United States v. Diaz-Castro

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2038
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JAVIER DIAZ-CASTRO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
María H. Sandoval, Peter Goldberger, and Pamela A. Wilk on
brief for appellant.
Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney,
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Nelson
Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, on brief for appellee.
May 23, 2014
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Defendant Javier Diaz-Castro,
formerly of the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD), was caught
committing crimes through a sting operation aimed at corrupt police
officers. Diaz-Castro provided armed protection at what he
believed were two drug deals approximately five weeks apart in
February and March 2010. He was found guilty by a jury on multiple
counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, attempt to possess with intent to distribute
a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking crime. Following his conviction, Diaz-Castro
was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment.
Diaz-Castro appeals, arguing that various aspects of his
conviction and sentence were erroneous. Like many caught in sting
operations, he argues entrapment, along with other issues. We
affirm the convictions and sentence.
I.
Seeking to combat corruption in the PRPD, in 2008, the
FBI began a large sting operation, known as "Operation Guard
Shack," as has been detailed in other cases arising out of the same
operation. See United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167,
171-72 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Díaz-Maldonado, 727
F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2013). The FBI recruited PRPD officers to
work for it as confidential informants; those officers then invited
suspect PRPD officers to participate for pay by providing armed
-2-
protection for (sham) drug transactions. See Díaz-Maldonado, 727
F.3d at 134. The officers who so participated often recruited
other officers into the scheme. See Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at
172-73 & n.5.
In late January or early February 2010, Diaz-Castro was
invited by fellow PRPD officer Angel Rivera-Ortiz, known as
"Kento," to provide armed protection at a drug deal on February 4,
2010. Diaz-Castro and Kento were apparently friends. Kento was a
target in the sting operation, as he had been recruited for and had
participated in two other Guard Shack deals before this one.
On February 4, Diaz-Castro and Kento arrived at the
apartment in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, where the deal was to take
place. They drank beer and socialized with the purported seller,
undercover agent Germán Vázquez. Diaz-Castro and Kento moved into
position when the purported buyer arrived. They frisked the buyer
and took up security positions around the room. A video of the
deal shows that Diaz-Castro carried his regulation firearm during
the transaction. The deal was for eight kilograms of cocaine;
during the deal, the buyer counted out six kilograms in front of
Diaz-Castro. After the deal was consummated, as caught on tape,
Kento and Diaz-Castro were each paid $2,000.1
1
Diaz-Castro asserts he was paid only $1,000. The
distinction is immaterial to our analysis.
-3-
Later (the record does not reveal the precise date),
Diaz-Castro was contacted directly by a confidential informant, who
invited him to provide protection at another drug deal if he
brought along another police officer willing to provide the illicit
protection. Diaz-Castro recruited Ramón Benítez-Falcon, a friend
and fellow PRPD officer. Diaz-Castro also told Benítez-Falcon to
bring a handgun with him, as the PRPD had taken Diaz-Castro's
police-issued weapon on March 4, 2010, because a domestic violence
complaint had been filed against him.
This second transaction took place at the Conrad Hotel in
San Juan, Puerto Rico on March 12, 2010. Like the first
transaction, Diaz-Castro spent time drinking and socializing with
the other participants in the deal, then moved into position when
the buyer arrived. At the request of the undercover officer,
Vázquez, Diaz-Castro handed him a bag purportedly containing nine
kilograms of cocaine, which Vázquez passed along to the buyer; the
buyer pulled out and inspected five kilograms. The deal
successfully concluded. Diaz-Castro and Benítez-Falcon were each
paid $2,000. After getting paid, Diaz-Castro stayed in the room
with the purported seller and others, drinking beer and
socializing.
