United States v. Silva

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1084
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY SILVA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Howard, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Edward J. O'Brien, by appointment of the court, with whom
O'Donnell, Trossello & O'Brien, LLP, was on brief for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
February 5, 2014
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Anthony Silva was convicted in
district court of possessing with intent to defraud counterfeit
United States currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. On appeal,
Silva claims that the district court erred in admitting evidence
seized by police during and after his arrest, denying his motion
for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the
evidence, and issuing a prejudicial jury instruction on the
statutory element of fraudulent intent. Because we find no error
in the district court's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions,
we affirm.
I. Facts and Background
A. Arrest and Search
On July 19, 2010, Daniel Pelletier came to the Derry
Police Department to report a complaint against his acquaintance
Anthony Silva. Pelletier told Officer O'Donaghue that Silva had
just given him $150 in counterfeit currency in exchange for $100
worth of repairs that Pelletier had performed on his car, which
Pelletier produced for the officer in a plastic bag. Pelletier
related that Silva was producing counterfeit bills as well as
counterfeit drivers' licenses, and that Silva had $300 to $400 more
in counterfeit currency in a white Sovereign Bank envelope. He
also reported that Silva was living out of his silver Cadillac
sedan, in which Silva kept all of his belongings and was currently
parked in a lot at 25 Linlew Drive. Asked why he had come forward
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with this information, Pelletier informed O'Donaghue that he had
been "burned" by Silva in past business transactions and was "fed
up" with his behavior.
Although O'Donaghue was unaware of it at the time, this
was not the first time that Pelletier had complained to the Derry
Police Department regarding alleged incidents. Over the previous
years, Pelletier had contacted the police on numerous occasions,
claiming to have been cheated out of the ownership of several gas
stations. In 2010, he claimed to have been beaten by six
unidentified men and reported a break-in into his home. None of
the ensuing investigations yielded any evidence corroborating
Pelletier's claims. Pelletier would also later claim to have won
ten million dollars in the lottery in 2005, although in fact he
currently lives with his mother and has shown no evidence of
receiving such winnings.
In response to Pelletier's report, Sergeant Muncey and
Officer Phillips of the Derry Police were dispatched to 25 Linlew
Drive. As reported by Pelletier, the officers observed a silver
Cadillac sedan full of personal belongings, occupied by a shirtless
man sitting in the driver's seat. Muncey and Phillips approached
the car and asked the individual for his driver's license. When
the individual refused to produce his license, Muncey threatened to
arrest him for failing to comply with an order from a policeman.
The individual subsequently produced a New Hampshire driver's
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license identifying him as Anthony Silva. Based on that license,
Phillips radioed in Silva's information and was informed by the
dispatcher that Silva had an outstanding bench warrant for an
unpaid motor vehicle fine.
Acting on Silva's outstanding warrant, the officers
ordered him to exit the car and placed him under arrest. When they
conducted a search of his person incident to arrest, the officers
found a fake New York driver's license with Silva's photograph, as
well as $20 and $10 bills that Phillips believed to be counterfeit
based on their texture, coloring, and missing watermarks. After
Silva was taken to the police station, he waived his Miranda rights
and told the officers that he must have obtained the counterfeit
bills during a transaction at a nearby Walmart or gas station. He
refused to give the police consent to search his car.
In the absence of consent, the police arranged to have
Silva's car towed to the police station. The officers did not
immediately search the car, instead assigning Detective Muise to
apply for a search warrant. That afternoon, Muise spoke with
Pelletier "in order to gain probable cause" for the search warrant.
Pelletier informed the detective that Silva had called him
following his arrest and lamented that he was "screwed" because he
had $3,000 worth of counterfeit bills in his trunk.
