated Thomas from his employment based on that
second investigation, but an arbitrator later reversed that
decision. Nevertheless, Thomas retired soon after and alleged,
inter alia, that Harrington and St. Pierre conspired against him.
He further alleged that Harrington violated the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12 §§ 11H, 11I, by
depriving him of a protected property right -- namely, his
continued employment with the SPD.
Thomas has offered little evidence beyond bald
speculation for the existence of a conspiracy. Moreover, he has
not shown that his constitutional rights were interfered with by
"threats, intimidation, or coercion," as required by the MCRA.
Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment.
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I. Factual Background
In April 2006, Harrington hired David L'Esperance as
Salisbury's new police chief. Soon after L'Esperance was hired,
he promoted Thomas to detective and eventually designated him as
Chief of Detectives,1 decisions which Thomas allege created
substantial jealousy among other SPD officers.
In autumn 2010, two SPD officers made allegations of
misconduct against L'Esperance. The allegations reached
Harrington who, on advice of counsel, placed L'Esperance on
administrative leave. Harrington then reached out to St. Pierre,
a retired former Chief of Police in Salem, Massachusetts, and set
up a meeting to discuss the allegations.2 After this discussion,
on December 9, 2010, St. Pierre entered into a "Professional
Services Agreement" with Salisbury to investigate the allegations
against L'Esperance. Harrington did not obtain permission from
the town's Board of Selectmen prior to soliciting St. Pierre's
services, nor did the Board initially approve the contract.
However, Harrington was not required to first obtain the permission
of the Board of Selectmen before hiring an outside consultant on
1 It appears that L'Esperance's decision to designate Thomas
as "Chief of Detectives" was informal.
2 Harrington had been the mayor of Salem, Massachusetts for
seven years, during which time St. Pierre was the Salem police
chief.
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behalf of the town, and no member of the Board voiced an objection
to Harrington's decision to retain St. Pierre's services.
Before the investigation concluded, however, L'Esperance
resigned from active duty with the SPD. Thereafter, on January
24, 2011, St. Pierre tendered his investigative report to
Harrington, which concluded that L'Esperance had violated numerous
SPD rules. As relevant here, the report also disclosed allegations
of misconduct against Thomas. Among those allegations were that
Thomas (1) studied for the bar exam while on the job; (2) observed
but failed to report L'Esperance pilfering evidence at crime
scenes; and (3) fabricated portions of his resume for submission
to the FBI in connection with his application to attend a FBI
training program.
The Board of Selectmen held a meeting on January 24,
2011, at which the Board asked Harrington to contact St. Pierre to
further investigate "loose ends" from the L'Esperance report,
including the allegations against Thomas. The Board confirmed
that request during a February 24, 2011 public meeting. At the
end of that meeting, Thomas requested that SPD internal affairs
conduct the investigation into him instead, but this request was
denied.
Pursuant to the Board of Selectmen's instruction,
Harrington once again reached out to St. Pierre and asked that he
conduct the investigation into Thomas. St. Pierre initially
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replied that, because Thomas was not a "ranking officer," the SPD
could conduct the investigation internally. However, St. Pierre
eventually acceded to the request and entered into another
Professional Services Agreement on February 28, 2011. The then-
acting SPD chief, Kevin Sullivan, requested that Detective Steven
Sforza be permitted to help with the investigation. On May 24,
2011, Sullivan's successor as acting SPD chief, Richard Merrill,
placed Thomas on paid administrative leave during the pendency of
the investigation.
During the investigation into Thomas, St. Pierre
interviewed several municipal and SPD employees. One SPD officer,
Daniel McNeil, testified that during his recorded interview, St.
Pierre turned off the tape recorder and said something to the
effect of "[this] is not where I'm going with this or what I'm
looking for." McNeil understood this comment to mean that he was
"being obviously directed" by St. Pierre to give negative
information about Thomas.
Thomas separately contends that, during the L'Esperance
investigation, Sforza illegally taped a conversation with him
while at the SPD station in December 2010. This allegation came
to light while Sforza was assisting with the Thomas investigation
and, although Sforza denied the claim,3 he was removed from the
3 Sforza claimed that the tape recorder was "broken" during
the incident in question.
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Thomas investigation thereafter. Despite that removal, Thomas
alleges that Sforza continued communicating with St. Pierre, a
claim that appellees deny.
During their respective depositions, Harrington and St.