On September 16, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted
Diaz-Castro on six counts. The charges came within a broader
indictment reaching other officers who had been caught in the same
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set of sham drug transactions, including Kento and Benítez-Falcon.2
The counts relevant to Diaz-Castro were:
Count 8: Conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, from
January 27 to February 4, 2010, under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Count 9: Attempt to possess with intent to distribute
a controlled substance on February 4, 2010,
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Count 10: Possession of a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking crime, on February 4, 2010, under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Count 14: Conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, from
February 16, 2010 to March 12, 2010, under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Count 15: Attempt to possess with intent to distribute
a controlled substance, on March 12, 2010,
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Count 16: Aiding and abetting possession of a firearm
in relation to a drug trafficking crime, on
March 12, 2010, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Diaz-Castro went to trial and was convicted by a jury on
all six counts in December 2011. The jury also made special
findings that the February 4 drug deal (Counts 8-9) involved eight
kilograms of fake cocaine, while the March 12 drug deal (Counts
14-15) involved nine kilograms.
The district court sentenced Diaz-Castro in July 2012.
Diaz-Castro received the mandatory minimum sentence on all counts:
2
Benítez-Falcon ultimately pled guilty and became a
cooperating witness for the government, testifying against
Diaz-Castro.
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10 years for each of the drug trafficking and conspiracy counts
(Counts 8, 9, 14, and 15), 5 years for the first firearms count
(Count 10), and 25 years for the second firearms count (Count 16).
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (drug trafficking crimes); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (firearms in drug offense); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (second conviction for firearms in drug offense).
The 10-year drug trafficking sentences were to run concurrently,
after which the 5-year and 25-year firearms sentences were to be
served consecutively. That sentence totals to 40 years'
imprisonment. Diaz-Castro timely appealed.
II.
Diaz-Castro presents a variety of challenges to his
conviction and sentence. Specifically, he argues: (1) that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the
district court erroneously denied him the opportunity to present
entrapment, derivative entrapment, or duress defenses; (3) that the
prosecutor's statements at closing argument improperly shifted the
burden onto the defendant and improperly vouched for witnesses; and
(4) that the two conspiracies were in fact a single one and so
Diaz-Castro should have been convicted and sentenced on only a
single count of conspiracy, and on only one count of possession of
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firearms in relation to a drug trafficking crime. We address each
of these arguments in turn.3
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
At multiple points during his trial, Diaz-Castro filed
motions for acquittal, claiming that the government's evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
The district court denied each, and Diaz-Castro now argues that
those denials constitute reversible error.
We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo.
See United States v. Willson, 708 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2013).
Denial of a motion for acquittal is proper if, "taking the evidence
at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a
rational factfinder could find that the government proved each
essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2013). In this case, the
evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to support the
jury's verdict.
3
Before reaching Diaz-Castro's principal arguments, we note
what is not at issue in this case. In the district court, Diaz-
Castro argued that his conviction as to Count 16 should be reversed
due to lack of sufficient notice in the indictment, and that his
entire sentence should be vacated due to sentencing factor
manipulation. The district court rejected both arguments. In his
opening brief, Diaz-Castro did not argue that the district court's
decisions were erroneous, much less why they were. Thus, those
arguments are waived. See, e.g., United States v. Miliano, 480
F.3d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
-7-
As to Count 8 (the first conspiracy count), the evidence
at trial showed that Diaz-Castro agreed with Kento to provide armed
protection at a drug deal. A video recording of the transaction,
introduced at trial, shows Diaz-Castro arriving, socializing, then
frisking the buyer for weapons, and accepting payment for his
services, all overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. As to
Count 9 (attempted drug trafficking with respect to the first
transaction), the video also showed the purported buyer counting
six kilograms of a substance he claimed was cocaine in Diaz-
Castro's presence, then consummating the transaction. And as to
Count 10 (possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime), the video further shows that Diaz-Castro brought his
firearm and had it with him during the transaction.
