United States v. Paladin

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2098
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
PATRICIO PALADIN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Thompson, Circuit Judge,
and Smith,* District Judge.
Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for
appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
May 12, 2014
*
Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
SMITH, Chief District Judge. Appellant Patricio Paladin
is serving a life sentence following his conviction on a series of
drug charges. Subsequent to Paladin’s conviction, but before his
sentencing, Paladin learned of the existence of certain evidence
that the government had failed to disclose to him, and that he
suggests may have been used to impeach the credibility of the key
government witness against him at trial. Relying on Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Paladin moved to set aside the
verdict and for a new trial. The district court denied the motion
in a thorough bench decision, and this timely appeal followed.
Because we agree with the district court’s determination
that the evidence in question was immaterial, we AFFIRM the
district court’s denial of Paladin’s motion. And, as Paladin
concedes that we are precedent-bound to do, we reject a series of
separate constitutional challenges to Paladin’s life sentence, the
imposition of which was made mandatory by the quantities of cocaine
at issue and by virtue of this being Paladin’s third felony drug
conviction.
I. Facts
A second superseding indictment charged Paladin with one
count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, three counts of
distribution of cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. Following a jury trial in December 2010,
Paladin was convicted on all counts.
-2-
The testimony of FBI Agent Mark Alford and a confidential
informant by the name of Kevin Vega was of central importance to
the government’s case. We briefly overview that testimony here,
but will return to it in greater detail later. Alford was the
first government witness and testified regarding his oversight of
the investigation into Paladin’s narcotics activities and about his
supervision of Vega in the initiation and completion of a series of
meetings and controlled purchases with Paladin.
Vega testified later in the trial and told jurors that he
had met Paladin in 2004 and thereafter routinely purchased cocaine
from him until late 2008, in a total aggregate amount that Vega
estimated was in excess of 100 kilograms. Of central importance to
this appeal, Vega testified that during the summer of 2009, he made
the decision to cease his participation in the drug trade and to
inform law enforcement of his prior activities. Vega told jurors
that, in July 2009, he walked into FBI headquarters in New
Hampshire, confessed, and agreed to serve as a confidential
informant.1 This somewhat unusual decision, Vega testified,
resulted from Vega’s guilty conscience, fear of arrest and
incarceration, and the fact that he had a newborn son. Vega stated
unequivocally that, aside from controlled buys that he performed at
1
Although the FBI did not immediately grant Vega immunity,
Vega was later assured by the United States Attorney’s Office that
he would not face prosecution so long as he continued to cooperate.
-3-
the direction of the government, the last time that he dealt drugs
was during the summer of 2009.
Because this was Paladin’s third felony drug conviction
and because the quantities of cocaine at issue were sufficient to
trigger a mandatory life sentence, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), a significant delay preceded sentencing as
Paladin sought to overturn at least one of his prior convictions.2
It was during this period of time, in March 2012, that the attorney
who had represented Paladin at trial received a letter from one
Jordan Manning, an inmate at a state correctional facility in New
Hampshire. Manning’s letter suggested that Vega had “got[ten]
busted for a drug charge” and had “received something in exchange
for testimony.”
Defense counsel contacted the Assistant United States
Attorney who had led the prosecution and asked that the matter be
investigated. In the course of the ensuing investigation, it was
discovered that, on November 12, 2010, prior to the start of
Paladin’s trial, representatives of various law enforcement
agencies and the New Hampshire United States Attorney’s Office had
interviewed an individual named Angel Andino in relation to a
separate narcotics investigation.
2
The imposition of a life sentence was made mandatory
based on the government having previously filed an information
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), setting forth Paladin’s two
prior felony drug convictions.
-4-
Notes from this proffer session, disclosed in redacted
form to defense counsel in April 2012, contain the following
passage:
“Andino said that he supplied Vega with 200
[O]xycontin tablets every 2 weeks for an
unspecified amount of time. Andino said that
he stopped supplying Vega with cocaine and
[O]xycontin tablets approximately 1-2 months
before his (Andino’s) arrest.”
The United States Attorney’s Office also informed defense counsel
that Andino had been arrested in February 2010. If the contents of
the Andino proffer were true, then it would suggest that Vega had
lied to the jury when he testified that he had ended his
involvement in the drug trade on his own accord during the summer
of 2009, because a transaction with Andino one to two months prior
to Andino’s arrest would have necessarily taken place during the
winter of 2009 to 2010.
