United States v. Jacques

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL JACQUES,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Brian J. Kelly, by appointment of the court, for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 11, 2014
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Following a seven-hour
interrogation in which he confessed participating in the arson of
an African-American church, Michael Jacques was convicted in
federal court of conspiracy against civil rights, damage to
religious real property, and the use of a fire to commit a felony.
On appeal, Jacques argues that the district court erred in
admitting his statements into evidence because agents obtained his
confession through coercive means and in violation of his right to
prompt presentment. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. Facts and Background
On the morning of November 5, 2008, hours after Barack
Obama was elected to be the next President of the United States,
the Macedonia Church of God in Christ in Springfield,
Massachusetts, burned to the ground. Still in the middle of
construction, the church was being built for a predominantly
African-American congregation. It was approximately 75% complete
at the time of the fire.
The National Response Team for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) concluded that the fire was
deliberately set and that gasoline had been used to ignite the
building. It subsequently convened a joint task force with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Springfield Police
Department, and the Massachusetts State Police (MSP) to investigate
the incident. When a civilian witness notified investigators of
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two men boasting about their involvement in the church arson, the
task force homed in its investigation on Benjamin Haskell and
Michael Jacques.
Soon after receiving the tip, law enforcement officials
arranged to have the civilian witness introduce Haskell to
undercover State Trooper Henot Rivera. Working under the name
"José," Trooper Rivera made three controlled purchases of narcotics
from Haskell, one of which turned out to be a fake bag of heroin.
"José" then told Haskell that he could compensate for the botched
drug deal by helping with a purported insurance scam --
specifically, by burning down a house in Springfield and an
abandoned property in Holyoke, Massachusetts. On January 14, 2009,
while driving to Holyoke to survey the alleged arson site, "José"
encouraged Haskell to describe his credentials as an arsonist. In
a recorded conversation, Haskell confided to Trooper Rivera that he
and Jacques had committed the church arson in November. Armed with
these statements, law enforcement officials intervened and
transported Haskell to a police interview room, where he confessed
to committing the church arson with the help of Jacques and two
other individuals. Haskell agreed to cooperate in the continued
investigation of the church fire.
The following evening, January 15, 2009, the task force
coordinated a meeting between Haskell, Jacques, and Trooper Rivera,
in which "José" invited Jacques to join the insurance scam. Both
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in the presence of Trooper Rivera and during a private conversation
with Haskell, Jacques made incriminating statements concerning his
involvement in the church arson. Jacques's statements were caught
on tape by the task force, which then detained Jacques and
transported him to an interview room for questioning.
Jacques arrived at the MSP's offices in Springfield and
was escorted by agents from the vehicle at 7:16 p.m. His
questioning commenced at approximately 7:20 p.m., when he knowingly
waived his Miranda rights. Jacques's interrogation lasted
approximately six hours and thirty minutes and was videotaped in
its entirety.
The interrogation was conducted primarily by State
Trooper Michael Mazza, although FBI Special Agent Ian Smythe was
present during the first hours and again toward the end of the
questioning. Over the course of the interview, Mazza and Smythe
employed various interrogation tactics from the "Reid technique."1
They exaggerated the strength of the evidence against Jacques,
misrepresented the involvement of high-profile federal agents in
the case, minimized the magnitude of Jacques's alleged criminal
conduct, interrupted Jacques's attempts to deny his guilt, and
suggested that Jacques's continued resistance would subject him to
more damning media coverage. Repeatedly, the agents informed
1
The "Reid technique" is a method of interrogation pioneered by
John E. Reid and Associates, aimed at extracting confessions and
evaluating suspect credibility.
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Jacques that an honest confession might lead to softer treatment by
the prosecutor and the sentencing judge, while a failure to
cooperate was likely to result in the maximum sentence. They also
remarked on the failing health of Jacques's elderly father,
suggesting that continued resistance might deprive Jacques of
crucial years with his family.
Throughout the interview, Jacques was permitted to take
bathroom, water, and cigarette breaks upon request. Having
previously faced charges on several criminal matters, Jacques was
also aware of his right to ask for the interrogation to cease,
although at no point did he do so. He did, however, continue to
deny his involvement in the fire throughout the interrogation,
claiming that his incriminating statements to the undercover
trooper were merely an attempt to make himself "look bigger."
