United States v. Rivera

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1349
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RANDY RAY RIVERA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
David B. Hirsch, for appellant.
Katharine A. Wagner, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
_________________
June 9, 2016
_________________
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Setting the Stage
Randy Ray Rivera pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His
conditional plea reserved the right to appeal from the district
judge's order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from
his home — a seizure authorized by a warrant issued by the same
judge. Rivera had argued below that the affidavit DEA special
agent John Barron submitted in support of the application failed
to establish probable cause because it did not provide an adequate
nexus between his drug dealing and his house.1 Rivera had also
asked the judge for an evidentiary hearing — dubbed a "Franks
hearing," after Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) — so that
he could challenge the truthfulness of Barron's affidavit
statements. But the judge concluded that even if the affidavit
failed to supply probable cause (a question the judge saw no need
to decide), Rivera's suppression bid failed because Barron had
obtained the warrant in good faith. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (discussing how evidence seized in good
faith, in reliance on a warrant later invalidated, may still be
admissible). And the judge also concluded that Rivera had failed
1 "DEA" is short for "Drug Enforcement Administration."
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to make the substantial showing of probable falsity on Barron's
part, thus making a Franks hearing unnecessary.
An unhappy Rivera appeals both aspects of the judge's
ruling. We affirm, though on the first issue we think law
enforcement actually had probable cause for the search — which
removes any need to invoke the good-faith exception.
Probable-Cause Issue
Background
We cite only those facts necessary to put the probable-
cause issue into workable perspective — presenting them, of course,
in the light most favorable to the suppression ruling. See, e.g.,
United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 823–24 (1st Cir. 2011);
United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 743 (1st Cir. 1999).
Back in 2012, a Vermont state trooper stopped an SUV for
a traffic infraction. The driver, Shawn Kivela, consented to a
vehicle search. And that search turned up about 5 ounces of what
turned out to be crack cocaine.
The trooper arrested and Mirandized Kivela and his
passengers, Randy and Star Gaboriault. After the trio waived their
Miranda rights, a series of police interviews ensued. Among other
juicy tidbits, law enforcement learned from Kivela that he and the
Gaboriaults had driven to Springfield, Massachusetts to meet with
a "Puerto Rican male" known as "Melvin" or "Randy" (we'll use
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"Randy" for simplicity) at a third-floor apartment at 6 Beaumont
Street — a very sparsely furnished apartment that "Randy" used as
a drug-stash house, not (apparently) as a home. Kivela said that
the Gaboriaults had bought about 5 ounces of crack from "Randy"
too — paying him $7,000, according to Star Gaboriault — and body-
cavity searches of the Gaboriaults uncovered that crack amount.
Kivela added that he had been buying crack from "Randy" on a weekly
basis since 2009. The Gaboriaults routinely accompanied him on
these drug-buying sprees — Kivela would score about 3 or 4 ounces
of crack per visit, while the Gaboriaults would score between 6
and 9 ounces. Kivela and "Randy" would communicate by text, Kivela
said. And he identified a photo of Rivera as "Randy."
Rivera, it turns out, was no stranger to the Springfield
police — a criminal-record check disclosed 13 prior narcotics
convictions plus a prior ammunition-possession conviction. He
lived at 56 Merwin Street (a street in Springfield) with his
girlfriend Yayaira Guzman, a confidential source ("CS") told the
police.2 Registry-of-deeds records showed that Guzman solely owned
the Merwin-Street property. The CS also identified some cars
(registered to Guzman at the Merwin-Street address) — including a
white Infiniti FX-35 — that Rivera used. A police-surveillance
2 According to the record in this case, Rivera's "residence is part
of a two-story, two-family duplex."
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team regularly saw Rivera and Guzman entering and leaving the
Merwin-Street property, and routinely saw the cars described by
the CS at that address as well.
Most helpfully for the police, the CS eventually agreed
to participate in a controlled buy of crack from Rivera. On the
day of the buy, but before the buy went down, a DEA agent spotted
the Infiniti FX-35 at 56 Merwin Street — Rivera's home — at 9 a.m.
and again at 1:45 p.m. Around 2:47 p.m., the CS phoned Rivera to
say that he would be at 6 Beaumont Street — Rivera's stash house
— shortly. The DEA saw the Infiniti drive away from Rivera's home
around 2:50 p.m., roughly 3 minutes after the CS's call. At about
2:56 p.m., Rivera texted the CS to stay away from 6 Beaumont Street
because a police officer was parked outside. Agents spotted the
Infiniti parked at 6 Beaumont Street a minute later.