With this information in hand, Paladin filed a motion to
set aside the verdict and for a new trial, contending that the
government had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that would
have allowed Paladin to undermine Vega’s credibility. The
government did not dispute that the Andino proffer should have been
disclosed, but maintained that Paladin was not entitled to a new
trial because the contents of the Andino proffer were immaterial.
After a lengthy hearing in August 2012, the district court denied
Paladin’s motion in an oral decision.
-5-
At a separate hearing shortly after the denial of
Paladin’s motion, the district court imposed a life sentence on the
conspiracy count, noting that such a sentence was “excessive,” but
“legally required” under the circumstances.3 This appeal followed.
II. Evidentiary Suppression
A. Standard of Review
The district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial
is properly reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Hall, 557 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2009). We conduct our review
mindful that “[t]he trial judge, having seen and heard the
witnesses at first hand, has a special sense ‘of the ebb and flow
of the recently concluded trial.’ Thus, his views about the likely
impact of newly disclosed evidence deserve considerable deference.”
United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 504 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 313 (1st Cir. 1991)).
B. An Introduction
“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. A “Brady” claim, then, has three elements: (1) the
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because
3
Paladin was sentenced to 300 months on each of the
remaining distribution and possession with intent to distribute
counts, with all sentences ordered to run concurrently.
-6-
it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence
must have been suppressed by the government either willfully or
inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have resulted. Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also United States v.
Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008). The government
concedes that the Andino proffer was potentially impeaching and
that it was suppressed inadvertently. Thus, the determinative
issue is whether the suppression resulted in prejudice.
“Impeachment evidence must be material before its
suppression justifies a new trial.” Conley v. United States, 415
F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2005). Evidence is material when a
“reasonable probability [exists] that the result of the trial would
have been different” if the suppressed evidence had been disclosed.
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Reasonable probability does not require that “the defendant ‘would
more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence,’ only that the likelihood of a different result is great
enough to ‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (alteration in original)
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “This
somewhat delphic ‘undermine confidence’ formula suggests that
reversal might be warranted in some cases even if there is less
than an even chance that the evidence would produce an acquittal.”
-7-
Conley, 415 F.3d at 188 (quoting United States v. Sepúlveda, 15
F.3d 1216, 1220 (1st Cir. 1993)).
The strength of impeachment evidence and the effect of
suppression are evaluated in the context of the entire record to
determine materiality. Id. at 189. Evidence is immaterial where
it is cumulative or merely impeaches a witness on a collateral
issue. United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000).
Likewise, “suppressed impeachment evidence has little probative
value if additional evidence strongly corroborates the witness’s
testimony the suppressed evidence might have impeached.” Conley,
415 F.3d at 189.
C. The Materiality of the Andino Proffer
The materiality of undisclosed evidence ultimately turns
on the factors outlined above. As such, we assess the Andino
proffer in terms of: (1) its evidentiary strength; (2) whether it
was cumulative of other evidence offered at trial; (3) whether the
matters on which it would have allowed impeachment were collateral;
and (4) whether the matters on which impeachment would have been
made possible were otherwise corroborated.
i. Evidentiary Strength
While the impact of withholding evidence is severe when
that evidence is highly impeaching, the failure to disclose
evidence whose impeachment value is merely marginal is manifestly
insufficient to place the trial record in “such a different light
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as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Mathur, 624 F.3d at
505 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435).
The district court’s finding that the Andino proffer was
immaterial was based, in part, on the conclusion that its contents
were “ambiguous.” This conclusion was well-founded, because while
the Andino proffer suggests that Vega was involved in the drug
trade months after he had professed otherwise, the full story is
considerably more complicated. At the hearing on the motion for a
new trial, the government represented to the district court that
Vega’s service as a confidential informant extended beyond the
Paladin investigation. More specifically, the government indicated
that Vega had executed a controlled buy with Andino in December
2009 at the direction of agents involved in a separate
investigation of Andino. This buy, of course, would exactly
correspond with the information contained in the Andino proffer.
Based on the government’s representations, it seems
likely that Vega did engage in a drug transaction with Andino
during the period of time that Andino described. And, because
Andino was merely under investigation at the time, one might
reasonably infer that Andino would have had no reason to believe
that he was dealing with a government informant.4 But, because
4
Indeed, the notes from the Andino proffer go on to
describe that: “Andino said that he had [later] heard that . . .
