Sinapi v. RI Board of Bar Examiners

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 16-2251, 16-2261
ANTHONY E. SINAPI,
Plaintiff, Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
v.
RHODE ISLAND BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS; DAVID A. WOLLIN,
individually and in his official capacity as member of the RI
Board of Bar Examiners; MELLISSA K. BURNETT TESTA, individually
and in her official capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar
Examiners; MARC B. DECOF, individually and in his official
capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar Examiners; THOMAS
DICKINSON, individually and in his official capacity as member
of the RI Board of Bar Examiners; CARLY B. IAFRATE, individually
and in her official capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar
Examiners; DEBORAH M. TATE, individually and in her official
capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar Examiners; ADAM M.
RAMOS, individually and in his official capacity as member of
the RI Board of Bar Examiners; MICHAEL A. ST. PIERRE,
individually and in his official capacity as member of the RI
Board of Bar Examiners; MICHAEL A. URSILLO, individually and in
his official capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar
Examiners; CYNTHIA WILSON-FRIAS, individually and in her
official capacity as member of the RI Board of Bar Examiners,
Defendants, Appellants, Cross-Appellees,
C. LEONARD O'BRIEN, individually and in his official capacity as
member of the RI Board of Bar Examiners,
Defendant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Ponsor, District Judge*
Michael W. Field, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Rebecca Tedford Partington, Assistant Attorney General, was on
brief, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Richard A. Sinapi for appellee/cross-appellant.
December 11, 2018
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
PONSOR, District Judge. Anthony Sinapi, an individual
with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and anxiety,
sought certain accommodations to assist him in taking the Rhode
Island bar exam. The Rhode Island Board of Bar Examiners (the
Board) denied his request and, on review, the Chief Justice of the
Rhode Island Supreme Court denied his petition for reversal of the
Board's decision. Immediately following this denial, Sinapi filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
against the members of the Board.1 The district court issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the Board to permit
Sinapi the requested accommodations. In further proceedings,
Sinapi filed an amended complaint, which the court ultimately
dismissed, and a motion for attorneys' fees, which the court
allowed.
These cross appeals followed. The Board seeks reversal
of the attorneys' fees award; Sinapi objects to the district
court's dismissal of his amended complaint. For the reasons set
1 The Board members, who are sued both individually and in
their official capacities, are David Wollin, Mellissa K. Burnett
Testa, Marc B. Decof, Thomas Dickinson, Carly B. Iafrate, Deborah
M. Tate, Adam M. Ramos, Michael A. St. Pierre, Michael A. Ursillo,
Cynthia Wilson-Frias, and C. Leonard O'Brien. For the sake of
simplicity, both the Board collectively and the individual members
are referred to as "the Board."
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forth below, we reverse the award of attorneys' fees and affirm
the dismissal of the amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts and
procedural history. Anthony E. Sinapi suffers from ADHD and
anxiety. During college and law school he received certain testing
accommodations, such as extra time and low-distraction examination
environments. As Sinapi prepared to take the bar exams in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, he sought similar accommodations,
specifically fifty percent extra time, a distraction-reduced
testing environment, and permission to take prescribed medication
in the testing room.
The Massachusetts Board of Bar Examiners initially
denied Sinapi's request but relented and approved the
accommodations after Sinapi submitted additional materials. The
Rhode Island Board submitted Sinapi's request for accommodations
to an impartial medical examiner for evaluation and, on July 16,
2015, notified Sinapi by letter that his request for accommodations
was denied. The Board's reason, the letter stated, was that
Sinapi's request "was not supported by the medical documentation
provided."
Rule 4(b) of the Rhode Island Board of Bar Examiners
Rules of Practice Governing Admission on Examination states that
requests for reconsideration of Board decisions are "discouraged."
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Instead, disappointed applicants are directed to file a petition
for review with the Rhode Island Supreme Court within thirty days
of receiving the denial.
Despite this direction, Sinapi contacted the Board's Bar
Administrator on July 16, 2015, to request reconsideration of the
no-accommodation decision. The next day, July 17, 2015, the
Board's counsel contacted Sinapi by phone. In the conversation
that followed, Sinapi pressed for clarification of the reasons
supporting the Board's decision and pointed to the contrary
decision of the Massachusetts Board.
By letter dated Monday, July 20, 2015, the Board's
counsel advised Sinapi that he could petition the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for a review of the Board's denial. In addition,
the letter advised Sinapi that, with submission of a valid
prescription, he could bring his medication into the examination
room.