Following Rivera's instructions, the CS drove to a
Walgreens parking lot. Rivera said he would package up the crack
and meet the CS there. The surveillance team saw the Infiniti
drive away from 6 Beaumont Street at 3:27 p.m. An officer later
identified the driver as Rivera. Investigators watched as the
Infiniti pulled up behind the CS's vehicle. Rivera honked the
Infiniti's horn and motioned to the CS to follow him to the back
of the parking lot. The CS did as asked. Then the CS got into
the Infiniti around 3:30 p.m., and after a short time, returned to
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his car with a package of what proved to be crack. Investigators
followed Rivera to a body shop, saw him get out and walk around a
bit, and then tailed him back to 6 Beaumont.
Armed with this information, the DEA's Barron applied
for federal warrants to search Rivera's residence at 56 Merwin
Street and his stash house at 6 Beaumont Street. In addition to
recounting the events just described, Barron's accompanying
affidavit stated that — based on his 13 years of training and
experience, including his participation in over "500 narcotics
investigations" — dealers often sell drugs at places other than
where they live, though they frequently hide evidence of their
illicit trade in their homes: weapons; cash; expensive items,
like furniture, artwork, and jewelry; records showing things like
addresses, phone numbers, drug buys, and steps taken to launder
drug money; photos of themselves and their accomplices, etc. The
judge signed the warrants. And the search of Rivera's residence
revealed $132,571 in cash, money-order receipts, and a loaded 9mm
handgun, while the search of his stash house disclosed (among other
things) sizeable amounts of crack and cocaine.
Rivera's indictment (on a felon-in-possession-of-a-
firearm charge), rejected suppression motion (a motion that only
targeted items taken from his home), conditional guilty plea
(reserving the right to contest the judge's suppression ruling),
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and appeal to us followed apace. Now we must decide whether Rivera
is right that the judge's suppression order amounts to reversible
error — an argument premised on the theory that the affidavit did
not establish probable cause because it did not show a nexus
between drug trafficking and his house. Rivera is wrong, however,
for reasons we will come to — right after we highlight the legal
principles that govern our analysis.
Legal Primer
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants issue
only on a showing of probable cause, see U.S. Const. amend. IV —
"a common sense, nontechnical conception that deals with the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," see United
States v. Vongkaysone, 434 F.3d 68, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 198 n.11 (1st Cir. 1997)).
To satisfy this standard, a search-warrant application must reveal
probable cause to believe two things: one, that a crime has
occurred — a.k.a., the "commission" element; and two, that
specified evidence of the crime will be at the search location —
a.k.a., the "nexus" element. See, e.g., United States v. Joubert,
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778 F.3d 247, 251 (1st Cir. 2015). Rivera focuses only on the
nexus element. So we will too.
When it comes to nexus, common sense says that a
connection with the search site can be deduced "from the type of
crime, the nature of the items sought," plus "normal inferences as
to where a criminal would hide" evidence of his crime. See United
States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)). Common
sense also says that when a criminal peddles narcotics "outside
his home," one can infer that "evidence of his drug dealing
activity" will be found "in the home," at least when he is spotted
"leaving the home immediately prior to selling drugs." See United
States v. Barnes, 492 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2007).
Keep in mind too that probable cause does not demand
certainty, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a
preponderance of the evidence — it demands only "a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238
(1983); accord Feliz, 182 F.3d at 87 (explaining that the
government need not show that the agent's belief "that evidence of
a crime will be found" is "necessarily correct or more likely true
than false"). "Fair probability" is another way of saying
"reasonable likelihood," by the way. See United States v. Clark,
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685 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2012). And in asking whether probable
cause existed, courts look to the "totality of the circumstances,"
see Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 — a phrase that means that all material
"circumstances should be considered," see United States v. Correa-
Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003).
Last but not least, we stress that when evaluating a
judge's suppression ruling, we review legal conclusions de novo
and factual findings for clear error. See, e.g., McGregor, 650
F.3d at 819-20. And because of the de novo component to our
review, we can affirm on any ground appearing in the record —
including one that the judge did not rely on. See United States
v. Arnott, 758 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2014); see also United States
v. García-Álvarez, 541 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that we
review a suppression-motion denial "with deference," upholding the
denial "if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it");
Feliz, 182 F.3d at 86 (similar).
Analysis
Rivera does not dispute that agents had probable cause
to believe that he was a long-time drug pusher. And he does not
dispute that agents had probable cause to believe that he lived at
56 Merwin Street. Instead he principally argues that the search-
warrant affidavit established only that he "confine[d]" his drug
"business" to his stash house — running his drug operation "from
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there as opposed to his home." And this means that the affidavit
provided no nexus between his home and his alleged drug peddling
and thus supplied no probable cause for the house search — or so
he says. Though ably presented, his argument ultimately fails to
persuade.