Vega was working with the police and had set Andino up. Andino
said that after he heard about Vega possibly working for the
police, he stopped dealing with Vega and pushed him away.”
-9-
Paladin chose to leave the record before the district court
undeveloped, this panel is left to speculate as to what Vega might
have said if confronted with the Andino proffer on cross-
examination at trial.
We can envision three scenarios. Vega could have
confirmed that he purchased Oxycontin from Andino in or around
December 2009, but indicated that he did so at the direction of
government agents investigating Andino; second, Vega could have
admitted to lying on direct examination about his motivation for
turning himself in to the FBI and about the cessation of his drug
dealing; and third, Vega could have flatly denied engaging in
narcotics transactions of any kind with Andino. We simply cannot
know which of these scenarios would have played out because Paladin
declined the district court’s invitation to hold an evidentiary
hearing to learn more.
As the movant seeking a new trial under Brady, the burden
to demonstrate the materiality of undisclosed evidence rests
squarely with Paladin. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. Yet
Paladin made the decision not to call either Vega or Andino as
witnesses before the district court.5 Of the potential scenarios
5
When asked, defense counsel indicated to the district
court that he did not intend to call either Vega or Andino, leaving
the district court to lament that “I have limited information here
because neither of you decided to investigate further or tried to
produce it in front of me . . . .” With respect to Andino, the
district court theorized that “I suspect [defense counsel elected
not to call Andino] because you’re probably concerned that he might
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that we outline above, only two of three are potentially helpful to
Paladin. In scenario one, were Vega to confirm that he purchased
Oxycontin from Andino at the direction of the government, the
impeachment value of the Andino proffer would be nonexistent
because it would not suggest a discrepancy in Vega’s testimony.
If, on the other hand, in scenario two, the Andino
proffer prompted Vega to admit that he had lied to the FBI and to
the jury, the impeachment value of such testimony would be most
significant. Likewise, in scenario three, were Vega to flatly deny
dealing with Andino, it is possible that the Andino proffer could
have been used to highlight the factual discrepancy and undermine
Vega’s credibility, assuming that the district court admitted the
proffer under an exception to the rule against hearsay.6
In effect, Paladin asks this panel to infer (or, more
accurately, guess) that either scenario two or scenario three would
have unfolded and, furthermore, were it scenario three, that the
not say something that favors you.”
6
As the district court recognized, were Vega to deny the
contents of the Andino proffer, use of the proffer to impeach
Vega’s credibility would be significantly complicated by the
prohibition against hearsay. See United States v. Walthour, 202 F.
App’x 367, 371 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Statements in police
reports made by individuals other than the reporting officer . . .
constitute hearsay upon hearsay, and are therefore inadmissible.”).
The parties hotly contest the applicability of several hearsay
exceptions, and moreover whether inadmissability necessarily
precludes a finding of materiality. But, because we find that the
Andino proffer is of questionable impeachment value based on its
inherent ambiguity, we need not reach these questions.
-11-
district court would have resolved the various hearsay
complications in Paladin’s favor. This is a bridge too far and we
decline to cross it because we conclude that Paladin has not
carried his burden to demonstrate that the Andino proffer would
have been at all helpful to him. We reach the same conclusion as
the district court: the contents of the Andino proffer are at best
highly ambiguous. Based on the record before us, we can only
conclude that the impeachment value of the undisclosed evidence was
likely minor, and thus it is insufficient to undermine our
confidence in the jury’s verdict.
ii. Was the Andino Proffer Cumulative?
Suppressed evidence that is cumulative of evidence
presented at trial is immaterial. Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d at 19;
see also Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 148 (1st
Cir. 2003). Where, as here, suppressed evidence would have been
used for impeachment purposes, the key issue is whether the defense
had an adequate opportunity to impeach the witness by other means.
Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 266 (1st Cir. 1981).
“Impeachment evidence, even that which tends to further undermine
the credibility of the key Government witness whose credibility has
already been shaken due to extensive cross-examination, does not
create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist where that
evidence is cumulative . . . .” Dumas, 207 F.3d at 16 (quoting
United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1978)); see
-12-
also United States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 217 (1st Cir. 2007).
Nevertheless, “suppressed impeachment evidence can be immaterial
because of its cumulative nature only if the witness was already .
