Hilton v. Kerry

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-2444
ALEXANDER HILTON,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
JOHN KERRY, United States Secretary of State; ERIC H. HOLDER,
United States Attorney General; JOHN GIBBONS, United States
Marshal, District of Massachusetts,
Respondents, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Monica R. Shah, with whom Norman Zalkind and Zalkind Duncan &
Bernstein LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Theodore B. Heinrich, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellees.
June 12, 2014
LYNCH, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from a denial of
a habeas corpus petition asking the court to block extradition.
Upon receiving an official request from the United
Kingdom, the United States sought extradition of Alexander Hilton,
a United States citizen, to face an attempted murder charge in
Scotland. Hilton argued that, because of his mental health
problems, he may not be extradited because extradition would cause
him an increased risk of suicide, and so violate his Fifth
Amendment right to due process under the United States
Constitution. In addition, Hilton argued that he may not be
extradited because trial under the Scottish jury system requires
only a simple majority for conviction and that would violate his
U.S. constitutional rights.1 After a hearing, a magistrate judge
found Hilton extraditable and issued a Certificate of
Extraditability. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
Hilton then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
seeking to block extradition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also In re
Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993)
(explaining that "neither party to an extradition proceeding may
challenge a decision rendered therein by direct appeal"). The
district court denied the petition. See Hilton v. Kerry,
1
Hilton also alleged a derivative violation of this
country's treaty obligations under the United States-United Kingdom
extradition treaty, Extradition Treaty Between the United States of
America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108–23.
-2-
No. 13-11710-TSH, 2013 WL 5755485 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2013). We
affirm the district court.
I.
A. Allegations
Hilton attended the University of St. Andrews in Scotland
from September 2009 through March 2011. United Kingdom authorities
allege that on or about March 5, 2011, Hilton attempted to murder
a fellow student, Robert Forbes, by spiking a bottle of wine with
methanol, giving the bottle to Forbes, and encouraging him to drink
the contents. Because of Hilton's continuous encouragement, the
allegations continue, Forbes drank most of the contents of the
bottle. Forbes was later hospitalized. According to the request
for extradition, a treating neurologist "is of the opinion that if
[Forbes] had not received medical treatment then he may have
sustained kidney failure or other neurological deficit. Due to the
high levels of acid in his blood this would have resulted in his
death." Forbes is alleged to have lost initially his eyesight as
a result of the incident, though it has since improved. Forbes
continues to require and receive medical treatment.
Following the incident, police recovered evidence that
Hilton had purchased a plastic funnel and glass measuring jug from
a local store. In addition, police recovered Hilton's laptop,
analysis of which showed that a user had on March 7, 2011 -- two
days after the poisoning but two days before Forbes' condition was
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diagnosed -- accessed web pages containing information regarding
methanol poisoning and the long term effects thereof. In addition,
analysis showed that, on an unknown date, a user had conducted
Google search for "methanol mixed with ethanol."
Scottish authorities interrogated Hilton for five hours
on March 11, 2011 but did not charge him at that time. On March
15, 2011, Hilton sought and received a leave of absence from St.
Andrews, citing, among other things, his personal and medical
circumstances (see infra). Hilton left Scotland and returned to
his home in Massachusetts on March 22, 2011. On October 11, 2012,
the British Embassy submitted a diplomatic note formally requesting
that Hilton be extradited. Hilton was charged with attempted
murder in Scotland, and a warrant for his arrest was issued on
December 2, 2012. On February 12, 2013, the United States filed a
complaint seeking an arrest warrant and the extradition of Hilton.
Hilton was arrested on February 13, 2013.
B. Hilton's Mental Health Problems
Hilton, now age 22, has a long history of mental illness
including suicidal thoughts and ideation. According to Dr. Judith
G. Edersheim, a psychiatrist retained by Hilton's counsel to
evaluate Hilton, Hilton suffers from "a primary psychotic disorder,
a primary disorder of thought," with diagnostic considerations
pointing to schizophrenia, delusional disorder, or generalized
psychotic disorder.