Taking the facts in the light most agreeable to the
suppression order, as we must, see McGregor, 650 F.3d at 823-24,
we can infer that Rivera used a phone at his house (either a
landline or a cell phone — the record doesn't say which it was) to
conduct his drug business, i.e., talking with the CS to help push
the crack deal along. That is a commonsense insight, given the
timeline of events:
 Agents saw the Infiniti parked outside Rivera's home at 1:45
p.m.
 The CS called Rivera at 2:47 p.m. to tell him he was minutes
away from the stash house — the agreed-to rendezvous point.
 After finishing his drug-related call, Rivera drove off in
the Infiniti at 2:50 p.m., stopped at the stash house at 2:57
p.m., and gave the CS the crack in the Walgreens parking lot
at 3:31 p.m.
So while the search-warrant affidavit does not explicitly say
Rivera was at home when he had a drug-related phone confab with
the CS, we can — consistent with common sense — infer as much given
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the concatenation of circumstances. And that means that the
affidavit contains evidence showing that Rivera used his home as
a communications point to further his drug crimes — making it
reasonably likely that a search there would reveal incriminating
evidence, such as his drug contacts' names and phone numbers. And
remember, the affidavit noted that dealers often keep info of that
sort in their homes — "a factor" that a judge can "weigh in the
balance." United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1306 (1st Cir.
1987); accord United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir.
2014).
But that is not all. The affidavit's info also suggests
a fair probability that a search of Rivera's home would reveal
other incriminating evidence. For example, given the affidavit's
description of the stash house as "sparsely furnished" and not
lived in (that's the account Kivela gave agents), one can infer
that Rivera — a long-time, high-volume drug dealer — would opt to
keep cash from his sales and stuff he bought with his profits
(e.g., furniture, artwork, jewelry) at his home. After all, common
sense indicates that a drug pusher would want to hide these drug-
connected things in a "safe yet accessible place," like a house,
see Feliz, 182 F.3d at 87-88 — a stash house would not cut it,
experience tells us, because it is a dangerous venue, often filled
with criminals looking to steal whatever they can from there. See
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generally United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2014)
(discussing a planned stash-house robbery). On top of all this,
the affidavit also permits an inference that Rivera would have a
firearm at his home to protect his drug cash and spoils from any
would-be robbers — a commonsense inference to be sure, deriving
(as it does) from the everyday understanding of the drug trade's
violent nature. See generally United States v. Rivera–González,
776 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that guns are common
in the drug trade).
So looking at everything — i.e., taking in the totality
of the circumstances — we think the affidavit established a fair
probability of finding incriminating items in Rivera's residence.
And Rivera gives us no convincing reason to hold otherwise.
Take first Rivera's argument about "the evidence
show[ing] that [he] took pains to confine his business" to the
stash house. Yes, the search-warrant affidavit provides no
specific info showing that Rivera actually doled out drugs from
his home. But again, a commonsense reading of that document shows
that he participated in a drug-related call with the CS from his
house. And that commonsense insight sinks his line of argument
about only doing "business" from the stash house.3
3 Although the judge bypassed the probable-cause issue, he did
think that "[t]he evidence in the affidavit was extremely thin
. . . in showing the connection between [Rivera's] drug trafficking
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Unwilling to give up so easily, Rivera spends a lot of
time trying to convince us not to follow Barnes. There, we held
that even though agents only saw the defendant sell drugs from his
SUV, the search-warrant affidavit showed there was a fair
probability that they would find "evidence of drug dealing" at his
house — and as support we noted (in a passage we quoted earlier)
that "it is reasonable to conclude that there is evidence of . . .
drug dealing activity in the home . . . when the defendant is
observed leaving the home immediately prior to selling drugs."
492 F.3d at 37, 38 (concluding — "given both that the [confidential
informant] stated that Barnes lived at the [target] residence and
that the police observed Barnes exit the [target] residence, drive
away, and sell drugs on the day of his arrest and the search" —
that "the totality of the circumstances strongly suggested that
there was evidence of drug dealing at the [target] residence").
Hoping to avoid its reach, Rivera calls Barnes "an anomaly." But
Barnes is still good law, having never been overruled or
and the Merwin Street residence." "[T]he strongest inference to
be drawn from the evidence," the judge added, "was that [Rivera]
took pains to conduct his business, largely if not completely,
from a different site on Beaumont Street." Reading the ruling as
a whole and in context, we believe what the judge was saying was
that the evidence was too skimpy to support the idea that Rivera
actually dealt drugs from his home. And on that point, we agree.