. . impeached at trial by the same kind of evidence.” Conley, 415
F.3d at 192 (quoting United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518
(D.C. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s immateriality finding was based, in
part, on its conclusion that the Andino proffer would have provided
avenues of impeachment that were cumulative of others already
available to the defense. We agree that, at best, the Andino
proffer would have provided Paladin with more of the same kind of
evidence that was already available to him to undermine Vega’s
credibility.
Paladin relies principally on the notion from Conley that
evidence is cumulative only insofar as the witness was already
impeached by the “same kind of evidence.” See id. In Conley, the
defendant police officer was convicted of perjury and obstruction
charges stemming from his involvement in (and subsequent cover-up
of) the accidental beating of an undercover officer. Id. at 187.
A key government witness - a fellow officer involved in the pursuit
that led to the beating - testified regarding his perception of the
chain of events. However, the prosecution had failed to disclose
an FBI interview with the witness during which he expressed
uncertainty regarding the events, and even asked that he be
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hypnotized in order to better recall what had happened. Id. at
185-86. This Court found that a Brady violation had occurred
because the defendant had been unaware of any evidence suggesting
that the witness was uncertain as to his recollection of events.
Id. at 191 (“Prior to trial . . . Petitioner did not know the
Government’s key witness previously suggested he be hypnotized to
‘truly recall’ the events . . . . Without any other similar
material, Petitioner did not impeach [the witness’s] ability to
recall at trial.”).
A prejudicial Brady violation has not been effected,
however, where the defendant already had available to him evidence
that would have allowed for impeachment on the same or similar
topics. In Moreno-Morales, for example, a key government witness
implicated the defendant police officer in the murder of an unarmed
suspect. 334 F.3d at 143-44. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the government had turned over only a subset of polygraph test
results demonstrating that the witness changed his story numerous
times prior to trial. This Court disagreed, concluding that the
additional test results would have been cumulative because the
defense had ample opportunity to impeach the witness’s credibility
with other evidence of his prior inconsistencies. Id. at 148; see
also Connolly, 504 F.3d at 217 (“Given [the witness’s] extensive
criminal history, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for
the district court to find that the absence of additional cross-
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examination on essentially the same well-developed theme would not
undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.”).
Paladin’s reliance on Conley is misplaced. While the
Andino proffer had the potential to lead to a line of questioning
regarding Vega’s truthfulness with law enforcement and with the
jury, Paladin already had available - and used - the same kind of
evidence to undermine Vega’s credibility. For example, on cross-
examination, the defense elicited from Vega the concession that,
despite earning upwards of a million dollars from the sale of
Oxycontin tablets, Vega paid virtually nothing in taxes and
laundered the narcotics proceeds through a small business that he
owned. Vega was also questioned about a home invasion in which
several masked intruders broke into his house, bound Vega and his
wife in front of their children, and stole various items. Vega
admitted that he lied to police officers after the incident when he
told them that he was not a drug dealer. In continued questioning,
the defense suggested that Vega was similarly lying about his
relationship with Paladin in order to avoid prosecution.
In sum, the principal focus of the defense on cross-
examination sought to undermine Vega’s credibility by suggesting to
the jury that Vega was generally dishonest and was willing to lie
to serve his own interests. In the best case scenario for Paladin,
the Andino proffer would have permitted one additional avenue to
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accomplish this same objective.7 This, we believe, necessarily
means that the Andino proffer was cumulative because it is
ultimately the same kind of evidence already in the record. See
Conley, 415 F.3d at 192.
iii. Were the Issues for Impeachment Collateral?
“Impeachment evidence . . . does not create a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist where that evidence is . . .
collateral.” Dumas, 207 F.3d at 16 (quoting Shelton, 588 F.2d at
1248). A matter is considered collateral if “the matter itself is
not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence,
i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of
the in-court testimony of the witness.” United States v.
Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting 1 McCormack on
Evidence § 45, at 169 (4th ed. 1992)).
The district court touched on this issue when it drew a
distinction between “evidence the government has produced to
support the elements of the case” and “evidence that bears on the
credibility of a witness.” We read the district court’s oral
decision as concluding, based on this distinction, that the Andino
proffer was collateral because while it would have possibly
7
Though we note again the distinct possibility that Vega
might have responded to this line of questioning by indicating that
the transactions with Andino had been in his capacity as a
confidential informant and at the direction of the government - a
response that would have served to eliminate any impeachment value
that the proffer might have provided.
