D'Angelo v. New Hampshire Supreme Court

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1059
STEPHEN L. D'ANGELO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT,
BRIAN GERMAINE, ESQ.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Ripple,* and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Stephen L. D'Angelo, pro se.
Nancy J. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Bureau, with whom Joseph A. Foster, Attorney General, was on brief
for appellee New Hampshire Supreme Court.
William C. Saturley, with whom Nathan R. Fennessy and Preti,
Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, were on brief for appellee Brian
Germaine, Esq.
January 29, 2014
*
Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen L.
D'Angelo ("D'Angelo"), a licensed attorney appearing pro se,
appeals an order from the District Court of New Hampshire
dismissing, for failure to state a claim, his complaint against the
Defendant-Appellee New Hampshire Supreme Court ("NHSC") and
Defendant-Appellee Brian Germaine ("Germaine"), a court appointed
Commissioner in the underlying alimony and child support litigation
between D'Angelo and his former spouse.
After several years of cantankerous litigation, the New
Hampshire District Court, 10th Circuit, Family Division ("Derry
Family Court") found D'Angelo in contempt for failure to pay past-
due child support obligations, entered judgment in his ex-wife's
favor in excess of $110,000, and modified D'Angelo's child support
obligations going forward. D'Angelo subsequently sought
discretionary appeal from the NHSC, which was denied. D'Angelo
then filed suit with the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Hampshire, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Derry Family
Court's orders on constitutional grounds. The District Court
denied D'Angelo relief, and dismissed his complaint for failure to
state a claim. D'Angelo now appeals.
I. Background
This matter began in Derry Family Court in 2006 and
involved a lengthy battle relating to D'Angelo's support
obligations to his former wife and his son. The dispute spanned
-2-
several hearings and court orders, largely related to D'Angelo's
finances. The court observed throughout the process that D'Angelo
had "selectively exclud[ed] relevant financial information" from
the proceedings, and found D'Angelo in contempt of court "on
multiple occasions."1
In light of D'Angelo's financial evasiveness, the court
appointed attorney Brian Germaine as Commissioner in September
2011, and tasked him with investigating and reporting to the Derry
Family Court D'Angelo's gross income from 2006 forward. Germaine
presented his report in May of 2012. Unsurprisingly, it found that
D'Angelo's income was significantly higher than what he had
previously represented to the court. Thereafter, the Derry Family
Court found Germaine's report to be well-supported and credible,
adopted the report as to D'Angelo's income from 2006 onward, and
held D'Angelo in contempt for failure to pay past-due child support
obligations. Judgment was entered in favor of his ex-wife for more
than $110,000, and D'Angelo's child support obligations were
modified prospectively.
D'Angelo filed a Notice of Discretionary Appeal before
the NHSC, but that court declined to hear his appeal. Undeterred,
D'Angelo filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court on
1
Specifically, D'Angelo represented his gross income as low as
$29,500 and as high as $93,387, despite the court's observance that
he traveled extensively, owned two Porsches and at least one Lexus
automobile, purchased a $190,000 yacht and had various expenditures
far exceeding the reported figures.
-3-
October 25, 2012 seeking to enjoin both orders of the Derry Family
Court, and to reverse the denial of his discretionary appeal by the
NHSC. D'Angelo argued that New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 3
("Rule 3"), which classifies appeals from child support orders as
"discretionary," runs contrary to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. He sought enjoinment
of the state court orders, as well as monetary damages from the
NHSC for failure to supervise the Derry Family Court. D'Angelo
also asserted various claims against Germaine, alleging that
Germaine failed to cooperate with D'Angelo in his investigation,
that his appointment violated ethical rules by reason of an alleged
conflict of interest, and lastly, that Germaine misrepresented
facts to the court in his report.
The district court dismissed all of D'Angelo's claims.
As to D'Angelo's challenge to Rule 3, the court found that Due
Process does not contemplate a constitutional right to an appeal
and thus found no violation in that respect. Likewise, the
district court found that Rule 3 draws no arbitrary distinction
between classes or categories of litigants and accordingly does not
run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
As to Germaine, the district court concluded that he was a court
appointed official charged with performing quasi-judicial duties,
-4-
and thus D'Angelo's claims were barred by the absolute provisions
of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.2
D'Angelo appeals from the district court's judgment
dismissing all of his claims. Specifically, D'Angelo reiterates
his Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to Rule 3, and his
claim that Germaine is not entitled to immunity.3
II. Discussion
A. Constitutionality of Rule 3
D'Angelo reiterates the same constitutional challenges to
Rule 3 that he made before the district court. Namely, he makes a
two-pronged attack: one under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, the other under the Equal Protection Clause.
