United States v. Hufstetler

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1393
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DANIEL HUFSTETLER,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Lipez and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Joshua L. Solomon, with whom Pollack Solomon Duffy LLP was on
brief, for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 20, 2015
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Appellant-Defendant Daniel
Hufstetler challenges his conviction for robbing a federal credit
union, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), arguing that he was coerced into
confessing to that crime in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. At the time of Hufstetler's interrogation, his girlfriend
was also in police custody for the robbery. A significant chunk of
Hufstetler's interview thus dealt with the impact that his
cooperation would have on her prospects for release. Before trial,
Hufstetler filed two motions to suppress, each anchored on the
theory that the invocation of his girlfriend in this manner
constituted an improper threat or promise. The district court
twice rejected that argument. Because we conclude that the
officers did not act impermissibly, and that Hufstetler confessed
through his own volition, we affirm.
I.
In November 2011, the New Hampshire State Police and the
FBI were investigating a bank robbery at the Guardian Angel Credit
Union in Berlin, New Hampshire. Relatively quickly, they homed in
on Hufstetler and his girlfriend Sheena Craig as the primary
suspects. After arresting Hufstetler and Craig, three law
enforcement officers -- FBI Special Agent Laura Hanlon, Berlin
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Police Corporal Luc Poulin, and Berlin Detective Rich Plourde --
interrogated Hufstetler.1
At that time, the officers had already painted a detailed
picture of the crime. They knew that the two suspects were in
financial trouble; they had conducted a search of Hufstetler's home
and car which led them to clothing and shoes that matched those
worn by the robber in the bank's surveillance video; they had
obtained pictures from the bank video that showed Hufstetler; they
had met with witnesses who saw Hufstetler and Craig both sitting in
a car and driving around the bank before the robbery; and, they
knew that Hufstetler was sitting across from the bank immediately
before the crime. They had also interviewed Craig prior to their
discussion with Hufstetler, at which time she provided them with
the precise routes that the two took on the day of the robbery.
At several points throughout Hufstetler's interrogation,
the officers referred to this evidence and indicated that they
believed he was guilty. They also noted that the purpose of the
interrogation was, in part, to determine Craig's precise role.
Though they knew that she drove him to the bank, they knew little
else about her culpability. For instance, Special Agent Hanlon
said, "This is your opportunity to explain to us what her role is,"
and, "she's down there [being held by officers] based on what we
1
We take note that the officers began the interrogation by
providing Hufstetler with his Miranda rights. They also tape
recorded the entire interview.
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have right now." Corporal Poulin also asked, "[W]as she there on
her own accord or did she not know what was going on?" Later on,
Corporal Poulin cut to the chase and stated, "I know it was you.
I already know it was you . . . My only intention up here Daniel,
is to figure out [Craig's] involvement."
Intersecting with that line of inquiry was the officers'
recognition that Hufstetler was concerned for his significant
other. After Hufstetler repeatedly expressed that concern, his
interrogators tried to explain the situation in terms that would
resonate with him; that is, they explained how his cooperation
could or could not assist Craig. For instance, Special Agent
Hanlon said, "You should feel like a real heel because you put her
in this position . . . Our job is to find [the person responsible
for the robbery] and arrest him . . . We feel we've done that job."
At another point, Special Agent Hanlon also stated, "you should be
upset because you care for her and this is quite disruptive to her
life." Corporal Poulin summed it up for Hufstetler by saying,
"There's obviously different outcomes for [Craig], depending on
what it is in the details that we're looking for here."
Critically, the officers consistently told Hufstetler that he
needed to tell the truth and that they lacked the authority to make
any guarantee or promise in exchange for his cooperation.
For Hufstetler's part, he appeared to be enjoying the
process and wanted it to continue. He noted, "I don't get what
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you, you're trying to speed up the process . . . Why are you so
quick on the draw? . . . Don't you know every minute I sit in here
is a little more funner than down there?" At other times, he
steered the conversation back to Craig in a blatant attempt to
secure a deal for her; he obfuscated his answers; or, he simply
ignored the officers' questions. Both his tone and cadence
reflected his aim at any given point; e.g., he spoke quickly and
somewhat combatively when attempting to secure a deal for Craig,
but was slow and relaxed when trying to elongate the interview.
At the end of this two hour and fifteen minute
conversation, Hufstetler seemed satisfied that his confession would
save Craig from criminal charges. He asked, "so once you get your
guy, so to speak, for that . . . are you still gonna keep digging
like super deep." After Detective Plourde assured Hufstetler that
"I'm not gonna go from here . . . and just try to rip every part of
your life and everybody involved with you," Hufstetler confessed.
During that admission, he took full responsibility for the robbery.
