Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Indulac, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1132
VAQUERÍA TRES MONJITAS, INC.; SUIZA DAIRY, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
PUERTO RICO DAIRY FARMERS ASSOCIATION (PRDFA),
Plaintiff,
v.
MYRNA COMAS-PAGÁN, in her official capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; EDMUNDO ROSALY-RODRÍGUEZ,
in his official capacity as Administrator of the Office
of the Milk Industry Regulatory Administration for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Defendants, Appellees,
-----------------------------
INDUSTRIA LECHERA DE PUERTO RICO, INC.,
Intervenor Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Rafael M. Santiago-Rosa, with whom Vanessa Medina-Romero,
Darissa C. Hernández-Egúrbida and Marichal, Hernández, Santiago &
Juarbe, LLC, were on brief, for appellant.
Rafael Escalera-Rodríguez, with whom Amelia Caicedo-Santiago,
Carlos M. Hernández-Burgos and Reichard & Escalera, were on brief,
for appellee Suiza Dairy, Inc.
José R. Lázaro-Paoli, José R. Lázaro-Paoli Law Offices,
Enrique Nassar-Rizek and ENR & Associates, on brief, for appellee
Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc.
December 2, 2014
-2-
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case stems from a long-
running dispute that involves the Puerto Rico milk industry.
Plaintiffs Suiza Dairy, Inc. ("Suiza") and Vaquería Tres Monjitas,
Inc. ("Vaquería") reached a settlement agreement in the original
case with the government defendants, Myrna Comas-Pagán, the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture for the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and Edmundo Rosaly-Rodríguez, the Administrator of the
Office of the Milk Industry Regulatory Administration
(collectively, the "Department"). Intervenors Industria Lechera de
Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Indulac" under its Spanish acronym) and the
Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Association (the "PRDFA") objected to the
settlement, claiming that it violated Puerto Rico's constitutional
and statutory law. The district court approved the settlement
agreement, and Indulac appeals, contending that the said action
violated its due process rights by approving the agreement without
affording Indulac a hearing. We conclude that Indulac's appeal is
untimely, which deprives us of appellate jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
I. Background
The dispute over Puerto Rico's dairy industry is not new
to this Court, and ample accounts of the litigation's origins can
be found in our previous opinions. P.R. Dairy Farmers Ass'n v.
Pagán, 748 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2014); Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v.
Pagán, 748 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2014); Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v.
-3-
Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464 (1st Cir. 2009), reh'g & reh'g en banc
denied, 600 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
For the purposes of this appeal, the following summary of
the facts suffices: after almost a decade of litigation -- complete
with various evidentiary hearings, three appeals, and the onset of
contempt proceedings -- the principal parties settled. The
Department agreed to promulgate a regulation that would drastically
reshape the already pervasively regulated Puerto Rico dairy
industry.1 As a result of the proceedings, a regulation was
crafted to rework the pricing and structure of the market.2
Indulac and the PRDFA were excluded from the bargaining table.
Spurned, they moved for the district court to reject the settlement
agreement, alleging that the regulation violated a host of Puerto
Rico's constitutional and statutory provisions because the
regulation allowed the Plaintiffs to keep more money and forced the
1
"The milk industry is heavily regulated in Puerto Rico, and is
under the purview of ORIL, a subdivision of the Department of
Agriculture." P.R. Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Pagán, 748 F.3d 13, 15
(1st Cir. 2014).
2
According to Indulac, Regulation 12, the new regulation,
constitutes a de facto repeal of a "service charge" previously paid
to it under the milk regulatory scheme, which operated essentially
as a direct subsidy. See Indulac's Urgent Opp'n to the Adoption of
Final Settlement Agreement and Mem. of Understanding Between the
Parties ¶10, Oct. 30, 2013, ECF No. 2328. Neither Suiza nor
Vaquería contest this assertion. Likewise, neither contest that
Regulation 12 also forces Indulac to pay a significantly higher
price for raw milk than it paid prior to the regulation's
promulgation. The regulation mandates that all milk processors pay
the same price of $0.785 per quart of raw milk. See Informative
Mot. Ex. 2, at 4, Sept. 30, 2014, ECF No. 2495.
