Blomquist v. Horned Dorset Primavera, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 17-1856
KRISTIN BLOMQUIST; KEVIN WARNER,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
THE HORNED DORSET PRIMAVERA, INC.;
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE GROUP, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellees,
VICTORIA BANUCCI; MICHAEL DIXON;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BANUCCI-DIXON,
Third Party Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Roberto Boneta, with whom Boneta & Nogueras, LLC was on brief,
for appellants.
Julio C. Cayere-Quidgley, with whom Héctor J. Ferrer-Ríos,
were on brief, for appellee Universal Insurance Group, Inc.
May 31, 2019
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. A destination wedding in
Puerto Rico can be a wonderfully jovial affair. Spirits flow
freely. The sights are beautiful. Guests chat and dance into the
early morning hours under the Caribbean sky. Unchecked joviality,
however, has an unfortunate tendency of leading to carelessness.
Add an intentionally wet and soapy dancefloor to the equation and
someone is bound to get hurt. And when someone gets hurt, lawsuits
frequently follow. That is what happened here.
Appellants Kristin Blomquist and her husband Kevin
Warner filed suit in the District of Puerto Rico against The Horned
Dorset Primavera Hotel, Inc. (the "Hotel"), claiming the Hotel was
negligent in relation to a slip and fall Blomquist suffered during
their friends' wedding in the Hotel premises. Blomquist and Warner
alleged that the Hotel was liable for Blomquist's injuries because
it did not respond in accordance with its heightened responsibility
under Puerto Rico law to the presence of a dangerous condition in
its premises -- a wet and soapy dancefloor. The jury disagreed,
and the district court entered judgment accordingly.
Discontent with this result, Appellants moved for
judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial.
The district court denied both motions, finding that the jury's
verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and that the
Appellants' motion did not provide basis for either a judgment as
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a matter of law or a new trial. Blomquist and Warner appealed,
and we now affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Appellants Kristin Blomquist and Kevin Warner
("Appellants"), a married couple from New York, traveled to Puerto
Rico on April 4, 2013, to attend their friends' destination
wedding. Upon arriving in Puerto Rico, Blomquist and Warner
checked into the Horned Dorset Primavera Hotel,1 where the wedding
ceremony, banquet, and reception were to be held on April 6, 2013.
The ceremony and banquet were held in one of the Hotel's
ballrooms. After the banquet, the wedding guests moved outdoors
for the reception. The outdoor reception area consisted of a
rectangular space, about thirty-five meters long and eight meters
wide, described as a "plaza" (the "plaza") and a slightly elevated
pool section. The plaza is located in a space between two sets of
stairs, one leading up to the second floor of the Hotel's main
building, and the other leading up to the elevated pool section.
Here, a bar was set up and a temporary dancefloor2 was installed.
1 During the course of the proceeding, the Hotel filed for
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the case to continue
with the Hotel's insurer, Universal Insurance Group, Inc., as the
defendant.
2 The temporary dancefloor did not belong to the Hotel. It was
rented from an outside vendor by the wedding planner.
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A DJ set up his equipment in the elevated pool area, which had
been furnished with tables and chairs. Under the stars, guests
enjoyed an open bar and danced to the DJ's tunes.
The festivities, however, took a turn for disorder as
the night wore on. The younger crowd of guests that remained at
the reception -- a group of approximately forty-five to fifty
individuals -- began jumping into the pool and transitioning
between the pool and the nearby dancefloor. At some point between
12:00am and 1:30am, following the bride's lead, the guests
purposefully wet the dancefloor and began to "slip and slide."3
They slipped and slid laying on their front sides, backsides, and
sideways. A few of the partygoers even began running from the top
of the pool area staircase to the dancefloor, in an effort to slide
across it.
The Hotel's most senior staff member present, Geraldine
Thouvenin, witnessed these actions and proceeded to confront the
groom, Michael Dixon, regarding the guests' behavior. Thouvenin
warned the groom that this behavior was not recommended and was
dangerous. The groom arrogantly disregarded Thouvenin's warning
and, in outright defiance, went to the Hotel's kitchen, retrieved
soap, and poured it on the dancefloor to increase its
3 "Slipping and sliding" refers to the deliberate act of a person
using the momentum created by a vertical movement to launch their
body across a flat surface.
