DocketNumber: 19-1899
Filed Date: 6/21/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-2088 HARRY D. BARNETT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER, NH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge] Before Stahl, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lynch, Circuit Judge. Harry D. Barnett on brief pro se. June 17, 1999 Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Harry D. Barnett, a New Hampshire state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se, appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). For the following reasons, we vacate, in part, but otherwise affirm. In his complaint, Barnett asserts claims against various prison officials based on alleged cessation of a kosher diet, improper handling of attorney mail (including an allegation that prison officials delayed delivery and read privileged mail), and denial of meals. Barnett subsequently sought leave to amend his complaint. The proposed amended complaint sought to correct various omissions, to supplement the improper-handling-of-mail claim with two new alleged instances that had occurred since the filing of the complaint (this time, alleged improper handling of court mail, rather than attorney mail), and to add a totally new claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. A magistrate judge ("magistrate") recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The magistrate subsequently denied the motion to amend for failure to comply with Loc. R. 15.1(a) which requires litigants, in motions to amend, to identify all that is new and explain why it was not included in the prior filing. The district judge, after review of Barnett's objections to the magistrate's report, adopted the magistrate's recommendation of dismissal. Barnett argues that the magistrate judge applied an overly stringent standard in evaluating his complaint, and that, in any event, he should have been permitted to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies. The circuits are divided over whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") eliminates discretion to permit amendment to avoid dismissal. Compare McGore v. Wrigglesworth,114 F.3d 601
, 612 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Under the Prison Litigation Act, courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal.") with Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank,171 F.3d 794
, 796 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Although the language of 1915 is mandatory, stating that 'the court shall dismiss the case' in the enumerated circumstances, we conclude that a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis should be afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid plaintiff to amend his complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . "). Given our disposition of the case, we need not reach the question whether the denial of leave to amend was required by the PLRA or was otherwise justified as an exercise of authority under Loc. R. 15.1. In particular, we conclude that the original complaint states a free exercise claim. Cf. Ward v. Walsh,1 F.3d 873
, 877 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that inmates have the right to be provided with food that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion). The magistrate recommended dismissal of this claim because Barnett failed to identify the religion he practices or allege that consumption of a kosher diet is a tenet of his religion. Contrary to the position taken by the magistrate, we think that the missing allegation can be fairly inferred from facts Barnett does allege. Barnett alleged that he was required to, and did get, the approval of the chaplain to receive a kosher diet. A natural inference is that the chaplain determined that Barnett has a religious need for a kosher diet. By contrast, we conclude that Barnett's improper- handling-of-mail claim fails, and that it does so even if one takes into account allegations in filings subsequent to the complaint. Cf. Purvis v. Ponte,929 F.2d 822
(1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal where magistrate's report alerted plaintiff to complaint's deficiencies, and plaintiff's subsequently-tendered filings were not curative). Because the mail at issue was addressed to Barnett as president of a corporation and the state defines "contraband" to include correspondence relating to the operation of a business, prison officials could permissibly open the envelope and inspect its contents, notwithstanding the fact that the letter was from an attorney. See Taylor v. Sterrett,532 F.2d 462
, 475 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that privileged mail may be searched and seized if there is "probable cause"). In addition, the delay in delivery was justified given the address on the envelope, Barnett's refusal to give permission to a search, and the resulting need to involve other persons in the decision how to handle the letter. Cf. Lewis v. Casey,518 U.S. 343
, 361-62 (1996) (delays that are the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests are not of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury); Owen v. Shuler,466 F. Supp. 5
, 7 (N.D. Ind. 1977) ("So long as a delay in mail delivery is not unreasonable, it does not reach constitutional dimensions."), aff'd,594 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1979). We similarly conclude that Barnett's claim as to missed meals fails even if one takes into account allegations in documents subsequent to the complaint. Barnett alleged that he was denied a meal on five occasions. We agree with the magistrate that these allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Barnett made no allegation that any of the meals he missed were in succession, and, as the magistrate pointed out, occasionally missing a meal is entirely consistent with the realities of modern life. We add that Barnett has alleged no specific facts which would support an inference that he was being "harassed" for requesting kosher meals. Cf. Judge v. City of Lowell,160 F.3d 67
(1st Cir. 1998) (refusing to accept purely conclusory pleading on the element of discriminatory intent). As for Barnett's allegations of improper handling of court mail and his allegations under the ADA, these claims were raised for the first time in the proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, they have not been addressed by the district court. In light of our decision to remand, we think it appropriate that Barnett be permitted to file a renewed motion to amend seeking leave to add these particular allegations. We express no opinion as to whether these allegations state a claim. Affirmed, in part, and vacated, in part.