United States v. Varela-Rivera

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2039
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
GILBERTO VARELA-RIVERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Baldock,* and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Rafael F. Castro Lang, for appellant.
Richard A. Friedman, Appellate Section, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez,
United States Attorney, Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, María L. Montañez-Concepción, Assistant United States
Attorney, District of Puerto Rico, and Denis J. McInerney, Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, were on brief for appellee.
January 15, 2014
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Baldock, Circuit Judge. On March 9, 2012, Defendant
Gilberto Varela-Rivera pled guilty to possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The Government agreed to recommend a sentence of
15 years’ imprisonment in return for his plea. Nearly two months
later, Defendant requested new counsel and moved to withdraw his
plea, arguing his public defender had coerced him into pleading
guilty. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment, which
“include[d] a component for lying before the Court.” Defendant now
appeals, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion when
it refused to grant Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, and
(2) his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742, we affirm.
I.
On December 19, 2011, Puerto Rico police officers entered
a motel room where Defendant was sleeping after the motel manager
called to report that Defendant had overstayed in the room.
Defendant never responded to manager or police efforts to
communicate with him from outside the room. When officers entered
the room, they found Defendant sleeping with a loaded Glock
handgun, modified to fire in automatic mode, lying next to him on
the bed. They also saw what was later proven to be about 125 grams
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of marijuana and 17 grams of cocaine in various see-through
containers. Defendant was initially indicted in Puerto Rico
Commonwealth court; however, these charges were dismissed after the
Commonwealth court concluded the motel manager and the police had
violated Defendant’s privacy rights when they entered the motel
room. Federal authorities then arrested Defendant and indicted him
on four counts, including possession of an automatic firearm in
connection with a drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1). If Defendant had been convicted of this offense
alone, he would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 30
years’ imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Defendant moved to suppress under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments the gun, the drugs, and various incriminating statements
he made during his arrest and booking. The district court
scheduled a hearing on Defendant’s motion for March 6, 2012, and
Defendant’s trial for March 7. On March 6, before the suppression
hearing began, Defendant’s public defender informed the court that
he had just received in discovery from the Government evidence that
Defendant may have told one of the booking officers that the police
were lucky he was asleep when they entered the motel room because,
if he had been awake, he would have shot them. In light of this
new evidence, the public defender asked for a five-working-day
continuance to “talk it over” with Defendant and “see if he still
wishe[d] to proceed given this statement.” The parties then
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discussed Defendant’s options, and the court held an off-record
bench conference with the public defender. After this bench
conference, the court explained to Defendant that if it held a
suppression hearing, the hearing would amount to the police giving
testimony, which Defendant’s public defender could try to impeach
or which Defendant himself could take the stand to try to
contradict. The court then explained that if Defendant took the
stand to argue his suppression motion, the police would impeach him
with his criminal record and getting the court to believe his story
rather than the Government’s would be “pretty uphill” for him,
given this record.1 The court then postponed Defendant’s trial
until March 9 so Defendant and his public defender could “explore
a disposition of this case that may dispense [with the] statutory
minimum of 30 years, because of the firearm.”
On March 9, 2012, Defendant executed a plea agreement
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) whereby he pled guilty only to
a charge of possession of a non-automatic firearm and the
Government agreed to recommend a 15-year sentence. The court held
a change-of-plea hearing that same day. The court advised
Defendant of the purpose of the hearing, and the consequences of
1
Although the court’s statement here arguably could call its
ability to be impartial into question and was therefore improper
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the statement did not “reveal an opinion
that derives from an extrajudicial source [or] reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
-4-
pleading guilty. Defendant twice confirmed at this hearing that
his plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied with the work of
his public defender. Defendant also confirmed that he understood
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. When the court asked
Defendant “has somebody threatened you or anybody else related to
you in order to induce you to plead in this case?,” he responded:
“No.” When asked whether there was “anything that may still bother
you in your mind,” Defendant responded: “No. It’s fine.”
Thirteen days later, on March 22, Defendant filed a pro
se transcript request for the March 6 and March 9 hearings. The
court provided these transcripts on April 4. Then, on May 4,
Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and obtain substitute
counsel. He argued his public defender had told him the district
court would deny his suppression motion and sentence him to life if
he did not plead guilty, but when he read the transcripts, he
realized the court had said no such thing. He therefore argued his
public defender had misled and coerced him into pleading guilty.
The public defender withdrew as defense counsel, citing the obvious
conflict of interest, but offered to respond to the allegations
related to the voluntariness of Defendant’s plea if needed.
Substitute counsel was then appointed, and filed a formal motion to
withdraw Defendant’s plea, stating Defendant only gave up on the
suppression hearing and chose to plead guilty based on
misstatements by his public defender.