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slipperiness.4 Other wedding guests assisted the groom, pouring
water and soap on the dancefloor to add to the "fun."
At some point after the soap and water were poured,
Blomquist left the reception and pool area to change into her
bathing suit. When Blomquist returned to the reception area, she
slipped and fell on the wet and soapy dancefloor,5 fracturing her
wrist and injuring her back.
B. Procedural Background
On November 1, 2013, Blomquist and Warner filed a
complaint in the District of Puerto Rico on diversity jurisdiction
grounds against the Hotel and its insurance company, Universal
Insurance Group, Inc. Blomquist and Warner alleged that the Hotel
was negligent in failing to provide a safe facility, allowing
inherently dangerous conditions to continue, and neglecting to
warn all parties at risk. Blomquist demanded $40,909.18 in medical
4 Appellants did not sue the groom. As the district court noted,
if anything, Appellants attempted to prevent a third-party
complaint against the groom and bride to proceed.
5 Consonant with the governing standard of review, Appellants'
counsel conceded at oral argument that, for purposes of our review
of the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a
matter of law, we must assume that Blomquist's injuries were the
result of her deliberate attempt to slip and slide on the
dancefloor. Appellants' motion for new trial, however, is based
on the premise that Blomquist's fall was. Thus, for purposes of
their appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for
new trial, Appellants maintain that Blomquist did not partake in
the slipping and sliding on the dancefloor.
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damages; $400,000 for pain and suffering; $200,000 for disability
to engage in her normal life and career activities; and $250,000
for mental suffering and anguish. Warner demanded $200,000 for
mental pain and anguish.
A two-day jury trial was held on October 4 and 5, 2016.6
After closing arguments, the jury was provided a verdict form with
the following two-prong question (the "verdict question"):
Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that The
Horned Dorset Primavera was negligent in the operation
of the hotel facility at the wedding reception held in
April 2013, and that its negligence proximately caused
damages to Kristin Blomquist?
The jury responded in the negative.7 Accordingly, the
district court dismissed Blomquist and Warner's claims and entered
judgment in favor of the Hotel and its insurer.
Dissatisfied, Blomquist and Warner moved for judgment as
a matter of law. In the alternative, they requested a new trial.
The district court denied both motions and this appeal ensued.
6 Pursuant to the parties' consent, trial was conducted before a
magistrate judge.
7 If the jury had responded "Yes" to the verdict question, it was
required to proceed to additional questions. Specifically, the
verdict form asked the jury: whether it found that the Hotel,
Blomquist, and/or Warner had acted negligently and if their
negligence constituted the proximate cause of Blomquist's
injuries; what proportion of the negligence that caused damage to
Blomquist was attributable to each of these parties; and, how much,
if anything, it would award Blomquist and Warner for their physical
and emotional injuries.
-6-
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as
matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New Albertson's, Inc., 915
F.3d 36, 60 (1st Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Notwithstanding,
"our scrutiny of the jury verdict is tightly circumscribed."
Sailor Inc. F/V v. City of Rockland, 428 F.3d 348, 351 (1st Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we examine the
record as a whole, the facts are construed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, Jennings v. Jones (Jennings I), 499
F.3d 2, 3 (1st Cir. 2007), and any inferences are drawn in favor
of the non-movant, Jennings v. Jones (Jennings II), 587 F.3d 430,
438 (1st Cir. 2009). Moreover, "we do not evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence." Lama v. Borrás,
16 F.3d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1994). In sum, "[w]e must sustain the
district court's denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a
matter of law unless the evidence . . . could lead a reasonable
person to only one conclusion, namely, that the moving party was
entitled to judgment." Id. at 476 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law was
grounded on their contention that the Hotel was liable because it
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did not comply with its "duty to remediate the dangerous condition"
on the dancefloor despite its knowledge of the "dangerous activity"
taking place thereon. In denying Appellants' motion for judgment
as a matter of law, the district court recounted that the jury was
presented evidence reflecting that the dangerous condition was
created by "wedding guests and/or the groom"; that Warner was aware
of the condition and even partook in the slipping and sliding; and
that at least one member of the Hotel's staff -- Thouvenin --
warned the groom about the dangers the condition presented. Based
on this, the district court determined that the evidence "[did]
not point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of liability
that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for [the
Hotel and its insurer]."8
Appellants filed their suit under Puerto Rico's general
8 In fact, the district court went beyond this, concluding that
"the Jury determined the Hotel was not negligent," which implied
that they "found the Hotel staff acted reasonably and prudently
under the circumstances in deciding not to halt the wedding
reception" and instead only warning Warner about the dangerous
condition. Because a negative response by the jury to either of
the verdict question's two prongs -- one related to negligence and
the other to causation -- would have freed the Hotel from
liability, see P.R. Civ. Code Art. 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 5141 (requiring both negligence and causation for the imposition
of liability), the district court's conclusion regarding the
jury's finding of negligence is not necessarily accurate. It is
possible that the jury found that the Hotel was negligent in not
taking further action (e.g., warning every single guest about the
dangerous condition) but that its negligence was not the proximate
cause of Blomquist's injury.