Because Silva's arrest involved counterfeiting of United
States currency, the Derry prosecutor passed the case to the Secret
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Service. Muise shared the information she had collected on Silva
with Special Agent Brian Coffee, including Pelletier's initial
report and her follow-up conversation. It is unclear whether she
knew or shared information about Pelletier's history of false
reports. Coffee submitted an application for a search warrant that
included Pelletier's accusations against Silva, but no information
regarding Pelletier's mental health or his personal antipathy
towards Silva. Coffee wrote that Pelletier's information was
"trustworthy and reliable." After a warrant was executed, Secret
Service agents discovered $2,880 in counterfeit money, a
copier/scanner, and a paper cutter in the trunk, as well as $200 in
counterfeit money in the glove compartment.
B. Trial
The government charged Silva with possession with intent
to defraud of counterfeit United States currency in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 472. Before trial, Silva moved to suppress any evidence
discovered during his arrest and the subsequent search of his car.
He further moved to invalidate the search warrant for his car on
the basis that Coffee's application concealed material facts
bearing on Pelletier's credibility. The district court denied the
motion to suppress and, after holding a Franks hearing on the
matter of the warrant, denied Silva's motion to invalidate.
At trial, the prosecution presented substantially the
same information described above, as well as evidence that the
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serial numbers on Silva's counterfeit bills matched the numbers on
counterfeit bills recently passed in nearby towns. After the
presentation of evidence, Silva moved for a judgment of acquittal
based on insufficient evidence to establish the statutory element
of intent to defraud. The district court denied the motion. During
the charging conference, it proposed the following jury instruction
with respect to that element:
Because it is impossible to know a person's
intentions or subjective beliefs, the
government need not directly prove the
defendant's intent to defraud another person.
Rather, it may prove his intent by
circumstantial evidence. That is to say, you
may infer the defendant's intent from the
surrounding facts and circumstances. So, for
example, in determining whether the defendant
had the requisite intent to defraud, you may
consider things such as whether he possessed a
substantial number and/or variety of
counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. You may
also consider whether those counterfeit
Federal Reserve Notes were of such a quality
that they would be likely to be accepted in a
transaction since the more closely counterfeit
Notes resemble genuine currency, the more
likely you might find that the defendant
intended to use those Notes fraudulently to
receive goods or services.
Silva challenged the proposed instruction on the grounds that the
court's references to the amount of currency as potential evidence
of intent endorsed the government's theory of proof. The court
overruled the objection.
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The jury returned a conviction on the charge of
possession with intent to defraud. Silva now appeals to this
court.
II. Discussion
With the exception of Silva's challenge to the jury
instructions, which are reviewed for abuse of discretion, United
States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012), we review Silva's
challenges to the admissibility of seized evidence and the judgment
of acquittal de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996) (holding that reasonable suspicion and probable cause
determinations are reviewed de novo); United States v. Grace, 367
F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (reviewing sufficiency of the evidence
determinations de novo). We review the district court's factual
findings only for clear error. United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d
199, 205 (1st Cir. 2009).
A. The Investigative Stop
Silva alleges that the Derry police officers violated his
Fourth Amendment right when they seized him at 25 Linlew Road based
on Pelletier's allegedly unreliable complaint. The parties do not
dispute that the police officers "seized" Silva when they
approached his car and demanded his driver's license. The only
question is whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity sufficient to justify their actions.
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Under the Supreme Court's precedent in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may perform "a brief investigatory
stop of an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Am, 564
F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe
that criminal activity may be afoot.") (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A permissible investigatory stop must
satisfy two requirements:
First, the police officer "must have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of an individual's involvement in some
criminal activity." United States v. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d 25, 28 (1st
Cir. 2008). A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requires
some "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting a stopped
individual of legal wrongdoing. United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d
20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). It entails "more than a mere hunch but less
than probable cause." Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 29. The First Circuit
recognizes that reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry
stop may arise when "presumptively reliable information about
criminal activity is provided by third parties." Id.Second, the officer's "actions undertaken pursuant to
that stop must be reasonably related in scope to the stop 'unless
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the police have a basis for expanding their investigation.'" Id.
at 28-29 (quoting Unites States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 45 (1st
Cir. 2006)). It is well settled that a police officer conducting
an investigatory stop may request the stopped individual to produce
identifying information. "Asking questions is an essential part of
police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is
free to ask a person for identification without implicating the
Fourth Amendment." Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). Where circumstances give
officers reasonable grounds to suspect that a defendant may have a
criminal history, they may also run a routine background and
warrant check without exceeding the scope of an investigatory stop.
