Pan Am Systems, Inc. v. Atlantic Northeast Rails & Ports, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2118
PAN AM SYSTEMS, INC.; SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY;
DAVID ANDREW FINK,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ATLANTIC NORTHEAST RAILS AND PORTS, INC.; CHALMERS HARDENBERG,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Thompson and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Thad B. Zmistowski, with whom Jonathan A. Pottle and Eaton
Peabody were on brief, for appellants.
Russell B. Pierce, Jr., with whom Norman, Hanson & DeTroy,
LLC was on brief, for appellees.
October 9, 2015
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Overview
Today's appeal centers on a district judge's decision
kicking out this battle-scarred defamation case on summary
judgment. By way of introduction, plaintiffs are David Andrew
Fink, Pan Am Systems, Inc., and Springfield Terminal Railway
Company. Fink is the former President and CEO of Pan Am, the
parent corporation of Springfield. Defendants are Chalmers
Hardenbergh and Atlantic Northeast Rails & Ports, Inc. ("ANR&P,"
for short). Hardenbergh is a writer and editor at ANR&P, a trade
newsletter and e-bulletin covering the railroad industry. So
defendants are — both sides tell us — "media defendants" for all
purposes relevant to this case. Saving certain details for later,
we quickly sketch the main contours of the parties' dispute.
Basically, plaintiffs are upset because they think four
ANR&P articles — published between December 2009 and March 2011 —
contained false and defamatory statements. Discussing a train
derailment on a Springfield-owned rail line, the first article —
after relying on reports in leading newspapers — quoted a state
official as saying the accident was "'perfectly predictable'"
because the "'railroad system'" was "'horrendously dilapidated.'"
The next article said Springfield neither stationed a crew at a
certain locale nor provided five-day-a-week service on a certain
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line — despite "promis[ing]" to do both. Touching on Pan Am's
"haz-mat service," the third article — relying on an email from an
unnamed source — claimed Springfield "'loses' cars on a consistent
ongoing basis, including one car 'lost' for over 60 days." And
finally, the last article said Pan Am's owner had "removed" Fink
"from management," though some of ANR&P's sources did not know
whether Fink had "definitely left" or whether the owner "came to
New England to administer the coup de grace," but sources did
express the hope that Fink's successor — Fink's son, it turns out
— "might have more freedom either to spend more money on
railroading, or put the existing money into different [and one
would hope more productive] places." (Brackets in original.)
Fed up with these write-ups, plaintiffs sued defendants
in diversity, alleging (as relevant here) defamation. According
to Maine law — which the parties agree applies to this litigation
— liability for defamation exists if there is
(a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third
party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on
the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence
of special harm caused by the publication.
Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 558 — which we will call "RST" from now on).
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Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to
state a claim, arguing (among other things) that plaintiffs had
insufficiently pled falsity and fault — defamation elements (a) and
(c), respectively. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Acting on the
motion, the judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice,
granting plaintiffs a chance to replead to fix these problems.
The judge also ruled that defendants should be considered "media
defendants" and that the complained-about speech involved "matters
of public concern" (more on the quoted concepts later).
Taking their cue from the judge's order, plaintiffs
seasonably filed an expanded complaint. Worried that a fight over
the fault element might require them to divulge confidential
sources and threaten their First-Amendment interests, defendants
proposed — and the district court accepted — having the parties do
discovery on all issues except fault, followed by summary judgment
on those issues, followed by discovery on fault if needed. See
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597-
98 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing how bifurcated discovery like this
can protect a defendant's journalistic sources). After the first
discovery phase, defendants moved for summary judgment,
maintaining that they had published nothing defamatory or false.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Plaintiffs opposed the motion,
naturally. But the judge granted the motion, concluding (in a
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nutshell) that none of the offending statements were actionable in
defamation.
Plaintiffs now appeal, making the big-picture argument
that the troublesome passages in the offending articles — dealing
with the derailment, promises, lost cars, and Fink's departure —
are capable of defamatory readings and are provably false. Wrong,
and wrong again, defendants fire back. But, for reasons to appear
shortly, we think plaintiffs are right about the lost-car comments.
And so we reverse only on that issue.
Let us be perfectly clear, though. Our reversal on the
lost-car comments does not mean that those comments may proceed to
trial. After all, our analysis here concerns only part of the
defamation inquiry — whether the battled-over statements are
capable of a defamatory meaning and whether they are provably
false. There remains the question whether defendants were at
fault. To show fault, plaintiffs will need to show at the very
least that defendants were negligent — and they may need to show
that defendants acted with actual malice. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a public figure
suing for defamation must show that the defendant acted with actual
malice). Because the judge bifurcated discovery, she left the
fault issue for another day. And so we must do the same.