The evidence equally supports the jury's verdict with
respect to the second transaction. As to Count 14 (the second
conspiracy count), Benítez-Falcon, the officer Diaz-Castro
recruited, testified that he had agreed with Diaz-Castro to provide
armed protection for the drug deal. The video of the transaction,
introduced at trial, shows that Diaz-Castro actually played a part
in the drug deal, including handing the bag containing the fake
drugs to the seller. As to Count 15 (attempted drug trafficking
with respect to the first transaction), the video also shows the
seller counting out quantities of the fake drugs and transferring
the fake drugs to the buyer. And as to Count 16 (aiding and
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abetting possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime), Benítez-Falcon testified that Diaz-Castro had instructed
him to bring a firearm to the deal, and that he actually did so, in
furtherance of the goal of providing security for the drug deal.
This evidence -- much of it objective video evidence --
is, when taken in the light most favorable to the government, more
than sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the government proved its case on all counts. That disposes
of the sufficiency claim.
Diaz-Castro makes two more limited arguments. First, he
argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
participated voluntarily, and that the jury should have heard
evidence of and been instructed on an entrapment or duress theory.
This argument turns on the validity of those defenses, and we
address it in that context below. Second, he argues that the fact
that he was unarmed at the second transaction precludes a guilty
verdict on the second firearms count. This argument neglects the
fact that the count charged "aiding and abetting" the firearms
crime, not direct possession of the firearm. Since the evidence
showed that Diaz-Castro recruited Benítez-Falcon and instructed him
to bring a firearm, it was sufficient to sustain the conviction.4
4
The Supreme Court recently addressed the topic of aider and
abettor liability in Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240
(2014). There, the Court clarified that "[a] defendant can be
convicted as an aider and abettor without proof that he
participated in each and every element of the offense," id. at 1246
-9-
B. Entrapment, Derivative Entrapment, and Duress Defenses
Before the trial, the government filed a motion in limine
to prohibit Diaz-Castro from entering certain evidence for the
purpose of supporting entrapment, derivative entrapment, or duress
defenses, arguing that none of the defenses were viable.5 In
response, Diaz-Castro pointed to the following: (1) phone calls
between the government's agents and Kento pressuring Kento to
recruit more officers; (2) acting by the purported seller, Vázquez,
at the time of the first drug deal that may have made Diaz-Castro
afraid to withdraw, such as comments implying that Vázquez was
armed, had used drugs that day, was suspicious that Diaz-Castro was
an undercover agent, and would shoot any law enforcement agents who
arrived; (3) Diaz-Castro's profuse sweating at the first deal;6 and
(4) similar acting by Vázquez at the time of the second deal,
although this time apparently mostly targeted at Benítez-Falcon.
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sigalow, 812
F.2d 783, 785 (2d Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
so long as he also has "advance knowledge" of the other elements,
id. at 1249. Diaz-Castro clearly had advance knowledge that
Benítez-Falcon would have a firearm, since he instructed
Benítez-Falcon to bring it.
5
Most of the evidence excluded consisted of a set of
audiotaped conversations between confidential informants and Kento
organizing the first drug deal, with two additional audiotaped
conversations between a confidential informant and Diaz-Castro
organizing the second drug deal.
6
In response to this piece of evidence, the government
points out that the room in which the purported drug deal occurred
was approximately 90 degrees Fahrenheit at the time, as the air
conditioner was not turned on until shortly before the deal.
-10-
The district court granted the government's motion, concluding that
this evidence did not establish the elements of any of the various
defenses. It subsequently denied Diaz-Castro's request for a jury
instruction on these defenses. Diaz-Castro argues that these
decisions were erroneous.
We review the evidentiary challenge for abuse of
discretion and review the refusal to give a jury instruction de
novo. See United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
There was no error in either of the rulings.
1. Duress
Duress is an affirmative defense requiring proof that the
defendant committed a crime as a result of (1) an immediate threat
of serious bodily injury or death (2) that the defendant reasonably
believed was true, (3) without a reasonable opportunity to escape
or frustrate the threat. See United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d
444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996). Diaz-Castro argues that he was coerced
into the drug transactions to the point of duress, and would not
otherwise have engaged in these crimes.