On July 22, 2015, six days before the Rhode Island bar
exam, Sinapi filed an Emergency Petition for Review and Summary
Reversal of Denial of Testing Accommodations and Access to
Documentation in Support of Denial, with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. The following day, July 23, 2015, Chief Justice Paul A.
Suttell heard the petition. On July 24, 2015, Chief Justice
Suttell granted Sinapi's request for access to the basis for the
Board's rejection of the request for accommodation (the medical
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evaluation), but otherwise denied the petition. His order, dated
July 24, 2015, stated as follows:
This matter came before the Duty Justice on an emergency
petition seeking review and summary reversal of a
decision of the Board of Bar Examiners (the Board)
denying the petitioner special testing accommodations
for the July 2015 Rhode Island bar examination and access
to the Board's independent medical evaluation of his
requested accommodation. After carefully considering
the arguments of counsel, the Duty Justice hereby
directs that the following Order shall enter: 1. The
petitioner's request for emergency relief is hereby
denied. 2. The petitioner's request for access to the
independent medical evaluation is hereby granted.
That same day, Friday, July 24, 2015, Sinapi filed this
suit against the Board in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Rhode Island. He sought both monetary damages for disability
discrimination under federal law and a TRO compelling the Board to
permit him certain bar exam accommodations, including a reduced
margin of twenty-five percent additional time and a testing
environment with limited distractions. In his request for the
TRO, Sinapi emphasized equitable considerations, most prominently
the lack of harm to the Board and the corresponding severe harm he
would suffer if he were compelled to sit for the imminent exam
without the requested accommodations. Sinapi even offered to
stipulate that he would retake the exam if he passed it with the
requested accommodations but was found not to be entitled to these
accommodations in subsequent proceedings on the merits of his
claims.
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Events following Sinapi's July 24, 2015, filing moved at
a headlong pace. The Board filed its opposition on Sunday, July
26. On Monday, July 27, Sinapi filed a reply. The district court
held a hearing later that day, with the bar exam looming on the
28th.
After hearing argument, the district court granted
Sinapi's motion for a TRO and ordered that he be permitted to sit
for the bar exam the following day with the accommodations he
sought. The district court's decision emphasized the harm to
Sinapi and the balance of harm weighing in favor of him as compared
to the Board. In finding that Sinapi "certainly would be
irreparably harmed" without the accommodations, the TRO noted that
because Sinapi had registered to sit for the multistate portion of
the bar exam in Rhode Island, with his score being applicable both
in Rhode Island and in Massachusetts, the denial of accommodations
in Rhode Island would undermine his chances for success in both
states.
In addition to irreparable harm, the district court also
found "based on the limited record before it" that Sinapi had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. In making
this finding, the court identified particularly the failure of the
Board to consider the accommodations afforded to Sinapi in
Massachusetts.
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On July 28, 2015, Sinapi sat for the Rhode Island bar
exam with the accommodations of twenty-five percent extra time and
a distraction-reduced testing environment.2
On August 27, 2015, the Board filed an appeal of the
grant of the TRO with this court, arguing among other things that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the TRO. On
October 13, 2015, this court dismissed the Board's appeal as moot
because Sinapi had by then already sat for the Rhode Island bar
exam with accommodations, and thus the district court's order
"ha[d] been irrevocably executed." We added, "Even assuming that
we may reach other issues in the pending case, we prefer to wait
for further developments in the trial court."
Following this, Sinapi's suit seeking monetary damages
for disability discrimination proceeded in the district court. On
October 26, 2015, Sinapi filed an amended complaint adding a count
under Rhode Island law, and the Board responded with a motion to
dismiss. Before Sinapi filed an opposition to the Board's motion,
the district court on November 23, 2015, issued an order sua sponte
requiring Sinapi to show cause why the case should not be dismissed
"for lack of jurisdiction and there being no current case in
controversy." Sinapi responded to the court's order to show cause,
2 Sinapi failed this exam, but upon retaking it the following
February, this time with fifty percent additional test-taking
time, he passed.
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but he did not file any formal opposition to the Board's motion to
dismiss.
On April 15, 2016, the district court issued its ruling
on the Board's motion to dismiss. The court observed that Sinapi
(without formally removing it from his complaint) appeared to have
"abandoned his claim for injunctive relief in light of the Court's
decision to grant his temporary restraining order." Based on this,
the court found that only the "issue of [the Board's] immunity
from [Sinapi's] compensatory and punitive damages claims"
remained. These claims the court dismissed based on Eleventh
Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity.