In March 2012, a federal grand jury indicted Hufstetler
for this crime. Prior to trial, his counsel moved to suppress the
confession. The district court, albeit with limited discussion,
rejected the motion after finding the confession to be "entirely
voluntary." Roughly one week before trial, Hufstetler tried again
with an analogous pro se motion. The district court again denied
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it. A jury subsequently found Hufstetler guilty on the charged
crime, and the court sentenced him to 180 months in prison.
This timely, single-issue appeal followed.
II.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress an allegedly
involuntary confession de novo. United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d
428, 438 (1st Cir. 2011). Any findings of fact, of which there
were none here, are ordinarily reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804, 809.
III.
It is well established that the government may not use an
involuntary confession against a defendant at trial. See Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). A coerced confession
is improper because it is not "the product of a rational intellect
and a free will." Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
introduction of such evidence violates an individual's due process
rights and thus requires reversal regardless of the sufficiency of
the remaining record. United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 241
(1st Cir. 1990). When the voluntariness of a confession is
challenged, the government must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was properly elicited. Id.
To make a voluntariness determination, we engage in a
"totality of the circumstances" inquiry. Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438.
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This requires us to balance the officers' tactics with the unique
background of each individual suspect. Id. The lynchpin of our
analysis is whether the government's conduct overtook the will of
the defendant. See Jackson, 918 F.2d at 242.
Hufstetler's case turns on whether the officers'
references to his girlfriend during the interrogation were
inappropriate and, if so, whether such statements overpowered his
will. As he sees it, his interrogators immediately sensed his
concern for Craig and then repeatedly referenced her incarceration
in order to force his hand. It was only after the officers
successfully convinced Hufstetler that Craig's freedom hinged on
his willingness to talk, he says, that he finally confessed. He
thus insists that the officers infringed upon his constitutional
rights.
Over time, there have been several developments in the
law applicable to addressing the propriety of utilizing a suspect's
family member during an interrogation, as Hufstetler alleges
occurred here. Admittedly, the applicability of the decision in
any one case to another can be difficult given the fact-intensive
nature of the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. As a body
though, the cases do provide guideposts to aid us in determining
whether police conduct in this context crosses the line. We thus
begin by laying out a mosaic of cases on this topic before plotting
Hufstetler's plea in that panoply of law.
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i.
One cluster of cases implies that the use of a family
member uniquely tugs at a suspect's emotions and thus can have an
undue impact. Particularly notable here are two Supreme Court
decisions. The first, Lynumn, involved officers informing a
defendant that her failure to cooperate would result in her losing
financial aid for, and custody of, her children. 372 U.S. at 534.
The Court noted that the defendant had no reason to question the
officers' capacity to carry out those threats. Id. Accordingly,
the court deemed the tactics improper and ordered the confession
suppressed.
A few months later in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963), the Court reiterated this point. There, interviewing
officers repeatedly told a suspect that he would be unable to call
or see his wife until he wrote out a confession. 373 U.S. at 507.
Those threats occurred over a number of days and the defendant
"gave in only after consistent denials of his requests to call his
wife, and the conditioning of such outside contact upon his
accession to police demands." Id. at 514. The Court deemed this
improper and, when weighed against the defendant's susceptibility
to coercive tactics, found the confession to be involuntary.
Hufstetler points us to a number of cases from the Ninth
Circuit which he believes best capture the import of those Supreme
Court opinions. The first is United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d
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1332 (9th Cir. 1981). In that case, the Ninth Circuit evaluated an
interrogation in which the suspect was told that she had "a lot at
stake" with respect to her child. 658 F.2d at 1334. The court
used the occasion to broadly state that it is impermissible to
"deliberately prey upon the maternal instinct and inculcate fear in
a mother that she will not see her child in order to elicit
cooperation." Id. at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In 2011, that court restated this proposition in Brown
v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2011) -- a case that Hufstetler
largely clings to here. The Ninth Circuit reviewed an
interrogation during which an officer noted that the suspect's
ability to see or be with his child was entirely contingent on his
cooperation with the police. 644 F.3d at 981. They "expressly
conditioned [the suspect's] ability to be with his child on his
compliance with her questioning." Id. Although the petitioner's
ultimate claims were denied under relevant habeas standards, the
court still classified such threats as coercive. Id. at 981-82.
At a minimum, these cases illustrate that we must be on
alert when an officer utilizes a family member as a tool during an
interrogation. Nonetheless, cases from this circuit provide
examples of situations where the discussion of a family member was
deemed acceptable. The parties emphasize two.
