Rosario-Gonzalez v. United States

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 12-2342
12-2343
DANIEL ROSARIO-GONZÁLEZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Rosario González and Juan Vélez Padilla, on brief for
appellants.
Freddie O. Torres Gomez and Roberto Sueiro Del Valle, on brief
for appellee, Clinical Medical Services for VA.
Leila Castro Moya and Rovira-Rodríguez Group Law Offices, on
brief for appellee, Servicios de Salud en El Hogar y Hospicio San
Lucas, Inc.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Juan Carlos Reyes-
Ramos, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez,
United States Attorney, on brief for appellee United States, VAMC,
San Juan and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Regional Office.
November 8, 2013
Per Curiam. Daniel Rosario-González ("Rosario") and Juan
Vélez-Padilla ("Vélez") appeal from the district court's judgment
in favor of the United States, other federal defendants, and two
non-federal medical care providers. See Rosario-González v. United
States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.P.R. 2012). We vacate the judgment
in part and affirm in part as indicated herein.
We review the district court's ultimate legal conclusions
on the jurisdictional issues in the case de novo, but its factual
findings, insofar as they depend on materials outside the
pleadings, for clear error. U.S. ex rel. Ondis v. City of
Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing, inter alia,
Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir. 2001)
(describing the standards applicable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
motions to dismiss based on factual challenges to the district
court's jurisdiction). We review the court's rulings under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo, Manning v. Boston Medical Center Corp.,
725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2013) (citations omitted), and apply the
same standard of review to its rulings based on Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. N.E. Teamsters & Trucking
Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Our reasons for affirming in part and vacating and
remanding in part are as follows:
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1. Appellants raise no objection to the district court's
determination that appellant Vélez lacked standing to sue, thereby
waiving or forfeiting any claim of error. See Manning v. Boston
Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (claims of error
are deemed waived on appeal if no analysis or developed argument is
presented). In any event, we find no error. In the rest of our
opinion, we refer only to appellant Rosario.
2. We agree that the Veterans' Judicial Review Act
("VJRA") deprived the district court of jurisdiction over any
claims by Rosario challenging the July 30, 2008 rating decision by
the Department of Veterans Affairs ("DVA"). See 38 U.S.C. §§
511(a), 7252(a), 7292(c) (final agency decisions regarding benefits
for veterans and their dependents or survivors are exclusively
reviewable by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and then,
as specified, by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court). Nor has Rosario raised any claim of error as
to the district court's treatment of his veterans benefits claims.
We therefore see no need to address the district court's
alternative ruling based on the discretionary function exception of
the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). See Jones v. United States,
727 F.3d 844, 849 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2013) (bypassing a district court
ruling based on § 2680(a) where affirming based on its VJRA ruling
was appropriate); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (claims "based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
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discretionary function or duty" are excepted from the FTCA's waiver
of sovereign immunity).
3. For various reasons, the district court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction under the FTCA over Rosario's claims
against the United States. 898 F. Supp. 2d at 424-27. In arguing
for an affirmance, the government relies exclusively on one of the
district court's rulings--that Rosario's filing of an SF-95 form
the month before he filed this suit amended his prior SF-95s
raising his claims, which had been pending for more than six months
without final agency action, thereby postponing, for six more
months, his time for filing suit under the "deemed denial"
provision in § 2675(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (permitting
claimants to file suit at their option at "any time" if six months
have passed without final agency action on a claim); 28 C.F.R. §
14.2(c) (providing that the claimant's option under § 2675(a)
"shall not accrue until six months after the filing of an
amendment" to a claim). Rosario denies that § 14.2(c) restarts the
statutory deemed denial period.
There is little case law discussing the jurisdictional
import of § 14.2(c), and the government (like the district court)
has not addressed the only reasoned decision that seems precisely
on point. In Seals v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744-45
(W.D. Texas 2004), the district court rejected the argument the
government makes here. Like Rosario, the plaintiff in Seals had
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filed suit after her initial claim had been pending for more than
six months without final agency action, but the government moved to
dismiss her suit as premature based on § 14.2(c) because the
plaintiff had amended her claim less than six months before filing
her suit. The court declined to dismiss the suit, concluding that
§ 14.2(c) could not deprive the court of jurisdiction it otherwise
had under the deemed denial provision in § 2675(a). The district
court relied primarily on Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284 (5th
Cir.), clarified on denial of rehearing, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
1980), which concluded that a court's power to adjudicate an FTCA
claim depends "solely" on compliance with § 2675(a)'s presentment
requirement, which is satisfied if the claimant has given the
agency written notice of the claim sufficient to enable it to
investigate and has placed a value on the claim. 615 F.2d at 292.