But for the reasons already given, we have no trouble concluding
that Rivera took part in a drug-related call from his house, which
helps establish the required nexus element.
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discredited. So follow it we must. See United States v.
Rodríguez, 527 F.3d 221, 224-25 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting the
"general rule" that "newly constituted panels in a multi-panel
circuit are bound by prior panel decisions closely on point").
Rivera also accuses the government of asking us to lay
down a per se rule that agents can search a drug dealer's home
whenever they spy a controlled buy. Binding caselaw, he reminds
us, rejects any rule that treats the agents' viewing of a
controlled buy as "per se sufficient to establish probable cause
to search" the dealer's residence. See United States v.
Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 1997). But the government
here asks for no such rule. Instead, and consistent with
Khounsavanh, the government asks us to evaluate probable cause
through a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in a commonsense
manner, see id. — circumstances that include the controlled buy
but also Rivera's drug-connected phone call in his house. And
staying faithful to controlling precedent, we have done just that.
Consequently, Rivera's Khounsavanh-based argument is a nonstarter.
So too is Rivera's suggestion that a judge cannot rely
on an agent's affidavit statement that drug-dealing evidence —
cash, high-priced items, records, firearms, etc. — is often found
in the dealer's home. As Rivera sees it, such reliance is
tantamount to delegating the probable-cause decision to the agent.
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But the Federal Reporter is teeming with First-Circuit opinions
(some of which we cited above) saying that "a law enforcement
officer's training and experience may yield insights that support
a probable cause determination." See Floyd, 740 F.3d at 34
(collecting a bunch of cases). And those cases kibosh Rivera's
argument.
Let us be clear: We might very well have reached a
different result had a commonsense reading of the evidence not
indicated that Rivera participated in a drug-related phone call
from his home. But with that inference, there is enough probable
cause to believe evidence of his drug-pushing activities would be
at his house. And for that reason, we need not assess the judge's
good-faith-exception analysis either.
Enough said about the probable-cause issue. On to the
last issue, then.
Franks-Hearing Issue
Barron's search-warrant affidavit said (emphasis ours)
that (a) before the controlled buy, agents "conducted database
checks" that showed "Rivera uses a residence at 56 Merwin Street
. . . in addition to the third floor apartment at 6 Beaumont
Street" and that (b) "[a] confidential informant" told agents "that
Rivera resides at 56 Merwin Street . . . with his girlfriend, and
uses that residence as well as the third floor apartment at 6
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Beaumont Street." Claiming that the word "uses" deliberately or
recklessly suggested that he had used his home to sell drugs (the
affidavit, he said, "failed" to "establish" that "drugs" were
there), Rivera asked the judge for a Franks hearing to test the
accuracy of Barron's statement. The judge denied the motion,
finding that "uses" was not misleading because it did not suggest
that Rivera "used" his home "for his drug dealing, only that he
lived there." Rivera protests that ruling. But we notice no
reversible error.
Legal Primer
Simplifying slightly, we know that to get a Franks
hearing, a defendant must "make[] a substantial preliminary
showing" of intentional or reckless falsehood in the affidavit.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. "Allegations of negligence or innocent
mistake" will not suffice. Id. at 171. Also, the contested
statement must be crucial to the probable-cause calculation — no
evidentiary hearing is required if after ignoring the fought-over
comment, enough remains in the affidavit to show probable cause.
See, e.g., id. at 171-72; United States v. Cartagena, 593 F.3d
104, 112 (1st Cir. 2010). And we review the judge's Franks-hearing
ruling for clear error, see, e.g., United States v. Moon, 802 F.3d
135, 149 (1st Cir. 2015) — meaning the ruling stands unless the
judge was "wrong with the force of a 5 week old, unrefrigerated,
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dead fish," see Toye v. O'Donnell (In re O'Donnell), 728 F.3d 41,
46 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc.,
249 F.3d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Analysis
We can make quick work of Rivera's Franks-hearing plea.
Here is why. Assume — for argument's sake only — that "uses"
implies that he handed out crack from his home. And assume too —
again solely for argument's sake — that Barron stuck this "false"
info "intentionally" or "recklessly" in his affidavit. Even with
all that assumed (but not decided, we stress — lest there be any
misunderstanding), Rivera's Franks-hearing quest must fail. And
that is because the evidence arrayed above — including, for
example, his drug-related call in his home — is sufficient to
support probable cause even with the offending "uses" words out of
the picture. See, e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; Cartagena,
593 F.3d at 112.
And that is that for the Franks-hearing issue.
Wrapping Up
Our work over, we affirm the judge's ruling in all
respects.
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