United States v. Miranda-Martinez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 14–1149
14–1244
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SANTOS J. MIRANDA-MARTINEZ, a/k/a Santitos, a/k/a Chiquitin,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Selya, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Raymond E. Gillespie on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, Unites States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United
States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
June 24, 2015
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Santos J. Miranda-Martinez
("Miranda") appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to drug
trafficking crimes. He argues that he is entitled to resentencing
because the government breached the terms of his plea agreement,
and because the district court erroneously imposed a two-level
firearm enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
Finding neither argument persuasive, we affirm.
I. Background
Miranda was indicted in 2011 in the District of Puerto
Rico for conspiring to import cocaine into the United States (count
one) and conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to
distribute (count two). In 2012, a second indictment charged that,
with respect to a different conspiracy, Miranda conspired to
possess heroin, cocaine, and marijuana with the intent to
distribute (count one); aided and abetted the distribution of those
controlled substances (counts two through four); and conspired to
possess firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count
five). At Miranda's request, the two cases were consolidated for
his change of plea hearing and sentencing. Miranda pled guilty to
count one in both indictments pursuant to a plea agreement with
the government.
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The district court sentenced Miranda to 293 months'
imprisonment for count one in each of the two cases, with the terms
to be served concurrently, and dismissed the remaining counts in
both indictments. The district court calculated the guidelines
range using a total offense level above that recommended by the
parties in the plea agreement, and also imposed a firearm
enhancement not contemplated in the agreement, thereby permitting
Miranda to appeal his sentence notwithstanding the plea
agreement's waiver of appeal clause.1 See United States v.
Fernández-Cabrera, 625 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2010).
II. Discussion
A. The Alleged Breach of the Plea Agreement
Miranda first argues that the government violated the
plea agreement when one of the prosecutors stated facts known to
the government relating to his possession of firearms during the
time period alleged in the second indictment. Because Miranda did
not make this argument in the district court, we review for plain
error. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133–34 (2009).
1 The plea agreement stated that "[t]he defendant hereby
agrees that if [the district court] accepts this agreement and
sentences the defendant according to its terms, conditions, and
recommendations, the defendant waives and surrenders the right to
appeal the judgment and sentence in this case."
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While Puckett stated that plain error review applies "in the usual
fashion" to forfeited arguments that the government breached a
plea agreement, id. at 134, the Supreme Court also observed in
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971), that the fault
with respect to the government's failure to uphold its end of a
plea agreement "rests on the prosecutor, not on the sentencing
judge." And we have ourselves said the same. United States v.
Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Although plain error
review usually applies to errors committed by the court, we have
also assessed governmental breaches of plea bargains, in the
absence of a contemporaneous objection, under this same
standard."). In any event, for the following reasons, we find
that the prosecutor's comments at Miranda's sentencing hearing
likely did not violate the plea agreement, and therefore could not
have constituted plain error.
1. The Plea Agreement
The plea agreement stipulated that Miranda's base offense
level should be thirty-six due to the amount and type of controlled
substances involved in the conspiracies, and that a downward
variance of three levels should apply due to his acceptance of
responsibility. The plea agreement also stipulated that the
parties "agree that no further adjustments or departures to the
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defendant's base offense level shall be sought," and it obligated
each party to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range
corresponding to the agreed-upon total offense level of thirty-
three. That recommendation did not bind the district court, even
once it accepted the guilty plea. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(B). Rather, the agreement specified that Miranda
understood "that the sentence will be left entirely to the sound
discretion of the [district court] in accordance with the advisory
Sentencing Guidelines."
2. The Prosecutor's Statements
The presentence investigation report ("PSR") conveyed
that a Drug Enforcement Administration agent learned that Puerto
Rico police seized a semi-automatic handgun from Miranda in 2007,
that they seized guns from his co-conspirators, and that another
one of his co-conspirators carried a gun throughout the period of
time covered by the conspiracy in the second indictment. As we
explain in more detail below, those facts, if accepted by the
district court, called for a two-level enhancement in the
guidelines sentencing calculations. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
Miranda objected to the PSR's reliance on such an enhancement. In
addressing that objection at the beginning of the sentencing
hearing, the district court observed of its own account that the
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PSR recited that "members of the Police of Puerto Rico seized a
semiautomatic handgun from [Miranda]. He denies it. I believe
there's a record for that; so, your objection is denied." Counsel
then argued the point. He asserted that Miranda himself had no
gun; but conceded that "[i]n this case, every single defendant
[other than Miranda] . . . , they did possess firearms," and that
another defendant who accompanied Miranda to a meeting had a
firearm. Counsel also argued that the connection between this
case and the alleged 2007 seizure of a gun from Miranda himself
was unclear, even if the seizure occurred.
When Miranda's counsel finished his argument, the
following colloquy ensued:
District Court: Government?
. . . .
