Staples v. Gerry

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1727
FRANK STAPLES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
RICHARD GERRY, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in
both his individual and official capacities, WILLIAM WRENN,
Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections,
Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities,
JEFFREY BROWN, New Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both
his individual and official capacities, DONNA SYTEK, New
Hampshire Parole Board, Defendant, in both her individual and
official capacities, MARK FURLONE, New Hampshire Parole Board,
Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities, JAMES
DALY, Chaplain of the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in
both his individual and official capacities, KIM LACASSE,
Director of classifications at the New Hampshire State Prison,
Defendant, in both her individual and official capacities,
JOSEPH MICHAUD, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State
Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official
capacities, RONALD GAGLIARDI, Correctional Officer at the New
Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and
official capacities, JON FOUTS, Head of Security at New
Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and
official capacities, CHRISTOPHER KENCH, Correctional Officer at
the N.H. State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and
official capacities, LEO DEUSAULT, Correctional Officer at the
New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual
and official capacities, PAUL CASCIO, Correctional Officer at
the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his
individual and official capacities, MARC MILLER, Correctional
Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both
his individual and official capacities, MICHAEL EDMARK,
Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State Prison,
Defendant, in both his individual and official capacities, SCOTT
MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at the New Hampshire State
Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and official
capacities, JOSEPH DIAMENT, Correctional Officer at the New
Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and
official capacities, MARC THERIAULT, Correctional Officer at the
New Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual
and official capacities, PAUL COURCHESNE, Correctional Officer
at the New Hampshire State Prison, in both his individual and
official Defendant, in both his individual and official
capacities, ROBERT PARENT, Correctional Officer at the New
Hampshire State Prison, Defendant, in both his individual and
official capacities.
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Donna J. Brown, with whom Wadleigh, Starr & Peters, P.L.L.C.,
was on brief, for appellant.
Francis C. Fredericks, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
with whom Gordon J. MacDonald, Attorney General, was on brief, for
appellees.
April 24, 2019
BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal concerns three
claims that a New Hampshire State Prison ("NHSP") inmate brought
against two of the prison's officers in a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights.
The inmate alleges in the first of these claims that, in 2013, one
of the officers pushed him against a pillar, allegedly causing him
to hit his head on it, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
inmate alleges in the other claims that, in 2015, the other officer
sprayed pepper spray into his cell, in violation of both the First
Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. The officers moved for summary
judgment on those claims based on qualified immunity. The District
Court granted the motion, and the inmate appealed. We affirm.
I.
The plaintiff is Frank Staples, a NHSP inmate at all
relevant times. The defendants are two NHSP corrections officers,
Robert Parent and Scott Marshall. The following facts are not in
dispute, except where expressly noted otherwise.
In November 2011, Staples was transferred from a New
Hampshire county prison to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") of the
NHSP, a facility run by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections
("NHDOC"). Around that same time, Staples started practicing
Taoism, including the Taoist practice of growing long hair.
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NHDOC policy set a one-fourth inch limit on facial hair
length that was enforced in all units except the SHU. Staples
grew a lengthy beard between November 2011 and September 2013.
In September 2013, NHDOC staff decided to transfer
Staples from the SHU to the Close Custody Unit ("CCU"), which did
enforce the NHDOC facial hair policy. CCU staff escorted Staples
and five other inmates to the office area of the CCU for intake.
Parent, a sergeant in the CCU, ordered Staples to trim his beard.
Staples became visibly upset and refused to shave. Parent asked
Staples to fill out a written statement form.
The parties dispute what Parent said when he handed
Staples the form. The government claims that Parent asked Staples
to explain why he was refusing to enter the CCU. Staples claims
that Parent actually asked Staples, "[t]ell me why you want to be
PC." Staples contends that "PC" is short for "protective custody,"
a label associated with "snitch[es]" and "sex offender[s]" that
could put Staples in a dangerous position with other inmates.
