Garcia-Catalan v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1907
ITZEL GARCÍA-CATALÁN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Rubén T. Nigaglioni and Nigaglioni Law Offices P.S.C. on brief
for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
November 4, 2013
SELYA, Circuit Judge. In a pair of watershed cases —
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) — the Supreme Court
retreated from the historic pleading standard that it had
previously established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48
(1957), and replaced that standard with a standard centered on
plausibility. This plausibility standard has become the "new
normal" in federal civil practice. A.G. v. Elsevier, Inc., ___
F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2013) [No. 12-1559, slip op. at 2].
The district courts, through no fault of their own, have
struggled with the implementation of the new standard. As with
many changes in preexisting practice, the devil is in the details.
This case illustrates the point. In it, the district
court, in a well-intentioned effort to walk the new line, applied
the plausibility standard too mechanically. As a result, it
improvidently dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. We reverse.
In her complaint, plaintiff-appellant Itzel García-
Catalán alleges that on June 24, 2009 she visited the commissary at
Fort Buchanan in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. While strolling through
one of the aisles, she "slipped and fell on liquid then existing
there," sustaining serious injuries. No sign warned that the floor
was wet.
The appellant duly filed an administrative claim with the
United States. After the statutory period for disposition of her
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claim expired without a decision, see 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the
appellant repaired to the federal district court and sued the
United States for the negligence of its employees at the
commissary. She premised her action on the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
"The FTCA is a limited waiver of the federal government's
sovereign immunity" with respect to tortious conduct of federal
employees. Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 690 (1st Cir.
1999). "The 'law of the place' [where the alleged tort occurred]
provides the substantive rules to be used in deciding FTCA
actions." Bolduc v. United States, 402 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2005)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Here, the substantive law of
Puerto Rico controls.
In due course, the government moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Puerto Rico law, a
business invitee must prove that the owner or occupier of premises
had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition in
order to recover for injuries caused by that condition. See
Nieves-Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 379 (1st Cir. 2013)
(construing Puerto Rico law); Mas v. United States, 984 F.2d 527,
1
The government also sought dismissal of the complaint for
insufficiency of service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
The district court denied this motion, allowing the appellant to
cure this defect. The government has not challenged this ruling
and we do not address the issue.
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530 (1st Cir. 1993) (same). Here, the government argued that the
appellant had failed to allege that federal employees had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that allegedly
existed at the commissary.
The district court referred the motion to a magistrate
judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The magistrate judge
recommended that the motion be denied. The government did not
object to this recommendation.
Some three months later, the district court revisited the
magistrate judge's recommendation on its own initiative. The court
disagreed with the recommendation, granted the motion, and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. See García-Catalán v.
United States, No. 11-1192, 2012 WL 639250, at *8 (D.P.R. Feb. 8,
2012). Following the district court's rejection of her motion for
reconsideration, the appellant prosecuted this timely appeal. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim. See Santiago v. Puerto
Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011); SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d
436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc). "In conducting this review, we
accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." Grajales v. P.R.
Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012).
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To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At the pleading stage, the
plaintiff need not demonstrate that she is likely to prevail, but
her claim must suggest "more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In fine,
the claim must be "plausible on its face." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The plausibility inquiry necessitates a two-step pavane.
See Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.
2013). First, the court must distinguish "the complaint's factual
allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory
legal allegations (which need not be credited)." Morales-Cruz v.
Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, the
court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient
to support "the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39,
46 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a complaint crosses the
plausibility threshold, "the reviewing court [must] draw on its
judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
This context-specific inquiry does not demand "a high degree of
factual specificity." Grajales, 682 F.3d at 47. Even so, the
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complaint "must contain more than a rote recital of the elements of
a cause of action." Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 53.
We emphasize that the complaint must be read as a whole.
See Elsevier, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at 11]. As we have
explained, "[t]here need not be a one-to-one relationship between
any single allegation and a necessary element of the cause of
action." Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 55. "For pleading purposes,
circumstantial evidence often suffices to clarify a protean issue."
Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the case at hand, the complaint averred that there was
a dangerous condition at the Fort Buchanan commissary; described
that condition and attributed it to the government's negligence;
and linked the condition to the appellant's ensuing injuries. Read
holistically, we think that these allegations are sufficient to
withstand the government's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Common
sense suggests that the existence of a dangerous condition, not
hidden from view, in a public area controlled by the defendant,
supports a plausible inference that the defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge of the condition.
