Montanez Allman v. Garcia-Padilla

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2384
AGUSTIN MONTAÑEZ-ALLMAN,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
MERCEDES PEGUERO-MORONTA; JEAN PIERRE PEGUERO-MORONTA; AGUSTIN
MONTAÑEZ-PEGUERO; JEAN PIERRE MONTAÑEZ-PEGUERO; NICOLE MARIE
MONTAÑEZ-PEGUERO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALEJANDRO GARCÍA-PADILLA; ELIZABETH LÓPEZ-CABRERA,
Defendants, Appellants,
MIGUEL A. PEREIRA-CASTILLO; BIENVENIDO RAMOS; CARLOS RIVAS-
QUIÑONES; MANUEL RIVERA-GARCIA; SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PUERTO RICO; INGRID VILA-BIAGGI; EDUARDO BHATIA-GAUTIER; JORGE
IRIZARRY-VIZCARRONDO; HÉCTOR LÓPEZ; ROSSANA LOPEZ-LEÓN,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Margarita L. Mercado-Echegaray, Solicitor General, Puerto Rico
Department of Justice, for appellants.
Fredeswin Pérez-Caballero, with whom Pérez-Caballero Law
Office was on brief, for appellee.
April 1, 2015
LYNCH, Chief Judge. When the government of Puerto Rico
changed hands following the November 2012 General Elections, the
legislature enacted Law 75-2013 ("Law 75") which repealed
Reorganization Plan No. 1-2011 ("2011 Reorganization Plan") and in
doing so purportedly "abolished" four positions that the 2011
Reorganization Plan had created. At the same time, the legislature
also enacted several other laws creating "new" positions with
substantially similar duties and removal limitations. When
Governor García-Padilla filled the "new" positions, several of the
now-displaced former officials brought suit in federal court. See,
e.g., Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla, No. 3:13-cv-01646
(D.P.R. filed Aug. 27, 2013).
This is an interlocutory appeal from one of those suits,
that of former Veteran's Ombudsman Agustin Montañez-Allman.
Montañez-Allman brought federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims under the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Commonwealth
law claims for fault or negligence under Article 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. This
interlocutory appeal concerns a preliminary injunction, granted on
due process grounds, that, inter alia, reinstated Montañez-Allman
and vacated the political appointment of his replacement.
When this rather extraordinary relief issued, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court had not yet issued its opinion in the nearly
identical case of Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla. That
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opinion, issued on June 19, 2014, confirmed the availability of
relief in Commonwealth court. Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla,
2014 TSPR 75, 2014 WL 3013335, at *14-16 (P.R. 2014), petition for
cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. ---- (U.S. Mar. 3, 2015) (No. 14-1062)
(certified translation provided by the parties). This, then,
raises the question of whether Montañez-Allman remains entitled to
federal injunctive relief for his due process claim. Cf. Acevedo-
Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernández, 447 F.3d 115, 124 (1st Cir. 2006). In
light of the extraordinariness of the relief sought, the immense
importance of this case to the Commonwealth's own constitutional
balance of powers, and the relief now available under the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court's decision in Díaz-Carrasquillo, which both
parties agree is adequate, we remand with instructions to vacate
the preliminary injunction within thirty days of the date of this
opinion, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
We provide only a limited summary of the facts as
necessary to resolve the appeal. A more detailed description may
be found in the district court's opinion. See Allman v. Padilla,
979 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209-12 (D.P.R. 2013).
In June 2011, then-Governor Luis Fortuño appointed
Montañez-Allman to a ten-year term as Acting Veteran's Ombudsman
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pursuant to the 2011 Reorganization Plan.1 As relevant here, the
2011 Reorganization Plan established the ten-year fixed term, and
placed limitations on the governor's removal power. Those
limitations included a requirement of advance notice and the right
to a hearing, and only permitted removal for total disability,
gross negligence, or reprehensible conduct.
Following the November 2012 General Elections, the
administration changed, and García-Padilla became governor. Soon
thereafter, in July 2013, the legislature enacted Law 75, which
repealed the 2011 Reorganization Plan and purported to abolish the
positions that the plan had created, including Montañez-Allman's
position of Veteran's Ombudsman. At the same time, the legislature
also enacted Laws 76, 77, 78, and 79, creating nearly identical
positions as those purportedly destroyed. One of those, Law 79,
established the position of "Veteran's Advocate." The "new"
position of Veteran's Advocate had similar responsibilities and
privileges, and a similar term, as the purportedly abolished
Veteran's Ombudsman.
In August 2013, Montañez-Allman was notified that the
Office of Veteran's Ombudsman had "ceased to exist" under Law 75,
and that Governor García-Padilla had appointed someone else,
Elizabeth López-Cabrera, to the "new" post of Veteran's Advocate
1
Montañez-Allman had also served as Veteran's Ombudsman
under the previous law, Law 57-1987, which had been repealed by the
2011 Reorganization Plan.
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under Law 79. He was informed he needed to turn over his files,
equipment, and other agency resources to López-Cabrera as part of
the transition.
In September 2013, Montañez-Allman2 filed this federal
suit against Governor García-Padilla, López-Cabrera, and various
other officials who are members of the Popular Democratic Party.