The parties agree that Staples took the form and tore it
in half. At the moment at which Staples tore up the form, Staples
was within "arms' reach" ("three to four feet") of Parent. Parent
then swiftly pushed Staples against a support pillar in the office
in order to restrain him. Another officer, Robert Leitner, then
handcuffed Staples.
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Staples claims that Parent "took [his] arm and threw it
behind [him] and pushed" him and "slammed him face first into [the]
cement pillar." Parent claims that he was not holding Staples's
arm but only the "center of his back" and that "the front of
[Staples's] body was pressed up against the pillar," but that
"Staples'[s] head did not make any contact with the pole."
A different officer escorted Staples to an isolation
cell. Video footage of the search conducted of Staples upon
entering the cell shows Staples without any obvious marks on his
forehead and without any obvious signs of discomfort.
Pursuant to NHDOC policy, Staples was offered medical
attention, which Staples accepted. Officers escorted Staples to
the NHSP Health Services Center. Staples reported bilateral wrist
tingling and intermittent lower back and shoulder pain. A nurse
examined Staples and concluded that Staples's wrist functioning
"was within normal limits" and reported that she "did not observe
any visible sign of injury, such as redness or bruising, to Inmate
Staples'[s] wrists, back, head, or shoulder." The nurse "did not
recommend that Inmate Staples receive any follow up medical care
as [she] saw no indication that continued care was necessary."
On December 13, 2014, Staples filed a lawsuit detailing
his disputes with NHSP officers relating to the NHDOC facial hair
policy and seeking damages. On December 24, 2014, Staples received
a "Hurt Feelings Report" that was slipped under his cell door.
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The "Hurt Feelings Report" is a mock form that allegedly purports
to "assist whiners in documenting hurt feelings," and suggests
that a person who complains is a "sissy," "candy-ass," and a
"wimp." Staples was allegedly told by other officers that Marshall
had arranged for Staples to receive the document, and Marshall
allegedly later asked Staples, "[O]h, did you get that?" in
reference to the document. Marshall does not admit to sending
Staples the Hurt Feelings Report or to making the comment in
reference to it.
In July 2015, NHDOC staff decided to move Staples from
the "D-tier" in the SHU to the "I-tier" in the same unit. Staples
viewed the transfer to "I-tier" as punitive.
Officers David Dionne and Kory McCauley unsuccessfully
attempted to get Staples to leave his cell to complete the move.
The two officers then met with Marshall, the SHU sergeant, to
determine how to effectuate the move. Marshall ordered them to
try to get Staples's voluntary compliance with the move by talking
to Staples again during their next rounds. Dionne did so, and
Staples again refused. Dionne again conferred with Marshall.
Marshall made the decision to use pepper spray to extract Staples
from his cell if Staples continued to refuse to leave.
NHDOC policy permits the use of pepper spray to obtain
an inmate's compliance with an order to leave his cell. When
pepper spray is used, the NHDOC policy requires officers to warn
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the inmate of its use, videotape its use, and offer the inmate
medical attention promptly after.
Marshall approached Staples in his cell and ordered
Staples to "cuff up" several times. A "cuff up" is when the inmate
places his hands through the cell's tray slot so the officer can
handcuff him before opening the cell door. Staples refused.
Marshall then left the tier to get the pepper spray, a camera, and
Officers Dionne and McCauley.
Marshall, Dionne, and McCauley returned to Staples's
cell. McCauley turned the camera on and began recording. Marshall
warned Staples: "I am giving you a direct order or you are going
to be sprayed." Staples replied: "[S]pray me, tase me, do whatever
the fuck you want."
Marshall then sprayed the pepper spray into the cell
through the tray slot using a cone nozzle, which produces a mist,
for approximately nine seconds. To protect himself from the spray,
Staples turned around and covered his face with a blanket.
Staples remained in the cell. Less than ten minutes
later, Dionne returned to the cell and offered Staples medical
attention, to which Staples responded: "I'm fine, this shit doesn't
bother me." According to Staples, he refused medical attention
because he did not want to come out of his cell to receive it.
