United States v. Correy

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1542
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOHN CORREY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Selya, and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Robert Herrick for appellant.
John A. Matthews II, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief,
for appellee.
December 3, 2014
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This is defendant-appellant
John Correy's third visit to this court, but his first solo
appearance. See United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373 (1st Cir.
2009); United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2005). He
asks us to reconsider his sentence a third time because the
sentencing judge failed to follow this court's instructions on
remand. We agree, so we vacate his sentence and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
We set forth succinctly the facts and procedural history
relevant to this appeal. Readers seeking greater detail may wish
to consult our prior opinions. See Correy, 570 F.3d at 375-77;
Casas, 425 F.3d at 29.
On March 21, 1994, Drug Enforcement Administration
agents stopped a vehicle containing 81 kilograms of cocaine at the
San Juan airport. An investigation followed, exposing the vast
drug conspiracy involved in this case.
On August 8, 1996, the government charged 60 defendants,
including Correy, with conspiracy to distribute 1400 grams of
heroin and 9445 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1). The government further charged Correy
and several co-defendants with possession of 36 kilograms of
cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 4). Correy and one
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co-defendant were also charged with the intentional killing of two
people, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(Counts 5 and 6).
On December 14, 1999, following a seven-month jury trial
before U.S. District Judge Carmen Consuelo Vargas de Cerezo, Correy
and his co-defendants were convicted of Count 1, conspiracy to
distribute heroin and cocaine. Correy was acquitted of Counts 4,
5, and 6. At trial, Thomas Martínez and Israel Pérez-Delgado, two
leading figures in the conspiracy who pleaded guilty and received
lighter sentences, testified against Correy and his co-defendants.
Much of Correy's and his co-defendants' appeals has hinged on the
credibility and weight afforded these witnesses' testimony.
A. First Sentencing and Appeal
Due to a backlog in the trial court's docket, the case
was reassigned to U.S. District Judge Héctor Laffitte for
sentencing. Judge Laffitte made individual drug-quantity
determinations at sentencing based on his review of the record,
relying heavily on leader Martínez's testimony. On May 9, 2002, he
found Correy responsible for over 150 kilograms of cocaine,
resulting in a base offense level of 38. He added a two-level
enhancement for possession of a weapon, raising Correy's total
offense level to 40. Correy's past offenses placed him in criminal
history category VI. Out of a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") range of 360 months to life, Judge Laffitte
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sentenced Correy to 480 months of imprisonment, followed by seven
years of supervised release.
Correy and his co-defendants appealed on several grounds.
On October 7, 2005, this court affirmed their convictions, as well
as the statutory maximums to which they were subjected, but
remanded their cases for resentencing. Casas, 425 F.3d at 67. We
based our remand of Correy's sentence on the probation department's
failure to timely serve him with a revised presentence report
making specific drug-quantity findings grounded in the record, in
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e),1 which
Correy had challenged as part of a Booker claim.2 Casas, 425 F.3d
at 57 n.43, 61, 64-65. On remand, we "instructed the resentencing
[judge] to review the entire record, making [his] own credibility
determinations in order to determine drug quantity." Correy, 570
F.3d at 376 (citing Casas, 425 F.3d at 64 n.56). We flagged
particular concerns about witness Martínez's credibility and the
sentencing judge's flawed interpretation of the jury verdict as
crediting his testimony wholesale, when in fact the jury had made
certain findings inconsistent with that testimony. Casas, 425 F.3d
1Rule 32(e) provides that "[t]he probation officer must give
the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant's attorney,
and an attorney for the government at least 35 days before
sentencing unless the defendant waives this minimum period." Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2).
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), held that
the Guidelines must be treated as advisory, rather than mandatory.
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at 64 n.56. We further noted that the trial judge had labeled
witness Pérez's testimony "dubious," id. at 53-54, and that Pérez's
account conflicted with that of Martínez, id. at 45. Accordingly,
it should have been clear on remand that the sentencing judge had
to examine both Martínez's and Pérez's credibility. See Correy,
570 F.3d at 379.
B. Second Sentencing and Appeal
At a resentencing hearing on June 9, 2006, Judge Laffitte
found Correy responsible for at least 908 kilograms of cocaine,
again resulting in a base offense level of 38. Judge Laffitte
again added a two-level enhancement for possession of a weapon, for
a total offense level of 40, and placed Correy in criminal history
category VI. He then re-imposed Correy's 480-month sentence and
seven-year supervised release term.
On June 18, 2009, this court again vacated Correy's and
his co-defendants' sentences. Id. at 374. We found that, as to
all defendants, the sentencing judge "did not heed our instruction"
to thoroughly review the record in order to evaluate witnesses'
credibility and make individualized drug-quantity determinations,
"but rather persisted in [his] view that the jury verdict was
controlling" and "categorically refuse[d] to engage in a
credibility assessment." Id. at 379-81. Further, as to Correy,
the sentencing judge relied on a clearly deficient presentence
report which, "[i]ncredibly," was "the exact same [report]" as was
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used at his prior sentencing, and which "simply included
allegations copied from the indictment" rather than providing the
individualized, record-based assessment that this court demanded.