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At Defendant’s August 1 sentencing hearing the court
considered his motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant was sworn,
and proceeded to renege on nearly all of the answers he gave at his
change-of-plea hearing. He blamed his public defender for
“intimidating” him into signing the plea agreement. He said he had
lied to the court because of this intimidation. This was the only
evidence Defendant advanced in furtherance of his motion to
withdraw his plea. The court did not believe Defendant. It noted
the public defender “was an extremely competent lawyer with a lot
of experience gained in dealing with these kinds of cases,” who
“never, ever in his many appearances before the Court did anything
other than defend zealously his clients.” On the other hand, the
court found Defendant had “no credibility whatsoever.” The court
thus denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant’s
new counsel clarified that Defendant was initially satisfied with
his public defender, but that after he went back and looked at the
transcript from the suppression hearing he believed what his public
defender had told him was inconsistent with what he read in the
transcript. The court acknowledged this clarification, but did not
change its mind. It then proceeded to sentencing.
Before sentencing Defendant, the court confirmed with the
parties that “this case is totally non-guideline,” and defense
counsel agreed. The court then sentenced Defendant to 20 years’
imprisonment—five years above the Government-recommended sentence.
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The court based the sentence on a number of factors, including
Defendant’s prior convictions for robbery, murder, and attempted
escape from prison. The court also noted this sentence “include[d]
a component for lying before the Court.” Defendant never objected
to the sentence, nor the court’s sentencing procedure.
II.
We first address Defendant’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Because Defendant “moved to withdraw his guilty plea
prior to sentencing, we review the denial of the motion for abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir.
2009). In doing so, “we review credibility findings for clear
error, a standard highly deferential to the district court’s
conclusions.” United States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir.
2012).
“A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after
the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence
if: . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). In assessing
whether a fair and just reason exists, we consider (1) whether the
plea was voluntary, intelligent, knowing and in compliance with
Rule 11; (2) the strength of the reasons offered in support of the
motion; (3) whether there is a serious claim of actual innocence;
(4) the timing of the motion; and (5) any prejudice to the
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government if the withdrawal is allowed. Isom, 580 F.3d at 52.2
Defendant never argued actual innocence, nor could he; we therefore
address the remaining four factors in turn.
A.
Defendant argues his plea was involuntary because his
public defender coerced him into pleading guilty by telling him the
district court would impose a life sentence unless he did so.3 “The
burden is upon [Defendant], as the one attacking the plea, to show
the circumstances justifying relief from the plea . . . .” United
States v. Padilla-Galarza, 351 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.
2003)(internal citations omitted). Moreover, “[o]rdinarily, a
defendant is stuck with the representations that he himself makes
in open court at the time of the plea. They are more likely to be
reliable than later versions prompted by second thoughts, and
guilty pleas—often in the defendant’s interest—could hardly be
managed any other way.” Id.
2
The district court should ordinarily consider these factors
in the first instance. United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d
342, 347 (1st Cir. 1997). Here, the district court failed to
explicitly analyze these factors, but we need not remand. As we
shall explain, we are satisfied that Defendant did not meet his
burden under these factors.
3
Defendant argues the sub-issue of his claim of coercion
should be reviewed de novo. We have not yet decided the applicable
standard for such claims, and we need not do so now, as Defendant’s
claim fails under any of the applicable standards. See United
States v. Rodríguez-Morales, 647 F.3d 395, 397–98 (1st Cir. 2011).
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Defendant provides no evidence to support his claim of
coercion beyond his own sworn testimony. Defendant was free to
call his public defender—indeed, the public defender offered to
respond to the allegations related to the voluntariness of
Defendant’s plea—but he did not do so. Thus, the court faced two
conflicting pieces of evidence in ruling on Defendant’s motion.
First, at the change-of-plea hearing, Defendant twice confirmed
under oath that his plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied
with his public defender’s work. Second, five months later,
Defendant testified under oath that he had lied to the court and
his public defender had coerced him into signing the plea
agreement. “We review credibility findings for clear error,” Hart,
674 F.3d at 40, and, without more, we cannot say the district court
clearly erred when it believed Defendant’s initial
representations—at the time of his plea—that he was not coerced or
intimidated and later found Defendant had “no credibility
whatsoever” when he attempted to change his story. As such,
Defendant is stuck with the representations he made at the time of
his plea.
Defendant also contends that he did not have time to
review the plea agreement and that his public defender had coached
him on how to respond at the change-of-plea hearing. He therefore
argues his plea was unknowing. Defendant’s “claim that he did not
carefully review the written document and that his counsel coached
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him as to the responses is not by itself enough to show that the
plea was uninformed.” Padilla-Galarza, 351 F.3d at 598. As in
Padilla-Galarza, Defendant here confirmed with the court that he
had “ample opportunity” to discuss his case and his decision to
plead guilty with his public defender. Furthermore, the main terms
of Defendant’s agreement were spelled out by the judge in open
court. See id. Thus, we conclude Defendant’s original plea was
voluntary, intelligent, knowing, and in compliance with Rule 11.