Prosecutor Castellón-Miranda: . . . . We
were the prosecutor [sic] assigned to the case
of 12-769, which arises from the drug
conspiracy in Juana Díaz. [Miranda] was
identified as one of the leaders of this
organization, and several cooperators
identified the defendant as one that would go
to the drug point armed and who would carry
firearms in this case. So, the fact that he
was arrested, it was also a fact known to the
witnesses of the Government. And I understand
that the weapon was seized by the Police of
Puerto Rico also.
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Defense Counsel: Can I have a moment with the
prosecutor, Judge.
(Government and defense counsel confer.)
Prosecutor Hernández-Vega: And, Your Honor,
at this time AUSA Olga Castellón clarified
what the evidence in that case was.
Nonetheless, as part of the plea negotiations,
the government reached a plea agreement in
which that enhancement was not contemplated;
and the total offense level was in
consideration of the amount of drugs in
relation to the cases and his acceptance of
responsibility for a total offense level of
33. Nonetheless, with candor to the Court, we
have to indicate what the evidence is and how
the incident relates to the offense.
Defense Counsel: Did you mention that with
respect to the plea agreement this was not
contemplated in it.
Prosecutor Hernández-Vega: Yes.
The Court: That's what she stated. Of course
I was very clear to counsel and the defendant
that I am not bound by the plea agreement.
And there is evidence that the government has
to the effect that he did possess weapons
during -- sometime during the conspiracy in
this case. So, the objection is denied.
In thereafter sentencing Miranda, the district court
included the two-level enhancement in its guidelines calculations,
explaining its reasoning as follows:
As it was foreseeable that dangerous weapons,
including firearms, would be possessed during
the drug trafficking conspiracy, a two-level
increase is warranted . . . . As you notice,
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Counsel, if it was foreseeable that firearms
would be possessed.
Miranda now argues on appeal that Assistant U.S.
Attorney Castellón's statements breached the government's promise
not to seek any upward enhancements.
3. Analysis
The applicable law bearing on the prosecutor's conduct
seeks to balance competing aims. On the one hand, several opinions
of this court expressly provide that "[t]he government's review of
the facts of the case . . . cannot constitute a breach of the plea
agreement [when] they [are] relevant to the court's imposition of
sentence; no limitation can be placed, by agreement or otherwise,
on this information." United States v. Gonczy, 357 F.3d 50, 53
(1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2000) (noting that under 18 U.S.C. § 3661, "[n]o
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence" (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Hogan, 862 F.2d 386, 389 (1st Cir. 1988) (sentencing judge "has a
right to expect that the prosecutor and the probation department"
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will "give him all relevant facts within their ken"). Thus, "[t]he
mere furnishing" of facts concerning the background, character,
and conduct of the defendant "gives us little pause." Saxena, 229
F.3d at 6.
On the other hand, we have acknowledged that certain
factual "omission[s], helpful to the defendant," may be "an
implicit part of the bargain" in a plea agreement. United States
v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005). In Gonczy, for
example, we held that a prosecutor breached a plea agreement when
he began a sentencing argument by recommending a sentence according
to the plea agreement, but then went on to say that the "defendant
was the brains behind [the] operation," that "his conduct ruined
many lives," that the "defendant basically laughed in the face of
law enforcement," and that "the defendant at a minimum deserves
what the guidelines provide for and those are his just deserts."
357 F.3d at 53–54 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the
government's "solemn duty to uphold forthrightly its end of any
bargain that it makes in a plea agreement, and its equally solemn
duty to disclose information material to the court's sentencing
determinations . . . . admittedly can tug in different directions."
Saxena, 229 F.3d at 5 (citations omitted).
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The precise terms of the plea agreement in this case
help resolve these competing tugs. The agreement does not limit
the information that the prosecutor can convey. Rather, it limits
the purpose of her remarks: no enhancement above the agreed level
"shall be sought." Such a prohibited purpose plays no causal role
when a prosecutor accurately answers a judge's query by citing
objective facts responsive to the question, or rebuts factual
assertions made by defense counsel. Conversely, when a prosecutor,
as in Gonczy, gratuitously offers added detail garbed in implicit
advocacy, a court might well find that the prosecutor is actually
seeking a result in a manner that breaches the agreement.
In gauging the equilibrium struck by these competing
tugs in this case, we observe first that the district court--not
the prosecutor--raised the subject of the challenged enhancement
based on its reading of the PSR. After defense counsel explained
his view of the facts relevant to that inquiry, and in response to
an apparent invitation by the court, AUSA Castellón explained in
non-argumentative terms her knowledge of the basis for the PSR's
recommendation. Then, and without any verbal winks, AUSA Hernández
twice voiced full support for including no enhancement.