He brought claims under § 1983 for violations of the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, and under Commonwealth law for fault or
negligence. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
damages, on the basis of these claims. He also sought a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.
On October 18, 2013, the district court granted Montañez-
Allman's request for a preliminary injunction on the basis of his
due process claim, but denied his request for an injunction on
First Amendment grounds. The injunction (1) vacated the
appointment of López-Cabrera as Acting Veteran's Advocate; (2)
ordered that Montañez-Allman be reinstated; and (3) enjoined
Montañez-Allman's removal without due process of law. García-
Padilla and López-Cabrera filed this interlocutory appeal on
October 21, 2013.
2
Members of Montañez-Allman's family also joined as
plaintiffs for purposes of the claims under Commonwealth law.
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II.
When the district court issued its preliminary
injunction, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico had not yet responded
to the questions certified in the nearly identical case of Díaz-
Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla concerning the existence of a
property right under Commonwealth law. The Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico has since ruled, see Díaz-Carrasquillo, 2014 WL 3013335, at
*14-16, holding, inter alia, that Montañez-Allman now has at least
an equivalent remedy available in state court, and so he will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied federal equitable relief,3 see
El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez-Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 496-98 (1st Cir.
1992). The parties at oral argument agreed that the state remedy
would indeed be adequate. We now face the question of whether the
rather extraordinary federal injunctive relief reinstating a high-
level Commonwealth political appointment and removing the now-
reinstated appointee's replacement remains appropriate. Cf. id.
We have previously held that, in determining entitlement
to federal relief for due process violations, a relevant
consideration is the adequacy of "existing state remedies."4 See
3
We need not address whether this opinion of the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court is binding or merely advisory, because, in either
case, it provides persuasive authority of how the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court would likely decide the issue. Cf. United States v.
Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2001); Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l,
Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996).
4
A similar principle underlies the Parratt-Hudson doctrine:
"'where an injury has been caused not by a state law, policy, or
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Acevedo-Feliciano, 447 F.3d at 124; Bane v. Registry of Motor
Vehicles, 72 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished
disposition); Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E. Providence, 970
F.2d 996, 999-1000 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of
procedural due process claim for failure to allege inadequacy of
state remedies and noting availability of adequate relief under
state-law claims); cf. S. Commons Condo. Ass'n v. Charlie Arment
Trucking, Inc., 775 F.3d 82, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2014) (recognizing
that, "in some circumstances," an "after-the-fact remedy" under
state law may be adequate). This is particularly true "[i]n
shaping equitable remedies, [where] comity concerns can loom
large." Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 323 (1st
Cir. 1989) (en banc); see also R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (holding that federal courts
administering equitable remedies must "exercis[e] a wise
discretion" to "avoid[] . . . needless friction with state
policies" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Simply because an
procedure, but by a random and unauthorized act that can be
remedied by state law, there is no basis for [federal court]
intervention under § 1983,' in a suit alleging only a procedural
due process claim." San Gerónimo Caribe Project, Inc. v. Acevedo-
Vilá, 687 F.3d 465, 480-81 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc) (alteration in
original) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 285 (1994)
(plurality) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). "This
'commonsense teaching' is designed to 'respect[] the delicate
balance between state and federal courts . . . .'" Id. at 481
(first alteration in original) (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 284
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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equitable remedy may be available does not necessarily mean that it
must automatically issue." El Dia, 963 F.2d at 497.
Federal courts, as Justice Holmes once emphasized, are to
"strictly observe[]" the "important rule" "that no injunction ought
to issue against officers of a State . . . unless in a case
reasonably free from doubt and when necessary to prevent great and
irreparable injury." Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525,
527-29 (1926). In light of the relief now available in Puerto Rico
courts under Díaz-Carrasquillo and the importance of this case to
the Commonwealth's own constitutional balance of powers, this
"important rule" is applicable here. Under the altered and unusual
circumstances of this case, the maintenance of continuing federal
equitable relief is no longer appropriate. Cf. Direct Mktg. Ass'n
v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1133-34 (2015) (noting that, under the
comity doctrine, "federal courts refrain from 'interfer[ing] . . .
with the fiscal operations of the state governments . . . in all
cases where the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be
preserved unimpaired'" (alterations in original) (quoting Levin v.
Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 422 (2010))).
Accordingly, we remand to the district court with
instructions to vacate the preliminary injunction within thirty
days of the date of this opinion (to provide time to file suit in
Commonwealth court), to dismiss without prejudice Montañez-Allman's
due process claim, to resolve Montañez-Allman's First Amendment
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claim, and, if dismissed, to decline pendent jurisdiction over the
remaining Commonwealth claims. Cf. Desjardins v. Willard, 777 F.3d
43, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2015) (ordering remand to state court of state
law claims implicating state constitutional issues following
dismissal of federal claims); Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla,
No. 3:13-cv-01646 (D.P.R. Dec. 15, 2014) (opinion and order)
(providing plaintiff time to file suit in Commonwealth court before
dismissal of federal case without prejudice because decision by
Puerto Rico Supreme Court rendered federal case unnecessary, citing
comity concerns).
So ordered. No costs are awarded.
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