After the dismissal of his claims, Sinapi filed a motion
for attorneys' fees and costs asserting he was a prevailing party
under the fee-shifting provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, based on his successful motion
for a TRO. Over the Board's opposition, the district court allowed
Sinapi's motion and awarded him $19,486.00 in fees and $400.00 in
costs.
As noted above, the Board filed a timely appeal of the
district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs, and Sinapi
filed a cross-appeal of the dismissal of his amended complaint.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Rooker-Feldman
Our jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
gives us power to review final decisions of the district courts.
In exercising this power, we regularly begin with an examination
of the basis for the district court's own jurisdiction. A district
court generally has the obligation, when there is any question, to
confirm that it has subject matter jurisdiction prior to
considering the merits of the underlying controversy. Acosta-
Ramírez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 712 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2013).
Throughout this litigation, the Board (in addition to
offering other arguments) has vigorously contended that, under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims raised by Sinapi. Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) -- typically cited together -- stand
for the proposition that only the Supreme Court has the power to
reverse or modify final state court judgments. The doctrine
divests "lower federal courts of jurisdiction to hear certain cases
brought by parties who have lost in state court." Klimowicz v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 907 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir.
2018) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 291-93 (2005)); Coggeshall v. Massachusetts Bd. of
Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010).
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The doctrine applies "to cases of the kind from which the doctrine
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp., 544
U.S. at 284. We have observed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies "where 'the losing party in state court filed suit in
federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an
injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and
rejection of that judgment.'" Federación de Maestros de Puerto
Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d
17, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291).
Applying these precedents in another case from Rhode
Island involving the practice of law, we have noted that a litigant
could not avoid the impact of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply
by recasting his claims in federal court as arising under the
United States Constitution, where adjudicating these claims would
"necessarily require reviewing the merits of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's decision." McKenna v. Curtin, 869 F.3d 44, 48
(1st Cir. 2017).
The Board's Rooker-Feldman argument has force, but on
the particular facts of this case it raises troublesome issues --
regarding, for example, the finality of Chief Justice Suttell's
ruling and the precise issues raised in the parallel state and
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federal proceedings -- that we need not address here. Courts of
Appeals generally have an obligation to address any question of
Article III jurisdiction before addressing the merits of an appeal.
Steele Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-97
(1998). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, is based on 28
U.S.C. § 1257 and implicates statutory, not Article III,
jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291; In Re
Athens/Alpha Gas Corp., 715 F.3d 230, 235 (8th Cir. 2013).
Some controversy exists among the circuits as to whether
a court may step around a Rooker-Feldman issue to reach a more
straightforward issue that will easily resolve a case on the
merits. See Edwards v. City of Jonesboro, 645 F.3d 1014, 1017-18
(8th Cir. 2011) (collecting authorities). This circuit's
precedent stands with those that permit a bypass of a Rooker-
Feldman issue where an alternative substantive ruling provides a
simpler and more direct resolution of an appeal. Torromeo v. Town
of Fremont, NH, 438 F.3d 113, 115 (1st Cir. 2006). This approach
is consistent with our more general rule that bypassing
jurisdictional questions to consider the merits is appropriate
where, as here, the jurisdictional question is statutory. See,
e.g., United States v. Catala, 870 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2017)
(distinguishing between statutory and Article III jurisdiction);
Restoration Pres. Masonry, Inc. v. Grove Europe Ltd., 325 F.3d 54,
59 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that inquiries into statutory
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jurisdiction need not precede merits inquiries and collecting
cases holding the same).
Bypassing these difficult jurisdictional questions is
particularly appropriate in cases like this one where the merits
issues are "foreordained" and "do[] not create new precedent."
Seale v. I.N.S., 323 F.3d 150, 152 (1st Cir. 2003); Royal Siam
Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 144 (1st Cir. 2007) (setting aside
a jurisdictional question when it "is not only thorny but also a
matter of statutory, not constitutional, dimension" and where
"[o]n the other hand, the outcome on the merits is foreordained").
Further, this approach may be taken when the prevailing party on
the merits is the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction
denied because, in such a case, the outcome is the same either
way. This is such a case.3
3 It could be argued that, because the Board presented the Rooker-
Feldman jurisdictional argument in its round-one appeal, the
earlier panel's brevis opinion describing the substantive issue on
appeal at that time as "moot" constituted an implicit ruling that
no Rooker-Feldman-based jurisdictional issue existed at that time.