-4-
After his arrest, Hilton was transferred to Wyatt
Detention Facility. Immediately, Hilton began to engage in
suicidal behaviors. Officials placed Hilton on suicide watch. His
attorneys report that Hilton became increasingly despondent,
refusing nutrition. While detained, Hilton also expressed overt
psychotic thoughts, including auditory, visual, and tactile
hallucinations.
In Dr. Edersheim's opinion, Hilton's suicidal thoughts
and ideations worsen whenever he is away from his home and the set
of supports his family has put in place. She opines further that
extradition to Scotland would greatly increase Hilton's risk of
suicide.
C. Extradition Proceedings and Bail
Ten days after his arrest, Hilton filed a motion to
permit visits from his treating psychologists. The Government
assented, and, based upon a showing of medical necessity, the
magistrate judge granted the motion the same day. Around the same
time, Hilton filed a motion for release from custody on bail
pending extradition proceedings, arguing, among other things, that
his psychiatric illness was severely exacerbated as soon as he was
placed in custody. After a hearing, the magistrate judge found
that special circumstances existed overriding the presumption
against granting bail in extradition proceedings and that Hilton
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did not pose a serious risk of flight or danger to the community.
She ordered him released on conditions on March 4, 2013.2
The magistrate judge held an extradition hearing on March
7, 2013. On May 3, 2013, she issued a decision finding Hilton
extraditable to Scotland and, soon after, a Certificate of
Extraditability. The decision found that Hilton conceded that a
valid treaty exists between the United States and the United
Kingdom, that the charged crime of attempted murder is covered by
the treaty, and that probable cause exists for the charged crime.
Relying upon the rule of non-inquiry, the decision rejected
Hilton's argument that, by subjecting him to Scottish criminal
procedure, extradition would violate his constitutional rights and,
as a consequence, certain provisions of the extradition treaty.
The decision also rejected Hilton's argument that extradition
should be barred on humanitarian grounds, reasoning that, under the
federal extradition statute, such considerations were properly
addressed to the Secretary of State. The magistrate judge ordered
a stay of the Certificate of Extraditability so that Hilton could
diligently pursue a habeas petition.
2
Hilton's current release is set to end upon the termination
of habeas proceedings. In the extradition proceedings below, the
magistrate judge appears to have left open whether, under the
extradition statute, she retains authority to order release for the
period after habeas proceedings have terminated but prior to
extradition. The Government has not challenged before this court
the earlier order granting release. We do not address the issue.
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D. Habeas Proceedings
Hilton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
July 16, 2013, again seeking to prevent his extradition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, Hilton claimed first that
extradition should be blocked because of certain features of
Scotland's criminal procedure, and second that extradition would
violate his constitutional rights because of the risk he would
commit suicide if extradited. Hilton, 2013 WL 5755485, at *2-3.
The district court denied Hilton's petition on October 22, 2013.
Id. at *5. The court rejected Hilton's claim for relief based upon
Scotland's jury system, reasoning that the rule of non-inquiry
prevented it from looking into the fairness of the procedures that
await Hilton if he is extradited. Id. at *2-3. The district court
also rejected Hilton's claim based upon his mental health issues,
observing that "humanitarian concerns, such as the one Hilton
raises, surrounding extradition are exclusively within the purview
of the Secretary of State." Id. at *4. Hilton had argued that his
mental health claim was predicated on an alleged violation of his
due process rights, as opposed to humanitarian concerns, citing
Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) and In
re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482-87 (7th Cir. 1984). The district
court reasoned, however, that, "[u]nlike [in] Plaster and Burt, in
Hilton's case there is no action by the United States beyond the
extradition proceeding that might violate Hilton's due process
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rights." Hilton, 2013 WL 5755485, at *4. The district court
ordered a stay of its decision denying habeas relief pending
appeal.
II.