Not so. Diaz-Castro voluntarily came to the two
locations to participate in the drug deals. There is no evidence
that he was threatened before making the initial choice to
participate. He voluntarily chose to return for the second
transaction, making implausible his argument that he was so
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seriously threatened at the first as to have participated against
his will. There was no evidence in the record of an immediate
threat of injury or death that forced him to participate.
Diaz-Castro shifts his argument to what was said at the
transactions, arguing that Vázquez made intimidating statements at
the events, which coerced him into staying and participating when
he otherwise would have withdrawn. There was no record evidence of
any effort to withdraw. To the contrary, the video shows Diaz-
Castro was enjoying himself. Further, a defendant cannot claim a
duress defense if he "recklessly placed himself in a situation in
which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress."
United States v. Castro-Gómez, 360 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2004)
(quoting 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.3, at 622
(West 1996 & 2003 Supp.)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The
duress defense was not even colorable.
2. Entrapment
An entrapment defense requires proof that (1) the
government applied an improper degree of pressure or used other
improper tactics to induce the crime and (2) the defendant was not
already predisposed to commit the crime. United States v.
Santiago, 566 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2009). Diaz-Castro does not
point to any evidence showing that he would not have committed
these crimes but for improper pressure by the government. In fact,
he does not even claim that the government pressured him at all.
-12-
He joined the first conspiracy when asked by Kento without any
improper pressure, and he freely and voluntarily returned for a
second transaction.
3. Derivative Entrapment
Diaz-Castro also argues that he was entitled to put on a
derivative entrapment defense. The derivative entrapment doctrine
allows criminal defendants to assert they were entrapped when "a
government agent 'uses [an] unsuspecting middleman as a means of
passing on an inducement' to the defendant." United States v.
Luisi, 482 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting 2 W. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law, § 9.8(a), at 93 (2d ed. 2003)). We have
dealt with the derivative entrapment defense at length in two
cases: Luisi, 482 F.3d at 43, and United States v. Bradley, 820
F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1987).
In Bradley, a prison inmate was offered a reduced
sentence in exchange for providing a drug dealer to the police.
The inmate, acting as an agent of the police, approached co-
defendant James Brenner, whom he asked to provide a pound of
cocaine. See Bradley, 820 F.2d at 5-6. The inmate repeatedly
threatened Brenner with physical violence. Brenner, in turn,
reached out to defendant John Bradley for help. Bradley resisted
at first but ultimately agreed to help procure cocaine out of
concern for Brenner's physical safety. At trial, the jury
acquitted Brenner, presumably on his entrapment or duress defense,
-13-
but convicted Bradley. See id. On appeal, we affirmed Bradley's
conviction, finding no viable entrapment defense. We cited a
number of factual and policy considerations, namely: the fact that
the inmate had neither instructed nor expected Brenner to apply
improper pressure against a third party; the absence of direct
pressure on Bradley; the increased difficulties of proof when the
government is a stranger to the transaction; the difficulty of
investigating "victimless" drug crimes; and the relative social
importance of fighting this type of crime weighed against the
"offensive[ness]" of the government action. Id. at 6-9.
In Luisi, by contrast, the government's pressure was much
more direct. For several months, an undercover FBI agent attempted
to conclude a cocaine deal with La Cosa Nostra member Robert Luisi.
Eventually, the FBI had an informant in the organization tell the
organization's boss (and Luisi's superior) that Luisi had an
opportunity to make a profitable deal but was failing to execute on
it. Following this manipulation from the informant (although the
boss did not know of the FBI connection at the time), the boss
directly ordered Luisi to complete the transaction, and he complied
within two days. See Luisi, 482 F.3d at 45-48. At trial, the
district court declined to give a jury instruction stating that the
boss's order to Luisi could be attributed to the government.
See id. at 54. Luisi was convicted by a jury. On appeal, this
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court vacated the conviction. Id. at 45. We identified five
features in our case law defining the entrapment defense:
(1) a government agent specifically targeted
the defendant in order to induce him to commit
illegal conduct; (2) the agent acted through
the middleman after other government attempts
at inducing the defendant had failed; (3) the
government agent requested, encouraged, or
instructed the middleman to employ a specified
inducement, which could be found improper,
against the targeted defendant; (4) the
agent's actions led the middleman to do what
the government sought, even if the government
did not use improper means to influence the
middleman; and (5) as a result of the
middleman's inducement, the targeted defendant
in fact engaged in the illegal conduct.