Pierre testified that Harrington's role in the Thomas
investigation was limited. For example, both testified that
Harrington did not provide St. Pierre with questions to ask
witnesses or tell St. Pierre or Sforza whom to interview. In
addition, Harrington was never given a copy of St. Pierre's
investigatory notes.4 Appellees claim that Harrington also did
not give St. Pierre advice on what "issues [St. Pierre] should
investigate." Thomas disputes that claim, pointing to several
communications between Harrington, St. Pierre, and town counsel
relating to the investigation. Although those communications
largely summarized the progress of St. Pierre's investigation, in
one email concerning Thomas's prior disciplinary history, town
counsel stated "[Thomas] may have just shot himself in the foot."
On August 1, 2011, St. Pierre delivered a draft copy of
his investigative report to Harrington. Harrington made several
changes to the report, and submitted it to the Board of Selectmen
4 St. Pierre provided Harrington with the transcript of a SPD
dispatcher, Kristine Harrison, to keep him "informed." Thomas
also points out that St. Pierre destroyed his investigative notes
from the L'Esperance and Thomas investigations. However, St.
Pierre testified that he was trained to destroy investigative notes
at the conclusion of an investigation.
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on September 28, 2011. That same day, Harrington sent a letter to
Thomas notifying him that a disciplinary hearing would be held
regarding the contents of the report. In addition, in response to
a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request, Harrington
forwarded a copy of the report to a reporter with the Newburyport
Daily News, a local newspaper.5 The report was published the
following day. A copy was also anonymously forwarded to the
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, an action Thomas attributes
to Harrington.6
The disciplinary hearing was held on December 15, 2011,
during which no witnesses testified, and the town simply entered
St. Pierre's report into the record. Harrington issued a decision
on February 8, 2012, upholding two of the four charges against
Thomas and dismissing the other two. Specifically, Harrington
found that Thomas had (1) studied for the bar exam while on duty;
and (2) falsified his resume in the application to the FBI. He
then terminated Thomas's employment with Salisbury. However, on
5 In his brief, Thomas disputes that the report was given to
the Newburyport Daily News pursuant to a FOIA request. However,
Harrington and St. Pierre explicitly referred to the FOIA request
in an e-mail exchange, and Thomas offers no evidence to rebut that
claim.
6To that end, in an email dated September 21, 2011, Harrington
stated "I am assuming that we will also be giving a copy of the
[Thomas] report to the Board of Bar Overseers." In his deposition,
Harrington testified that he could not recall whether he had
provided the Thomas report to the Board of Bar Overseers.
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October 31, 2012, an arbitrator reversed the decision, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to support Thomas's
termination. The SPD reinstated Thomas in December 2012 and, in
accordance with the arbitrator's order, provided him with full
back pay.
Thomas testified that soon after his reinstatement, the
new permanent police chief, Thomas Fowler, told him that many SPD
officers "did not want him back." In addition, Fowler placed
certain conditions on Thomas's ability to moonlight as a practicing
attorney, expressing the need to avoid conflicts of interest.
Specifically, Fowler required that Thomas refrain from practicing
criminal defense and labor and employment law. He also required
Thomas to decline any cases involving either the SPD or Salisbury.
Emails from that time show that Fowler notified Harrington that he
was limiting Thomas's law practice, though the parties dispute
whether Harrington played an active role in Fowler's decision-
making.
On March 24, 2014, Thomas sent Fowler a letter stating,
"I am in fear for my life at work and truly believe that many of
the officers and town employees will retaliate with grave
circumstances[.]" As a result of this letter, Fowler placed Thomas
on paid administrative leave. Approximately two weeks later,
Fowler received a letter from Thomas's psychologist stating that
Thomas was being treated for certain medical conditions and
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recommending that Thomas "take a leave of absence until further
notice." Fowler then converted Thomas's administrative leave to
long-term sick leave. Thomas never returned to active duty, and
eventually retired from the SPD on November 23, 2015.
II. Procedural Background
On September 29, 2014, Thomas filed this suit in the
District of Massachusetts against Harrington, St. Pierre,
Salisbury, and eight other current and former SPD officers. His
complaint included 12 counts, including claims under the United
States and Massachusetts Constitutions, Massachusetts Civil Rights
Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I, Massachusetts
Whistleblower Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 185, and state
common law. On separate motions to dismiss, the district court
dismissed claims against all defendants except for Harrington, St.