Klaucke v. Daly, 595 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2010); Foley v. Kiely,
602 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2010).
At the time Officers Muncey and Phillips approached
Silva, they had received information from a third party alleging
that Silva was producing and in possession of counterfeit currency.
The officers who received Pelletier's complaint had no knowledge of
Pelletier's prior eccentricities that may have led them to question
the reliability of his account. Pelletier's accusations were
corroborated by the fact that he produced an exemplar of
counterfeit currency allegedly handed to him by Silva, as well as
by the officers' own observations of Silva's car at 25 Linlew Road.
Even if Pelletier's account would not have provided "probable
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cause" for a full-scale search of Silva and his vehicle, the
partially corroborated complaint created a "reasonable suspicion"
sufficient to justify the police's actions in approaching Silva and
requesting basic identification. At that point, Silva's refusal to
provide his driver's license -- coupled with Pelletier's specific
allegations that Silva was producing counterfeit identification --
gave police officers reasonable grounds to run a routine warrant
check on his license. See Klaucke, 595 F.3d at 26 ("[Defendant's]
refusal to produce a license . . . reasonably roused a suspicion
that his non-cooperation was driven by other considerations, like
an outstanding warrant for his arrest . . . ."); Foley, 602 F.3d at
33 ("[Defendant's] inability (or unwillingness) to provide his
Social Security number, combined with his initial attempt to avoid
contact with the police, provided reasonable grounds . . . to
investigate his criminal history.").
The district court did not err in admitting evidence
seized on Silva during the arrest ensuing from the officers'
investigative stop.
B. The Seizure of the Car
Second, Silva argues that the Derry police lacked
probable cause to seize his vehicle following his arrest. He
insists that Pelletier's history of delusional reports undermined
the credibility of his information, and that the police's attempts
to obtain further information for a search warrant prior to
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actually searching the car demonstrate their lack of probable cause
at the time of seizure.
Under the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment,
police officers may seize and search an automobile prior to
obtaining a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains contraband. Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25,
31-32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2831 (2013); see also
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1999) ("[W]hen federal
officers have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains
contraband, the Fourth Amendment does not require them to obtain a
warrant prior to searching the car for and seizing the
contraband.").
Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances
as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that evidence of a crime will be found." Robinson, 706 F.3d at 32;
see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) ("A police
officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts
available to [him] would warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present."
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
standard is satisfied when the totality of the circumstances create
"a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in
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a particular place." United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130, 136
(1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
In this case, the record suggests that at the time the
police seized Silva's vehicle they had ample evidence supporting a
finding of probable cause for a search. After the officers
discovered Silva's outstanding warrant, their search incident to
arrest yielded several counterfeit bills and a counterfeit driver's
license in Silva's wallet. The seized material corroborated
Pelletier's complaint, in which Pelletier had insisted that Silva
was producing both counterfeit currency and counterfeit
identification. Furthermore, the officers' observations of Silva's
car, which suggested that the defendant was currently living out of
the vehicle, gave them reason to believe that further evidence of
counterfeiting might be found inside the vehicle. Together with
Pelletier's initial report, which alleged that Silva had an
additional $300 of counterfeit bills in his glove compartment, this
evidence more than sufficed to suggest there existed a "fair
probability" that searching Silva's car would lead officers to
further contraband.
Silva insists that the officers' decision to forestall
searching his car until they had obtained a proper warrant reveals
their own doubts as to whether they had probable cause at the time
of seizure. Setting aside the fact that the officers' procedural
diligence in obtaining a warrant hardly proves their subjective
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uncertainty about the quality of their evidence, Silva's argument
misreads the law of probable cause. In evaluating probable cause,
a court looks "at the objective facts, not at the actors'
subjective intent." United States v. Sánchez, 612 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2010). Consequently, an officer's subjective belief that he
or she lacked probable cause is not dispositive where the facts
support an objective finding that the standard has been satisfied.