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permitted impeachment of Vega’s general credibility, it would not
have permitted impeachment of the factual evidence underlying the
government’s case. In light of the weakness of the suppressed
evidence and its cumulativeness, any error in the district court’s
finding - if indeed there was any at all - was harmless.
iv. Were the Issues for Impeachment Corroborated?
“[S]uppressed impeachment evidence has little probative
value if additional evidence strongly corroborates the witness’s
testimony the suppressed evidence might have impeached.” Conley,
415 F.3d at 189; see also Hall, 557 F.3d at 19. Nevertheless,
“[c]onfidence in the outcome is particularly doubtful when the
withheld evidence impeaches a witness whose ‘testimony is
uncorroborated and essential to the conviction.’” Norton v.
Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 126 (1st Cir. 2002)).
This Court has previously found undisclosed evidence to
be immaterial by virtue of having been independently corroborated.
See, e.g., United States v. González-González, 258 F.3d 16, 18-19
(1st Cir. 2001) (despite government’s nondisclosure of evidence
tending to undermine the credibility of two witnesses, numerous
other witnesses testified as to defendant’s involvement in a drug
conspiracy and the government introduced documentary evidence
including recordings of conversations, travel records and
surveillance photographs); Connolly, 504 F.3d at 214 (aside from a
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government witness who later purportedly recanted his testimony,
multiple other witnesses testified as to defendant’s corrupt
dealings with organized crime figures); Mathur, 624 F.3d at 505
(despite delayed disclosure of evidence defendant argued could be
used to shift blame to one of the witnesses against him, numerous
other witnesses testified as to their victimization by defendant’s
financial scheme and the government introduced voluminous
corroborative records). Nevertheless, at the other end of the
spectrum, this Court has found that a trial court erred when it
declined to grant a new trial where evidence emerged post-
conviction that the government’s sole witness had fabricated
allegations and where no additional corroborative evidence was
introduced at trial. See Norton, 351 F.3d at 9.
Our focus with respect to corroboration is on the
conspiracy charge. The district court concluded, and we agree,
that the evidence of Paladin’s guilt on the distribution and
possession with intent to distribute charges was overwhelming and
did not depend on Vega’s credibility. Jurors heard testimony from
federal, state and local law enforcement personnel who variously
investigated Paladin, conducted surveillance on a series of
controlled buys with Vega, tested and confirmed as cocaine the
substances that Vega purchased from Paladin, executed a search
warrant at Paladin’s residence where a significant cocaine stash
was uncovered, and arrested Paladin while he was traveling in
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Georgia and carrying some ten thousand dollars in cash. This
evidence was not meaningfully contested.
As the district court recognized, however, despite the
strength of the government’s case with respect to the other counts,
the conspiracy charge depended in large part on the jury’s
willingness to accept Vega’s version of events that had taken place
prior to his becoming a confidential informant.8
We believe that there was sufficient evidence
corroborative of Vega’s testimony on the conspiracy count. We
begin with Paladin’s own statements. The jury heard a series of
audio recordings of meetings and controlled buys between Vega and
Paladin, as well as the testimony of members of law enforcement who
surveilled these interactions. Paladin is heard to make a series
of comments indicative of a long-standing drug dealing relationship
with Vega. For example, in one conversation in which Vega and
Paladin are discussing drug quantities, the following exchange took
place:
Paladin: That’s what you need, we don’t need,
it’s not like [expletive deleted] to go around
like we used to do, you know what I mean.
8
“[I]n situations where the conspiracy involves only [one]
defendant and a government informer. . . . there can be no
conspiracy because it takes two to conspire and the government
informer is not a true conspirator.” United States v. Giry, 818
F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir. 1987) (second alteration in original)
(citations omitted). The controlled drug transactions that
occurred after Vega became an informant could not form the basis of
conspiracy liability.
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Vega: [Expletive deleted], what are we doing
[expletive deleted] that one summer like 100
keys.9
Paladin: [Inaudible] . . . I’m going beyond that.
During a separate conversation on the topic of conducting
their meetings in parking lots, Paladin is heard to say: “Yeah,
[expletive deleted], you gotta move in close so we can meet up like
we did before, you feel me?” We view these (and other) statements
by Paladin as corroborating Vega’s testimony that Vega and Paladin
had previously conspired to distribute cocaine prior to Vega’s
service as an informant.