-8-
tort statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R.
Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5141 ("Article 1802"). Article 1802 provides
that "[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage
so done." Id. Negligence under Article 1802 is generally defined
as "the failure to exercise due diligence to avoid foreseeable
risks." Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47,
50 (1st Cir. 1997). To succeed on a negligence-based tort claim,
a plaintiff must establish four essential elements: "(1) a duty
requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proof of damage, and (4) a
causal connection between the damage and the tortious conduct."
Id. at 50. "[L]iability will only arise if the damages complained
of were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant." Irvine v. Murad
Skin Research Labs., Inc., 194 F.3d 313, 322 (1st Cir. 1999).
Although they are not absolute insurers of their guests'
well-being, hotels have a heightened duty of care towards their
guests. Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51. A hotel is required to
maintain its premises in such conditions that its guests will not
suffer foreseeable injuries; in other words, the hotel must ensure
that the areas to which its guests have access are safe. Cotto v.
C.M. Ins. Co., 16 P.R. Offic. Trans. 786, 793 (1985). In carrying
out its duty of care, a hotel must act as would a "prudent and
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reasonable person under the circumstances." Vázquez-Filippetti v.
Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, a hotel breaches its duty of care, and thus is liable
for an injury caused by a dangerous preexisting condition within
the hotel's premises (e.g., as a result of an accidental fall), if
(1) the hotel knew or should have known of the condition, and
(2) the hotel did not take the precautions of a prudent and
reasonable person to avoid or remedy the foreseeable risks the
condition created. See id. at 49 (holding that a breach of duty
only occurs if a defendant "acted (or failed to act) in a way that
a reasonably prudent person would foresee as creating undue risk");
Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51 (citing Goose v. Hilton Hotels, 79
P.R.R. 494, 499 (1956)).
Appellants' tort claim is not at all unusual. As we
have noted before, "[c]ases premised on the existence of a
dangerous condition often arise from a 'slip-and-fall,' caused by
a wet or slippery floor, and involve a claim that the business
owner was negligent in permitting the condition to remain because
it is foreseeable that a wet floor is likely to cause injury."
Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50.
For Appellants to succeed on their challenge to the
district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter
of law, they must establish that, based on the evidence presented
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at trial, a reasonable jury could only conclude: (1) that the Hotel
breached its duty of care towards Blomquist (i.e., that the Hotel
was negligent), and (2) that this breach of duty constituted the
proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries.9 See Lama, 16 F.3d at
476; Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 50. A finding to the negative on
either is fatal to Appellants' request for a judgment as a matter
of law.
Appellants' chances for success slip from their grasp on
the second prong -- the jury was presented sufficient evidence to
conclude that the Hotel's breach of duty did not constitute the
proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries. Moreover, sufficient
evidence was presented for the jury to conclude instead that the
proximate cause was Blomquist's deliberate conduct.
1. Breach of Duty
Appellants aver that no reasonable jury could have
failed to find that the Hotel was negligent and breached its duty
of care under Puerto Rico law in the present case's circumstances;
in particular, where the Hotel "allow[ed] its guests to wet and
soap up a dancefloor during a wedding (with an open bar) . . .
[and] engage in dangerous behavior on it," and only advised one of
9 The two other elements of a negligence-based tort claim are not
at issue here. The Hotel does not dispute its heightened duty of
care under Puerto Rico law or the physical injuries suffered by
Blomquist.
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the persons present, the groom, to discontinue the dangerous
behavior.