Id. at 55.
Both Luisi and Bradley contemplate that, to establish a
derivative defense, the government must actually pressure the
defendant to commit a crime, even if it applies that pressure
through the medium of a government-instructed middleman. See
Luisi, 482 F.3d at 56, 58 (concluding that derivative entrapment
instruction is proper where a jury can find that the government
"was responsible" for the pressure brought to bear on the
defendant); Bradley, 820 F.2d at 8 (requiring a defendant seeking
to present a derivative entrapment defense to show, "at least,"
that "pressure had been put upon him by the intermediary at the
instruction of the government agent"). Thus, in Luisi, the
derivative entrapment defense was viable where a government agent
targeted the defendant by having his superior, a criminal gang
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lord, instruct him to commit a crime, while in Bradley, the defense
was not viable because there was no evidence that the government
had sought to pressure the defendant at all.
Diaz-Castro cannot show that the government was
responsible for pressuring him to commit a crime, since he has not
shown that he was pressured at all. To be sure, the government
agents asked Kento to recruit another officer into the scheme; but
they did not ask Kento to target Diaz-Castro, nor did they ask him
or reasonably expect him to apply pressure of any sort in
recruiting a confederate. Without any evidence of improper
pressure exerted upon him by Kento, Diaz-Castro cannot make out a
derivative entrapment claim.
Because none of the asserted defenses were viable, the
motion in limine was properly granted and the request for a jury
instruction was properly denied.
C. Government's Comments at Closing Argument
Diaz-Castro next argues that the prosecution's comments
during closing argument were improper for two reasons: first,
because they improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the
defense, and second, because they highlighted the risk of danger
associated with the undercover agent's job. We analyze de novo
whether the comments were improper. United States v. Glover, 558
F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2009). If we conclude that they were
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improper, we then review for harmless error, because Diaz-Castro
preserved his objections. See id.
1. Burden of Proof Comments
The following exchange took place during the closing
argument by Diaz-Castro's attorney, Ms. Sandoval:
[MS. SANDOVAL:] What informant, what
undercover agent contacted Javier Diaz-Castro
and urged him to bring another police officer,
to make sure that he had a weapon? You know
the answer to that question. And there were
informants in those DVDs. There were
informants in those DVDs. . . .
Why weren't those informants brought
into this courtroom so you could look at them
in the eyes, look at them sitting in that
chair, and let me interrogate and
cross-examine them?
MR. GIBSON: Objection. She could have
brought any one of them in here any time she
wanted to.
MS. SANDOVAL: Objection, Your Honor. This is
highly irregular.
THE COURT: Continue, Counsel.
MS. SANDOVAL: Highly irregular.
In whose control were these informants?
In response to what my colleague just said,
I'm going to ask you -- I'm going to ask you
to remember what the Honorable Judge Gelpi
said. My client is presumed innocent. He
doesn't have to put on one shred of evidence.
I could have painted my nails throughout this
trial and done nothing, and the Government
would still have the burden of proving my
client beyond a reasonable doubt.
The ones who had the duty to bring
those informants and put them on the stand --
MR. GIBSON: Objection, Objection.
THE COURT: Counsel, approach.
MS. SANDOVAL: I'll withdraw. I'll move on.
MR. GIBSON: No, Your Honor. I think we need
to approach.
-17-
Diaz-Castro points to the comment made during the first objection
-- "[s]he could have brought any one of them in here any time she
wanted to" -- and argues that this comment improperly shifted the
burden of proof onto the defendant. In response, the government
argues that the comments were not improper because they responded
to the discussion by Diaz-Castro's attorney of the government's
decision not to present certain witnesses.
In fact, the court had previously instructed the parties
that it would not allow an argument about missing witnesses.