There was also corroboration of Vega’s testimony by other
witnesses, principally Agent Alford, the FBI agent who oversaw the
investigation of Paladin and who testified first for the
government. In one instance of corroboration, among others, Vega
testified that in approximately 2007, he paid Paladin for a
shipment of cocaine by giving him a customized Suzuki motorcycle.
Agent Alford testified regarding the FBI’s seizure of the same
motorcycle in 2010 and the government offered in evidence the
motorcycle’s title history which showed Vega’s past ownership and
present ownership by Paladin’s girlfriend, Cristy Baez.10
9
The government represented at oral argument, and we have
no reason to doubt, that a “key” is a kilogram.
10
Agent Alford testified that when the FBI tracked down the
motorcycle, it was for sale on Craigslist, with interested buyers
instructed to call a phone number registered to Paladin and Baez.
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Next, Agent Alford corroborated Vega’s testimony with
respect to the nature of the “fronting” and payment practices.
Vega testified that his independent dealings with Paladin spanned
from 2004 to 2008, and that there was a gap between Vega’s last
purchase in 2008 and his reinitiation of contact with Paladin at
the direction of the FBI in November 2009. Vega testified
regarding the details of the first controlled buy, and jurors heard
an audio recording of what transpired. During this meeting,
Paladin provided Vega with six ounces of cocaine, and Vega and
Paladin agreed that Vega would pay for it approximately a week
later. This practice, in which the buyer effectively purchases
drugs on credit, then pays the seller later with proceeds from the
resale, is known as fronting. Vega testified that in two
additional controlled buys in November and December 2009, Vega and
Paladin used similar fronting arrangements.
Agent Alford corroborated this testimony by detailing for
jurors his oversight of the controlled purchases. Specifically,
Agent Alford testified that in the case of each controlled
purchase, Paladin fronted Vega the drugs, then Vega later paid for
them with funds provided by the government. As the district court
recognized, Paladin’s willingness to front significant quantities
of cocaine to Vega beginning with the first controlled purchase in
November 2009 is indicative of a prior drug dealing relationship.
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We believe it unlikely that Paladin would have done so were he
dealing with Vega for the first time.
Witnesses other than Agent Alford corroborated Vega’s
testimony as well. For example, Vega testified that Paladin used
the Lowell, Massachusetts home of an associate by the name of Juan
Burgos (nicknamed “Indio”) as a stash house for guns, drugs and
bulletproof vests. Vega testified about a conversation that he had
with Paladin in 2007 in which Paladin described arriving at Indio’s
home to collect a package of marijuana, knocking on the front door,
and it being opened by police officers and FBI agents who happened
to have just recently raided the home in connection with an
investigation into Indio. Vega testified that Paladin told him
that the officers questioned but ultimately released him. This
testimony was corroborated by members of the Lowell Police
Department who testified as to the execution of the raid at Indio’s
home and Paladin’s ill-timed arrival, questioning and release.
D. Conclusion
Because of the questionable evidentiary strength of the
Andino proffer, the fact that we believe it to provide avenues of
impeachment that are merely cumulative of others that were already
available to the defense, and because Vega’s testimony was
sufficiently corroborated, we agree with the district court that
the Andino proffer was immaterial. As such, we AFFIRM the denial
of Paladin’s motion to set aside verdict and for a new trial.
-22-
III. Constitutional Challenges
Paladin raises a series of constitutional challenges to
the district court’s imposition of a life sentence. As we noted
previously, the life sentence was made mandatory by the
government’s filing of an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1) regarding two prior felony drug convictions that
Paladin had sustained.11 These convictions, combined with the fact
that the instant charges involved more than the necessary five
kilograms of cocaine, triggered the requirement set forth at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) that “[i]f any person commits a
violation of this subparagraph . . . after two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense have become final, such
person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
without release . . . .” Paladin raises these constitutional
challenges for further appellate review because, as he concedes,
most of them are foreclosed by binding precedent. We consider each
of Paladin’s arguments in turn, but they need not detain us for
long.
11
The information, filed in August 2010, suggests that
Paladin was previously convicted in 1998 for conspiracy to possess
a controlled drug with intent to sell, and in 2003 for conspiracy
to sell a controlled drug. Both convictions were in New Hampshire
state courts. The record suggests that, prior to sentencing,
Paladin sought unsuccessfully to vacate the 1998 conviction.