The United States judiciary has a limited role in
extradition proceedings. "Extradition is an executive, not a
judicial, function." Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen, 993 F.2d 824,
828 (11th Cir. 1993). "Because extradition is a creature of
treaty, 'the power to extradite derives from the President's power
to conduct foreign affairs.'" Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588,
606 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 194
(3d Cir. 1997)); see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see generally
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22
(1936).
As such, "[e]xtradition is a matter of foreign policy
entirely within the discretion of the executive branch, except to
the extent that the statute interposes a judicial function."
Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997),
superseded by regulation on other grounds as recognized by
Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). A
judicial officer who presides over an extradition proceeding "is
not exercising 'any part of the judicial power of the United
States,'" In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d at 1325 (quoting In
re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 120 (1852)), but instead "acts in
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a non-institutional capacity by virtue of a 'special authority,'"
id. (quoting In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 191 (1847)).
A. Federal Extradition Statute
Extradition proceedings in the United States are governed
by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. "The statute establishes a
two-step procedure which divides responsibility for extradition
between a judicial officer and the Secretary of State." United
States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997) (footnote
omitted). Once a formal complaint is filed, the judicial officer3
must determine whether there is an extradition treaty between the
United States and the relevant foreign government and whether the
crime charged is covered by that treaty. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
Assuming both questions are answered in the affirmative, the
judicial officer issues a warrant for the arrest of the individual
sought for extradition (commonly referred to as the "relator").
Id. If a warrant issues, the judicial officer then conducts a
hearing to determine whether "the evidence [is] sufficient to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the . . . treaty." Id.If it is, the judicial officer "shall certify" to the Secretary of
State that a warrant for the surrender of the named individual "may
issue." Id. (emphases added). The judicial officer must also
3
"[A]ny justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of the United
States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction
of any State" may serve as the judicial officer. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
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provide to the Secretary of State a copy of all testimony and
evidence from the extradition hearing. Id.The statute commits to the sole discretion of the
Secretary of State the ultimate decision of whether to extradite.
See id. § 3186 ("The Secretary of State may order the person
committed under section[] 3184 . . . to be delivered to any
authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the
offense . . . charged." (emphasis added)). "The Secretary may
. . . decline to surrender the relator on any number of
discretionary grounds, including but not limited to, humanitarian
and foreign policy considerations." Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 109. In
addition, the Secretary may attach conditions to the relator's
release. See Jimenez v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Fla.,
Miami Div., 84 S. Ct. 14, 19 (1963) (Goldberg, J., chambers
opinion) (denying stay of extradition and describing commitments
made by Venezuelan government to United States Department of State
as a condition of surrender of fugitive).
B. Rule of Non-Inquiry
Judicial involvement in the extradition process is also
constrained by the "rule of non-inquiry." "[T]his doctrine bars
courts from evaluating the fairness and humaneness of another
country's criminal justice system, requiring deference to the
Executive Branch on such matters." Khouzam v. Att'y Gen. of U.S.,
549 F.3d 235, 253 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
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674, 700 (2008) ("Such allegations are of course a matter of
serious concern, but in the present context that concern is to be
addressed by the political branches, not the judiciary.");
Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) ("We are bound by the
existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be
fair."); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901) ("In the
judgment of Congress these [treaty] provisions were deemed adequate
to the ends of justice in cases of persons committing crimes in a
foreign country . . . and subsequently fleeing to this country. We
cannot adjudge that Congress in this matter has abused its
discretion, nor decline to enforce obedience to its will as
expressed . . . ."). The rule of non-inquiry "serves interests of
international comity by relegating to political actors the
sensitive foreign policy judgments that are often involved in the
question of whether to refuse an extradition request." Hoxha v.
Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Koskotas v. Roche,
931 F.2d 169, 174 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing that "extradition
proceedings 'necessarily implicate the foreign policy interests of
the United States'" (quoting Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d
1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980))).4 As this court explained in
4
The rule of non-inquiry is related to the "act of state"
doctrine, which "in its traditional formulation precludes the
courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within
its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 401 (1964); see Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 111 n.11 (noting
parallel); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
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Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 111, "[i]t is not that questions about what
awaits the relator in the requesting country are irrelevant to
extradition; it is that there is another branch of government,
which has both final say and greater discretion in these
proceedings, to whom these questions are more properly addressed."