Sandoval violated that instruction first. At a sidebar following
the above exchange, the court explained:
Ms. Sandoval, the mention that the Government
had to put informants on the stand or bring
them, that goes against the instructions I
gave. I know you had submitted that
instruction that I give. Now, I have to give
the jury a curative instruction because they
did not have to bring those informants. They
can choose who their witnesses are going to
be.
After hearing from the parties, the court ultimately gave two
curative instructions to the jury, stating:
Okay. Before the Government presents a
rebuttal, let me inform the members of the
jury the Government is entitled to present a
short rebuttal argument in a criminal case and
that is because the Government carries the
heavy burden of proving the case beyond a
reasonable doubt.
So before we hear from the prosecutor,
let me explain something. When Ms. Sandoval
did her closing, she mentioned that the
Government did not bring some particular
witnesses to testify. The Government is not
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required by the law or the constitution to
present every witness that may be available.
The witnesses and the evidence that you will
consider is only the evidence that was
presented here in court.
On the same token, the defendant, Mr.
Diaz-Castro, does not have to bring any
evidence nor present any witnesses. So you
only decide the case based on the evidence
that was presented here in court and not what
was not presented. You only consider what was
presented here in court.
So having said that, Mr. Gibson, if you
want to present a short rebuttal argument,
please go ahead.
Contrary to the government's contention, its comments
were improper: made in the context of a speaking objection before
the jury and entailing an incomplete statement of the law, they
suggested to the jury that the defense had to call any witnesses it
felt were missing. See United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006,
1015 (1st Cir. 1997) (vacating conviction for plain error where, in
part, prosecutor had said to jury, "the defendant has the same
responsibility [as the government] and that is to present a
compelling case"). Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the situation in
Roberts, the district court here considered both the prosecution's
error and the defense's error that had prompted the objection and
gave instructions that directly addressed both. The jury was
explicitly reminded that the burden -- a "heavy" one -- belongs
solely to the government, and that the defense's decision not to
call witnesses was irrelevant. Diaz-Castro does not argue that he
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was still prejudiced despite that instruction. In the context of
this trial, it is evident that the instruction was enough to render
harmless any defect that the prosecution's comments caused. Cf.
United States v. Ferrera, 746 F.2d 908, 910-11 (1st Cir. 1984)
(discussing factors relevant to harmlessness, including
contemporaneous curative instruction).
2. Comments on Risk to Undercover Agent
Diaz-Castro also argues that the prosecution's comments
regarding the risks that the undercover agent (Germán Vázquez)
faced were improper. Specifically, the prosecutor explained in
closing argument that Vázquez had received threats against his
family and ultimately had to move to Florida as a result of his
undercover work on Operation Guard Shack. Diaz-Castro argues that
this comment was improper under United States v. Ayala-García, 574
F.3d 5, 17-22 (1st Cir. 2009), which, he says, prohibits a
prosecutor from bolstering a witness's testimony or credibility by
pointing to the public service the witness has performed or the
danger he faced.7
In context, the prosecutor's comments were not improper.
The prosecutor was not suggesting that the mere fact that Vázquez's
work was dangerous made his testimony important, or that Diaz-
Castro was too dangerous to acquit. Instead, the prosecutor
7
Diaz-Castro does not argue that the statements about the
risks Vázquez faced were unsupported by the record -- in fact, he
admits that they were based on Vázquez's trial testimony.
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mentioned the threats against Vázquez's family and his need to
relocate to Florida in direct response to Diaz-Castro's argument,
as he frames it on appeal, that Vázquez "was a manipulative and
greedy man who had handled the FBI much better than they had
handled him." Diaz-Castro had tried to discredit Vázquez's
testimony by showing that he had used his role as an FBI informant
for significant personal gain; the government then rebutted that
argument by showing the risks and losses that Vázquez faced as a
result of his work in the operation. That is a valid response,
based on trial evidence, to the defense's attempt to damage the
witness's credibility. See United States v. Gentles, 619 F.3d 75,
84-85 (1st Cir. 2010). As such, those comments were not improper.