Pierre, and Salisbury. As relevant here, the district court
allowed the following claims to proceed to discovery: retaliation
in violation of the First Amendment by Harrington and Salisbury
(Count 1), civil conspiracy by Harrington and St. Pierre (Count
5), and interference with Thomas's continued right to employment
in violation of the MCRA by Harrington (Count 7). In two separate
decisions,7 the district court granted defendants' motion for
7
In its memorandum and order dated September 30, 2017, the
district court granted summary judgment as to the sole remaining
federal claim. See Thomas v. Town of Salisbury, 277 F. Supp. 3d
161, 165 (D. Mass. 2017). The court then ordered a status
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summary judgment on all three remaining claims. This timely appeal
followed. On appeal, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of
Thomas's claims against Salisbury and Harrington as to Count 1.
III. Analysis
This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 217, 223
(1st Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is warranted only if "there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
When "a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made,
the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (internal quotations marks omitted). The
nonmoving party may not simply "rest upon mere allegation or
denials of his pleading," but instead must "present affirmative
evidence." Id. at 256-57.
conference for the parties to discuss whether the remaining state
law claims should be remanded to state court in light of Wilber v.
Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2017) ("[I]t can be an abuse of
discretion -- if no federal claim remains -- for a district court
to retain jurisdiction over a pendent state law claim when that
state law claim presents a substantial question of state law that
is better addressed by the state courts."). Thereafter, all
parties agreed that the district court could retain jurisdiction
and resolve the remaining claims. See Thomas v. Town of Salisbury,
284 F. Supp. 3d 66, 69 (D. Mass. 2018).
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A. Civil Conspiracy
Thomas first contends that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on his conspiracy claim because there
was evidence "that Harrington and St. Pierre had a common plan to
deprive [him] of his . . . property right of employment, . . . and
took affirmative steps to achieve the desired result." He argues
that the district court failed to consider evidence that, viewed
in its totality, would permit a jury to infer the existence of a
conspiracy. He primarily relies on: (1) the existence of
Harrington and St. Pierre's prior work relationship; (2)
Harrington's alleged control over the investigative process, as
demonstrated through communications between him and St. Pierre;
and (3) alleged irregularities that arose during St. Pierre's
investigation.
In Massachusetts, civil conspiracy may take the form of
"'concerted action,' whereby liability is imposed on one
individual for the tort of another."8 Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d
833, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). "Because it is vicarious
liability, this type of civil conspiracy requires an underlying
8Massachusetts also recognizes another form of civil
conspiracy where "defendants, acting in unison, had some peculiar
power of coercion over plaintiff that they would not have had if
they had been acting independently." Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P&B
Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1563 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). However, because Thomas's briefs
explicitly rely on the "concerted action" theory of conspiracy, we
need not address this alternative form of conspiracy.
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tort [and t]he conspiracy consists in agreeing to, or assisting
in, this underlying tort." Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576
F.3d 16, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To prove a
"concerted action" conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that
defendants either (1) acted "in concert with or pursuant to a
common design with" the tortfeasor or (2) "gave substantial
assistance to" the tortfeasor's conduct.9 Kyte v. Phillip Morris
Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Mass. 1990); see also Taylor, 576
F.3d at 35 ("Massachusetts courts have recognized two theories of
liability under [Restatement (Second of Torts)] section 876: (1)
'concert of action,' and (2) 'substantial assistance' or 'aiding
and abetting.'").
Under the "common design" theory, a plaintiff must show
"first, a common design or an agreement, although not necessarily
express, between two or more persons to do a wrongful act and,
second, proof of some tortious act in furtherance of the
agreement." Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P&B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546,
1564 (1st Cir. 1994). "[A]n inference of an implied agreement
[can] properly be drawn from the conduct of two or more parties."
Kyte, 556 N.E.2d at 1028.
9 Thomas appears to mistakenly conflate these two
alternatives, treating them as necessary elements of "concerted
action" liability.