They contend that the Hotel had knowledge of the wet and
soapy dancefloor and that, since Blomquist's fall and the resulting
injuries were foreseeable, the Hotel had a duty to warn the guests
of the condition of the dancefloor and, furthermore, remedy the
situation by taking measures to put an end to the guests' dangerous
behavior. Appellants rely on the testimony of Hotel employee
Thouvenin in support of this contention. Thouvenin testified that
she witnessed the wet dancefloor and the guests sliding on it. Up
to this point, we can agree with Appellants. Because Thouvenin
was present as an employee of the Hotel, her testimony regarding
the dancefloor's condition and the wedding guests' behavior could
only led a reasonable jury to conclude that the Hotel was aware of
the dangerous condition on the dancefloor and of the dangerous
activity taking place thereon. Similarly, the jury could only
have concluded that the risks presented by the precarious
combination of a wet and soapy surface and the ever-present forces
of gravity, such as that of Blomquist's fall, were foreseeable to
the Hotel. Reaching the opposite conclusion would belie basic
human experience, as reflected in a long line of case law. See
generally Donald M. Zupanec, Store or Business Premises Slip-and-
Fall: Modern Status of Rules Requiring Showing of Notice of
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Proprietor of Transitory Interior Condition Allegedly Causing
Plaintiff's Fall, 85 A.L.R. 3d 1000 (2019) (collecting cases).
With these two elements met -- knowledge of the dangerous
condition and a foreseeable risk -- the Hotel had, as a matter of
law, a duty to address the dancefloor's dangerous condition.
Vázquez-Filippetti, 504 F.3d at 50. In doing so, the Hotel had to
act as would a prudent and reasonable person in those
circumstances, id. at 49, and here is where things start to slide
downhill for Appellants. The inquiry as to whether the Hotel acted
as a prudent and reasonable person is case-specific and fact-
dependent. See Ocasio-Ocasio v. Guadalupe-Hernández, Civil No.
09-1982 (SEC), 2010 WL 5184785, at *3 (D.P.R. Dec. 21, 2010)
(citing Irvine v. Murad Skin Research Labs., Inc., 194 F.3d 313,
322 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying Puerto Rico law)). As such, the
question of how the Hotel should have responded to the situation
on the dancefloor is one better left for the fact-finder, in this
case, the jury. Id. This, in tandem with our standard of review
-- which requires that we construe the facts in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict and draw any inferences in favor of
the Hotel, Jennings I, 499 F.3d at 3; Jennings II, 587 F.3d at 438
-- sets up a slippery slope for Appellants' fall to failure.
Thouvenin testified that the only action the Hotel took
to prevent the wedding guests from continuing to slip and slide on
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the wet dancefloor was warning the groom that such conduct was not
safe.10 We recognize that the extent of this response was, as a
matter of law, lacking and, thus, inappropriate given that
Thouvenin's warning was directed at a single individual,11 despite
the Hotel having a heightened duty of care towards every guest,
including Blomquist. See Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51.
Notwithstanding, a finding that the Hotel breached its heightened
duty of care by not warning all guests, and Blomquist in
particular, is not enough to save Appellants. The jury could have
found that the Hotel did not have a duty of take the further step
of remedying the dangerous condition by preventing the guests from
using the dancefloor. This finding, as will become evident below,
plays a critical role in our proximate cause analysis.
The jury was certainly presented evidence of additional
measures the Hotel could have taken to prevent the guests from
using the dancefloor. On cross-examination, Appellants' counsel
10The content and forcefulness of Thouvenin's warning to the groom
is not completely clear on the record. Thouvenin, however, did
testify that in the hospitality business employees cannot use
language as forceful as "You stop it right now" when talking to
guests.
11Our review of the record reveals that this warning was not the
first or only warning given to the groom about wetting the
dancefloor. Before formalities commenced on the day of the
wedding, the Hotel's General Manager told the groom that "the
[dance]floor cannot be wet." In fact, the Hotel acquired a tent
to place over the dancefloor in order to prevent it from getting
wet if it rained.
-14-
asked Thouvenin if she requested the Hotel's security guard to
intervene with the dancing guests or if she turned off the power
so there was no light, to which she responded that she did not.
These could seem to be effective measures to us, but the jury might
as well have found that they would have been counterproductive.