At 1:17 a.m., just under six hours from the time
Jacques's interrogation began and just over six hours from the time
he was taken into custody, Mazza asked Jacques to "sign something
for [him] real quick" and handed Jacques a waiver of his right to
prompt presentment. Mazza read the document aloud and explained
the requirement that a defendant must be arraigned within six hours
of detention. When Jacques asked Mazza to clarify precisely what
he was signing, Mazza replied that the document meant that "you
don't want the questioning to stop and be brought to court or
anything like that, that you're willing to still talk to me."
-5-
Jacques signed the document at roughly 1:20 a.m. Approximately
half an hour later, Jacques took another cigarette break. When he
returned to the interrogation room at around 1:45 a.m., Jacques
admitted his involvement in the church arson. Jacques explained
that he chose to confess because Mazza had "proved" the charges and
"w[as] honest to me."
Jacques was arraigned later that morning. He was
ultimately charged with conspiracy against civil rights in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, damage or destruction to religious
real property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 247(c), and use of a
fire to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1).
Following his arraignment, Jacques moved to suppress the
incriminating statements made in his confession. Jacques argued
that the confession was involuntary because the agents' coercive
tactics had overborne his will and that his waiver of his right of
presentment was neither timely nor knowing under federal law. The
district court took in abundant briefing and numerous days of
testimony, during which Jacques testified, among other things, that
he understood the nature of his right to presentment and waived
that right to "have a chance to continue explaining" his innocence,
"rather than going into court right away and being charged with a
crime." The district court ultimately denied the motion to
suppress. On April 14, 2011, Jacques was convicted by a jury of
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all three charges. On May 9, 2011, the district court issued a
memorandum explaining its ruling on Jacques's motion to suppress.
Jacques now appeals to this court.
II. Discussion
In considering a challenge to a district court's denial
of a motion to suppress, we review the court's legal conclusions de
novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v.
Mejía, 600 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2010). The voluntariness of a
defendant's confession is a question of law meriting de novo
review. United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 438 (1st Cir.
2011).
A. Coercive Interrogation
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
prohibits courts from admitting into evidence a defendant's
involuntary confession. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
433 (2000). In assessing whether a confession is voluntary, courts
must inquire "whether the will of the defendant had been overborne
so that the statement was not his free and voluntary act." Bryant
v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367-68 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Procunier v.
Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453 (1971)). We determine the voluntary
nature of the statements by considering "the totality of the
circumstances, including both the nature of the police activity and
the defendant's situation." Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438. Relevant
considerations include the length and nature of the questioning,
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promises or threats made by investigators, and any deprivation of
the suspect's essential needs. Id. They also include the
defendant's personal circumstances, including his age, education,
intelligence, and mental condition, id., as well as his prior
experience with the criminal justice system, see United States v.
Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.
Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006). A defendant's calm
demeanor and the lucidity of his statements weigh in favor of
finding his confession voluntary. Rojas-Tapia, 446 F.3d at 8.
Numerous facts in the record indicate that Jacques
provided his confession knowingly and voluntarily. A defendant in
multiple criminal matters in the past, Jacques was experienced with
the justice system. Throughout the interrogation and his
subsequent confession, Jacques remained calm and provided a level-
headed account of his involvement in the arson. His decision to
confess was not a sudden or immediate response to any of the
agents' questions or threats, indicating the agents' coercive
impact, but rather came after a cigarette break during which
Jacques was relieved of all interrogation. Perhaps most
importantly, Jacques himself explained his decision to confess
based on his belief that Mazza had "proved" the allegations and had
been "honest" with him.
In the face of this evidence, Jacques claims that Mazza
and Smythe's coercive interrogation techniques overbore his will in
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violation of the Fifth Amendment. We find that none of the
allegedly coercive tactics identified by Jacques, either
individually or together, suffice to show that Jacques's confession
was involuntary.