See also Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990) ("It is
the function of the Secretary of State to determine whether
extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds."); Escobedo,
623 F.2d at 1107 ("[T]he degree of risk to [the relator's] life
from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the
exclusive purview of the executive branch." (quoting Sindona v.
Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980))).
III.
On appeal, Hilton argues first that, in light of his
severe psychological impairments and high risk of suicide, his
extradition to Scotland would violate his Fifth Amendment right to
due process. As presented here, this claim amounts to a challenge
to the conditions awaiting him in Scotland, and is barred by the
rule of non-inquiry. Next, on appeal Hilton presses an argument
not fully developed below regarding whether his medical condition
precludes placing him in custody -- either in the United States or
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972) (plurality opinion) (explaining that
the act of state doctrine was "fashioned because of fear that
adjudication would interfere with the conduct of foreign
relations").
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in Scotland. This claim, however, is simply too speculative at
this stage.5 Finally, Hilton claims that his extradition would
violate his constitutional rights because Scotland allows simple
majority jury verdicts, and that because the Senate was never
apprised of the Scottish jury system it did not give its knowing
advice and consent to the United States-United Kingdom extradition
treaty as required by Article II, § 2, cl. 2. The former claim
fails under the rule of non-inquiry, as this court may not pass
judgment on the merits of the Scottish jury system. The latter
claim fails because it is not for this court to consider whether
the Senate's advice and consent was substantively adequate. The
Secretary may choose to assess and credit Hilton's claims that his
mental health status should bar extradition on humanitarian
grounds, and that he will not receive an adequate jury trial. We
will not bar extradition on either basis.
A. Standard of Review
On appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, this court reviews the district court's legal
conclusions de novo, In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d at 1327,
and any factual findings for clear error, Gomes v. Brady, 564 F.3d
532, 536 (1st Cir. 2009). Ordinarily, "habeas corpus is available
only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether
5
Whether Hilton raised before the district court precisely
the nuances he raises before us is unclear, but the claim fails
under any standard of review.
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the offense charged is within the treaty, and . . . whether there
was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable
ground to believe the accused guilty." Koskotas, 931 F.2d at 171(alteration in original) (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S.
311, 312 (1925)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, as
this court has observed, "serious due process concerns may merit
review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in extradition
proceedings." In re Extradition of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st
Cir. 1989); see also Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223,
1229 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Despite our limited role in extradition
proceedings, the judiciary must ensure that the constitutional
rights of individuals subject to extradition are observed.").6
B. Mental Illness
Hilton argues that his extradition to Scotland would
result in an increased risk of suicide and would thereby involve
deliberate indifference on the part of the United States officials
6
As the Seventh Circuit explained in In re Burt:
[T]he broad language of Fernandez, which on its
face would appear to restrict the scope of inquiry
here, must be construed "in the context of its time
and in the context of subsequent development of the
scope of habeas corpus review." Only subsequent to
Fernandez did the Supreme Court substantially
redefine the scope of habeas corpus review, which
previously had been tied to an examination of
jurisdictional defects, to include an evaluation of
whether the petitioner is being held in violation
of any of his or her constitutional rights.
737 F.2d at 1484.
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authorizing the extradition. Hilton's argument fails under the
rule of non-inquiry.
Hilton emphasizes that doubts about the ability of the
United States authorities to keep him from committing suicide
during the period leading up to the Secretary's decision whether to
extradite substantiates his claim that he should not be extradited
at all. Such doubts, however, rest on speculation.
Hilton's core argument is that his extradition to
Scotland would result in his suffering from an increased risk of
suicide and, for that reason, that United States officials would
infringe upon his due process rights by authorizing the
extradition. It rests upon on a "state created danger" theory of
due process. See Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.