For example, the crowd of guests could have reacted violently to
a security guard's intervention, even more so if they were under
the influence of alcohol. As the Hotel's general manager testified
based on his forty-six years of hospitality experience, when guests
are provided an open bar they tend to drink more and "lots of
things . . . happen." Likewise, the jury could have concluded
that turning off the lights would have been ineffective in
deterring the guests' behavior and, furthermore, made the
dancefloor more dangerous than it already was by limiting their
vision.
Based on the foregoing, it was reasonable for the jury
to conclude that the Hotel's breach of duty towards Blomquist was
limited to its failure to warn her of the dangerous conditions on
the dancefloor and, by the same token, that the Hotel's heightened
duty of care did not require it to take additional measures to
prevent her from using the dancefloor.
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2. Proximate Cause
Under Puerto Rico law, a negligent omission, such as a
hotel's failure to carry out its duty of care, may constitute the
proximate cause12 of an injury if "in all likelihood, verging on
certainty, the injury could have been avoided if the action omitted
would have been carried out." Soc. de Gananciales v. G. Padín
Co., 17 P.R. Offic. Trans. 111, 124 (1986) (citation omitted).
General experience guides the analysis to make such
determinations. See Díaz v. E.L.A., 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 473,
500 (1987). After a careful review of the record, we find that
the jury was presented sufficient evidence to conclude that
Blomquist would have sustained her injuries even if the Hotel had
met its duty of care by warning her of the dangerous condition on
the dancefloor.
At trial, the Hotel presented two key pieces of evidence
upon which the jury could reach this conclusion: a video showing
the wedding guests' behavior on the dancefloor, and the testimony
of Hotel employee Antonio Rosa Miranda ("Rosa"), who was working
as a waiter during the wedding reception. The video depicts the
atmosphere at the dancefloor area during the early morning hours.
It shows guests joyfully slipping and sliding in their bathing
12 The legal cause of a tortious injury is also referred to as
"adequate cause" in Puerto Rico case law.
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suits across the visibly wet13 yet crowded dancefloor, while others
dance beside them. Some guests even have friends grab their limbs
and spin them on the dancefloor. Despite Blomquist's testimony to
the contrary, based on the video, the jury could have concluded
that Blomquist knew the dancefloor was wet, as she saw the other
guests slipping and sliding, but nonetheless attempted to join the
fun, which ultimately led to her injuries. That Blomquist changed
into her bathing suit after the dancefloor had been soaked with
water and soap, and thus after the guests had already began to
slip and slide therein, as stipulated by the parties, further
supports the belief that she was determined to partake in the
dangerous behavior.
Rosa's testimony reinforces this notion. He testified
that he saw many of the guests "running and sliding chest first on
the dancefloor." Among these guests was Blomquist, whom he saw
fall while "running or . . . slipp[ing] or . . . try[ing] to slide
and [going] . . . sideways." Rosa was able to single Blomquist
out among the crowd of guests on the dancefloor with certainty
because she was, according to him, "bigger than all the other
girls."
Together, the video and Rosa's testimony provided
13The video also shows a guest further wetting the dancefloor by
spraying what appears to be champagne into the air.
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sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the
proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries was not the Hotel's breach
of its duty of care towards her, but rather Blomquist's deliberate
attempt to slip and slide on the wet dancefloor like the other
guests. See Soc. de Gananciales v. Jerónimo Corp., 3 P.R. Offic.
Trans. 179, 186 (1974) (holding that, under Puerto Rico law,
proximate cause is not "every condition [without] which the result
would not have been produced," but rather only that condition
"which ordinarily produces [the result] according to general
experience."). In other words, sufficient evidence was presented
for the jury to conclude that Blomquist's fall was not the result
of an accident attributable to the Hotel's failure to warn her of
the dangerous condition in the dancefloor because, based on common
experience, she would have decided to partake in the slipping and
sliding that caused her injuries regardless. See Aquellos
Aseguradores de Lloyd's London v. Compañía de Desarrollo Comercial
de P.R., 126 D.P.R. 251, 264 (1990), 1990 WL 710138 (noting that
there are situations in which "one cause substitutes [and] takes
[the] place" of a prior natural cause14 of an injury, thereby
14 Puerto Rico law distinguishes natural cause from legal or
proximate cause. Natural cause is an expansive concept, covering
"any of the conditions necessary to produce an injury," while legal
or proximate cause is only "the condition that ordinarily causes
the damage, according to common experience." Jiménez v. Pelegrina
Espinet, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 881, 887 (1982).