Rule 3 defines a "mandatory appeal" as an "appeal filed
by the State . . . or an appeal from a final decision on the merits
issued by a superior court, district court, probate court, or
family division court." N.H. Sup. Ct. R. Rule 3 (Definitions).
Rule 3 then lists nine appeals that are not mandatory, among which
2
At the district level, D'Angelo also sought to enjoin
enforcement of the Derry Family Court's orders. However, the
district court correctly concluded it had no jurisdiction to review
the state court's judgment. See Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 59
(1st Cir. 2009)("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal
jurisdiction over a challenge to a state court judgment to which
the challenger was a party.")(citations omitted). D'Angelo offers
no retort on appeal. Therefore, the district court's judgment on
this issue is final and unimpeachable.
3
At oral argument, D'Angelo voluntarily and explicitly waived the
remainder of his theories on appeal.
-5-
is listed: "[A]ppeal[s] from a final decision on the merits issued
in, or arising out of, a domestic relations matter . . . ." Id. at
3(9).
First, D'Angelo claims that the exclusion of domestic
relations matters from the general rule of cases entitled to
mandatory appeal before the NHSC, violates the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution. The sole purpose for this purportedly
arbitrary distinction is, according to D'Angelo, to reduce the
number of appeals stemming from New Hampshire Family Courts.
According to D'Angelo, this amounts to an unconstitutional
impediment to his right of access to the courts.
Although there is undisputedly a well-established
fundamental right of access to the courts, Rogan v. City of Boston,
267 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2001)(citations omitted), it is equally
well-established that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
states to afford litigants a right to appellate review, Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972)(citations omitted).
Thus, D'Angelo's argument on this front is dead on
arrival, particularly since he has had ample opportunity to
ventilate any and all arguments he could have creatively conjured
throughout the several years of divorce and child support
litigation in the Derry Family Court. That he chose an obstinate
and wholly uncooperative approach before that court, which
ultimately resulted in an unfavorable judgment against him, is an
-6-
outcome entirely of his own making that we cannot, and will not,
disturb.
D'Angelo's second argument, that Rule 3 violates Equal
Protection, is equally beyond the pale. He again contends that
Rule 3 impermissibly distinguishes between persons litigating
matters in family courts by deeming their appeals discretionary, as
opposed to litigants of other civil matters whose appeals are
mandatory. The result, according to D'Angelo, is a class of
persons whose access to New Hampshire courts is hampered in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Although Equal Protection commands that access to the
courts cannot be "capriciously or arbitrarily" denied to a class of
litigants, id., this constitutional right does not require courts
to provide all litigants "absolute equality or precisely equal
advantages," San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 24 (1973). And where there are no suspect classifications or
fundamental rights at play, such as in the present case, our Equal
Protection review is limited to a deferential, rational basis
standard. LCM Enters., Inc. v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675,
678-79 (1st Cir. 1994)(citations omitted). "Under rational basis
scrutiny, a classification will withstand a constitutional
challenge as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest and is neither arbitrary, unreasonable nor irrational."
Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
-7-
D'Angelo's facial challenge to Rule 34 fails. First, on
its face, Rule 3 does not create classes of litigants, but only
distinguishes among classes of cases arising out of different types
of civil proceedings. D'Angelo's position is thus identical to any
other litigant seeking appellate review in those classes of cases,
namely, most domestic relations cases, in the State of New
Hampshire. Secondly, that the NHSC seeks to alleviate a heavy
domestic relations appellate docket by adopting a procedural rule
that allows it discretion in accepting or rejecting a certain class
of cases is patently valid. The proper, speedy, and efficient
operation of the state's highest court is certainly a legitimate
and valid state interest to be encouraged, not impeded. The State
of New Hampshire has allowed the NHSC to exercise its inherent
power over its docket, and to craft Rule 3 in order to achieve that
end. We thus find Rule 3, on its face, to be rationally related to
the achievement of a legitimate state interest. See id. at 678-79.
4
In his appellate brief, in the initial description of his Equal
Protection argument, D'Angelo explicitly states his theory as
"[w]hether New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 3 on its face violates
the Equal Protection Clause . . . ." We thus address a facial
challenge only. Out of an abundance of caution, we note that
elsewhere in his appellate brief he mentions in passing that Rule
3, as applied, is constitutionally problematic. However, he does
so only in general terms, providing us with no indication of Rule
3's faults as applied to his particular case. Therefore, even if
the argument was purportedly attempted, we need not address an as
applied challenge to Rule 3. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,
17 (1st Cir. 1990).
-8-
This conclusion pretty well sums up this appeal.