The first is United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236 (1st
Cir. 1990). There, a defendant was arrested for gun and drug
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offenses but only admitted to possessing the drugs. In an effort
to entice the suspect to talk, the investigating officer informed
him that his sister was under arrest for the gun violation, and
thus his confession could assist her. 918 F.2d at 241. On appeal,
Jackson argued that the use of the sister in that way was unduly
coercive, but we concluded that the statement was neither a direct
threat nor promise. Id. at 241-42. Moreover, we found that "there
[was] no evidence that an especially close relationship existed
between Jackson and his sister, or that Jackson was unusually
susceptible to psychological coercion on that account or any
other." Id. at 242. Accordingly, we affirmed the district court's
decision that the confession was voluntary.
Recently, we reached a similar result in United States v.
Jacques, 744 F.3d 804 (1st Cir. 2014). In that case, interrogating
officers remarked "on the failing health of Jacques's elderly
father, suggesting that continued resistance might deprive Jacques
of crucial years with his family." 744 F.3d at 808. In response
to an involuntariness challenge, we stated that "statements that a
defendant's refusal to cooperate may lead to an extended separation
from his or her loved ones may contribute to a finding that the
defendant's confession was coerced . . . [h]owever, the mere fact
that a defendant is placed under some psychological pressure by
agents does not necessarily render a confession involuntary." Id.
at 811 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
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ultimately concluded that the subsequent confession was voluntary
because there was only a single reference to the family member, the
suspect's demeanor during the interrogation did not manifest any
notable psychological or emotional anxiety, and there was no
evidence that he was particularly susceptible to coercion. Id. at
811; see also Cooper v. Bergeron, ___ F.3d ___ , 2015 WL 627070 at
*13 (1st Cir. Feb. 13, 2015).
Thus, while Lynumn and its progeny counsel us to be
particularly cognizant of the risk of coercion when reviewing
interrogations where officers invoke references to a family member,
our cases also emphasize that discussion of a family member, on its
own, is not per se coercive. Instead, we must closely examine the
specific manner in which the officer discussed the relative and
weigh such references against the defendant's susceptibility to
coercion.
ii.
In this case, we balance the officers' conduct with
Hufstetler's susceptibility to coercion by addressing each
consideration in turn.
a.
When evaluating the propriety of police tactics we
consider "the totality of the circumstances," which may include the
"length and nature of the questioning," the existence of any
explicit or implicit threats, and any deprivation of a suspect's
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essential needs. Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438. A promise or threat
need not be explicit, but can also result from "[s]ubtle
psychological coercion." Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1335.
Hufstetler accuses the officers of making improper
threats or promises. To flesh out this argument, he cites portions
of the transcript which, in his view, show the officers
conditioning Craig's release on his willingness to confess. Most
notably, he quotes: "I certainly don't want to see those kids be
without their mother;" "[T]here's obviously different outcomes for
[Craig], depending on what it is in the details;" and, "[Y]ou can
save her a buck by saying that you didn't tell her what you were
gonna go do, but you're not doing that." He thus believes that the
officers deliberately preyed on his emotions to force a confession
from him.2
After carefully reviewing the transcript and listening to
the interrogation, we can discern no improper threat or promise.
At the outset, we note that the officers had probable cause to hold
2
Hufstetler also briefly points to statements that "[y]ou not
saying anything is hurting her. [y]ou're willing to sell her down
the river, so be it," and "you'll miss an opportunity to have any
kind of input on the outcome for her, and that's all on you." He
says that these comments violated his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. As will be discussed though, the officers merely
described the position that Hufstetler and Craig were in without
embellishing or distorting that difficult reality; they were not,
however, conditioning either individual's freedom on a willingness
to talk. Further, the officers made clear that Hufstetler had the
right to remain silent and could stop answering questions at any
point. Accordingly, this argument lacks merit.
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Craig. In such a circumstance where the referenced relative is
both a family member and a co-suspect, probable cause for holding
that individual helps to place the officers' statements in context.
Without more, an officer's truthful description of the family
member's predicament is permissible since it merely constitutes an
attempt to both accurately depict the situation to the suspect and
to elicit more information about the family member's culpability.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir.
1994) (finding a confession voluntary where agents had probable
cause to suspect Jones's girlfriend, informed him that she would be
prosecuted if she was involved, and "never told [him] that his
girlfriend would not be prosecuted if he cooperated"); Allen v.
McCotter, 804 F.2d 1362, 1363 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying an
involuntariness claim where officers told the suspect that "because
his wife was directly involved in the robbery, charges could be
filed against her"); see also Thompson v. Haley, 255 F.3d 1292,
1296-97 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 879-
80 (8th Cir. 1996); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 943 F. Supp. 2d
447, 456-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (where an officer's threat to arrest a
suspect's elderly aunt without any probable cause was deemed
improper); United States v. Andrews, 847 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249-50
(D. Mass. 2012) (finding police conduct impermissible where
officers sought to make a suspect believe that they would arrest
his elderly mother for the alleged crime).