Shortly thereafter, Dionne escorted a nurse into Staples's cell
who examined Staples and deemed him medically cleared.
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About ninety minutes later, Marshall returned to
Staples's cell and offered to move Staples to "H-tier" instead of
"I-tier." Staples agreed. Staples then complied with Dionne's
order to "cuff up." Dionne offered Staples a shower, which he
accepted.
In June 2016, Staples brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging multiple constitutional and statutory claims against
twenty NHSP officials in the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire. The defendants moved to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court
dismissed most of the plaintiff's claims, except for the claim
that Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive
force against him and the claims that Marshall had violated the
First Amendment and the Eighth Amendment by using pepper spray
against him. After discovery on these three remaining claims, the
defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were
entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court granted the
defendants' motions. The plaintiff appealed.
II.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See
Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 558 (1st
Cir. 2010). In undertaking that review, we "draw[] all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party while ignoring
'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
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speculation.'" Shafmaster v. United States, 707 F.3d 130, 135
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d
314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009)).
We may affirm only if the record reveals "no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute
is "genuine" if "a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor
of the nonmoving party." Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d
507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc.,
229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court relied on the
first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. That prong
concerns whether "a plaintiff plead[ed] facts showing . . . that
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right."
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The District Court
concluded that no reasonable jury could conclude from the record
that Parent had violated the Eighth Amendment or that Marshall had
violated the First Amendment or Eighth Amendment. On appeal,
Staples contends that the District Court erred in construing the
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record because it reveals a "genuine dispute" as to whether the
defendants violated those constitutional provisions.
III.
We begin with Staples's Eighth Amendment claim against
Parent for pushing him against the pillar in the CCU. "A claim of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
has two components -- one subjective, focusing on the defendant's
motive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing on the
conduct's effect." Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1992); Blyden
v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999)).
To prevail on the objective prong, Staples must show
that "the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 'harmful enough' to
establish a constitutional violation." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The
subjective prong turns on "whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom.
John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). The "factors" that "are
relevant to that ultimate determination" include "the extent of
the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials," "the need for the
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application of force," "the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used," "the extent of the injury
inflicted," and "any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response." Id. at 321 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The District Court, reaching only the subjective prong
of the inquiry, concluded that the record compelled the conclusion
that Parent had acted "in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline" and therefore without "malicious[] and
sadistic[]" intent. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. On appeal, Staples
contends that "the District Court failed to consider evidence from
which a jury could conclude that Parent's use of force was planned,
sadistic and unnecessary." But, we do not agree.
Parent testified that he was prompted to use the force
at issue because he was "surpris[ed]" when Staples "aggressively
ripped [the form] up." Parent testified that he thus immediately
"put [Staples] against the wall to be handcuffed" "[b]ecause that
was . . . an unusual incident and [he] took control of it as
quickly as [he] possibly could."
Staples does not dispute that his "defiance of
[Parent's] order[s]" by ripping up the statement form "could
reasonably be thought to present a threat to" Parent's safety.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 323-24; see also Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d
423, 426 (8th Cir. 1990) ("When a prisoner, having been warned
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three times, refuses to comply with a legitimate jail security
regulation, the incident has escalated into a
'disturbance . . . that indisputably poses significant risks to
the safety of inmates and prison staff.'" (quoting Whitley, 475
U.S. at 320)). Thus, this case is not one in which a reasonable
jury could conclude, even on the officer's own account of why force
was needed, that it was wanton based on an inference that there
was no "need for the application of force." Whitley, 475 U.S. at
321.
Nor could a reasonable jury infer from the undisputed
record that "the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used" supports a finding that the use of force was
wanton. Id. Staples conceded during his deposition that Parent
restrained him in "one quick movement." See, e.g., Wright, 554
F.3d at 270 (relying on concession made in plaintiff's deposition
testimony). And, while the parties disagree as to whether Staples
in fact hit his head against the pillar, Staples admitted that he
hit his head "in the course of [Parent] pushing [him] to the pole"
and that Parent did not "grab[] his head and slam[] it into the
pole." See, e.g., Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir.