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Guiding Legal Principles
Summary Judgment
We give fresh review to the judge's summary-judgment
ruling, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs
(the motion's opponents). See, e.g., Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of
P.R., 765 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2014). And we will affirm only if
no genuine issues of material fact muddle the dispute and only if
defendants (the motion's proponents) merit judgment as a matter of
law. See, e.g., id.
Two other things worth noting: First, to get the ruling
flipped, plaintiffs must offer us "more than arguments woven from
the gossamer strands of speculation and surmise." RTR Techs.,
Inc. v. Helming, 707 F.3d 84, 93 (1st Cir. 2013). And second, we
can affirm the ruling on any ground apparent in the record, even
one not relied on by the judge. See, e.g., Collazo-Rosado, 765
F.3d at 92.
Defamation
Modern defamation law is a complex mixture of common-
law rules and constitutional doctrines. See, e.g., Levinsky's,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 132 (1st Cir. 1997).
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And working one's way through it all can be dizzying. But work
our way we must. So off we go.
(a)
Common-Law Rules
Starting with Maine law, we see (and this is a paraphrase
of what we said earlier) that a defamation cause of action "arises
from (1) the defendant's unprivileged publication to a third party
(2) of a false statement pertaining to the plaintiff (3) through
fault amounting at least to negligence, (4) as long as the
statement either is defamatory per se or causes special harm."1
See Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2002)
(citing Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 86 (Me. 1996)). A statement
is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another either
by lowering the esteem in which he is held or by discouraging
others from associating with him. See, e.g., Bakal v. Weare, 583
A.2d 1028, 1029 (Me. 1990) (relying on RST § 559). Because for-
profit corporations have "business reputation[s]," they too can be
defamed. See RST § 561 cmt. b; see also id. § 561(a) (explaining
that "[o]ne who publishes a defamatory matter" concerning a for-
profit corporation can be liable "if . . . the matter tends to
prejudice [the corporation] in the conduct of its business or to
deter others from dealing with it"); see generally Vahlsing
1 Elements (3) and (4) are not at issue here.
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Christina Corp. v. Stanley, 487 A.2d 264, 265-66 (Me. 1985)
(dealing with a defamation action brought by a corporation and its
president). And keep in mind that one who repeats a defamatory
statement may be as liable as the original defamer. See RST § 578.
Whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning
is a threshold question for the court. See Bakal, 583 A.2d at
1030 (citing, among other authorities, RST § 614). To discern
meaning, a court must draw from the context of the statement and
not interpret words "in the most negative . . . way" imaginable.
Id. (citing RST § 563 cmt. d for the in-context point); see also
Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 108 (1st Cir. 2000).
This "is not a question of the intent of the speaker, or author,
or even of the understanding of the plaintiff, but of the
understanding of those to whom the words are addressed . . . ."
Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 835 (Me. 1973) (quoting Chapman
v. Gannett, 171 A. 397, 398 (Me. 1934)). But if the court concludes
that the statement can reasonably carry both a defamatory and
nondefamatory meaning, it is up to a jury to decide whether the
statement was in fact understood as defamatory by its recipients.
See, e.g., Schoff v. York Cty., 761 A.2d 869, 871 n.2 (Me. 2000)
(citing RST § 614).
Truth is a complete defense, of course. The Maine
courts' direction on this is crystal clear: so long as the
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offending statement turns out to be true, the defendant is free
from liability, regardless of how much the statement may have hurt
the plaintiff's public reputation. See, e.g., Picard, 307 A.2d at
834–35. Critically too, a statement need not be 100% true to be
protected — if it is "substantially true," a defendant is safe.
See McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Serv. of S. Me., Inc., 691 A.2d
1201, 1204 (Me. 1997); see also RST § 581A cmt. f (stressing that
"[s]light inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that
the defamatory charge is true in substance"). The question is
whether the "allegedly false facts" about a plaintiff are "variants
of the true" and so do not "paint him in a worse light." Haynes
v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, C.J.); see also McCullough, 691 A.2d at 1204 (deeming the
contested statement — that plaintiff was fired "for 'several
incidents' when, in fact, she was only terminated for two
incidents" — nonactionable because it was "substantially true even
though it may not be technically accurate," adding that "[t]o a
reasonable person," the comment "is no more damaging to her
reputation than an accurate statement would have been"); Picard,
307 A.2d at 836 (holding that the difference between the defamatory
statement (that a person was "fired") and the truth (that he had
voluntarily resigned) could not cause a reasonable member of the
public to think less of plaintiff).
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(b)
Constitutional Doctrines
On the constitutional side, the Supreme Court — reading
the First Amendment (made binding on the states through the
Fourteenth) — "has hedged about defamation suits" with lots of
"safeguards designed to protect a vigorous market in ideas and
opinions." Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.); see also Gray v. St. Martin's Press,
Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 2000). We mention only two.