See United States v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 106 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004)
("Although [the police officer's] testimony . . . calls into doubt
whether he believed that the information about throwing the lighter
amounted to probable cause, . . . an officer's subjective belief is
not dispositive of whether probable cause existed."). The practice
of awaiting a magistrate's warrant prior to conducting a search,
even where officers feel confident in their own assessment of
probable cause, is one that should be commended, not punished with
exclusion.
The district court properly found that the police had
probable cause to seize Silva's vehicle following his arrest.
C. The Warrant Application
Third, Silva argues that Agent Coffee's failure to
include Pelletier's history of delusional complaints or his self-
identified animus against Silva in the warrant application, both of
which may have undermined the magistrate's finding of probable
cause, renders the ensuing warrant and search of Silva's car
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invalid. Silva insists that Coffee's failure to note Pelletier's
potential motives to fabricate evidence, as well as his entirely
speculative assertions that Pelletier was "trustworthy and
reliable," constituted a reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
A defendant who seeks a Franks hearing to suppress
evidence obtained through an invalid warrant must make two
showings. First, the defendant must show that the warrant
application included a "false statement or omission . . . [that]
was made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for
the truth." United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169, 173 (1st Cir.
2012); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)
(requiring "a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit"). An omission of material fact is sufficient to trigger
a hearing. United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.
2007).
Furthermore, a defendant must show that the identified
falsehood or omission "was necessary to the finding of probable
cause." Rigaud, 684 F.3d at 173; see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
Consequently, evidence procured through a challenged warrant may be
suppressed at a Franks hearing "only if the warrant application,
cleansed of any false information or clarified by disclosure of
previously withheld material, no longer demonstrates probable
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cause." United States v. Stewart, 337 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir.
2003). Probable cause to issue a warrant exists when, "given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place." Reiner, 500 F.3d at 15 (omission in original)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
The analysis of probable cause in the foregoing section
is sufficient to dispose of Silva's challenge with regard to his
Franks hearing. When the police seized Silva's vehicle, they
already had ample evidence to obtain a warrant, including
Pelletier's partially corroborated complaints, police officers' own
observations, and the counterfeit bills and driver's license found
in Silva's wallet. By the time he applied for the warrant, Agent
Coffee additionally had the benefit of Pelletier's report that
Silva claimed to have $3,000 worth of counterfeit currency in his
car trunk. While Silva objects to Coffee's omission of Pelletier's
past history of false reports, the district court properly found
that the disclosure of this additional information would not have
undercut the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Much of
Coffee's most damning evidence, including the actual counterfeit
bills, existed independently of Pelletier's statements.
Furthermore, several of Pelletier's predictive statements about
Silva's involvement with counterfeit goods had been corroborated by
the officers' arrest, lending credibility to his other statement.
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Finally, as the district court noted, Silva has produced no
evidence suggesting that Coffee's omission of the evidence was
"intentional" or even "reckless." Aside from potentially Officer
Muise, there is no evidence that any of the officers involved with
the investigation had any knowledge of Pelletier's history, nor
that they shared this history with Coffee.
The district court properly denied Silva's motion to
suppress.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Fourth, Silva argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the
government's lack of evidence establishing his "intent to defraud"
under 18 U.S.C. § 472. Specifically, Silva insists that mere
possession of counterfeit currency cannot establish an intent to
deceive third parties and that his admission to Pelletier that the
bills were counterfeit undercuts any deceptive intentions on his
part.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 472, anyone who "with intent to defraud
. . . keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged,
counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the
United States, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 472. To convict a defendant of
possession under the act, the government must demonstrate that (1)
the defendant possessed a bill which was (2) counterfeit and that
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(3) the defendant "intended to use the false bill to defraud."