1. Threats of Retaliation
It is well settled in the First Circuit that an officer
does not impermissibly overbear a defendant's will by promising to
bring the defendant's cooperation to the prosecutor's attention or
by suggesting that cooperation may lead to more favorable
treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170,
179 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Jackson, 608 F.3d at 103. While the
rules governing an agent's threats of harsher punishment in
exchange for a defendant's failure to cooperate is less settled,
this court has held that threats of retaliation are just one factor
relevant to evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. United
States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 242 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Congress and
the courts have indicated that to determine voluntariness it is
necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances, including
any promises or threats made by police officers or the prosecution,
in order to see whether the will of the accused was overborne.");
see also United States v. Martin-Ramírez, No. CR-08-220-E, 2009 WL
928103, at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 2, 2009) ("[I]f a defendant has had no
previous experience with criminal law coupled with facts that she
was threatened with adverse consequences for lack of cooperation
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and had no friend or advisor during the time of confession, are
factors that should be considered in determining whether a
defendant's confession was voluntary."). Accordingly, federal
courts considering the totality of the evidence have repeatedly
found that an interrogator's threats of a harsher prison sentence
if a defendant failed to cooperate did not suffice to overbear the
defendant's will. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 214 F.
App'x 678, 680 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that, "[i]n the absence of
other coercive pressures," an agent's statements that "he would
advise the prosecutor if William cooperated or if he refused to
cooperate" "do not entail the conclusion that William's statements
were involuntary"); United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1379
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding a confession voluntary where agents
offered "threats of a long prison sentence if [the defendant]
failed to cooperate," but no evidence showed that defendant was
"especially susceptible to police pressure").
Jacques points to a series of Ninth Circuit cases
suggesting that an agent's threats of retaliation automatically
render an ensuing confession involuntary. See United States v.
Casillas, 538 F. App'x 751, 751-52 (9th Cir. 2013) ("We have
repeatedly found that a threat of harsher treatment renders any
subsequent confession involuntary."); United States v. Harrison, 34
F.3d 886, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]here are no circumstances in
which law enforcement officers may suggest that a suspect's
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exercise of the right to remain silent may result in harsher
treatment by a court or prosecutor."); see also United States v.
Melnikas, 929 F. Supp. 276, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("Threatening to
inform the court or a prosecutor of a suspect's refusal to
cooperate in order to elicit such cooperation violates an
individual's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and is clearly
coercive."). This is not the prevailing rule in our circuit.
Furthermore, even the Ninth Circuit has more recently qualified
that its "disapprov[al] . . . of an interrogator's threats to tell
the prosecutor about a defendant's refusal to cooperate . . . does
not amount to a categorical rule." Jenkins, 214 F. App'x at 680
(citations omitted). In greater harmony with our own rule, the
Ninth Circuit's cases holding that an agent's threats of
retaliation violated the Fifth Amendment involved significant
additional indicia of coercion. See, e.g., Harrison, 34 F.3d at
892 (finding a defendant's confession involuntary where the
defendant "broke her silence only after the agent asked whether she
thought it preferable if the judge were informed that she had
cooperated or not cooperated," indicating a strong coercive
impact); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding a defendant's confession involuntary where the
agents threatened to communicate her lack of cooperation to the
prosecutor and warned that defendant would not see her two-year old
child "for a while").
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In this case, there is no evidence suggesting that Mazza
and Smythe's threats of a harsher sentence in exchange for
Jacques's refusal to cooperate had any meaningful impact on
Jacques's conduct during the interrogation. Unlike prior cases
where agents' threatening or manipulative statements inspired
demonstrable anxiety in the defendants, see, e.g., Tingle, 658 F.2d
at 1334, Mazza and Smythe repeated their threats numerous times
over the course of a six hour interrogation without any
identifiable effect on Jacques. Similarly, unlike previous
defendants who explicitly identified the threat of retaliation as
their reasons for confessing, see, e.g., Harrison, 34 F.3d at 892,
Jacques explained his decision to confess without reference to any
of the agents' alleged threats. While these threats are certainly
relevant to a determination of voluntariness, in light of the
entire record they fail to establish that Jacques's will was
overborne.