D. Multiplicity Challenges
Diaz-Castro argues he should have been convicted and
sentenced for only one conspiracy because both drug transactions
were part of a single, larger conspiracy. He argues that the
conspiracy counts, Counts 8 and 14, were artificially divided by
the government. He further argues that because there was only one
conspiracy, there can be only one firearms charge, so the 25-year
mandatory minimum on the second firearms charge cannot apply.8
These two claims were preserved and thus are subject to de novo
8
The firearms provision under which Diaz-Castro was
convicted and sentenced for Counts 10 and 16, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
provides a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for a first
offense and 25 years for a second or subsequent offense.
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review. See United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir.
2010).
1. Division of Conspiracy
Diaz-Castro argues that whether there was one conspiracy
or two is a jury question and that he was entitled to an
instruction on that topic.
The district court did not err because it is clear that
no reasonable jury could find that only a single conspiracy
existed. The actors in the two conspiracies were completely
different, with Diaz-Castro as the only overlapping member, and no
activity took place for more than a month after the first drug
deal. See United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 52 & n.11 (1st
Cir. 2004) (explaining that government agents cannot be members of
a conspiracy). Diaz-Castro was invited to the second drug deal by
an unnamed confidential informant with whom he had apparently had
no prior direct contact. He then recruited Benítez-Falcon, who had
not previously been involved in any Operation Guard Shack deals.
In fact, the agreement with Benítez-Falcon is what triggered the
second conspiracy charge. The evidence does not show in any way
that the second drug deal was related to the first aside from the
fact that both were sting deals in Operation Guard Shack and
involved the same undercover agent.
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2. Multiple Firearms Charges
Diaz-Castro argues that his convictions and sentences for
the firearms charges were improperly multiplicitous. That argument
fails.
The statute under which Diaz-Castro was charged, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), explicitly states that it applies with respect to
each "crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." Here, Diaz-
Castro engaged in two separate drug trafficking crimes, as charged
in Counts 9 and 15. These offenses were distinct: they were
separate deals, more than a month apart, involving different
people, and at different locations. Diaz-Castro was properly
convicted and sentenced on two separate counts under § 924(c) when
he violated that provision on two separate occasions.9
United States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2000),
is not to the contrary. In Peña-Lora, we held that a set of
consecutive sentences imposed under § 924(c) must instead run
concurrently where a single crime of violence (an incident of
9
Diaz-Castro also attempts to reframe his multiplicity
argument as an argument under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2151 (2013). He argues that, in order to sentence him to a 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence for his second conviction under
§ 924(c), the district court needed to refer the question of
whether the conviction on Count 16 was a second or subsequent
conviction to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
This argument is frivolous. The jury found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on two separate § 924(c) charges. Even if that
verdict itself were not enough to show that the conviction on Count
16 was a second or subsequent conviction, Alleyne explicitly does
not require jury findings for the fact of a prior conviction. See
id. at 2160 n.1.
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hostage-taking) involved the use of multiple firearms and the
defendant was charged separately for each weapon. Id. at 32. The
facts are readily distinguishable from this case, in which two
completely distinct drug trafficking crimes involved the possession
of firearms and the defendant was charged separately based on each
underlying drug crime.10
III.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm.
10
Diaz-Castro further argues that his firearms sentences
should be set to run concurrently like those in Peña-Lora. This
argument fails, however, for the same reasons described above;
Peña-Lora does not control here.
Diaz-Castro also makes a related argument regarding his
sentencing, that the district court should have granted certain
downward variances that it chose not to. This argument is not
clearly developed and so is waived. See United States v. Zannino,
895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Even if the argument were not
waived, Diaz-Castro does not show how the variances he sought would
have helped him avoid the mandatory minimums to which he was
ultimately sentenced, nor does he identify any factors showing that
the district court abused its discretion. That is insufficient to
reverse what Diaz-Castro admits were the district court's
"thoughtful[]" considerations at sentencing.
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