B.
Defendant offers two reasons to justify withdrawing his
plea. The first is his allegation of coercion. As we discussed
above, Defendant told the district court two contradictory stories,
both times under oath, and the court had to choose which of his
stories to believe. Thus, Defendant’s coercion argument fails.
The second reason Defendant advances to support
withdrawing his plea is that “two separate judges in the local
courts had ruled in his favor” and found the motel manager and
police had violated his privacy rights when they entered the motel
room where he slept. In United States v. Muriel, 111 F.3d 975 (1st
Cir. 1997), we addressed whether a potentially meritorious
suppression motion based on an alleged defect in the search warrant
that led to the defendant’s arrest was a plausible reason to
withdraw his plea. Id. at 978–79. We rejected this proffered
reason because the defendant failed to demonstrate that there was
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in fact a defect in the warrant. Id. at 979. True, the defendant
bears the burden of proving a warrant is defective, whereas the
Government here bears the burden of proving the lawfulness of a
warrant-less search. See United States v. Lopez, 380 F.3d 538, 543
(1st Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “[b]efore embarking upon the merits
of a suppression challenge, a criminal defendant must show a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched and in
relation to the items seized.” United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d
854, 856 (1st Cir. 1988). Defendant fails to make this initial
showing.
Defendant does not argue that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the motel room. Indeed, the police
entered hours after the time he had paid for had expired.4
Furthermore, the motel manager and the police had tried repeatedly
to contact Defendant from outside the room before entering.
Instead, on appeal, Defendant merely relies on the favorable
findings of two Commonwealth judges. These judges’ findings led to
the dismissal of the original Commonwealth charges brought against
4
Defendant admits in his opening brief that he only paid for
one eight-hour rental of the motel room, which had expired over two
hours before police entered. Def’s. Op. Br. at 5. But he also
drops a footnote in his brief stating he “claims he paid for two 8
hour periods.” Id. at 5 n.1. Defendant never objected to the
presentence report statement that he had overstayed in the motel
room. Furthermore, Defendant’s uncorroborated statement that he
paid for two eight-hour rentals comes from his sworn statement in
furtherance of his effort to withdraw his plea, which the district
court found had “no credibility whatsoever.”
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Defendant based on the gun and drugs found in the motel room.
Defendant does not provide us with translations of these decisions,
and the Spanish versions are beyond our review. See United States
v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5–6, 12 (1st Cir. 2002). The
Government, however, provides us with a translation of the
transcript of one of the Commonwealth judge’s decisions. This
decision concludes the police entrance of the motel room was
unreasonable under “due process.” The decision nowhere explains
whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
motel room at the time the police entered. Furthermore, the
decision nowhere cites the Fourth Amendment, or any other law for
that matter.5 Thus, like the defendant in Muriel, Defendant’s
unsupported claim regarding the violation of his privacy rights
does not provide a plausible reason for withdrawal of his guilty
plea.
C.
A “two month lag between the plea hearing and appellant’s
motion to withdraw places it well within the area of vulnerability
because of untimeliness.” United States v. Pagan-Ortega, 372 F.3d
22, 31 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Ramos, 810 F.2d
308, 313 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining a thirteen-day delay between
5
Indeed, even if the police violated Defendant’s privacy
rights under Puerto Rico law, this would not trigger the
exclusionary rule. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171
(2008).
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hearing and motion to withdraw disfavored defendant). Here,
Defendant waited 13 days before taking even the first steps toward
withdrawing his plea—requesting transcripts of the March 6 and
March 9 hearings—and he waited nearly two months before actually
moving to withdraw his plea. Even if we attribute Defendant’s
delay to the challenges of communicating through the prison mail
system, at most this means Defendant filed a timely motion to
withdraw his plea that ultimately failed on the merits.
D.
We “must weigh in the balance any demonstrable prejudice
to the government” only where “the defendant carries the burden of
persuasion on the aforementioned considerations.” United States v.
Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 347 (1st Cir. 1997). As discussed
above, even assuming his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
timely, Defendant failed to carry his burden on any of the other
aforementioned considerations. His plea was voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing within the meaning of Rule 11; he does not
proffer a plausible reason justifying withdrawal of his plea; and
he cannot and does not assert actual innocence. As such, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
III.