2. Preying on Family Feeling
This circuit recognizes that psychological duress may
suffice to overbear a defendant's will so as to make subsequent
statements inadmissible. Jackson, 608 F.3d at 102-03. Accordingly,
statements that a defendant's refusal to cooperate may lead to an
extended separation from his or her loved ones may contribute to a
finding that the defendant's confession was coerced. See, e.g.,
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (finding the
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defendant's confession involuntary where "the petitioner's oral
confession was made only after the police had told her that state
financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her
children taken from her, if she did not 'cooperate,'" among other
factors); Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336 (finding confession involuntary
where agents made defendant "fear that, if she failed to cooperate,
she would not see her young child for a long time").
However, the mere fact that a defendant is placed "under
some psychological pressure" by agents does not necessarily render
a confession involuntary. United States v. Jobin, 535 F.2d 154,
159 (1st Cir. 1976). In Jackson, for example, this circuit refused
to find that a defendant's confession was involuntary on the basis
of police officers' threats to charge his sister with a crime if he
did not cooperate. 918 F.2d at 242. Distinguishing Lynumn and
Tingle, we noted that those earlier cases involved "mothers . . .
coerced by threats that their children would be taken from them"
and included evidence that the defendants "may have been more
susceptible to psychological coercion" than other suspects. Id.;
cf. Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336 (emphasizing the "primordial and
fundamental" relationship of a mother to her child). Absent
evidence that the defendant in Jackson had "an especially close
relationship" with his sister or "was unusually susceptible to
psychological coercion on that account or any other," we found that
the "totality of the circumstances" failed to suggest that his will
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was overborne. Jackson, 918 F.2d at 242; see also United States v.
Charlton, 565 F.2d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding that the
defendant's confession was voluntary despite agents' threats to
arrest his son, of whom defendant "was highly protective," because
a desire to protect a relative "does not, in our judgment, render
his confession involuntary or necessitate a finding that he was
coerced").
In this case, Agent Mazza made a single reference to
Jacques's father's health several hours before Jacques decided to
confess. Jacques's demeanor at the time of his confession did not
manifest any notable psychological or emotional anxiety in response
to Mazza's statement, nor does the record include any indicia that
Jacques was particularly susceptible to manipulation. Under the
totality of the circumstances, the record does not suggest that
Mazza's appeal to Jacques's family feeling had a coercive impact on
the defendant's confession.
3. Other Claims
Finally, Jacques claims that Mazza and Smythe overbore
his will through their use of the "Reid technique," including
exaggerating their evidence and minimizing the gravity of his
suspected offense, in obtaining a confession.
Extreme forms of deception or chicanery by the police may
be sufficient to render a confession involuntary. Hughes, 640 F.3d
at 439. Nevertheless, "the use of chicanery does not automatically
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undermine the voluntariness of a confession." Id. This court has
consistently recognized that "some degree of deception . . . during
the questioning of a suspect is permissible." Id.; see also United
States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 79 (1st Cir. 2008) (reaffirming "the
proposition . . . that 'confessions procured by deceits have been
held voluntary in a number of situations'") (quoting United States
v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Specifically, "a confession is not considered coerced
merely because the police misrepresented to a suspect the strength
of the evidence against him." Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147,
1158 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739
(1969) (finding that the police's "misrepresent[ations]" of a
co-defendant's alleged incriminating statements were, "while
relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary
confession inadmissible."); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044,
1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding "the fact that the officer
misrepresented . . . the strength of the evidence" to be "one
factor to consider among the totality of circumstances in
determining voluntariness"); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 903 (2d
Cir. 1988) (finding police officer's "assert[ion] that he already
had a strong case against petitioner" insufficient to render the
ensuing confession involuntary). As the Seventh Circuit has noted,
"[o]f the numerous varieties of police trickery, . . . a lie that
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relates to a suspect's connection to the crime is the least likely
to render a confession involuntary." Holland, 963 F.2d at 1051.
In this case, the agents' statements exaggerating the
quality of their evidence, minimizing the gravity of Jacques's
offense, and emphasizing the negative media attention that would
attend Jacques's trial all fall safely within the realm of the
permissible "chicanery" sanctioned by this and other courts.
Jacques points to no federal authority supporting a finding of an
involuntary confession under similar circumstances. The one case
cited by Jacques, Commonwealth. v. Baye, 967 N.E.2d 1120 (Mass.