Because truth can set a defendant free, so to speak, it
follows that defamatory statements are not punishable unless they
are capable of being proved true or false. Which brings us to
opinions. Because they express the speaker's subjective views
(rather than implying that he possesses objectively testable
facts), they are First-Amendment protected — not so, obviously, if
they imply "false assertion[s] of fact." See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990); cf. generally RST § 566
(stressing that an opinion statement is punishable "only if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis
for the opinion"). Likewise, statements of "rhetorical hyperbole"
are not punishable. And neither are statements using words "in a
loose, figurative sense."2 See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l
2 Retail-giant Wal-Mart can call a competitor's store "trashy,"
even if the store is not actually "filthy" — "[t]he word 'trashy'
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Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-85 (1974);
see also Gray, 221 F.3d at 248. Understand, though, that simply
saying "'I think'" will not shield a defendant from liability,
particularly when what is allegedly "'thought'" is (or suggests)
a fact-proposition. See Gray, 221 F.3d at 248. But courts are
"likely" to stamp as "opinion" statements involving "expressions
of personal judgment, especially as the judgments become more vague
and subjective in character." Id.; see also Levinsky's, 127 F.3d
at 129 (commenting that "[t]he vaguer a term, or the more meanings
it reasonably can convey, the less likely it is to be actionable").
Also and importantly, where truth was once just an
affirmative defense, nowadays — thanks to the Supreme Court — if
misstatements involve issues of public concern, plaintiffs must
shoulder the burden of showing that the comments are false. See
Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 108; see also Phil. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). This includes, of course, a
showing that the statements at issue are not substantially true —
is a chameleon that continuously changes colors and shades of
meaning" (it can mean unkempt or sleazy, for example); it "is loose
language that cannot be objectively verified," and so is not
actionable. See Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 129-30. And the Boston
Globe can describe plaintiff's production of "The Phantom of the
Opera" (not the one created by Andrew Lloyd Webber) as "fake" and
"phony" — these "adjectives admit of numerous interpretations,"
meaning they are "unprovable" and so not actionable. See Phantom
Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724, 728 (1st Cir.
1992).
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or, to remove the negative, that the statements are materially
false. See Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 108-11 (indicating that a
statement that is not substantially true is materially false, and
vice versa); see generally Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (emphasizing that "[m]inor inaccuracies
do not amount to falsity so long as the substance, the gist, the
sting, of the libelous charge be justified" (internal quotation
marks omitted)). To qualify as a matter of public concern, the
speech (based on the content, form, and context) must touch on
issues in which the public (even a small slice of the public) might
be interested, as distinct, say, from purely personal squabbles.
See, e.g., Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 132.
Analyzing the Offending Statements
Train Derailment
Relying on articles appearing in the Nashua Telegraph
and Manchester Union Leader (two well-respected New Hampshire
newspapers), defendants published a story in December 2009 about
a train derailment occurring on tracks owned by Springfield.
Headlined "ST: COAL DERAILMENT*," the piece began like this (heads
up — the Fink mentioned in the article is plaintiff Fink's son):
17 November, Nashua. THE LOADED [Springfield]
BOW COAL TRAIN DERAILED SEVEN CARS of an 87–
car train near Bridge Street at about 11 AM.
Three turned over, with coal spilling out.
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David Fink, [Springfield's] president,
arrived on the scene in the afternoon. He
said preliminary investigation showed that one
of the truck sides (a truck contains axles,
springs, and other equipment for suspension)
had fallen off one of the cars. That caused
a chain reaction among several subsequent
cars. Asked whether he thought there was a
problem with the tracks, Fink said, "We're
looking at everything, but we don't think so"
because of the evidence with the truck. An
investigation into the cause of the derailment
would likely go on for about a month because
of metal that needs to be tested and other
factors.
Crews were expected to realign the four
upright cars and move them that same day. Most
of the train—an estimated 74 cars—continued on
to the Merrimack Station power plant in Bow
without a problem. {Karen Lovett in Nashua
Telegraph 18.Nov.09}
The piece continued (reader alert — plaintiffs complain about the
Peter Burling quotes):
Shows need for track investment?
Peter Burling, chair of the New Hampshire Rail
Transit Authority, blamed [Springfield] for
the accident. "What has happened here is a
perfectly predictable accident—but it's hard
to describe it as an accident, since the
probabilities were so clear it was going to
take place. The only thing we didn't know is
when and where."
Burling said the accident, occurring on
a stretch of line with a speed limit of under
10 miles per hour for large freight trains,
made a track upgrade which might have been
provided had the state won funding for
passenger service to Concord [see 09#10A] more
important. "A horrendously dilapidated
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railroad system has caused a slow-moving coal
train to fall off the tracks."