2005). The argument is squarely foreclosed by the rule of
non-inquiry. Whether the conditions Hilton would face would have
deleterious effects on his mental health so as to constitute a bar
to extradition (or require conditions on extradition) is a question
for the Secretary of State and not for this court.
Hilton contends that the rule of non-inquiry has no
application here because his allegations are directed at United
States officials as opposed to officials from the requesting state.
On Hilton's theory, any challenge to the conditions awaiting an
individual upon extradition could be recast as a challenge to the
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conduct of United States officials on the basis of but-for
causation. The rule of non-inquiry is not so easily circumvented.
Hilton points to Plaster and Burt as extradition cases in
which the rule of non-inquiry did not bar consideration of a
petitioner's due process claim based upon the actions of United
States officials. He mischaracterizes those cases. Both Plaster
and Burt involved challenges based upon actions or inaction by
United States officials apart from the act of extradition itself.
In Plaster, for example, the petitioner challenged the Government's
alleged breach of an immunity agreement. 720 F.2d at 344-45. In
Burt, the petitioner challenged extradition on the ground that the
Government had waited fifteen years before deciding to extradite.
737 F.2d at 1485-86. Here, by contrast, Hilton's challenge is
based only on the fact of extradition itself and seeks to block it.
As the district court explained:
No case law suggests that courts have the
authority to go beyond the limited statutorily
prescribed inquiry when the extradition itself
is the only action challenged. Instead, the
case law clearly shows that when humanitarian
concerns surrounding the extradition are
raised, including those involving danger to
the relator's life, they are for the Secretary
of State to consider.
Hilton, 2013 WL 5755485, at *4.7
7
Hilton argues that the principle of reciprocity counsels in
favor of judicial consideration of humanitarian concerns to the
extent that the United Kingdom instructs its courts, when
considering a request for extradition, to take such considerations
into account. See United Kingdom Extradition Act, 2003, 41, § 91
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In an effort to avoid this outcome, Hilton invokes
Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960). In that case, the
Second Circuit expressed some hesitation toward the rule of
non-inquiry, opining that it could "imagine situations where the
relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or
punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as
to require reexamination of the principle [of non-inquiry]." Id.
at 79. This court expressed a similar possible caveat in Kin-Hong.
110 F.3d at 112 ("None of these principles, including non-inquiry,
may be regarded as an absolute."). No court has yet applied such
a theoretical Gallina exception. Hoxha, 465 F.3d at 564 n.14. It
does not help Hilton here and we decline to apply such an
exception.
These arguments may be made to the Secretary. In
addition, Hilton may request that the Secretary of State, in an
exercise of discretion, attach conditions to Hilton's extradition
ensuring his safety in Scotland. It is not the role of this court
to supplant the Secretary's authority to respond to such a request.
Cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149 (2013)
(holding that harm alleged is not cognizable where it is based upon
(instructing courts to determine whether "the physical or mental
condition of the person is such that it would be unjust or
oppressive to extradite him"). The United Kingdom delegates
consideration of humanitarian concerns to the judiciary while, in
contrast, the United States delegates such considerations to the
executive. That difference is not evidence of lack of reciprocity.
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"speculat[ion] as to how [Executive Branch officials] will exercise
their discretion").
We turn briefly to Hilton's newly presented argument. As
confirmed by counsel at oral argument, the relief Hilton seeks in
this habeas action is an order barring his extradition to Scotland.
He raises, in further pursuit of that relief, what purports to be
a due process challenge based upon his pre-extradition detention in
the United States.
Hilton argues specifically that the Government cannot
comply with its obligation to address his high risk of suicide if
he is detained and so pre-extradition detention would result in
"deliberate indifference" to that risk on the part of United States
officials. Hilton relies on a finding by the magistrate judge in
the order granting Hilton's release following a bail hearing that
Hilton's "serious psychiatric condition is likely to deteriorate if
he is held in custody." At the bail hearing, the Government
"conceded that inpatient hospitalization at a mental health
facility may be appropriate in this case" and that "there are no
federal secure mental health facilities for pretrial detainees
where Hilton could be housed and treated." At that same hearing,
however, the Government also said it would locate a third-party
inpatient facility at which Hilton's medical needs could be met.