That order, however, merely recognized the practical reality that
we could not order the district court to turn the clock back and
bar an accommodation that Sinapi had already received. As the
court stated, all other substantive issues in the case -– which
included, necessarily, the Board's Rooker-Feldman argument --
would await "further developments in the trial court." This
interpretation of the earlier panel's intent seems particularly
compelling here, since "a federal court has leeway to choose among
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits."
Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,
431 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). In any event the issue
of the viability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine on the facts of
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Turning to the merits of the cross appeals, our logic
unfolds in two steps. First, the award of attorneys' fees was
improper because Sinapi was not, as the law in this area requires,
a prevailing party. Second, the district court correctly ruled
that Sinapi's claims for monetary damages against the Board and
its members in their official capacities were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and against the members in their individual
capacities were foreclosed by quasi-judicial immunity. We begin
with the award of attorneys' fees.
B. Attorneys' Fees
It is very well established that, in applying a fee-
shifting statute such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
a court may make an award of attorneys' fees only where a litigant
qualifies as a "prevailing party." Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v.
Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A
review of Supreme Court authority reveals how steep the incline is
disfavoring a fee award in cases where, as here, the moving party
never achieves success on the merits. In Buckhannon Bd. and Care
Home v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598(2001), the plaintiff, an assisted living facility, brought suit
seeking relief from state orders requiring it to close following
a failed inspection. The state agreed to stay the shut-down order
this case is somewhat academic since, for the reasons stated, we
have chosen not to address it.
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while the litigation was pending. Before the case was resolved,
the legislature eliminated the applicable inspection provision,
and the lawsuit was dismissed as moot. In rejecting the then-
prevalent "catalyst" theory supporting an award of fees, the Court
found that it had previously recognized "prevailing party" status
and awarded attorneys' fees only where the party had received a
judgment on the merits or obtained a favorable court-sanctioned
consent decree. Id. at 602-608. Based on this, the Court affirmed
the lower court's denial of fees.
Six years later in Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007),
the Court addressed a fact pattern closer to the one we confront
here. In Sole, the plaintiff wanted to present, on a public beach,
a Valentine's Day art installation comprising nude individuals
assembled into the form of a peace symbol. The state Department
of Environmental Protection prohibited the artwork unless the
participants were minimally clothed. A complaint was filed on
February 12, 2003, and the district court heard the plaintiff's
emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on February 13, the
day before the proposed performance. Although, as the Court noted,
the district court judge was "disconcerted by the hurried character
of the proceeding," id. at 79, he issued the injunction and the
display went forward. In a subsequent proceeding on the merits,
in somewhat altered circumstances, the court entered summary
judgment for the defendants. Despite this, the court awarded
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attorneys' fees based on the plaintiff's success in obtaining the
preliminary relief, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, holding that, despite plaintiff's
"transient victory at the threshold" the ultimate merits-based
decision against her meant she was not eligible for a fee award.
Id. at 78.
First Circuit authority follows this track. In Race v.
Toleda-Davila, 291 F.3d 857 (1st Cir. 2002), the plaintiff obtained
a preliminary injunction barring the police from arresting him for
driving with an expired registration sticker. Following
successful administrative proceedings, the plaintiff moved for
voluntary dismissal of his case and for attorneys' fees based on
the preliminary relief. The district court denied the fees, and
we affirmed, citing Buckhannon and finding that fees were not
proper where the plaintiff failed to obtain at least some relief
based on the merits of his claims. Id. at 859.
As in Sole, the preliminary proceedings in the case
before us were "necessarily hasty and abbreviated." Sole, 551
U.S. at 84. While it is true that the district court made the
required threshold assessment of a likelihood of success on the
merits, the precipitant circumstances permitted no thorough
examination of the merits of this issue prior to the issuance of
the TRO. Indeed, as noted, when the Board later moved to dismiss
any claim for injunctive relief, the district court declined to
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address its substantive arguments, finding that Sinapi appeared
"to have abandoned his claim for injunctive relief in light of the
court's decision to grant his temporary restraining order." Like
Ms. Wyner with her beachfront artistic display, Sinapi realized
his threshold goal of getting the accommodations, but his "initial
victory was ephemeral." Sole, 551 U.S. at 86. Since the substance
of Sinapi's claim for injunctive relief was never addressed in any
depth, despite the Board's vigorous argument that the claim was
fatally flawed, and no merits-based decision ever entered in his
favor, Sinapi never achieved prevailing party status, and the award
of fees was unsupported.