"The point is not to say 'I told you so,'
but to say this is why we feel it is so
important to get this line upgraded, and to
maintain it for passenger and freight
operations. We believe there are institutions
of the federal government that can move to
carry this along. I'm going to Washington in
[the] next couple of weeks to have further
discussions about the issue." {David Brooks
in Nashua Telegraph 18.Nov.09}
And the article ended with these words (remember — the Fink here
is plaintiff Fink's son):
Fink Response
Any number of reasons could explain why the
cars jumped the track, including equipment
failure, Fink said on 19 November, responding
to Burling's remarks. "I don't know what
(Burling) is basing that on. I don't think he
has any knowledge on it."
Specialists from Pan Am's mechanical,
engineering and operations departments will
comb the wreckage and analyze the train's
"black box" in the days ahead, Fink said.
Piecing together what happened will take time.
Fink drew comparisons to an airplane crash
investigation, saying multiple factors had to
be considered before reaching a conclusion.
As for the tracks, an automated dynamics
car had recently inspected the line and found
no problems. "I guess Mr. Burling is more
knowledgeable than the automated dynamics
car," Fink said. "I don't know where he gets
his information."
Pan Am's investigation team is working
with two Federal Railroad Administration
inspectors. Spokesperson Robert Kulat said it
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could take up to a year before the FRA releases
their findings. {Derrick Perkins in
Manchester Union Leader 20.Nov.09}
Later, as an attachment to his affidavit in this case,
David Nagy, Springfield's director of safety and rail security
submitted a report saying a railcar owned by a different rail
company was "a major contributing cause of" the accident.
According to the report, the car's age and poor condition prevented
it from properly travelling along the track.
Before going on, we note the obvious: Burling's comments
came hard on the accident's heels, at a time when even Fink's son
conceded that Pan Am was "looking at everything" as a possible
cause, though Pan Am "d[id]n't think" the problem was track-
related. And far from being one-sided, defendants' piece provided
a full overview of the derailment investigation — told from various
perspectives — and even included Pan Am's official response
doubting the correctness of Burling's remarks.
Now on to the parties' arguments.
Convinced that the phrase "railroad system" encompasses
only tracks (which Springfield is responsible for), not tracks and
trains, plaintiffs insist that the Burling quotes are defamatory
and untrue because another company's railcar — not Springfield's
tracks — caused the derailment. Defendants counter that the
disputed comments are incapable of a defamatory interpretation,
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because they are simply Burling's subjective thoughts, expressed
in nonactionable hyperbole. Also, their argument continues, the
comments address a matter of public concern, and plaintiffs have
not met their burden of showing that the remarks are materially
false.
For our part, we need not decide who is right on the
defamatory-meaning issue. And that is because even assuming (in
plaintiff's favor) that Burling's remarks are capable of a
defamatory reading — that Springfield's tracks caused the accident
— defendants cannot be on the hook because (as they argue) the
speech deals with an issue of public concern and plaintiffs have
not shown the speech (even if false) is materially false.3 We
explain.
3 Defendants argue that plaintiffs did not preserve any challenge
to the judge's public-concern ruling. Their theory is that while
plaintiffs argued against a public-concern finding at the motion-
to-dismiss stage, they did not ask the judge to revisit her public-
concern ruling at the summary-judgment phase. Adopting a belt-
and-suspenders strategy, defendants also argue that a prior
litigation collaterally estops plaintiffs from suggesting the
speech is not of public concern. We by-pass these complicated
questions, because even assuming (favorably to plaintiffs) that
there are no preservation or collateral-estoppel problems, we
easily conclude that the fought-over speech addresses matters of
public concern.
Another quick point. Suggesting that the record is not
sufficiently developed for us to decide the public-concern
question, plaintiffs ask for a remand so the parties can conduct
discovery on that issue. But their request comes far too late:
defendants squarely relied on the judge's earlier public-concern
ruling in their summary-judgment papers, yet plaintiffs never
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Examining the speech's content, form, and context (as we
must), we note that the targeted comments deal with the safety,
efficiency, and viability of plaintiffs' railway system — a system
that is part of a highly regulated industry, what with all the
federal laws on safety, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-21311, public
funding, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 22101-22706, and oversight, see 49 U.S.C.
§§ 103, 701-727. And it should go without saying (though we say
it anyway) that the public cares deeply about the safety,
efficiency, and viability of railways — something plaintiffs do
not contest. Also, don't forget that the speech appeared in a
public newsletter, helping to educate the community and possibly
ignite public discourse on topics citizens are interested in.4
asked for discovery either in their objection or in a motion after
the judge awarded defendants summary judgment.