We do not quarrel with the district court's erudite
statement of the substantive law of premises liability. See
García-Catalán, 2012 WL 639250, at *5-6. Here, however, the court
applied the new pleading standard too mechanically to the case
before it. Viewing the complaint holistically, we conclude that
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the appellant has pleaded sufficient facts to "provide fair notice
to the defendant[] and state a facially plausible legal claim."
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
The circumstances in the complaint create a reasonable expectation
that discovery may yield evidence of the government's allegedly
tortious conduct. No more is exigible. See id. at 17.
Our decision in Mas, much bruited by the government, is
not to the contrary. There, we affirmed the district court's entry
of judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove
at trial that the defendant had knowledge of the dangerous
condition that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries. See Mas,
984 F.2d at 528, 530. But Mas is a horse of a different hue. That
case dealt with the insufficiency of proof at trial, not with any
deficiency in the pleadings; and it is manifestly improper to
import trial-stage evidentiary burdens into the pleading standard.
See, e.g., Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 53-54.
So, too, our decision in Nieves-Romero does not assist
the government's cause. There, we affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant in a premises liability case on the
ground that the plaintiff had adduced no competent proof of the
defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly
dangerous condition. See 715 F.3d at 379-80. But summary
judgment, like a trial, hinges on the presence or absence of
evidence, not on the adequacy of the pleadings. In light of this
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important distinction, the standards for granting summary judgment
are considerably different from the standards for granting a motion
to dismiss. See, e.g., Vélez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d
145, 151 (1st Cir. 2006) (observing that "plaintiffs bear a heavier
burden at the summary judgment stage" than at the pleading stage).
It follows that the holding in Nieves-Romero has no real bearing on
the question that confronts us.
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — two
additional considerations support the conclusion that this
litigation should go forward.
For one thing, the appellant's complaint is plainly
modeled on Form 11 of the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 The complaint disclosed the date, time, and place of
the alleged tort, and it delineated both the nature of the
dangerous condition at the commissary and the resulting injuries to
the appellant. At least two courts of appeals have concluded that
2
The text of Form 11 reads in relevant part:
1. (Statement of Jurisdiction — See Form 7.)
2. On date, at place, the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the
plaintiff.
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically
injured, lost wages or income, suffered
physical and mental pain, and incurred medical
expenses of $____.
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the
defendant for $____, plus costs.
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the standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal does not undermine the
viability of the federal forms as long as there are sufficient
facts alleged in the complaint to make the claim plausible. See
K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277,
1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th
Cir. 2010).
We share this view. It pays due homage to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 84, which declares that "[t]he forms in the
Appendix suffice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 84. Honoring Rule 84 is, in
turn, consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that the
Civil Rules may not be amended by "judicial interpretation."
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
For another thing, "some latitude may be appropriate" in
applying the plausibility standard in certain types of cases.
Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Generally speaking, these are
cases in which a material part of the information needed is likely
to be within the defendant's control. See id. This is such a
case: it cannot reasonably be expected that the appellant, without
the benefit of discovery, would have any information about either
how long the liquid was on the floor or whether any employees of
the commissary were aware of the spill. Cf. Grajales, 682 F.3d at
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49 (noting that "'[s]moking gun' proof of discrimination is rarely
available . . . at the pleading stage").
We add, moreover, that the plausibility inquiry properly
takes into account whether discovery can reasonably be expected to
fill any holes in the pleader's case. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556
(requiring, as a hallmark of plausibility, that a complaint contain
"enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence"). Given what the appellant has set forth in
her complaint, it is reasonable to expect that "modest discovery
may provide the missing link" that will allow the appellant to go
to trial on her claim. Menard, 698 F.3d at 45.
We need go no further.3 For the reasons elucidated
above, we hold that the appellant's complaint contains sufficient
factual content to support a plausible claim for negligence against
the United States. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
3
In view of our determination that the complaint is
sufficient as it stands, we need not address the appellant's
contention that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow the appellant an opportunity either to amend or
supplement her pleadings.
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