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A. Does Alleyne v. United States Require Submission of
Prior Convictions to the Jury?
Paladin maintains that because the indictment did not
reference his two prior felony convictions, and because the jury
was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been
convicted of these crimes, Paladin’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights to have all of the elements of an offense included in an
indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt were
violated. Because this argument was preserved, our review is for
harmless error, see United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 94 (1st
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1530 (2014), but we conclude
based on binding Supreme Court and Circuit precedent that there was
no error at all.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a statute that permitted district
courts to enhance certain sentences based on the defendant’s status
as a recidivist even where allegations of the defendant’s prior
offenses were not set forth in the indictment. 523 U.S. 224, 228
(1998) (“An indictment must set forth each element of the crime
that it charges. But it need not set forth factors relevant only
to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged
crime.”) (citations omitted). Four years later, in Harris v.
United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a
defendant where the district court had found by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant had “brandished” a firearm in
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relation to a drug crime, but the question of brandishing had not
been submitted to the jury. 536 U.S. 545, 550-52 (2002). Under
the applicable statute, the district court’s finding that the
defendant had brandished the firearm resulted in an enhanced
mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 550-51.
Alleyne v. United States overruled Harris, reasoning that
“[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are . . .
elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013). Nevertheless,
Alleyne recognized an exception to this rule that a defendant’s
prior convictions need not be submitted to the jury even where
those convictions form the basis for an increased sentence. Id. at
2160 n.1. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
revisit Almendarez-Torres. See id.; see also United States v.
Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 51 n.4 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 668 (2013) (“[Appellant] . . . ask[ed] this court to find that
his sentence is unconstitutional because the question of his status
as an [armed career criminal] should have been submitted to the
jury pursuant to [Alleyne]. We disagree. In Alleyne, the Supreme
Court stated that [Almendarez-Torres] remains good law.”)
(citations omitted). This being the case, we must reject Paladin’s
argument that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were implicated
when the indictment did not set forth his prior convictions and the
jury was not required to pass upon them.
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B. Does Alleyne Require Submission of Drug Quantity to
the Jury?
Paladin contends that the district court erred by not
submitting to the jury the question of whether Paladin was
individually responsible for the charged quantity of cocaine (five
kilograms or more). Because Paladin did not preserve this
argument, our review is for plain error. See Harakaly, 734 F.3d at
94. To prevail, Paladin must show that the error was “prejudicial
and affected his substantial rights, and . . . caused a miscarriage
of justice or seriously undermined the integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Carpenter,
736 F.3d 619, 632 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901
(2014) (quoting United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 105 (1st
Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As we noted earlier, Alleyne requires that any fact that
serves to increase the mandatory minimum sentence be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 S. Ct. at 2158.
Prior to Alleyne, this Court had held that “when a district court
determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant
convicted of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, the
court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug
amounts attributable to, or foreseeable by, that defendant.”
United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101, 103 (1st Cir. 2004).
Paladin urges a collective reading of Colón-Solís and Alleyne to
require that the jury make an individualized finding as to the
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quantity of drugs attributable to a particular defendant. Against
that backdrop, Paladin argues that the district court’s jury
instructions were insufficient to glean an individualized finding
as to the quantity of cocaine attributable to him.
This argument misconstrues the district court’s jury
instructions and overlooks the nature of the charged conspiracy.
The district court instructed the jury that “[i]n order for the
defendant to be found guilty of the charged conspiracy, the
government must prove that the defendant conspired to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of
cocaine.” (emphasis added). These instructions required the jury
to find that Paladin directly conspired with respect to the
applicable minimum quantity in order to sustain a conviction.
What is more, we distinguish the instant conspiracy from
the facts underlying this Court’s holding in Colón-Solís. There,
this Court was faced with one defendant involved in a large-scale
Puerto Rican drug cartel responsible for massive quantities of
cocaine and heroin. Id. at 102. Of course, in these contexts, the
automatic attribution of the full scope of the conspiracy’s
dealings to a particular defendant without an individualized
quantity finding is problematic. See id. at 103-04. Here,
however, the charged five kilogram quantity was based solely on the
conspiratorial dealings of two men: Paladin and Vega. Paladin
cannot reasonably maintain that his substantial rights were
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affected when there are no third parties to whom a material portion
of the cocaine in question could be attributed.12
Even if we were to look beyond the sufficiency of the
jury instructions and the nature of the charged conspiracy and
conclude that the district court had erred, Paladin would be unable
to demonstrate the requisite prejudice necessary to prevail on
plain error review. This Court has previously “treated the
presence of overwhelming evidence of the requisite drug types and
quantities as a proxy for harmlessness.” Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 95
(quoting United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.