4 As the Supreme Court explained in a different context:
Railroads have from the very outset been
regarded as public highways, and the right and
the duty of the government to regulate in a
reasonable and proper manner the conduct and
business of railroad corporations have been
founded upon that fact. . . . The companies
hold a public franchise, and governmental
supervision is therefore valid. They are
organized for the public interests and to
subserve primarily the public good and
convenience.
Wis., Minn., & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 296-97
(1900).
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Looking for a way out, plaintiffs basically insist that
our saying that this speech implicates a public concern would make
any statement about a railroad a matter of public concern. But
the charge is off base, because — as we just explained — our ruling
today flows from a specific examination of the content, form, and
context of the precise speech at issue here. And because the
speech falls within the area of public concern, plaintiffs must
now prove that the disputed statements are not only false but
materially false. Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 108; see also Hepps, 475
U.S. at 776.
But this they have not done. Again, plaintiffs adamantly
insist that the derailment's true cause was a badly corroded
railcar owned by another company. For support, they rely on an
internal report that said only that the railcar was "a major
contributing cause" of the accident. Conspicuous by its absence,
however, is any suggestion there that the car was the accident's
sole cause — and that means this document is far too thin a reed
to support plaintiffs' material-falsity charge.5 See generally
Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 2014)
5 Plaintiffs talk up an affidavit by Springfield's Nagy which
states that federal officials inspected the tracks "just prior to
the derailment" (to quote plaintiffs' brief) and found no defects.
That inspection occurred about three weeks before the derailment,
however, which tells us nothing about the track's condition when
the derailment happened.
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(emphasizing that "[s]peculation about mere possibilities, without
more, is not enough to stave off summary judgment"); Geshke v.
Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2014) (stressing that
unsubstantiated conclusions cannot block summary judgment).
Sure, there is some difference between saying the tracks caused
the derailment (which is how plaintiffs read Burling's remarks)
and saying a railcar was "a major contributing cause" — and so the
tracks were not the only cause. But even assuming the difference
in those two statements about the role of the tracks suggests
falsity, plaintiffs point to nothing in the summary-judgment
record indicating that their reputations would be improved at all
by a more precise explanation of the cause. Cf. generally
Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 111 (concluding "that whatever inaccuracies
existed were [in]sufficiently material to establish defamation").
Consequently we affirm summary judgment on this article.
Promises
In 1985, New England Southern Railroad Company signed a
lease with Pan Am to operate a section of Pan Am's tracks between
Manchester and Concord (two of the Granite State's bigger cities).6
Fourteen years later, in June 2009, Pan Am asked the Surface
6 Among other things, "operate" means that New England Southern
could provide rail service to customers "located on or served by"
the line as of the lease's effective date.
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Transportation Board ("STB," from here on) for permission to end
New England Southern's operating rights (over time, the bond
between Pan Am and New England Southern became frayed over "payment
of invoices and the condition" of the tracks, apparently). An
agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation, the STB grants
requests like Pan Am's "only if [it] finds that the present or
future public convenience and necessity require[s] or permit[s]
the . . . discontinuance." See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(d).
Explaining that it wanted to operate the line itself,
Pan Am submitted an affidavit from Richard Miller, the assistant
to Pan Am's vice president of transportation. Pertinently,
Miller's affidavit said that "[i]n order to provide service" to
rail-line "customers on a consistent basis one crew will be
required on a five day per week basis," with the "plan[]" being
"to headquarter a crew in Concord, New Hampshire." Pan Am's
application relied on Miller's affidavit to back up its claim that
its plan would serve the "public convenience and necessity" — yet
the application said (in language not found in the affidavit) that
Pan Am would place a crew in Concord if customer demand justified
that action. Here is the application's money quote:
Once Pan Am service is restored to the Subject
Line, Pan Am will assign a crew to be
headquartered in Concord, New Hampshire to
work a five day per week schedule providing
service to the four major customers and a few
smaller customers on the Subject Line as long
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as traffic levels support such service, which
is an increase from the approximately two day
per week service currently provided to
Manchester, New Hampshire, with the increased
revenue earned by Pan Am justifying the
increased service to transfer cars to and from
[New England Southern]. . . .
New England Southern weighed in, expressing concerns
about whether Pan Am would provide adequate service along the line.
The New Hampshire Department of Transportation ("NHDOT," for
convenience) weighed in too, asking the STB to require Pan Am to
"interchange" at a specific rail yard in Concord.7
The STB later granted Pan Am's application in April 2010,
saying:
Pan Am claims that it is committed to working
with [New England Southern] to achieve a
smooth transition of operations once the Lease
is terminated, and that it is intent on
providing service on a consistent basis that
will meet and exceed the service needs and
demands of this growing region of New
Hampshire. To this end, Pan Am states that:
(1) it will operate one crew on a 5–day–a–week
basis; [and] (2) the crew will be
headquartered in Concord, where approximately
1,700 cars were interchanged with [New England
Southern] in 2006 . . . .