2012) (finding that officer did not act "maliciously and
sadistically" where he "twisted" inmate's wrist and "slammed" him
into a wall because the officer "did not use any force until [the
inmate] disobeyed a command that was designed to maintain order
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within the prison; and, when [the officer] applied modest force,
[the inmate] remained defiant").
Staples does point to what he contends was Parent's
statement during the incident, "[t]ell me why you want to be PC,"
when he handed him the statement form. Staples also points to
what he contends was Parent's subsequent admission to him, in a
conversation shortly after the CCU incident, that Parent "knew
[Staples] wasn't going to shave" and the "whole PC thing . . . was
[his] plan to try to get [Staples] to shave."
But, even crediting Staples's testimony that Parent made
these statements, they at most show that Parent wanted to pressure
Staples into shaving. Neither statement suffices to permit a
reasonable jury to find that Parent pushed Staples into the pillar
for a reason other than the one that Parent gave -- namely, that
Staples posed a security risk at the time of the push due to his
defiant act of ripping up the statement form. In fact, beyond
"general attacks upon the defendant's credibility," Staples points
to no "affirmative evidence," Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 600 (1998), that could suffice to rebut Parent's deposition
testimony that he was prompted to use force to "t[a]ke control" of
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the situation when Staples "aggressively ripped [the statement
form] up."1
We thus conclude that "the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, [does not] support a reliable
inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain." Whitley, 475
U.S. at 322. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's grant of
summary judgment to Parent on this claim.
IV.
We turn, then, to Staples's First Amendment and Eighth
Amendment claims against Marshall for using pepper spray against
him. We start with the First Amendment retaliation claim.
A.
To make out a prima facie case of First Amendment
retaliation, Staples must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in an
activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) Marshall took an
adverse action against him; and (3) there is a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse action. See Hannon v.
Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). The government concedes,
for the purposes of this appeal, that Staples's suit challenging
1
To the extent that Staples means to argue that Parent's
alleged attempt to label him as a "PC" inmate constitutes an
independent use of force that is also actionable under the Eighth
Amendment, Staples did not make this argument in any developed
manner below. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437
(1st Cir. 2002) ("[A] waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected
on appeal.").
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NHDOC's facial hair policy is protected activity under the First
Amendment and that the use of pepper spray on an inmate is adverse
in the context of retaliation. "The heart of the matter,
therefore, is the third element of the prima facie case: the
presence or absence of a causal link between the protected activity
undertaken by the plaintiff and the adverse action that he
experienced." Id. at 49.
To make out the third element of the prima facie case,
Staples must show that his protected activity "was a substantial
or motivating factor for the adverse [action]." Padilla–García v.
Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Even if Staples
succeeds in making that showing, however, the government may "still
prevail[] by showing that [Marshall] would have reached the same
decision in the absence of the protected conduct." Crawford-El,
523 U.S. at 593 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Padilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74;
McCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir. 2015).
The District Court concluded that "even if the evidence
[that Staples] cites is minimally sufficient to establish that
Marshall was angry with Staples for filing the 2014 lawsuit, the
other undisputed evidence . . . leaves no doubt that [Marshall]
would have taken the same action regardless of any retaliatory
motive." We need not decide whether the District Court was correct
in this respect, because we conclude that Staples has not met his
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burden to show that a reasonable jury could conclude from this
record that his protected activity was a "substantial or motivating
factor" for Marshall's decision to use pepper spray against him.
Padilla–García, 212 F.3d at 74.