We disagree with Hilton that he has established that the
Government is unable to provide proper care and safekeeping for
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him.8 We have no reason to expect that the Government, having now
been made acutely aware of Hilton's mental health conditions, will
be insensitive to that issue going forward. Indeed, we note that
the Government did assent to Hilton's motion to be seen by his
treating psychologist once he began to psychologically deteriorate
after first being taken into custody. At this juncture, Hilton's
claims concerning the conditions of his pre-extradition detention
are too speculative for this court to consider. See Clapper, 133
S. Ct. at 1149. At this stage, Hilton can and should express his
medical concerns to the Secretary, not the judiciary.
C. Scotland's Simple Majority Jury Trial
Hilton argues that extradition for trial in Scotland --
where a simple majority of jurors is sufficient to return a guilty
verdict -- would violate his constitutional rights because the
Senate was not aware of this aspect of Scottish criminal procedure
when it consented to the United States-United Kingdom extradition
treaty. In effect, Hilton asks this court to declare that the
Senate's "[c]onsent" to the treaty was not sufficiently informed
for purposes of Article II, § 2, cl. 2. Hilton's claim evinces a
fundamental misunderstanding of our Constitution's separation of
powers.
8
We assume without deciding that the "deliberate
indifference" standard applies in the context of pre-extradition
detention.
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Hilton's argument is built on two premises. First,
citing Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (holding that
conviction on the basis of a five-to-one majority of a six person
jury was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial), Hilton says that, as a legal matter, conviction on the
basis of a simple majority of a fifteen person jury would conflict
with the Sixth Amendment's jury trial requirement. Second, Hilton
asserts that, as a historical matter, the Senate was not informed
of Scotland's jury trial practice prior to consenting to the
treaty. From this, Hilton infers that his extradition would be
violative of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
As to Hilton's first premise, it is well settled that
"surrender of an American citizen required by treaty for purposes
of a foreign criminal proceeding is unimpaired by an absence in the
foreign judicial system of safeguards in all respects equivalent to
those constitutionally enjoined upon American trials." Holmes v.
Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1972); accord Neely, 180 U.S.
at 123. The rule of non-inquiry could not stand otherwise. See
Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 110 ("Under the rule of non-inquiry, courts
refrain from 'investigating the fairness of a requesting country's
judicial system' . . . ." (quoting In re Extradition of Howard, 996
F.2d at 1329)).
Here too Hilton invokes the Gallina exception. This
argument plainly fails. In Kin-Hong, for example, this court found
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that extradition of a relator to Hong Kong was consistent with its
"sense of decency," reasoning that the relator was "wanted for
. . . activities whose criminality is fully recognized in the
United States. His extradition [was] sought by . . . a colony of
Great Britain, which . . . is one of this country's most trusted
treaty partners." 110 F.3d at 112. For similar reasons, we find
no occasion to apply the Gallina exception here where extradition
is sought by a country within the United Kingdom.
As to Hilton's second premise, the suggestion that this
court may sit in judgment of the Senate in its performance of its
advice and consent duties is without basis. Hilton cites no case
in support of his ambitious conception of the judicial role. This
lack of support is unsurprising. For "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative -- 'the political' -- departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision." Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918);
cf. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839)
(observing that, with respect to questions of foreign relations,
"it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the Court
to determine, whether the executive be right or wrong. It is
enough to know, that in the exercise of his constitutional
functions, he has decided the question").
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Hilton concedes that the crime charged is covered by the
treaty. He does not contest that the Senate consented to the
treaty with the requisite number of votes. See U.S. Const. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that "two thirds of the Senators present
concur"). As to the adequacy of the Senate's consent, that is the
end of the matter.
IV.
The district court's denial of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is affirmed.
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