7 As best we can tell, "interchange" — in railway lingo — refers
to "the practice of railroads conveying freight cars . . . from
other companies over their lines" at specified junction points.
See Wikipedia, "Interchange (freight rail),"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interchange_(freight_rail) (last
visited Sept. 9, 2015).
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"Pan Am has a statutory obligation to provide adequate
service," the STB noted, and "states that it is intent on providing
service on a consistent basis that will meet and exceed the service
needs and demands of the affected area." Given this concatenation
of circumstances, the STB denied the NHDOT's request for a
condition requiring Pan Am to establish an interchange at the
specific Concord yard. "We will hold Pan Am to its assurances,"
the STB added. And "[i]n the event [Pan Am] fails to live up to
its statutory obligation to provide adequate service, we will
promptly consider requests for appropriate corrective action."
A month later, in May 2010, defendants published an
article on the STB's decision, noting among other things that "Pan
Am promises" to "'operate one crew on a 5-day-a-week basis,'" with
"'the crew . . . headquartered in Concord,'" and that "the STB
declined to condition the [lease's] discontinuance," though the
STB said it would "'hold Pan Am to its assurances.'" Then came
the offending article, in December 2010, the pertinent part of
which we now quote (attention — plaintiffs grouse about the
comments from Peter Dearness):
Better interchange would mean more customers.
Despite [Springfield's] promise to locate a
crew in Concord and switch customers five days
a week [citing to the May 2010 article],
[Peter] Dearness [New England Southern's
owner] reported that [Springfield] has done
neither. It is now providing a switch one day
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a week. He believed that to serve major
customers Blue Seal and Ciment Quebec,
[Springfield] had to switch at least three
times a week, which is "what I provided before
I left."
Plaintiffs do not argue that this passage is defamatory
because Pan Am actually stationed a crew in Concord, five days a
week. Rather, they protest that they never promised to provide
that service and that the passage is provably false to boot.
Defendants, for their part, focus their energies on selling the
idea that the speech involved matters of public concern and was
not materially false. And they have the better of this argument.
As for public concern, the subject article addresses the
adequacy of Pan Am's services, and as we noted before, whether a
railway provides adequate service is clearly of concern to the
public. As for material falsity, the word "promise" is the
sticking point, apparently. To plaintiffs' way of thinking,
defendants' piece — with the word "promise" front and center —
implies that Pan Am made a firm commitment that it later broke.
Recall, however, that Pan Am's Miller did tell the STB (via
affidavit) that his company "planned to headquarter a crew in
Concord" and that "one crew will be required on a five day per
week basis." (Emphasis ours.) Miller did not qualify his sworn
statement by saying Pan Am might do neither. Just think about
that for a second — an authorized Pan Am honcho told the STB under
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oath and without qualification that Pan Am planned to locate a
crew in Concord, five days a week.
Yes, Pan Am did put a qualifying phrase — "as long as
traffic levels support such service" — in the application. Yet
the STB still called what Pan Am said "assurances" — "assurances"
that Pan Am "will . . . headquarter[]" a crew in Concord, five
days a week. Plaintiffs have no beef with the STB's "assurances"
tag. And since an "assurance" is a "promise,"8 there is no falsity
— let alone a material one — when it comes to this statement. So
we affirm the entry summary judgment on this article.
"Lost" Railcars
Jones Chemical, Inc. — known as JCI — is (as its names
suggests) a chemical company. Springfield delivers cars carrying
chlorine to JCI's New Hampshire facility. In May 2007, Springfield
raised its chlorine-delivery prices, adding special handling
charges too. About four years later, in March 2011, defendants
reported on how all this affected JCI. Entitled "PAN AM: HAZ–MAT
SERVICE*," the article's offending part said this (ellipses and
brackets in original):
Quality of rail service
In addition to price and the need for special
trains, JCI has had difficulty with
8 See Oxford English Dictionary Online,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12057 (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
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consistency of service, according to another
source. It requires switching of at least four
cars a week.
The railroad "loses" cars on a consistent
ongoing basis, including one car "lost" for
over 60 days . . . even though certain DHS and
DOT statutes require carriers to release [TIH]
cars within 48 hours. {e-mails to ANR&P
2.Mar.11}.
TIH stands for toxic inhalation hazard. The quotes are from an
email to ANR&P. Defendants kept the sender's name out of the
article.
After plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, Hardenbergh
contacted the sender and got a response from the sender's lawyer
saying the car "lost" for over 60 days "was not a TIH car."
Defendants then published a clarification explaining that the
source "was not referring to lost TIH cars."