To argue otherwise, Staples points out that he had filed
the prison lawsuit in December 2014, seven months before Marshall's
use of pepper spray in July 2015. And, as evidence of Marshall's
animus toward Staples for filing the suit, Staples points to
Marshall's alleged sending of the "Hurt Feelings Report" in
December 2014, shortly after Staples had first filed the suit
against the prison and to Marshall's earlier alleged comment to
him in September 2013 that "I can't wait to see what that face
looks like without a beard" in connection with his move to the
CCU. Staples also points to motions that he filed in the lawsuit
a week before Marshall used the pepper spray.2 "[This] chronology
2
We note that the record contains no evidence that Marshall
was aware of any motion filed in the lawsuit -- let alone that
particular motion -- prior to his use of the pepper spray. See
Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)
("It is only intuitive that for protected conduct to be a
substantial or motiving factor in a decision, the decisionmakers
must be aware of the protected conduct."). The government also
points out that the lawsuit involved frequent filings by Staples,
which generated more than 140 docket entries over the span of a
year.
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of events," Staples contends, "gives rise to an inference of
retaliation." Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49.
But, the record "points to another explanation" for
Marshall's decision to use pepper spray -- Staples's multiple
refusals to leave his cell in the days before Marshall's use of
pepper spray -- "that is so obviously correct as to render the
charge of improper motivation implausible." Maloy v. Ballori-
Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2014); cf. Micheo-Acevedo v.
Stericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc., 897 F.3d 360, 366 (1st Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1297 (2019) (noting, in the employment
context, that "proximity in timing does not alone suffice to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to [causation]" where the
plaintiff's "own unprotected conduct readily explains the timing
of . . . the adverse . . . action[]"); Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM,
Inc., 904 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 2018) (same).
Here, Marshall testified that his "plan" was "[t]o use
the OC [spray] . . . to get [Staples] to cuff up and come out of
his cell." Consistent with Marshall's testimony, Staples
testified that he refused the orders to cuff up, that he expected
Marshall to "assemble a team and do an extraction" in response to
his refusals, and that he told Marshall to "spray me, tase me, do
whatever the fuck you want" immediately after Marshall warned him
that pepper spray would be used if he continued to refuse to
comply. Thus, Staples does not contest that the conduct that
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Marshall identified as supplying the "justification for using the
pepper spray against [him]" -- namely, Staples's refusal to cuff
up and to leave his cell -- in fact took place. Stallworth v.
Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
Nor does Staples contend that Marshall orchestrated the
plan to move Staples to a different cell in order to create an
excuse to use pepper spray against him.3 Cf. id. (concluding that
genuine dispute existed as to whether an officer "in fact responded
to [plaintiff's] attempt to hurt himself with a razor" where
plaintiff averred that the officer "set up" plaintiff by throwing
the razor into the plaintiff's cell). In fact, the undisputed
record shows that Marshall did not single Staples out for the use
of pepper spray. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App'x 241, 257 (4th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (finding genuine issue as to causation
where the adverse action was taken only against one of six
similarly situated employees and the employer "presented no
evidence to justify the decision to single out [the plaintiff] for
[the adverse] treatment"). Rather, Marshall testified that he
had, pursuant to prison policy, used pepper spray on inmates "six
to 10" times before. And, Staples points to no contrary evidence
3
Staples does not contend that the move to I-tier was itself
the adverse action for purposes of the First Amendment retaliation
claim.
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"that would support an inference of differential treatment." Air
Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2011).
Staples does try to make the case that Marshall
"deviat[ed] from standard operating procedures" in using the
pepper spray. Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49. But, the record shows that
NHDOC Policy and Procedure Directive 5.58 authorizes officers to
use pepper spray after "verbal directives fail to result in an
inmate's compliance with officers' commands," including "after
[an] inmate has indicated his refusal to leave [his] cell and is
not complying with staff orders." When an officer employs pepper
spray for such a purpose, NHDOC policy requires the officer to
warn the inmate prior to using the spray, to videotape the use of
the spray, and to disengage and consider other options if the use
of the spray does not result in the inmate's compliance. It is
undisputed that Marshall complied with these requirements. See
Air Sunshine, 663 F.3d at 36 (rejecting plaintiff's First Amendment
retaliation claim where there was no basis to conclude that "the
relevant procedures were not followed by [the defendant]").