Appellant nevertheless brings two cases to our attention which he
claims counsel us to rule in his favor. D'Angelo relies on Hawes
v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1976), and
Aggarwal v. Ponce Sch. of Med., 745 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1984), in
support of his constitutional contentions against Rule 3. They
are, however, inapposite to his position. Both Hawes and Aggarwal
involved challenges to a Local Rule of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico ("Rule 5"). In general, Rule 5
required plaintiffs not domiciled in Puerto Rico to post security
for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees at the commencement of a
suit in the district court. The rule made no such requirement of
residents of Puerto Rico.
The court in Hawes upheld the constitutionality of Rule
5 against the plaintiff's facial challenge and found that, on its
face, the rule surpassed the rational basis test. Hawes, 535 F.2d
at 145 (finding that Rule 5's distinction of residents versus
nonresidents, and Rule 5 on its face, are not constitutionally
invalid). Though it left the door open for an as applied challenge
to Rule 5, id., Hawes is of no help to D'Angelo and his reliance on
it is puzzling. In addition to the fact that Hawes left the local
rule unscathed, Rule 5 was found to be a procedurally permissible
requirement for access to a federal trial court. D'Angelo attempts
-9-
to have us entertain arguments based on access to state appellate
review, a right non-existent under our Constitution.
Aggarwal involved a similar challenge, in that case
involving an indigent plaintiff alleging the unconstitutionality of
Rule 5 as applied to him. Although the plaintiff in Aggarwal fared
better than Hawes, a reading of the opinion clearly establishes
that the reason for his success turned on our finding that the
district court abused its discretion when it set a bond that was
onerous in amount without taking into account, or probing,
Aggarwal's repeated allegations of destitution. Aggarwal, 745 F.2d
at 728-29. We explicitly abstained from undertaking a
constitutional analysis of Rule 5. Id. at 726. For the same
reasons as Hawes, and because D'Angelo does not marshal an as
applied challenge to Rule 3, we find Aggarwal entirely inapplicable
to the case before us.
Quite simply, there are no Due Process or Equal
Protection issues before us in this case. We turn now to
D'Angelo's quarrel with Germaine.
B. Germaine and quasi-judicial immunity
D'Angelo seeks to contest the district court's finding
that Germaine is immune to suit for his acts as Commissioner
appointed by the Derry Family Court to investigate and produce a
report on D'Angelo's financial condition. Though slightly more
developed in his appellate brief, at oral argument D'Angelo
-10-
whittled down his claim to whether Germaine is indeed entitled to
immunity if he "failed to do his job." Specifically, D'Angelo
claims Germaine failed to follow what he purports were the Derry
Family Court's orders to Germaine to meet with D'Angelo in the
process of carrying out his investigation of the latter's finances.
As a threshold matter, we note that the order D'Angelo
alleges Germaine violated, as quoted in his own appellate brief,
was handed down by the Derry Family Court after D'Angelo's
uncooperative and misleading approach to the litigation had been
well documented. D'Angelo apparently attempts to have us overlook
the fact that the order instructed him, and not Germaine, to pay a
retainer to the Commissioner and "cooperate with him." As far as
the record shows, Germaine carried out his investigation, and filed
the report as he was tasked to do by the Derry Family Court. And
in any event, D'Angelo's claims against Germaine, even if couched
in the most imaginative light, fail to pierce the veil of immunity.
"The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity provides
absolute immunity for those who perform tasks that are inextricably
intertwined with the judicial function." Nystedt v. Nigro, 700
F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). Court appointed
discovery masters and the like "plainly perform judicial functions"
and so long as they act in that capacity, they "share a judge's
immunity from suit." Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted). In fact,
even allegations of malice or bad faith do not defeat immunity.
-11-
Id. at 31-32 (citing Cok v. Consentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1989)).
The power of the New Hampshire courts to appoint special
officers such as Germaine is well established and cannot be
seriously disputed. See In re O'Neil, 159 N.H. 615, 623-24, 992
A.2d 673, 678-79 (2010). And though there are narrow exceptions to
the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, D'Angelo mentions none in
this case.
Even affording D'Angelo's argument the utmost generosity,
it amounts to little more than an assertion that Germaine did not
do his job properly. As the district court correctly concluded,
this is unquestionably the kind of claim that quasi-judicial
immunity prohibits. See Nystedt, 700 F.3d at 31 ("The fact that a
court-appointed discovery master performs a judicial function in an
imperfect (or even unethical) way does not, by itself, dissolve his
quasi-judicial immunity."). Accordingly, the district court's
dismissal of this claim stands on equal footing as D'Angelo's Due
Process and Equal Protection allegations, and thus, we need go no
further.
III. Conclusion
The district court's judgment is affirmed on all grounds.
Appellant is ordered to show cause within fourteen days as to why
the court should not assess double costs for needlessly consuming
the time of the court and opposing counsel. See In re Simply
-12-
Media, 566 F.3d 234, 236 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. App. P.
38; 1st Cir. R. 38.0.
Affirmed.
-13-