Plaintiffs claim defendants defamed them by telling
readers that they consistently lose cars carrying TIH, including
one car for over 60 days — a charge, defendants add, that is flat-
out false. Looking to parry this attack, defendants claim the
sentence is too cryptic to convey anything specific enough to be
considered a verifiable statement of fact.9 And, defendants add,
9 "Obviously," defendants told the judge, the word "loses" "was
not intended to suggest that the railroad permanently 'loses cars,'
within the wide ambit of connotation of the verb 'to lose.'"
"[T]he idea," defendants stressed, "is not that [p]laintiffs
- 25 -
assuming that argument does not carry the day, they should still
win because the gist of the sentence is true. This time, however,
plaintiffs come out on top.
For one thing, the statement is capable of being read in
a defamatory way. Just consider the following: Federal law
requires rail carriers (like Springfield) to "forward" hazardous
materials (like TIH materials) every 48 hours until they reach
their final destination. See 49 C.F.R. § 174.14. Federal law
also requires rail carriers (like Springfield) to have "procedures
in place to determine the location and shipping information for
each railcar under its physical custody and control that contains
[hazardous materials]." See 49 C.F.R. § 1580.103(b). And
defendants do not deny that their readers readily know what a big
deal it is for a rail carrier to act like a scofflaw when it comes
to hazardous materials. So we do not doubt that having defendants
accuse them of losing track of TIH cars (even temporally) — a
readily verifiable charge, supposedly based on specific events —
certainly lowers plaintiffs' standing in the community.
On top of that, the summary-judgment evidence (taken in
the light most favorable to plaintiffs) shows the statement —
dealing with public safety, a quintessential issue of public
literally lose cars, but that [p]laintiffs had difficulty tracking
where certain cars may be at any given time on the system."
- 26 -
concern, as we explained earlier — is materially false. According
to an affidavit by Doug Steward, Springfield's superintendent for
transportation, Springfield uses a computerized monitoring program
to track all TIH-carrying railcars, ensuring the cars "are fully
accounted for." And Springfield never "lose[s] TIH or other
railcars on a consistent and ongoing basis," Steward emphasized.
Federal agencies — the Federal Railroad Administration and the
Transportation Security Administration — routinely audit
Springfield, he added, to evaluate Springfield's compliance with
federal law. Yet no agency, he stressed, has ever accused
Springfield of losing TIH or other railcars, or of violating any
federal laws in shipping cars to JCI.10
10 Defendants take shots at an exhibit attached to Steward's
affidavit, calling it "a cryptic set of unclear documents" — e.g.,
"a one-page undated and illegible screen shot and a two-page
waybill for an empty car" dated two years after the offending
comment. Steward, though, based his affidavit not just on his
review of the documents but on his personal knowledge. And
defendants complaints do not suggest that the statements we've
highlighted fall outside his personal knowledge as the officer
responsible for "management and oversight on tracking rail cars
moving on [plaintiffs'] rail system" — "including TIH rail cars"
— "to ensure they are full[y] accounted for and are not lost or go
missing." Defendants' complaints about Steward's affidavit may
perhaps be pressed via a pretrial motion or before a jury, if the
case goes to trial.
One other thing. Defendants submitted an affidavit by
Dearness (New England Southern's owner) saying that "TIH cars often
sat several days in the Concord Yard" and that the "bunching" of
railcars (including TIH cars) probably gave rise to "technical[]
. . . violation[s] of the 48-hour rule on occasion." Dearness's
affidavit does not say that plaintiffs lost track of any cars, let
- 27 -
All that is left to do then is compare the challenged
defamatory comment (that plaintiffs lose TIH cars en route to JCI,
including one for over 60 days in violation of federal law) with
what we take as true at this stage of the case (that plaintiffs
never lost railcars carrying hazardous materials, even
temporarily). And having done this, we conclude that a sensible
juror could find that a more precise explication of the TIH issue
would have improved plaintiffs' public reputation — meaning we
must vacate the grant of summary judgment on this article.
Fink's Departure
Up until 2006, Fink was both president and CEO of Pan Am
and president and CEO of the Pan Am group of railroad entities
(the "Pan Am group," for easy reading). That year, at his request,
his son became president of the Pan Am group, though Fink stayed
on as president and CEO of Pan Am and CEO of the Pan Am group.
Unfortunately, father and son did not share the same
operational philosophy. Things came to a head in 2011, when Tim
Mellon, Pan Am's principal owner, decided that the dual-leadership
situation "was no longer working." Mellon gave Fink two options:
take back total control of Pan Am's railroad operations or
alone the ones sitting in the Concord Yard. Nor does it state
that an agency actually cited plaintiffs for losing cars. Again,
defendants might perhaps pursue these Dearness-based arguments in
a pretrial motion or before a jury, if a trial is in the offing.