2003)).
Vega testified that, in his estimate, he and Paladin
dealt in more than 100 kilograms of cocaine between 2004 and 2008.
We acknowledge that this figure is an estimate and nothing more.
But the volume of cocaine attributable to Paladin in the mere five
weeks between the first controlled purchase with Vega and the raid
on Paladin’s home confirms that he dealt in significant quantities,
lending credibility to Vega’s estimate.
Agent Alford testified that Vega purchased six ounces of
cocaine from Paladin in each of two controlled buys on November 12
and December 8, 2009, and a kilogram in a third buy on December 15.
12
Indeed, jurors heard testimony about just one transaction
in which Paladin was not directly involved. Vega testified that on
one occasion in early 2008, after Indio’s house was raided and
Paladin was nearly implicated, Paladin “had a little hiatus” and
Vega purchased cocaine from Paladin’s girlfriend.
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Then, Agent Alford testified that in the raid on Paladin’s home on
December 17, an additional three and a half kilograms of cocaine
were found and seized. That Paladin was responsible for nearly
five kilograms of cocaine during this short period of time suggests
that Vega’s estimate of their prior dealings between 2004 and 2008
was not wildly inaccurate.13
C. Does the Five-Year Limitation on Challenging Prior
Convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) Violate Due Process
and Equal Protection?
“No person who stands convicted of an offense . . . may
challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this
section which occurred more than five years before the date of the
information alleging such prior conviction.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(e).
Paladin’s argument with respect to this issue may be summarized as
follows: the 1998 felony drug conviction that he sustained and that
was one of two prior felonies referenced in the government’s
information filed with the district court was tainted due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, but Paladin was barred from
raising this issue before the district court because the conviction
was more than five years old. Thus, his right to due process and
equal protection was violated. Our review is de novo. See United
States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 653 (1st Cir. 1998).
13
A kilogram is equal to just over 35 ounces. The three
controlled purchases and the raid produced approximately 4.8
kilograms.
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As Paladin acknowledges, this argument has been squarely
refuted by Circuit precedent, and we must reject it. See
Henderson, 320 F.3d at 104 (“The ban against challenging
convictions over five years need only be supported by a rational
legislative purpose because no fundamental right or suspect class
is at issue in this case. The five year limitation . . . has a
rational basis in light of both the administrative difficulties
inherent in challenges to prior convictions . . . and the interest
in finality. We therefore have no difficulty concluding that
section 851(e) does not violate [defendant’s] right to due process
and equal protection of the law.”) (citations omitted).
D. Is the Life Sentence Arbitrary and Capricious?
Paladin contends that broad prosecutorial discretion
results in the arbitrary and capricious application of sentencing
enhancements under § 851(e). This argument too is foreclosed by
binding precedent as the Supreme Court has reviewed and deemed
constitutional the applicable practices under § 851. See United
States v. Labonte, 520 U.S. 751, 761-62 (1997).
E. Does the Life Sentence Violate the Eighth Amendment?
Paladin’s final challenge suggests that his life sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment because it is cruel and unusual and
is contrary to an emerging national consensus on sentencing for
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non-violent drug crimes.14 Our review is de novo. See United
States v. Raymond, 697 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2012). This Court
recently considered, and rejected, virtually identical arguments in
United States v. Jones, 674 F.3d 88, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 363 (2012) (citing Supreme Court cases upholding
life and other lengthy prison sentences for non-violent repeat drug
offenders), and we must do the same here.
While we may well agree with the sentiment of the
district court that the sentence here is excessive, like the
district court, we cannot but hold that it is lawful and
constitutional. Relief in cases such as this - if there is any -
must come, in the first instance, in the exercise of restraint and
wisdom in the charging decision of the prosecutor, or in the
exercise of the clemency power; both are executive not judicial
functions and leave us powerless to intercede to grant relief.
Affirmed.
14
With respect to an emerging national consensus, Paladin
relies principally on Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), in
which the Supreme Court considered national public opinion in
assessing the constitutionality of sentencing juveniles to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses.
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