United States v. Mousli, 511 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2007). Where a
defendant merely possesses counterfeit currency, rather than passes
or produces it, fraudulent intent "may be inferred from surrounding
circumstances or circumstantial evidence and thus need not be
proven directly." Id. at 16. A "general intent to defraud third
parties" is sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 472. United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 819 (11th Cir. 1983)
(Roney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also,
e.g., United States v. Marshall, 179 F. App'x 516, 518 (10th Cir.
2006); United States v. Baker, 650 F.2d 936, 937 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Wyatt, 611 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1980).
The district court properly denied Silva's motion for a
judgment of acquittal. Silva suggests that the prosecution failed
to present any credible evidence of his intent to defraud because,
in the course of his only transaction involving the counterfeit
currency, Silva openly informed Pelletier that the bills were
false; consequently, the only evidence from which a jury may have
inferred his fraudulent intent was possession of the false currency
itself. This theory is patently false. Aside from Silva's
possession of the currency, the prosecution demonstrated that Silva
had tendered Pelletier the counterfeit currency in satisfaction of
a genuine debt arising from a business transaction. While Silva
openly admitted that the bills were counterfeit, he also offered
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Pelletier a substantially higher amount of counterfeit bills than
his initially bargained-for debt. Silva's exchange with Pelletier
lends itself to an obvious inference that Silva offered Pelletier
the counterfeit bills for future use in third-party transactions,
intentionally injecting his false currency into the stream of
commerce. These facts support a finding that Silva acted with a
general intent to deceive third parties. Furthermore, Agent Coffee
testified at trial that the serial numbers on false bills found in
Silva's car matched the serial numbers on false bills recovered in
several nearby businesses, supporting an inference that Silva had
previously passed the bills in commercial transactions.
Based on the submitted evidence, the district court did
not err in submitting the question of Silva's fraudulent intent to
a jury.
E. The Jury Instructions
Finally, Silva argues that the district court's jury
instructions, identifying the quantity of a defendant's counterfeit
currency as potential evidence of a defendant's intent to defraud,
unfairly prejudiced the jurors in favor of the government.
Where a party challenges the trial court's jury
instructions, this court reviews de novo "whether the instructions
conveyed the essence of the applicable law" and reviews for abuse
of discretion "whether the court's choice of language was unfairly
prejudicial." Sasso, 695 F.3d at 29; accord DeCaro v. Hasbro,
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Inc., 580 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2009). "It is unquestioned that,
when instructing a jury, a judge 'may explain, comment upon and
incorporate the evidence into the instructions in order to assist
the jury to understand it in light of the applicable legal
principles.'" United States v. Hernández, 490 F.3d 81, 84 (1st
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 268
(1st Cir. 1990)); accord United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131,
145 (1st Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d
33, 44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 565 (2012) (approving
the "use of evidentiary exemplars from the body of existing trial
evidence to illustrate the meaning of" legal principles).
The jury instructions issued in this case were neither
incorrect on the law nor unfairly prejudicial in favor of the
government. This court has previously recognized that a defendant's
possession of a large amount of counterfeit currency supports an
inference that the defendant possessed the currency with a future
intention of use. See Mousli, 511 F.3d at 16 ("The number and
variety of bills also suggest that Mousli was engaged in an ongoing
effort to produce and refine fake currency with the intent of using
it."). The judge's instructions in this case were thus entirely
accurate. While Silva suggests that the judge's decision to single
out the amount of currency was unfairly prejudicial because the
prosecution's case relied precisely on this form of evidence in
establishing Silva's fraudulent intent, the judge's decision in
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this regard accorded with his recognized legal prerogative to
incorporate available evidence into jury instructions so as to
clarify the governing legal standard for the jury. As the
government notes, the judge did not seek to analyze or interpret
the government's specific evidence, nor did he opine on whether the
amount of counterfeit currency possessed by Silva rose to the
threshold of establishing an inference of fraudulent intent. The
jury instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the
district court.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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