-4-
Intervenors to receive less. The district court heard their
arguments, and, after reasoned consideration, approved the
settlement. The district court entered judgment on November 6,
2013. A day later, it amended the order to correct a simple
grammatical mistake. On December 5, Indulac moved to alter the
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The district court
denied the motion, concluding that Indulac lacked standing to
modify the judgment as it was not a party in the case. Vaquería
Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Comas, 992 F. Supp. 2d 39, 41 n.1 (D.P.R.
2013). Indulac appealed.
II. Discussion
Because "the taking of an appeal within the prescribed
time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional,'" we must examine the
timeliness of Indulac's appeal. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
209 (2007) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459
U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)); see Acevedo-Villalobos v.
Hernández, 22 F.3d 384, 387 (1st Cir. 1994). We have an obligation
to inquire into jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Díaz-Reyes v.
Fuentes-Ortiz, 471 F.3d 299, 300 (1st Cir. 2006); Doyle v.
Huntress, Inc., 419 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). We hold that we
lack appellate jurisdiction to hear Indulac's appeal because it was
untimely filed.
In a civil case, parties must appeal a judgment by filing
a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry. Fed. R. App. P.
-5-
4(a)(1)(A). This thirty-day limitations period is tolled if a
party files a Rule 59(e) motion seeking to alter or amend the
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). In this scenario, the
limitations period only begins to run after the district court
enters an order disposing of the motion. If, however, the Rule
59(e) motion itself is untimely, this court will not toll the
appeals limitations period. Feinstein v. Moses, 951 F.2d 16, 18
(1st Cir. 1991). A Rule 59(e) motion is timely if it is filed
within twenty-eight days of the judgment's entry. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e). Here, the district court entered judgment on November 6.
Indulac filed its motion on December 5, twenty-nine days later.
The Rule 59(e) motion was untimely, and thus, the period to file an
appeal was not tolled. Accordingly, Indulac's appeal is untimely,
meaning that we lack jurisdiction to hear its appeal.3
3
The district court's amended judgment on November 7 does not
change the result. The amendment was to fix a slight error in
quotation and was therefore de minimis. The amended quotation
reads: "[a]ll such parties hereby waive any defense they may have
to the enforcement of this Agreement." The original read: "all such
parties hereby waive and any defense they have to the enforcement
of this Judgment." Courts cannot toll jurisdictional limitations
periods based on amendments which are "of no import to the matters
dealt with on review." FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
344 U.S. 206, 249-50 (1952); see Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision
Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 223 n.2 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The
settled rule is that non-substantive revision of a previously
entered judgment does not restart or otherwise affect the period
within which appellate review must be sought."); see also Hider v.
City of Portland, No. 95-1077, 1995 WL 501984, at *2 (1st Cir.
Aug. 23, 1995) (applying this rule in the context of a Rule 59
motion and explaining that "neither the re-entry of a judgment
previously entered nor an immaterial revision to the judgment tolls
the time period within which review must be sought").
-6-
In an effort to overcome the untimeliness of its appeal,
Indulac argues that the district court's judgment was not contained
within a "separate document,"4 as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58(a).5 To determine whether a district court's judgment
was contained within a separate document, we utilize a mechanical
(i.e. technical and formal) approach. See Fiore v. Wash. Cnty.
Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir. 1992) (en
banc). Under this mechanical approach, we distinguish between
documents that are explanatory opinions and documents that are
separate judgments. See id. at 234-35. We have found, for
example, that a denial of a motion in a margin note, inscribed on
a photocopy of the original motion, is insufficient to constitute
a separate judgment. Id. at 234. We have also found that a five-
page document that "addressed and rejected each of [appellant's]
arguments in turn, using explanatory language to give its reason
for each rejection," and then concluded with a short order denying
the motion for a new trial, was not a separate judgment. See P.R.
4
Rule 58 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very judgment and
amended judgment must be set out in a separate document...." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 58(a).