Defense counsel's lack of objection in this context is
less like an oversight that merely triggers plain error review,
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and more like a real time acknowledgement that the prosecutor was
responding forthrightly to the judge's inquiry, as was her duty,
rather than seeking a result in breach of the agreement. Defense
counsel was familiar with the terms of the agreement, the agreement
was expressly mentioned, and counsel apparently secured a
reiteration by the prosecutor of the government's commitment in
order to eliminate any possible negative inference from its
response to the discussion of the gun possession issue. In this
context, it seems fair to say that the lack of objection was not
a mistake by counsel in the face of a plain breach, but was instead
a recognition by competent counsel that the agreement was not being
breached at all.
Our rejection on plain error review of the claim that
the prosecutor breached the plea agreement stands as well on the
fact that the prosecutor's words very likely had no effect on the
outcome. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141–42 (stating that a defendant
who does not receive the benefits of his bargain due to the
government's breach cannot prevail on the third prong of plain
error review when "he likely would not have obtained those benefits
in any event"); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)
(defendant "bears the burden of persuasion with respect to
prejudice" on plain error review). In definitively announcing and
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explaining his decision to adopt a two-level enhancement for
possession of a firearm, the district court cited only the
acknowledgement of the defendant and his counsel that, as described
in the PSR, co-conspirators possessed guns, which the trial court
thought was eminently foreseeable. Nothing the prosecutor said at
the hearing even bore on the possession of guns by co-conspirators.
Simply put, there is no non-speculative basis for concluding that
Miranda would not have received the two-level enhancement but for
the prosecutor's statement confirming her belief in the PSR's
statement that Miranda himself had a gun.
For the foregoing reasons, Miranda's plea agreement
argument fails.
B. The Firearms Enhancement
Miranda next challenges the merits of the district
court's decision to impose the two-level enhancement under United
States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1). Repeating the
argument that he made in the district court, Miranda contends that
the evidence was too sparse and insufficiently corroborated to
establish the type of foreseeable gun possession that would support
the enhancement. We review the district court's factual findings
at sentencing for clear error, and we give due deference to its
application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts. United
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States v. Carrero-Hernández, 643 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2011).
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) applies when a dangerous weapon was
possessed during the course of a drug trafficking offense. "To
warrant the enhancement, the defendant does not need to have
possessed the weapon [himself] or even to have known about it, it
just must be reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would
possess a weapon in furtherance of the criminal activity." United
States v. Greig, 717 F.3d 212, 219 (1st Cir. 2013). If the
government satisfies its initial burden of establishing that the
defendant or his co-conspirator possessed a weapon during the
offense, the defendant may avoid application of the enhancement if
he can show that it is "clearly improbable that the weapon was
connected with the offense." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 11(A); United
States v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 87, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2006). And we
have often observed that "firearms are common tools" in drug
trafficking conspiracies involving large amounts of drugs such as
the two in which Miranda admits he participated. United States v.
Bianco, 922 F.2d 910, 912 (1st Cir. 1991).
After hearing argument at the sentencing hearing, the
district court found that it was "foreseeable that dangerous
weapons, including firearms, would be possessed during the drug
trafficking conspiracy." In support of this finding, the district
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court referred to defense counsel's acknowledgment that co-
conspirators possessed firearms as described in the PSR. The
stipulated version of the facts in the plea agreement also
reflected that, with respect to each indictment, Miranda and his
co-conspirators engaged in transactions for a thousand or more
kilograms of cocaine at a time. Finally, Miranda did not object
to allegations in the PSR that enforcers in the organization used
guns to protect the organization's members and its proceeds.
Without clearly specifying which of these facts he is
challenging, Miranda argues that the district court lacked a
sufficient evidentiary basis to impose the firearm enhancement
because the evidence was "inherently suspect," "insufficiently
corroborated," and "quantitatively sparse." Using the above-
described precedent as our guide, however, we easily conclude that
there was no error in the district court's decision to impose the
enhancement. Based on the evidence the district court had at its
disposal, it is unsurprising that, as stipulated in the plea
agreement, officers discovered a pistol hidden in a vehicle driven
by Miranda's co-conspirator at the scene of one of the drug
transactions, and that a pistol was seized from the vehicle of
another co-conspirator two days later.
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Miranda makes a last-ditch effort at vacating the
enhancement by stating that "[t]he finding cannot be based on
foreseeability related to a leadership role, as was asserted in
the PSR, because the judge at sentencing expressly denied that
recommendation." While evidence that a defendant served as a
conspiracy's leader might support the conclusion that he could
have reasonably foreseen the activities (including possession of
a firearm) undertaken by his co-conspirators, such a finding is
certainly not a categorical prerequisite for creating a reasonable
probability that possession of a firearm was foreseeable. Here,
irrespective of whether Miranda led the conspiracy, he has failed
to show that it was clearly improbable that the firearms he and
his co-conspirators possessed were connected to the drug
conspiracies.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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