2012), is a state court decision that is neither binding on this
court nor directly analogous on the facts. See id. at 1130 (noting
in support of its finding that the agents "mischaracterized the law
of murder, felony-murder, and accident" and "dissuaded" the
defendant when he asked to consult an attorney). Considered in the
full circumstances of this case, Mazza and Smythe's interrogative
tactics did not amount to coercion in violation of Jacques's Fifth
Amendment rights.
B. Right to Prompt Presentment
Jacques further challenges the admissibility of his
confession on the ground that his interrogation violated his right
to prompt presentment.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant who has been arrested within the United States is
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entitled to be brought "without unnecessary delay before a
magistrate judge." Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A). The right of
speedy presentment not only checks the likelihood of coercive
questioning, but also avoids "all the evil implications of secret
interrogation of persons accused of crime." Corley v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 307 (2009) (quoting McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943)). Presentment is "the point at which the
judge is required to take several key steps to foreclose Government
overreaching: informing the defendant of the charges against him,
his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, the availability
of bail, and any right to a preliminary hearing; giving the
defendant a chance to consult with counsel; and deciding between
detention or release." Id. at 320. To protect this right, the
McNabb-Mallory rule established by the Supreme Court stipulates
that confessions made during a period of detention that violates
the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) are generally
inadmissible in federal courts. Id. at 309; United States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 354 (1994).
Following the Supreme Court's articulation of the
McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501
to create a safe harbor period for certain voluntary confessions.
See Corley, 556 U.S. at 309 (discussing legislative history and
intent of § 3501). With respect to Rule 5(a)'s requirement of
speedy presentment, § 3501(c) provides that "a confession . . .
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shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such
person before a magistrate judge or other officer . . . if . . .
such confession was made or given by such person within six hours
immediately following his arrest or other detention." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c). The section further provides that its six-hour cut-off
"shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such
person before such magistrate judge . . . is found by the trial
judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and
the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such
magistrate judge or other officer." Id.
Jacques signed a waiver of his right to prompt
presentment at 1:20 a.m., four minutes past § 3501(c)'s safe harbor
period. He now contends that, because his waiver was untimely
under § 3501(c), his subsequent confession is inadmissible under
McNabb-Mallory. Specifically, Jacques insists that the delay
cannot be deemed "reasonable" because § 3501(c) recognizes an
exception to its six-hour window only for delays caused by
transportation or travel considerations, neither of which apply to
this case.2
Jacques's argument misconstrues the significance of
§ 3501(c)'s safe harbor. Section 3501(c) does not provide that all
2
The parties additionally dispute whether Jacques was within
"federal custody" during his interrogation so as to trigger the
application of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). Because we can resolve
Jacques's challenge based on the reasonableness of the four-minute
delay, we need not reach this issue.
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confessions gathered beyond its six-hour window automatically or
even presumptively violate Rule 5(a)'s right of presentment
"without unnecessary delay." Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A). Rather,
it sets up a two-part inquiry for that right. First, the section
creates a safe-harbor for voluntary statements that are received
either within six hours of a defendant's detention, or within a
longer period deemed reasonable in light of travel or
transportation difficulties. Corley, 556 U.S. at 322 ("If the
confession came within that period, it is admissible . . . .").
Where a voluntary confession falls beyond the safe harbor,
§ 3501(c) then requires a court to determine whether the delay was
nevertheless reasonable or necessary under McNabb-Mallory. Id.
("If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six
hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying that long
was unreasonable or unnecessary under the McNabb-Mallory cases, and
if it was, the confession is to be suppressed."); United States v.
McDowell, 687 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2012) ("A confession given
outside the six-hour period is also admissible under § 3501(c) if
the court finds the confession was voluntary and the delay in
presentment was reasonable.").
The right of prompt presentment does not create a
"mechanical or automatic" duty for officers to arraign defendants
upon arrest. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).
Rather, "[c]ircumstances may justify a brief delay" where that
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delay is based on reasonable or legitimate grounds. Id. A delay
"is unreasonable and unnecessary when it is 'of a nature to give
opportunity for the extraction of a confession.'" United States v.