A shift in perspective highlights the basic equity of
this conclusion. To repeat, the Board has ardently opposed any
claim by Sinapi for injunctive relief from the outset. Sinapi
himself, as noted, recognized that a subsequent judgment against
him on the merits of his claim for injunctive relief might require
him to retake the bar exam. Nevertheless, beyond a necessarily
hasty review of the likelihood of Sinapi's success on the merits,
the Board never received in-depth assessment of its substantive
arguments. It would be unfair to deem Sinapi a "prevailing" party
in these circumstances and slap the Board with a fee bill based on
a finding it never received a fair opportunity to contest on a
properly developed record.
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In bringing this part of the analysis to an end, it is
important to reemphasize that we are not holding that preliminary
equitable relief, unless explicitly followed by a favorable
judgment on the merits, can never provide the basis for an
attorneys' fee award. As in Sole, "[w]e express no view on
whether, in the absence of a final decision on the merits of a
claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a
preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of counsel
fees." Id. at 86. Here, however, where the initial assessment of
likelihood of success on the merits was so pressured and
necessarily superficial -- with the bar exam only hours away --
and where the ultimate issue of Sinapi's entitlement to injunctive
relief was never addressed substantively, the fee award based on
Sinapi's supposed "prevailing party" status was not justified.
C. Dismissal of Damage Claims Against the Board
Turning to the decision to allow the Board's motion to
dismiss the damage claim in the complaint, we find it was entirely
correct. Though our analysis involves a modest degree of
intricacy, the path to that conclusion is clear.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Sinapi's amended complaint sought monetary damages from
the Board and its members in both their official and their
individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Title II of
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the ADA.4 We begin with the claims against the Board and its
members in their official capacities. The district court dismissed
these claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Significantly,
in his Statement of Issues on appeal, Sinapi seeks review of that
ruling only to the extent that it applied to a violation of the
ADA that "actually violated the Fourteenth Amendment." Sinapi
offers no argument that the district court erred in dismissing
claims offered solely under Title II of the ADA that did not rise
to the level of Fourteenth Amendment violations.5
The Eleventh Amendment provides a state immunity from
"any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted . . . by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. It is now well established
that such immunity also applies to suits brought by a state's own
citizens. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). There can
be no question that the Board, including its members in their
official capacities, stands in the shoes of Rhode Island itself,
as an arm of the state. In re Petition of DeOrsey, 312 A.2d 720,
724 (1973). Thus, without more, the Board and its members in their
4 The amended complaint also included claims under Rhode
Island law, but these are not the subject of appeal.
5 If Sinapi had offered such a pure-ADA argument, a
discussion of the possible application of Tennessee v. Lane might
have been necessary. Since the argument does not appear, however,
we leave that issue for another day.
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official capacities would appear to be protected by the Eleventh
Amendment from any suits for money damages.
Congress, however, has the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity when properly exercising its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No immunity protects states
from a claim for monetary damages based on "actual violations" of
the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151,
158 (2006) (emphasis in original).
The question we face here, then, is whether Sinapi
alleged sufficient facts to make out such an "actual" violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit in Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101(10th Cir. 2012) addressed this issue in a case involving a
physician whose license to practice medicine had been revoked by
the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners. Without in any way
adopting Guttman, we find a comparison of that case to this one
useful. As the first step in its analysis, the court examined
whether New Mexico's conduct in revoking the plaintiff's license
"actually violate[d] the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Id. at
1113 (citing Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159).
The potential Fourteenth Amendment violations identified
by the plaintiff in Guttman were significantly more serious than
those identified by Sinapi here. In Guttman the New Mexico board
suspended the plaintiff's license to practice medicine with no
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pre-deprivation hearing, with delays apparently unsanctioned by
state law, with hearing officers who had personal knowledge of the
plaintiff, and in reliance on outdated evidence. Guttman, 669
F.3d at 1114-15. In weighing these allegations, the Tenth Circuit
emphasized that the constitutional sufficiency of the process
plaintiff received was a matter of federal law and found that "when
examined from the perspective of federal law, the alleged
deficiencies do not rise to level of a denial of process."
Guttman, 669 F.3d at 1115 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-541 (1985)).