5
If Indulac were correct that the district court failed to enter
a judgment conforming with Rule 58(a), the judgment would not be
deemed "entered" until 150 days after the docket entry. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58(c); see also Santiago v. Rosario, 438 F.3d 101, 108 (1st
Cir. 2006). Indulac would then have 28 days from that date to file
its motion. Under this hypothetical, Indulac's motion was filed
before the 28-day period even began and is thus timely.
-7-
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Constructora Lluch, Inc., 169 F.3d 68, 75
(1st Cir. 1999).
Here, we conclude that under our mechanical approach, the
district court's Order and Judgment was a separate judgment, not an
explanatory opinion. While the document in question does express
the legal opinion that the signatures of the Department's agents on
the settlement agreement evince waiver of the Eleventh Amendment,
this single "explanatory sentence" is "not sufficient to transform
the judgment into a memorandum or opinion." Núñez-Soto v.
Alvarado, 956 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992). Indeed, even a cursory
examination reveals its true nature as a judgment, not some other
species of legal document. The Order and Judgment contains five
numbered provisions. The five provisions do not provide legal
analysis, but rather incorporate the terms of the settlement
agreement, explain that the district court retains jurisdiction for
purposes of compliance, and state which parties and successors are
bound by the agreement.
To be construed as an explanatory opinion, this Order and
Judgment would have to engage with the issues raised by the
parties.6 This it does not do. In advance of the issuance of this
document, the parties made a number of substantive arguments.
6
Cf. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 169 F.3d at 75 ("Appellees
cannot escape the fact that the December 11, 1997 Opinion and Order
was a five-page explanatory opinion denying [appellant's] motion
that was not accompanied by a separate one-line judgment."
(emphasis added)).
-8-
Indulac argued to the district court that the settlement agreement
would trample its and the Puerto Rico dairy farmers' rights.
Indulac's Urgent Opp'n to the Adoption of Final Settlement
Agreement and Mem. of Understanding Between the Parties ¶3,
Oct. 30, 2013, ECF No. 2328. In its motion, Indulac listed a
number of harms it would suffer if Regulation 12 were promulgated
as written. Id. ¶¶8-13. In Indulac's reply to Suiza's and
Vaquería's opposition, it reiterated that the Regulation
"contravenes Puerto Rico Law." Indulac's Urgent Reply to Opp'ns by
Suiza Dairy, Inc. and Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. ¶2, Nov. 1,
2013, ECF No. 2333. It cited the resignation of ORIL's
Administrator as evidence that the Regulation was illegal. Id. at
¶4. The district court's Order and Judgment addresses neither
these claims nor those of any of the parties. Cf. P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth., 169 F.3d at 75-76 (holding that a short document was
not a separate judgment because it analyzed each of the appellant's
arguments one-by-one). The order does nothing more than
incorporate and approve the parties' agreement, and it is almost
entirely devoid of legal analysis. The document at issue was also
entitled "Order and Judgment," which may be taken as a further
indication that the document is a separate judgment and not a
memorandum or an opinion. See Núñez-Soto, 956 F.2d at 2 ("The
separate document in this case is clearly labeled 'Judgment' and it
is crystal clear from its terms that it was intended to operate as
-9-
a judgment."); cf. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 169 F.3d at 73
(dealing with a document labeled "Opinion and Order"); In re Lupron
Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2012)
(dealing with a document labeled "Memorandum and Order").
Since we hold that the district court's Order and
Judgment satisfies the separate document rule, we lack appellate
jurisdiction to hear Indulac's appeal because it was untimely. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); Acevedo-Villalobos, 22 F.3d at 387. As we
lack jurisdiction, we need not address the merits of Indulac's
appeal. See Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149-
50 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that an assessment of the merits absent
jurisdiction is "gratuitous" and "a matter of purely academic
interest"); Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.3d 95, 100
(1st Cir. 2001) ("When a federal court concludes that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it is precluded from
rendering any judgments on the merits of the case.").
III. Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss Indulac's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
So Ordered.
-10-