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In context, it is difficult to view the officers'
actions, in their totality, as improper. The officers' statements
were undoubtedly difficult for Hufstetler to swallow, and the
officers were clearly aware that Hufstetler was in a rough spot.
But, they never lied, exaggerated the situation, or conditioned
either individual's release on Hufstetler's willingness to speak.
Instead, they told Hufstetler that Craig was a suspect and unless
new information came to light to discount her culpability she would
continue to be criminally liable. We take no issue with the
officers' utilization of this indisputably true fact to both gain
more information about Craig and to elicit more intelligence about
Hufstetler's own actions. Given Craig's putative criminality, such
statements simply do not align with the kind of inappropriate
threats made in the Lynumn line of cases.
Equally relevant, the officers also emphasized that they
could not, and would not, promise Hufstetler anything in exchange
for his confession. For example, Special Agent Hanlon stated
bluntly that "I don't have the power or the authority . . . nor
does the detective, to go down and un-arrest [Craig] right now."
Detective Plourde reiterated that by saying "I can't make you any
promises before you tell me what actually happened." Thus, even if
the references to Craig were impolitic, an objectively reasonable
individual in Hufstetler's shoes could not have construed the
statements as constituting a promise or threat. Cf. United States
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v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (framing the issue as
whether "a reasonable person would view the Agents' statements as
a promise").
Ultimately, this record reflects little more than
officers, faced with two criminal suspects, attempting to sift out
each individual's role. Though Craig was undoubtedly significant
to Hufstetler, the officers never utilized her in a manner which
would have converted their acceptable references into impermissible
ones. For that reason, the police conduct here falls far closer to
the Jackson and Jacques line of cases than the blatant and improper
discussions that occurred in Lynumn, Haynes, and the like.
b.
In addition to considering the officers' actions, we must
examine whether Hufstetler was susceptible to the allegedly illegal
police conduct. Jackson, 918 F.2d at 242. Here, we evaluate the
defendant's "age, education, intelligence, and mental condition,"
and any "prior experience with the criminal justice system."
Jacques, 744 F.3d at 809.
Hufstetler again cites to the transcript to support his
contention that he would not have confessed but for the officers'
implication that Craig's freedom hinged on him doing so. He notes
that he finally confessed after "Detective Plourde's assurance that
the way to 'get [her] out of here' was for Mr. Hufstetler to 'tell
us what happened.'"
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Focusing solely on the dynamics of this specific
interrogation, we are hard-pressed to find support for the
conclusion that Hufstetler was susceptible to coercion or that his
will was actually overcome. See, e.g., United States v. Larry, 126
F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1997) (examining remarks made to officers
during an interrogation and concluding, based on those statements,
that the defendant voluntarily confessed). Throughout the
interview, Hufstetler actively tried to extend the interrogation,
attempted to avoid questions, and even appeared to be having some
fun with the officers. As previously noted, he made remarks such
as "I don't get what you, you're trying to speed up the process,"
and "Why are you so quick on the draw?" The recording of the
interrogation renders his ploys unmistakable.
Further, our review of the recording makes plain that
Hufstetler was steering the conversation in an effort to secure a
deal for Craig; he was fully cognizant of what he was doing
throughout the entire process. At several points during the
interrogation, the officers proceeded to a different topic, but
Hufstetler pivoted the conversation back to Craig. He was not shy
about making his intent clear, making statements such as, "It's
like how does she physically get out of here? . . . where's the
guarantee at? What's the deal?" In fact, and contrary to
Hufstetler's interpretation, the transcript immediately preceding
his confession reflects the voluntary decision-making process that
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he undertook; it was only when he was satisfied that he had
accomplished his goal that he began to discuss the robbery. Such
self-awareness and negotiation tactics are simply not hallmarks of
an individual susceptible to, or who has been overtaken by, any
coercive techniques.3
Ultimately, the transcript and recording are devoid of
evidence that Hufstetler lacked sufficient control over his own
choices. In that respect, he stands in the same shoes as the
defendants in Jackson and Jacques, and his challenge must be
resolved the same way.
IV.
The dynamics of the interrogation in this case lead us to
conclude that Hufstetler voluntarily chose to confess.
Accordingly, we affirm.
3
Hufstetler briefly argues that the officers had reason to
believe that his mental health was compromised and that he was
particularly susceptible to coercive tactics. To support this
argument, he cites portions of the transcript and then references
competency issues that emerged throughout the pendency of his
criminal case. As the government persuasively rebuts though, no
evidence at the time of the interrogation would have put a
reasonable officer on notice that Hufstetler suffered from any such
mental condition. This case thus does not involve a situation
where the officers were "dealing with a suspect whose compromised
mental state" was known to them. See Hughes, 640 F.3d at 440.
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