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surrender power to his son. Fink chose the latter, writing Mellon
in March 2011:
Subject to your acceptance of the conditions
proposed below regarding severance, this
letter is submitted to confirm the resignation
of my employment, effective at the close of
business today, from all positions held with
Pan Am Systems, Inc., and its subsidiary
companies, including my positions as an
officer and director of those companies. With
regard to severance compensation I would agree
to resign under the following conditions:
[conditions redacted]
A few days later, defendants published an article about
Fink's departure. Headlined "PAN AM: A NEW DAWN?*," the piece
started out this way (FYI — the article uses "Fink pere" to refer
to defendant Fink (David Andrew Fink) and "Fink fils" to refer to
defendant Fink's son11):
9 March, Nashua, NH–North Billerica MA. PAN
AM OWNER TIM MELLON REMOVED DAVE FINK PERE
from management of the company, according to
four separate sources: one MBTA, one union,
one Maine source, and one from other railroad
management in New England. Sources differ on
what precipitated the action, whether Fink is
formally removed or is only on a "leave of
absence", and whether Mellon came to New
England to administer the coup de grace or did
it by telephone, but all agree that David
Andrew Fink, the head of Pam Am Systems, is no
longer in charge. . . .
11"Pere" means "father" and "fils" means "son." See Oxford English
Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140661 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2015); Oxford English Dictionary Online,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/70268 (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
- 29 -
"One source," the article added, stated that "'[t]he old man will
still run things.' Another source said that Fink fils is now the
head of both the railroad and the holding company." "If Fink pere
has definitely left," the article said, wrapping up, then some
sources "thought that young Fink might have more freedom either to
spend more money on railroading, or put the existing money into
different [and one would hope more productive] places." (Brackets
in original.)
The parties fight hard over whether this article is
capable of conveying a defamatory meaning and whether the
statements are about matters of public concern. As plaintiffs
tell it, one can easily infer — given quotes like "removed . . .
from management," "coup de grace," and spending money "more
productive[ly]" — that Mellon removed Fink for performance
reasons. And the point of the speech, they add, was to spotlight
an internal employment issue, not to raise a matter of public
concern. As defendants see it, though, the article is not
actionable because a statement that a person was fired — without
more — is not defamatory. See Picard, 307 A.2d at 835. And —
given quotes like "[s]ources differ on what precipitated the
action" — one would have to torture the story's text to conclude
that Mellon fired Fink for a specific reason, or so defendants
want us to rule. Also, they contend, the speech focuses on the
- 30 -
corporate shakeup at a major railway company, which is a matter of
concern to the public.
Once again, we need not take sides on the defamatory-
meaning question. Even assuming (favorably to plaintiffs) that
the article communicates the message that Mellon removed Fink for
performance reasons and that such a message may be defamatory,
defendants cannot be liable because (so far as the summary-judgment
record shows) the disputed statements relate to public concerns
and are not false in any material sense.
Starting with the public-concern issue, despite
defendants' best effort to pass Fink's departure off as involving
a purely private matter (his employment status), the speech at
issue implicates railway safety, efficiency, and viability. We
say that because the article talked about how his leaving might
cause Pan Am "either to spend more money on railroading, or put
the existing money into different [and one would hope more
productive] places." And a discussion about leadership change
tied to railroad improvement is firmly within the sphere of matters
of public concern.
Turning then to material falsity, we point out what
Fink's affidavit makes plain. The father/son leadership structure
was a no-go, given their different views on how best to run the
business. And Mellon had had enough. So to end the dysfunction,
- 31 -
Mellon delivered what defendants called the "coup de grace" (which
can mean an action "that settles or puts an end to something"12),
essentially telling Fink — according to Fink — either you take
charge or let your son take charge, but no more power-sharing.
His hand forced by Mellon's "directive" (another quote from Fink's
affidavit) the elder Fink "agree[d] to resign" (a quote from Fink's
letter to Mellon). Now perhaps there is a difference between
saying Mellon "removed" Fink for performance reasons (which is how
plaintiffs read the article) and saying Fink left following a
Mellon "directive" to either retake the reins of power or give
them up forever — a directive issued to end the corporate problems
caused by the father/son infighting (which is how plaintiffs
describe Fink's departure). But even assuming any difference
suggests falsity, plaintiffs identify nothing in the summary-
judgment record showing their reputations would be changed for the
better by a more fulsome account of Fink's leaving. Cf. generally
McCullough, 691 A.2d at 1204 (finding no defamation liability where
the challenged statement was no more damaging to plaintiff's
reputation than a more accurate statement would have been). So we
affirm the summary-judgment ruling on this article too.
12 See Oxford English Dictionary Online,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/43112 (last visited Sept. 9, 2015)
- 32 -
Final Words
Our work over, we reverse the grant of summary judgment
on the TIH article and affirm in all other respects. The parties
shall bear their own costs.
So ordered.
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