Id. at 382-83. On remand, we "insist[ed]" that the sentencing
judge resolve these issues. Id. at 402.
C. Third Sentencing
On July 6, 2011, the probation department filed an
amended presentence report in preparation for resentencing. After
summarizing trial testimony related to Correy's conduct, the report
assigned Correy responsibility for over 150 kilograms of cocaine
and recommended offense levels consistent with Correy's previous
sentences. Correy objected, challenging the credibility of the
testimony the probation department relied on. He further claimed
that the government was unable to prove he was responsible for more
than five kilograms of cocaine, though he conceded that his conduct
involved 3.5 to 5 kilograms of cocaine.
On October 24, 2011, following Judge Laffitte's
retirement, U.S. District Judge Gustavo A. Gelpí presided over
Correy's third sentencing. Relying on the amended presentence
report, and interpreting this court's remand order as preventing
him from making a finding below five kilograms of cocaine, Judge
Gelpí found Correy responsible for between five and fifteen
kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 32. He
declined to grant Correy a two-level reduction for acceptance of
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responsibility and added enhancements for Correy's possession of a
weapon and career offender status, raising Correy's total offense
level to 37 and placing him in criminal history category VI. Out
of a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, Judge Gelpí sentenced
Correy to an incarcerative term of 360 months followed by seven
years of supervised release.
On October 31, 2011, Correy filed a motion under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) to correct his sentence, arguing
that Judge Gelpí erred by failing to consider prosecutorial
misconduct during his trial as justification for a downward
departure in his sentence.3 Judge Gelpí denied the motion on the
grounds that (1) Correy had waived the issue by not raising it at
the October 24 sentencing hearing, and (2) the district court
lacked jurisdiction to revisit the sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a).
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Before us, Correy challenges his sentence on four
grounds: First, he says that Judge Gelpí failed to follow this
court's instruction to make individualized, record-based drug-
quantity findings on remand. Second, he claims that Judge Gelpí
erroneously refused to consider his request for an acceptance-of-
3
Rule 35(a) permits a district judge to correct a sentence
within fourteen days after sentencing if it "resulted from
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error." Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(a).
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responsibility sentence reduction. Third, he contends that his
sentence was procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable.
Fourth, he says that Judge Gelpí wrongly denied his Rule 35(a)
motion for correction of sentence. But because we remand based on
Correy's first challenge, we need not address the remainder.
A. Individualized Drug-Quantity Determination
Correy first contends that Judge Gelpí refused to follow
this court's order to make an individualized drug-quantity finding
by reviewing the record and assessing witness credibility upon
remand. Correy says Judge Gelpí mistakenly concluded that he
lacked authority to find Correy personally responsible for under
five kilograms of cocaine based on this court's determination that
the conspiracy-wide amount was five kilograms or more. As a
result, Correy says, Judge Gelpí improperly declined to consider
his claim that he was individually responsible for only 3.5 to 5
kilograms of cocaine.
Sentences in drug-conspiracy cases depend heavily on the
amount and type of drugs involved. United States v. Cintrón-
Echautegui, 604 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1993)). When sentencing
a drug-conspiracy participant under the Guidelines, the sentencing
judge "must make an individualized finding concerning the quantity
of drugs attributable to, or reasonably foreseeable by, the
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offender."4 Id. (citing United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d
101, 103 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Ramírez-
Negrón, 751 F.3d 42, 47-48 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 276(2014). This is so even though "we derive the applicable statutory
maximum in a drug conspiracy case from a conspiracy-wide
perspective."5 Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103 (emphasis added); see
also Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d at 49 n.4. Absent "an
individualized finding, the drug quantity attributable to the
conspiracy as a whole cannot automatically be shifted to the
defendant" for the purpose of calculating a Guidelines offense
level. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at 103.
4
"[F]actual findings made for purposes of applying the
Guidelines, which influence the sentencing judge's discretion in
imposing an advisory Guidelines sentence and do not result in
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, do not violate the rule
in Alleyne [v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013)]." United
States v. Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S.Ct. 276 (2014). In Alleyne, which was decided
during the pendency of Correy's appeal, the Supreme Court held that
any fact that increases the applicable mandatory minimum must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 S.Ct. at 2162-63.
5
The applicable mandatory minimum, on the other hand, depends
on the drug quantity attributable to the individual defendant.
Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d at 49 n.4 (citing Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d at
103). Unlike his co-defendant, see United States v. Pizarro, ___
F.3d ___, No. 12-1759, 2014 WL 6090601 (1st Cir. Nov. 14, 2014),
Correy does not raise any Alleyne issues in this appeal, and we
therefore address Correy's sentencing claims without regard to any
possible effect of the Supreme Court's decision on his statutory
sentencing range. On remand, the district court should consider
the applicability of our Alleyne jurisprudence, including our
decision in Pizarro, to Correy's circumstances.