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"break[ing] the causal nexus . . . [and] becoming . . . the only
legal cause of the resulting damage, thus releasing the first actor
from liability" (citation omitted)); see also Crespo v. H.R.
Psychiatric Hosp., Inc., 14 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1027, 1034 (1983)
(in the context of wrongful death claim, recognizing the difficulty
in preventing a determined individual from performing a self-
injurious act). After all, the jury had already been presented
evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Hotel's warnings; even after
being warned by Thouvenin about the risks of slipping and sliding
on the dancefloor, the groom continued engaging in this dangerous
behavior.
Because the evidence presented at trial could lead a
reasonable jury to conclude that the Hotel's failure to meet its
duty of care was not the proximate cause of Blomquist's injuries,
we affirm the district court's denial of Appellants' motion for
judgment as a matter of law.
B. Appellants' Motion for a New Trial
We review the district court's denial of Appellants'
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Jennings II, 587
F.3d at 435-36 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 435 (1996)). A district court may grant a new trial "if
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence" or if "the
action is required in order to prevent injustice." Id. at 436
-19-
(quoting Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co., 863 F.2d 177, 181 (1st
Cir. 1988)). "On appeal, we owe much deference to the trial
court's determination. . . . We reverse only if we find that the
trial court has abused its discretion in making its assessment of
the weight of the evidence." Correia v. Feeney, 620 F.3d 9, 11
(1st Cir. 2010).
Unlike our review of a district court's decision
regarding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, however, our
"new trial motion standard of review . . . [does] not requir[e]
that we take the evidence in favor of the verdict." Jennings II,
587 F.3d at 438 (citations omitted).15 Notwithstanding, when it
comes to witness credibility our standard tilts in favor of
deferring to the jury's verdict. See Correia, 620 F.3d at 12 ("It
is axiomatic that, absent exceptional circumstances, issues of
witness credibility are to be decided by the jury." (quoting United
States v. García, 978 F.2d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1992))). "In
general, conflicting testimony or a question as to the credibility
of a witness are not sufficient grounds for granting a new trial."
15 This court recently expressed that the standard of review for
the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which is
deferential to the jury's verdict, may be applied "in reviewing
the denial of a motion for a new trial . . . predicated on a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, [given that] the
inquiries merge." Dimanche v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 893 F.3d
1, 8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018). In the present case, the result would
be the same under either the deferential or traditional standard.
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García, 978 F.2d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellants aver that the district court abused its
discretion by not considering their arguments challenging Rosa's
testimony that he saw Blomquist dancing and then falling while
attempting to slip and slide on the dancefloor. They stress two
points: first, that Rosa testified that Blomquist was wearing a
black bathing suit when she fell, while stipulated photo evidence
reflects that she was actually wearing a black dress over a pink
bathing suit; and, second, that the testimony was directly
contradicted by Blomquist's testimony that she did not slip and
slide on the dancefloor, and was unaware it was slippery.
The nature of this challenge sets it up to fail. We
have held that "conflicting testimony or a question as to the
credibility of a witness are [generally] not sufficient grounds
for granting a new trial." García, 978 F.2d at 748 (citation
omitted). This is precisely the type of challenge Appellants
raise. They argue that we should strip Rosa's testimony of
credibility, accept Blomquist's version of the events, and
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that the jury's verdict was not "against the weight of
the evidence." Jennings II, 587 F.3d at 436. We are not persuaded.
The jury was presented with Blomquist's testimony,
claiming that her fall was accidental, and Rosa's testimony, which
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strongly suggested that Blomquist's fall was the result of an
unsuccessful attempt to slip and slide on the dancefloor. No other
witnesses testified about the specific circumstances of
Blomquist's fall. Thus, the jury had to decide whether to accept
Blomquist's account of how she fell or Rosa's. That they chose to
accept Rosa's, despite the inconsistencies in his testimony
regarding Blomquist's attire, is not grounds for a new trial.
García, 978 F.2d at 748.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the weight of the evidence supports the
jury's verdict, and therefore affirm the denial of Appellants'
motion for a new trial.16
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's
denial of Appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and
motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.
16Inasmuch as Appellants attempt to raise an argument based on the
doctrine of comparative negligence under Puerto Rico law, they did
not properly flesh it out on appeal and therefore we deem it
waived. See U.S. v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
-22-