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By contrast, under the "substantial assistance" theory,
"a person may be liable in tort if he 'knows that the . . . conduct
[of another person] constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself.'" Kurker, 689 N.E.2d at 837 (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 876(b) (1977)) (alterations in original); see also Baker
v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, 81 N.E.3d 782, 793
(Mass. App. Ct. 2017) ("The claim for civil conspiracy . . .
requires a showing that the defendants (1) knew that the conduct
of [others] constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and (2)
substantially assisted in or encouraged that conduct."). "Key to
this cause of action is a defendant's substantial assistance,
[given] with the knowledge that such assistance is contributing to
a common tortious plan." Kurker, 689 N.E.2d at 837. Moreover,
liability under this theory only applies to "assistance or
encouragement that is a 'substantial factor in causing the
resulting tort.'" Taylor, 576 F.3d at 35 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d.). In addition, the plaintiff must
also establish that the defendant had an "unlawful intent,"
consisting of both "knowledge that the other's conduct is
tortious[] and an intent to substantially assist or encourage that
conduct." Id.; see also Kyte, 556 N.E.2d at 1028 ("Evidence of
the defendant's knowledge of its substantial, supporting role in
an unlawful enterprise is required."). Merely showing the
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defendant's "general awareness" that their ostensible co-
conspirator is engaged in tortious acts is insufficient. Kyte,
556 N.E.2d at 1028. The plaintiff need not, however, provide
evidence of an agreement between the defendant and the tortfeasor.
Taylor, 576 F.3d at 35-36.
Thomas's argument fails under either theory. With
respect to the "common design" theory, the evidence on which Thomas
relies falls well short of supporting an inference of an agreement
between Harrington and St. Pierre to terminate his employment.
For example, Thomas notes that Harrington, without the Board of
Selectmen's prior knowledge,10 solicited St. Pierre to conduct the
L'Esperance investigation. From that and subsequent
communications between the two, he infers that Harrington
controlled the course of the investigation, including its eventual
discovery of evidence against Thomas. While the record contains
communications between Harrington and St. Pierre, they only
demonstrate that both men believed that there was good cause to
terminate Thomas's employment.11 There is no suggestion that
Harrington controlled or otherwise directed St. Pierre's work. In
addition, while such communications show that Harrington was
10 In any event, the Board of Selectmen ultimately approved
the investigation into Thomas.
11Notably, Thomas does not dispute that defendants had cause
to investigate him.
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"generally aware[]" of the investigation's progress, they do not
rise to the level necessary to impose liability under the common
design theory. Kyte, 556 N.E.2d at 1028; cf. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co.,
43 F.3d at 1564-65 (reasonable to infer concerted action from
repeated pattern of misstatements).
Thomas's argument that St. Pierre provided "substantial
assistance" to tortious acts against him is equally unavailing.
Thomas emphasizes that during the investigations into himself and
L'Esperance, St. Pierre attempted to unduly "influence" the
testimony of SPD officers.12 Even assuming that Harrington sought
to remove Thomas from the SPD prior to the investigations,13 there
is no evidence from which to infer that St. Pierre was aware of
that wrongful purpose. See Taylor, 576 F.3d at 35 (requiring,
inter alia, "knowledge that the other's conduct is tortious").
The evidence only shows that St. Pierre was retained by the Board
of Selectmen to investigate Thomas and that he communicated with
Harrington, the town manager, during that investigation. While,
as the district court noted, Harrington may have encouraged St.
12Thomas alleges that Sforza continued to participate in the
Thomas investigation despite being removed. However, he fails to
connect Sforza's purported wrongful involvement to either
Harrington or St. Pierre.
13 As discussed earlier, a "concerted effort" conspiracy
requires an underlying tortious act. See Taylor, 576 F.3d at 35.
Although Thomas does not explicitly identify a tortious act,
Harrington's decision to terminate Thomas is the only plausible
candidate.
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Pierre to "dig deep" for facts against Thomas, Thomas v. Town of
Salisbury, 284 F. Supp. 3d 66, 79 (D. Mass. 2018), that alone is
insufficient to support a finding that St. Pierre was aware of
Harrington's alleged tortious purpose. Cf. Grant v. John Hancock
Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 183 F. Supp. 2d 344, 363-64 (D. Mass. 2002)
(granting summary judgment on concerted action conspiracy on the
reasoning that "[b]ecause a conspiracy requires an agreement to
commit a wrongful act, none can exist where an alleged participant
lacks knowledge that a wrongful act is being perpetrated[]").
In short, there is insufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy between
Harrington and St. Pierre. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment on that claim.
B. Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
Thomas also contends that the district court erred in
dismissing his MCRA claim against Harrington.14 As noted, the MCRA
provides a right of action to any person whose exercise or
enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitutions
or laws has been interfered with by "threats, intimidation or
coercion." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. A "threat" means
"the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or
apprehensive of injury or harm"; "intimidation" means "putting in
14 The MCRA claim is not brought against St. Pierre.
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fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct"; and
"coercion" means "the application to another of such force, either
physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will
something he would not otherwise have done." Planned Parenthood
League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Mass. 1994).
"[T]he MCRA contemplates a two-part sequence: [liability may be
found where] (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces
the plaintiff, in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up
something that [she] has the constitutional right to do." Goddard
v. Kelley, 629 F. Supp. 2d 115, 128 (D. Mass. 2009).
Here, the parties do not dispute that Thomas's continued
employment with the SPD constituted a constitutionally protected
property interest.15 Accordingly, the only question with respect
to the MCRA claim is whether Harrington engaged in "threats,
intimidation, or coercion."
It is rare for a MCRA claim to involve no physical threat
of harm. Although "purely economic pressures may constitute
actionable coercion under the MCRA," "the exception for claims
based on non-physical coercion remains a narrow one." Nolan v.
CN8, 656 F.3d 71, 77-78 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Massachusetts courts have required "a pattern
15 It appears that Thomas is asserting a procedural due process
claim. See Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.
2009).
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of harassment and intimidation" to support a finding of non-
physical coercion under the MCRA. See Howcroft v. City of Peabody,
747 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (finding repeated verbal
harassment, relocation of work site, and multiple failed attempts
to suspend plaintiff without pay and deprive him of benefits
supported a MCRA claim). However, "by itself, a threat to use
lawful means to reach an intended result is not actionable under
[the MCRA]." Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 399, 411
(Mass. 2003).
Thomas contends that Harrington violated the MCRA by
forcing him to leave the SPD. In support, Thomas notes that
Harrington disseminated St. Pierre's investigatory report to a
local newspaper, possibly disclosed it to the Massachusetts Board
of Bar Overseers, and "steer[ed]" Fowler into forbidding him from
practicing law. Thomas has waived some of these points by failing
to raise or develop them below. See Thomas, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 78
& n.13. However, even taking these arguments at face value, the
events to which Thomas points fall well short of the MCRA's
coercion requirement. First, as the district court noted, the
dissemination to the local newspaper was in response to a FOIA
request. Id. Second, Thomas's allegation that Harrington
submitted the report to the Board of Bar Overseers suffers from
fatal flaws -- he does not show how, given the record here, this
filing could constitute "threats, coercion, or intimidation."
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And, his unsupported allegations are no more than that -- mere
allegations. And third, the record shows not only that Fowler
unilaterally implemented the policy restricting officers
moonlighting as practicing attorneys, but also that the policy was
narrowly tailored to ensure that officers avoided any conflicts of
interest.16 These events hardly evince a "pattern of harassment
and intimidation" geared towards coercing Thomas's resignation
from the SPD.17
Interpreted liberally, the evidence plausibly suggests
that Harrington wanted to see Thomas leave the SPD. However, as
we have stated, "the exception for [MCRA] claims based on non-
physical coercion remains a narrow one," and it should not be
invoked unless the record "resembl[es] the sort of physical, moral,
or economic pressure that courts have found sufficient to support
16The fact that the investigation caused Thomas to "strongly
contemplate[] leaving his employ," is of no avail where he does
not dispute that Harrington had cause for initiating the
investigation. This is true even though an arbitrator ultimately
reversed Harrington's decision to terminate his employment. See
Tracey v. Champeon, 79 N.E.3d 1111 (Table) (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)
(unpublished) (rejecting economic coercion theory under the MCRA
where plaintiff's suspension was reversed by an arbitrator).
17Thomas further alleges that subsequent to the filing of the
instant suit, Harrington interfered with the sale of his Salisbury
home. Specifically, he notes that Harrington contacted the
Salisbury building inspector and directed him to investigate
whether Thomas's home violated any zoning laws. Thomas contends
that this prevented him from selling his home. However, because
that incident occurred well after Thomas retired, it cannot have
interfered with his right to continued employment with the SPD.
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a claim under this statute." Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564
F.3d 507, 519 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). This is not one of those circumstances. Therefore, we
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Thomas's
MCRA claim against Harrington.18
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
18 Because the evidence fails to support a finding that
Harrington violated the MCRA, we need not address his qualified
immunity argument.
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