Staples does contend that Marshall violated NHDOC policy
by not first attempting to physically extract Staples before
resorting to the use of pepper spray. But, an officer -- unnamed
in the suit and certified by New Hampshire Police Standards and
Training in the use of pepper spray -- declared in an affidavit
that, under NHDOC policy, "a physical cell extraction is typically
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viewed as a last resort means of gaining an inmate's compliance
with leaving a cell" and that pepper spray is viewed as "a minimal
use of force." Staples points to nothing in the record to rebut
this competent evidence besides his own speculative testimony that
NHDOC policy requires officers to first attempt a physical
extraction. See Hannon, 645 F.3d at 49 ("[A]ffidavits and
deposition testimony are effective in opposing summary judgment
only when they are given on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is
competent to testify about the matter in question.").
Thus, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to Marshall on Staples's First Amendment retaliation
claim. We turn, then, to Staples's separate claim that Marshall's
use of pepper spray violated the Eighth Amendment.
B.
"[A]lthough it is not per se unconstitutional for guards
to spray mace at prisoners confined in their cells, it is necessary
to examine the 'totality of the circumstances, including the
provocation, the amount of [spray] used, and the purposes for which
the [spray] is used [to] determin[e] the validity of the use of
[spray] in the prison environment.'" Williams v. Benjamin, 77
F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d
963, 969 (4th Cir. 1984)). Here, as we have explained, Marshall
testified that he used pepper spray for a "valid[]" "purpose" -- to
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extract Staples from his cell -- in response to a "valid[]"
"provocation" -- Staples refusing multiple orders over several
days to leave his cell. Id.
The record amply supports that testimony, and the
evidence of Marshall's prior comments to Staples concerning his
beard do not suffice to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that
Marshall acted for a reason other than the one that he gave. See
Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483, 488 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding
no Eighth Amendment violation where an "extraction team sprayed a
non-lethal chemical irritant (derived from cayenne pepper) into
the cell to make [plaintiff] exit the cell without direct physical
force"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding "that use of [tear gas] in small amounts may be a
necessary prison technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate
warning to move from a cell"); Allen v. Bosley, 253 F. App'x 658,
659 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the use of pepper spray permissible
after inmate "refused to comply with orders to submit to standard
handcuffing procedure and attempted to block a cell extraction
team from entering his cell"); Rodriguez v. Elmore, 407 F. App'x
124, 126 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.) (same); cf. Torres-Viera v. Laboy-
Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (granting officers
qualified immunity where they used tear gas to "respond[] to a
security disturbance"); Passmore v. Ianello, 528 F. App'x 144, 148
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that "the use of pepper spray
- 21 -
was reasonable" where defendant "refused to present himself for a
mandatory shower at least nine times" before the use of the spray).
Nor does the "amount of [spray] used" by Marshall suffice
in and of itself to permit a reasonable jury to infer wantonness.
Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
undisputed record shows that Marshall used a cone nozzle that
produced a mist instead of a harsher stream of pepper spray, that
Marshall directed the pepper spray into Staples's cell and not at
Staples's person, that Marshall sprayed the pepper spray into the
plaintiff's cell for approximately nine seconds, and that Staples
was promptly offered a shower and medical attention after the
incident. This case is thus not like those cases on which Staples
relies "where . . . summary judgment in Eighth Amendment excessive
force claims based on pepper spraying" was denied. Burns v. Eaton,
752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014). The officers' use of pepper
spray in those cases "involved no warning th[e] force would be
used, no apparent purpose other than inflicting pain, use of
unnecessary 'super-soaker' quantities of the chemical, refusal to
allow the victim to wash off the painful chemical for days, and/or
use of additional physical force" and therefore permitted an
inference of wantonness. Id. (citing Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d
1186, 1189 (8th Cir. 2008); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 873
(8th Cir. 2002); Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 730, 732 (8th
Cir. 2002)).
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V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District
Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the
plaintiff's First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims. Each
party shall bear its own costs.
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