Defendant also claims his 20-year sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review a sentence
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first for procedural reasonableness, and if we are convinced no
substantial procedural error was committed, we then review the
sentence for substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Defendant claims the district court committed procedural
error by (1) “retaliating against [him] by imposing an additional
five years’ incarceration for having sought to withdraw the guilty
plea under the guise of [finding Defendant] ‘lied through his
teeth’” and (2) basing the sentence on the court’s “conscience and
particular sensitivities.” Defendant failed to object to the
court’s sentencing procedure below, so we review these claims only
for plain error. United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 445 (1st
Cir. 2007). To establish plain error, Defendant must show: “(1)
that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not
only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60
(1st Cir. 2001).
Although he does not expressly argue it, Defendant quotes
precedent that states “the Court must compute the guidelines” at
sentencing. Def’s. Op. Br. at 25 (quoting United States v. Stone,
575 F.3d 83, 94 (1st Cir. 2009)). At sentencing, Defendant
affirmatively agreed that his case was “totally non-guideline.”
Thus, any guideline-calculation argument Defendant may have had has
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been waived and we see no reason to excuse the waiver in this case.
Cf. United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir.
2011).
Returning to Defendant’s two stated procedural arguments,
Defendant first argues the court improperly imposed the five-year
increase above the government-recommended sentence entirely based
on Defendant’s lying to the court. We have already established the
district court did not clearly err when it found Defendant lied
under oath while attempting to withdraw his plea. Further, a
district court may properly increase a Defendant’s sentence if it
finds he committed perjury. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S.
41 (1978), superseded in unrelated part as stated in Barber v.
Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010). Moreover, Defendant’s argument on
this point is disingenuous because the district court based only “a
component” of the sentence increase on the fact that Defendant had
lied to the court. The rest of the increase the court justified
based on the fact that Defendant had “violated parole . . . tried
to escape prison . . . murdered people. You name it. Everything.
Everything in the book he has done. Theft, burglaries, robberies,
disguises. You name it. Everything.” As such, the district court
committed no error, let alone plain error, by increasing
Defendant’s sentence based on Defendant’s perjury as well as his
substantial criminal history.
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Defendant next argues the district court improperly based
his sentence on its “conscience and particular sensitivities.” His
argument is based on statements the court made in explaining why it
would not promise to follow the government’s 15-year sentence
recommendation at the March 9 change-of-plea hearing. The court
explained that it would not bind itself to follow a non-binding
plea agreement, first, because it wanted “to be able to do what
[its] conscience [said it] should do under the circumstances.”
Next the court explained that it would not relax its standards out
of “fatigue.” The court elaborated on this fatigue by recalling
how, at one time, when one saw a story about a murder in the paper,
one would be too upset to eat breakfast, but “[n]owadays
people . . . count the drops of blood while they [drink their]
coffee.”
Even if these statements were improper, they did not
amount to error that was clear and obvious. “A [court]’s views on
matters of law and policy ordinarily are not legitimate grounds for
recusal, even if such views are strongly held.” United States v.
Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2000). Moreover, this does not
strike us as a case where the court was “unable to put aside [its]
personal convictions in order to carry out the law. . . .” Id.
The court made these statements at Defendant’s change-of-plea
hearing, nearly five months before it sentenced Defendant and in
response to the public defender’s attempt to get the court to
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indicate in advance the sentence it would impose. When the court
later sentenced Defendant, it made no reference to its conscience
or to how one should feel when reading about a murder in the news.
Rather, the court based Defendant’s sentence on his substantial
criminal record and the fact that he had committed perjury in
attempting to withdraw his plea. Even assuming the court erred by
using social commentary to explain why it would not rubber-stamp a
non-binding sentence recommendation, the error was not clear and
obvious, and thus did not rise to the level of plain error.
Finally, Defendant contends his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Because Defendant did not object to the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence before the district court, we review
it only for plain error. United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 33
(1st Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2371 (2013) and cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 450 (2013). “When it comes to substantive
reasonableness, ‘a sentencing court’s ultimate responsibility is to
articulate a plausible rationale and arrive at a sensible result.’”
United States v. Rodriguez-Reyes, 714 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
2013)(quoting United States v. Carrasco–de–Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 30
(1st Cir.2009)).
Defendant cannot show his sentence was substantively
unreasonable. The undisputed offense conduct in Defendant’s
presentence report shows police found him sleeping with an
automatic firearm and a large quantity of drugs. Had he been
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convicted of the automatic firearm offense alone, he would have
faced a mandatory minimum 30-year sentence. Ultimately, Defendant
pled guilty to possession of a non-automatic firearm with a
statutorily imposed sentencing range of five years to life
imprisonment. The Government agreed to recommend a 15-year
sentence. The court, however, articulated a plausible rationale
for adding another five years: Defendant’s perjury and substantial
criminal history. Given the statutory sentencing range of five
years to life, and Defendant’s perjury and substantial criminal
history, we cannot say Defendant’s 20-year sentence was not a
sensible result, especially on plain error review.
Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
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