García-Hernández, 569 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455). However, a delay may be reasonable if
caused by administrative concerns, such as the unavailability of a
magistrate following an arrest, see, e.g., id. at 1106; see also
United States v. Carter, 484 F. App'x 449, 457-58 (11th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 994 (2013), or by a shortage of personnel,
García-Hernández, 569 F.3d at 1106; United States v. Salamanca, 990
F.2d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, a purely de minimis
delay past § 3501(c)'s six-hour limitation may not necessarily
raise any procedural concerns. See United States v. Oropeza-Flores,
230 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 2000).
Based on the circumstances of this case, Agent Mazza's
brief delay in acquiring Jacques's waiver of his right to
presentment was not "unreasonable and unnecessary" so as to merit
suppression of his statements under McNabb-Mallory.3 Assuming that
3
The government also suggests that § 3501(c)'s six-hour
limitation on an interrogation prior to presentment does not apply
to a defendant's waiver. By the government's theory, while the
prosecution may not introduce any statements made between the
termination of the six-hour safe harbor and the defendant's waiver
of his right to presentment, it can rely on any statements made
following a knowing waiver, no matter when the waiver occurred.
This argument would drain the right of prompt presentment of any
substance. A necessary extension of the government's theory is
that federal agents could interrogate a defendant for six hours and
then, instead of bringing him before a magistrate, detain him for
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Jacques's detention began the moment he was escorted from the
vehicle at 7:16 p.m., Mazza presented Jacques with a waiver one
minute past the six-hour window and Jacques signed that waiver four
minutes past that window. The extremely minor margin by which
Mazza exceeded the safe harbor and his prompt break in questioning
until Jacques signed the waiver suggest that Mazza did not
purposefully ignore § 3501(c) for the improper goal of continuing
an unrestricted interrogation. Nor, considering the unavailability
of a magistrate judge at the time of Jacques's interrogation, do
the circumstances suggest that Mazza willfully defaulted on his
hours or days longer in the hopes that he will eventually choose to
waive presentment and continue the interrogation. Such a practice
would avoid all the established procedural benefits of presentment,
including "informing the defendant of the charges against him, his
right to remain silent, his right to counsel, the availability of
bail, and any right to a preliminary hearing." Corley, 556 U.S. at
320.
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duty to take Jacques for prompt arraignment.4 More likely, they
suggest a minor and ultimately harmless miscalculation of the time.
Finally, Jacques argues that his waiver is invalid
because it was not obtained knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. See McDowell, 687 F.3d at 910 (noting that a waiver
of prompt presentment must be knowing and voluntary).
Specifically, Jacques insists that Agent Mazza misrepresented the
nature of his Rule 5(a) rights by suggesting that the waiver would
help Jacques by forestalling charges, while it in fact benefitted
the investigators by allowing them to continue interrogation. This
argument finds no support in the record. The transcript of the
interrogation reveals that Mazza accurately explained the contours
of Jacques's right to presentment, including the opportunity to
come before a judge, to have counsel appointed him, and to be
admitted to bail. Jacques's testimony at his suppression hearing
4
Jacques insists that the unavailability of a magistrate cannot
be used to justify prolonging an interrogation. Taken to its
extreme, he notes, the practice would allow agents to circumvent
§ 3501(c) at any time by arresting suspects at night or over
weekends. See United States v. Middleton, 344 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir.
1965) ("[T]he unavailability of a Commissioner does not license the
police to continue their interrogation through the night."). Unlike
Middleton, however, this situation is not one where agents took the
unavailability of a magistrate as an excuse to "continue their
interrogation through the night." Rather, it is one where agents
properly informed Jacques of his right to terminate the
interrogation and presented him with a formal waiver when their
six-hour safe harbor expired. In consideration of the record, the
agents' minor miscalculation does not constitute an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in violation of Jacques's right to prompt
presentment.
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confirmed that, as a veteran of the criminal justice system, he was
familiar with the right of presentment. Furthermore, Jacques
admitted that he chose to sign the waiver to "have a chance to
continue explaining" his innocence in order to dissuade the agents
from filing formal charges against him. Based on Jacques's
testimony, the district court did not err in concluding that
Jacques's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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