United States v. Rodriguez

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1275
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
AMANDA RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Selya and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
William Maselli on brief for appellant.
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, and Margaret
D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
April 21, 2015
Per Curiam. A jury convicted defendant-appellant Amanda
Rodriguez of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a
mixture or substance containing cocaine base (crack cocaine). See
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court
sentenced her to serve a 36-month incarcerative term. Rodriguez
now appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to
ground her conviction and that the district court's jury
instructions were flawed. Finding these claims of error
unpersuasive, we summarily affirm.
We begin with Rodriguez's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence. Such a challenge can succeed only if the evidence,
viewed in the light most hospitable to the verdict, could not have
convinced any reasonable trier of fact of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez,
597 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d
703, 706 (1st Cir. 1994). The evidence against Rodriguez easily
passes muster under this government-friendly standard.
We need not tarry. Viewing the record evidence most
favorably to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the government's favor, see United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210,
216 (1st Cir. 1995), a jury could reasonably find — as this jury
did — that an agreement existed to possess crack cocaine with
intent to distribute and that Rodriguez joined the agreement
intending that the underlying crime be committed. After all, the
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government presented, inter alia, evidence that Rodriguez allowed
her apartment to be used as a "trap house" from which the
conspiracy sold drugs; that Rodriguez sometimes took charge of
particular transactions; that Rodriguez drove the ringleader to
Connecticut, where he obtained drugs which were then individually
packaged; that Rodriguez placed the drugs in her pants "under her
stomach" for transportation back to Maine; that Rodriguez later
removed the drugs from this location to allow another co-
conspirator (Velasquez) to secrete them in a body cavity; and that,
after watching Velasquez hide the drugs, Rodriguez drove her back
to Maine. No more was exigible to allow the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez was guilty of the charged
crime. As we have said, "[t]he government may prove its case
entirely by circumstantial evidence and need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, provided the record as a whole
supports a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 86-87 (1st Cir. 1990).
Rodriguez's claim of instructional error is equally
unavailing. She objects to the district court's use of an aiding
and abetting instruction, saying that such an instruction is
improper in a conspiracy case. But this court has previously held
that a defendant can be convicted of a conspiracy charge as an
aider and abettor. See United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 751
(1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 30
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(1st Cir. 2002). Oreto establishes the law of the circuit: it is
still good law (it has never been overruled or called into serious
question), and this panel is bound to adhere to it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[I]n
a multi-panel circuit, prior panel decisions are binding upon newly
constituted panels in the absence of supervening authority
sufficient to warrant disregard of established precedent.").
Because there was evidence here to support an aiding and abetting
instruction, the court below did not err in instructing the jury in
accordance with Oreto.
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is summarily affirmed. See 1st
Cir. R. 27.0(c).
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