In our cases dealing with the presentment requirement in
§ 2675(a), we have agreed generally with Adams' approach. See
López v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809-10 (1985);
Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec'y of Dept. of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st
Cir. 1993). We have said that we will approach FTCA cases
"recognizing that individuals wishing to sue the government must
comply with the details of the law, but also keeping in mind that
the law was not intended to put up a barrier of technicalities to
defeat their claims." López, 758 F.2d at 809; accord Santiago-
Ramirez, 984 F.2d at 19 (citing López). Relative to § 2675(a)'s
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presentment requirement, we have suggested that a "flexible
approach" accords with "the original purpose behind the filing of
an administrative claim: that of allowing the efficient
investigation of a claim by the agency without sacrificing the
entitlement of a claimant to his or her cause of action against the
government." Santiago-Ramirez, 984 F.2d at 19. 8-20. We have also
suggested that we expect the government to apply its FTCA
settlement regulations in a manner consistent with Congress's
purpose in providing for an administrative procedure. López, 758
F.2d at 809 (citation omitted).
Before filing this suit, Rosario had filed SF-95s
relative to his father's medical care and treatment that had
complied with § 2675(a)'s presentment requirement by giving the
agency "due notice" of the "particular (potentially tortious)
conduct" it should investigate and including "a specification of
the damages sought." See Ramírez-Carlo v. United States, 496 F.3d
41, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing when a claim is properly
presented to an agency under § 2675(a)) (citation omitted). With
the exception of "Claim 33," the SF-95 Rosario had filed the month
before filing this suit, the agency had been considering his claims
for more than six months without having finally disposed of them,
entitling Rosario, under § 2675(a), to deem his claims denied at
his "option," and to file suit "any time thereafter" (that is,
until they were actually denied by the agency, Ellison v. United
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States, 531 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2008), which did not occur
until after this suit was filed).
Claim 33 did not change the substance of Rosario's
previously filed medical malpractice and wrongful death claims, but
instead demanded what was, on its face, a fantastical sum in
damages. There is no claim by the government that Rosario's filing
of Claim 33 had any prejudicial impact on its ability to properly
investigate his pending tort claims or to determine whether it
should settle them (and no prejudice is apparent), such that giving
the agency another six months in which to consider the claims would
accord with § 2675(a)'s exhaustion requirement. On these facts and
circumstances, we decline to apply § 14.2(c) to this case because
doing so seems tantamount to erecting "a barrier of
technicalities," López, supra, and "sacrificing the entitlement of
a claimant to his or her cause of action against the government"
without a corresponding showing that doing so would promote "the
efficient investigation of a claim by the agency."
Santiago-Ramirez, supra. Cf. GAF Corp. v. United States, 593 F.
Supp. 703, 707 (D.D.C. 1984) (declining to apply § 14.2(c) where an
amendment was unrelated to the initial claim and the government
could not reasonably contend that the amendment had affected its
investigation of the initial claim), reversed on other grounds, 818
F.2d 901, 920-21 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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We also find the district court's other reasons for
dismissing the FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
to be unpersuasive. As the government seems to concede on appeal,
the court apparently misapplied or misconstrued the import of the
law review article it relied on, which addressed different deemed
denial situations (this suit was Rosario's first exercise of his
deemed denial option). See 898 F. Supp. 2d at 421-25 (discussing
Ugo Colello, The Case for Borrowing a Limitations Period for
Deemed-Denial Suits Brought Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 391, 393-94, 407 (Spring 1998)). In
Rosario's case, the six-month limitations period would not have
started running until the agency issued and mailed by certified
mail its final written denial of his pending claims, which occurred
in February 2010, after he had filed this suit (in November 2009).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Case law not mentioned by the district
court also indicates that the filing of this suit did not deprive
the agency of its power to consider and finally determine Rosario's
pending claims, although the agency apparently was required to
consult in advance with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). See
Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting a contention that the filing of a suit deprives the
agency of power to act); 3 Lester S. Jayson & Hon. Robert C.
Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims, § 14.06[1], at 14-128 to
-128.1 (2013) (distinguishing situations where claimants have
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formally withdrawn their administrative claims in writing); 28
C.F.R. § 14.6(d)(2) (agencies must consult with the DOJ before
settling or determining a claim based on an incident or transaction
that is being litigated). Nor does it appear that there was any
administrative appeals procedure that Rosario should have exhausted
before filing suit in November 2009. Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (once
their claims have been finally denied, claimants "may" seek
reconsideration under certain circumstances).
For the above reasons, we vacate the district court's
judgment insofar as it dismissed Rosario's FTCA claims for lack of
jurisdiction and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.
4. We find Rosario's arguments based on the district
court's denial of his motions for default judgments against the
defendants and its alleged violation of one of its standing case
management orders to be meritless.
5. Except as indicated above, we affirm the district
court's findings on the remaining issues essentially for the
reasons it gives and/or because Rosario fails to develop any claim
of error on appeal.
6. We note that it is unclear whether the initial
November 2009 complaint or the March 2010 amended complaint is the
operative one. See, e.g., 898 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (treating the
complaint as the operative pleading); id. at 431 (addressing
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Rosario's "libel" claims, a term that appears only in the amended
complaint). This question should be clarified on remand.
The district court's judgment is affirmed in part and
vacated in part, and the matter is remanded in part as indicated
herein, with costs awarded only to appellees-defendants CMS and San
Lucas.
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