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In Correy and his co-defendants' first appeal, we found
that "the evidence overwhelmingly establishe[d] that the conspiracy
involved at least five kilograms of cocaine," corresponding to a
statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Casas, 425 F.3d at 65-66;
see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). In their second appeal, we clarified
that this discussion pertained only to the conspiracy-wide amount
and indicated "nothing about the drug quantities foreseeable to
each individual, which must be used for purposes of determining
each defendant's [base offense level] under the [G]uidelines."
Correy, 570 F.3d at 377, 380. We proceeded to explain that the
individualized "drug-quantity determination is an entirely
different inquiry from that of the conspiracy-wide determination"
and to reiterate that "the individualized drug-quantity issue
[cannot] be resolved without assessing credibility." Id. at
380-81.
Nevertheless, at Correy's third sentencing, Judge Gelpí
insisted that this court had partly tied his hands with respect to
Correy's drug-quantity determination. When Correy argued that he
was responsible for under five kilograms of cocaine, Judge Gelpí
said:
[I]n this particular case . . . the [c]ourt
cannot go below the ten-year mandatory minimum
as the Circuit noted. . . . [T]his particular
defendant, as well as the others[,] are
responsible for at least 5 kilos or more,
which triggers the ten-year mandatory minimum.
So I can't make a finding - and I'll hear from
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counsel, but I don't see how I can make a
finding below the mandatory minimum.
In other words, Judge Gelpí thought (incorrectly under our case
law, see supra note 5) that the conspiracy-wide amount of at least
five kilograms represented the minimum amount attributable to
Correy. He further concluded that, because a drug-quantity finding
of anything between five and fifteen kilograms of cocaine would
result in the same Guidelines range based on Correy's previous
offenses, it would be a "somewhat moot exercise" to make
credibility determinations and to state a more specific — and, he
implied, likely higher — finding.
When Judge Gelpí concluded that he could not find Correy
responsible for less than five kilograms of cocaine, he
misinterpreted our remand order in two important ways. First, when
we said that Correy and his co-defendants were responsible for at
least five kilograms of cocaine, we were discussing the conspiracy-
wide, statutory-maximum-controlling amount, rather than the
individualized, Guidelines-range-determining amount. See Correy,
570 F.3d at 377, 380. Second, not only did we not find Correy
independently responsible for at least five kilograms of cocaine,
we also did not direct the sentencing judge to find as such; in
fact, we explicitly stated that our conspiracy-wide conclusions
"sa[id] nothing about the drug quantities foreseeable to each
individual," and left the individualized assessment up to the
sentencing judge. Id. at 380.
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These misunderstandings led Judge Gelpí to forgo making
the individualized drug-quantity finding, based on his review of
the entire record and assessment of witness credibility, that this
court demanded. See id. at 388, 402. As a result, he refused to
consider Correy's record-based argument that he was responsible for
under five kilograms of cocaine. Although Judge Gelpí's ultimate
conclusion that Correy was responsible for five to fifteen
kilograms of cocaine is plausible and perhaps, as Judge Gelpí
suggested, even "utterly generous" under the preponderance of the
evidence standard used at sentencing, this does not alter the fact
that Judge Gelpí failed to perform the individualized, record-based
analysis that this Court ordered him to undertake on remand.
This failure to comply with our order justifies vacatur
and remand, just as it did when we considered this case in 2005 and
2011. See, e.g., id. at 384; United States v. Vigneau, 337 F.3d
62, 67 (1st Cir. 2003) ("One aspect of the law of the case doctrine
is the 'mandate' rule, which requires a district court to follow
the decisions of a higher court."); United States v. Ticchiarelli,
171 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (same). Accordingly, we vacate and
remand Correy's case for resentencing for the third time, and — at
the risk of sounding like a broken record — direct the sentencing
judge to determine the drug quantity specifically attributable to
Correy by thoroughly reviewing the record and assessing witness
credibility.
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B. Remaining Issues
Correy raises three further arguments on appeal.6
However, since we are remanding Correy's case for the sentencing
judge to make an individualized drug-quantity determination and to
resentence Correy, we need not rule on these challenges here. See
Correy, 570 F.3d at 401.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Correy's sentence
and remand his case for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
As in our previous decisions in this matter, we express no view as
to the ultimate sentence that should be imposed on remand. See id.
at 402. Nor do we profess any opinion as to how the sentencing
judge should resolve Correy's credibility challenges, or what drug
quantity the judge should attribute to Correy in particular. See
id. We simply insist that the sentencing judge consider and
resolve the credibility and factual issues identified herein and
sentence Correy based on an individualized drug-quantity
assessment, as required by our case law and as ordered repeatedly
on remand.
6
As you will recall, Correy argues that: (1) Judge Gelpí
erred by refusing to grant Correy a two-offense-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility; (2) Judge Gelpí committed procedural
error when he failed to make individualized findings about Correy's
offense conduct, thereby ignoring the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence; and
(3) Judge Gelpí wrongly denied Correy's Rule 35(a) motion for
correction of sentence. See text at part II, supra.
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