Here, the amended complaint offers four significantly
less compelling alleged due process violations: delay in reviewing
Sinapi's application for accommodation; failure to disclose the
reasons for the denial of the application; failure to provide for
timely reconsideration of the denial; and failure to provide notice
of the mechanism of appeal. The undisputed facts as set forth in
the amended complaint, however, are: (1) that Sinapi received
notice of the denial of his application for the accommodation
twelve days before the examination; (2) that he was given the
reason for the denial (lack of support in the medical record based
on an independent medical review) and ultimately a copy of the
letter supporting the Board's action; (3) that he was informed of
the mechanism to obtain review of the denial and in fact pursued
his appeal; and (4) that he indeed obtained a review of the Board's
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decision by the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
prior to his examination.6
This process could possibly have been improved; most
processes can be. But the standard here is relatively modest. As
Guttman observed, "professional licensing decisions are subject
only to rational basis review." Id. at 1123. We are far from the
arena of strict scrutiny, and the process Sinapi received, even
accepting the allegations of his complaint, falls well within the
basic constitutional requirements.7
In sum, we conclude that, because the alleged violations
of Title II of the ADA did not constitute actual violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Board and its members in their official
capacities enjoy protection under the Eleventh Amendment and are
immune from any claim for monetary damages. This leaves only the
claim against the members of the Board individually.
6 Sinapi's repeated suggestion that the Chief Justice's ruling
was only provisional because he lacked time to convene the full
court is unsupported by the language of the ruling or any other
portion of the record.
7 As we have noted, since Sinapi has not raised it, we need
not take up the second issue addressed in Guttman: whether a state
enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity in the face of a demand for
monetary damages based on misconduct that allegedly violated Title
II of the ADA, but did not constitute an actual violation of the
Fourteen Amendment. See supra n. 4.
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2. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
As to this claim, it is manifest that the Board members
enjoy quasi-judicial immunity. Our decision in Bettencourt v. Bd.
of Registration in Med. of Com. of Mass., 904 F.2d 772 (1st Cir.
1990) establishes the applicable standards. In that case, the
plaintiff doctor sought monetary damages from the Board of
Registration (BOR) based on an alleged violation of his civil
rights committed by the BOR when it revoked his medical license.
We noted in Bettencourt that quasi-judicial immunity extended "to
agency officials who, irrespective of their title, perform
functions essentially similar to those of judges or prosecutors,
in a setting similar to that of a court." Id. at 782 (emphasis in
original) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1977).
In concluding that the BOR members were immune from
claims for monetary damages, Bettencourt identified three pivotal
questions. First, did the BOR member, "like a judge, perform a
traditional 'adjudicatory' function, in that he decide[d] facts,
applie[d] law, and otherwise resolve[d] disputes on the merits .
. . ?" Second, did the BOR member, "like a judge, decide cases
sufficiently controversial that, in the absence of absolute
immunity, he would be subject to numerous damages actions?" Third,
did the BOR member, "like a judge, adjudicate disputes against a
backdrop of multiple safeguards designed to protect a [party's]
constitutional rights?" Id. at 783. See also Coggeshall v.
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Massachusetts Bd. of Registration of Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658,
662-663 (1st Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the Bettencourt criteria).
The answers to all three of these questions are self-
evident. First, the role of the Board member is functionally
comparable to that of a judge. Here, Board members weighed the
facts relating to the request for accommodations, albeit in a
manner disappointing to Sinapi, and resolved the dispute about his
entitlement to the accommodations on its merits. Second, the act
of denying a bar applicant an accommodation is likely to stimulate
a litigious reaction by the disappointed applicant, as was the
case here. The need for quasi-judicial protection of the Board
member is almost painfully obvious. Few people would serve on the
Board knowing that any negative accommodation decision would
likely trigger a lawsuit aimed at their personal checking accounts.
Even if someone had the brass to join the Board in these
circumstances, denials of accommodations, however well founded,
would likely be few and reluctant. Quasi-judicial protection is
simply essential if the Board is to function objectively. Finally,
the process embraced protections (including an independent medical
assessment and plenary review by the Rhode Island Supreme Court)
sufficient to "enhance the reliability of information and the
impartiality of the decisionmaking process." Id.- 24 -
Based on this analysis we conclude that the Board members
in their individual capacities were immune from any claim for
monetary damages.8
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and vacate
the district court's award of attorneys' fees and affirm its
dismissal of Sinapi's claims for monetary relief.
8 Because the argument for quasi-judicial immunity is dispositive,
we have no need to address the alternate argument, also strong,
that the Board members in their individual capacities enjoyed
qualified immunity as well.
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