United States v. Robinson

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 12-2336
12-2349
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT O. ROBINSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Thompson, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Michael M. Brownlee, with whom Brownstone, P.A. was on brief,
for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Peter F. Neronha, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
May 27, 2014
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. On June 13, 2011, after a
months-long investigation centered on a bar in Woonsocket, Rhode
Island, law enforcement agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF") arrested Appellant Robert O.
Robinson and charged him with a panoply of drug trafficking crimes.
Within the week leading up to trial, Robinson embarked on a series
of maneuvers--including trying more than once to convince the trial
judge to recuse herself and ostensibly firing his attorney after
the jury had been impaneled--in an apparent attempt to put off the
trial. But the best-laid plans of mice and men oft go awry, and
Robinson's plays for more time were unsuccessful. And due to his
continued complaints about his attorney's performance, Robinson
ended up trying the case himself.
Robinson, although untrained and unskilled in the law,
put on a spirited defense. Nevertheless, the jury convicted him on
all counts, and at sentencing he picked up a total of twenty-two
years behind bars. This timely appeal followed. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm Robinson's convictions in all respects.
I.
BACKGROUND
Robinson's appellate arguments revolve around an alleged
pre-trial deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of
his choice, coupled with a claim that the district judge erred in
refusing his requests for continuances. He does not contest the
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sufficiency of the evidence, the jury's ultimate verdict, or his
sentence. We shall, however, sketch the evidence at trial, which
we recite in the light most favorable to the verdict. See United
States v. Stewart, 744 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2014). We do this not
as an exercise in storytelling, but because the nature and the
amount of evidence at trial comes into play here.
a. The Trial
The government sought to prove Robinson headed up a drug
distribution conspiracy in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Robinson ran
things out of Talu's Café, described by one witness as "a cool
little sports bar, you know, go there, play pool, watch sports
events, hang out with friends, grab something to eat," and
(according to his testimony) buy crack. ATF special agent Michael
Payne described his three-and-a-half month investigation of
Robinson's drug sales and various "undercover purchases of cocaine
base from Mr. Robinson and his associates."1 Payne utilized a
confidential informant ("CI"), to conduct the controlled drug buys.
Payne's CI engaged in ten such drug buys over the course of the
investigation. Each buy--with the exception of the first--was
monitored through audio or, at times, video surveillance equipment.
The drugs were then sent to a laboratory for testing.
Payne discussed each of the ten different buys made
between February 16 and June 2, 2011. He explained how Robinson
1
The colloquial term for cocaine base is "crack."
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used others, including Tonia Rawlinson, to physically exchange the
drugs for money. Payne authenticated various video and audio
recordings of these transactions, which were admitted into evidence
as full exhibits and published to the jury. Payne's investigation
culminated with Robinson's arrest on June 10, 2011, followed by a
voluntary jailhouse interview--a recording of which was entered as
a full exhibit--wherein Robinson admitted he was a drug dealer.
Robinson, however, attempted to convince Payne that he only sold
powder cocaine, not crack. According to Payne, Robinson was trying
to do this because he knew the penalties for distributing crack are
much stiffer than those for distributing powder cocaine.
Payne's testimony was corroborated by that of the CI, who
told the jury he knew Robinson had been selling drugs for a long
period of time. The CI confirmed that he bought drugs from
Robinson on ten occasions at Payne's direction. He also stated
that although Robinson often used his underlings to physically
handle the drugs and make the sales, on May 5, 2011, he purchased
an ounce-and-a-half of crack directly from Robinson himself. As
the CI described it, Robinson came into the bar and placed the
drugs on a nearby chair. The CI took the drugs and left payment
with one of the women at the bar.
The government also called Jason Roman and Rawlinson, two
of the individuals alleged to be involved in Robinson's drug
trafficking. Roman testified that he grew up with both Robinson
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and Rawlinson in Woonsocket, and that he has known them for many
years. He admitted that he personally distributed drugs to the CI.
Roman then took the money from the CI and gave it to Rawlinson so
that she could, in turn, hand it over to Robinson. On occasion he
gave the drug money directly to Robinson rather than Rawlinson.
When it was Rawlinson's turn to testify, she indicated
that she has known Robinson for nineteen years and that they have
three children together. According to her, Robinson had asked her
to sell drugs with him at some point in the past, and she also
corroborated several of the CI's controlled buys at Talu's. For
example, and with respect to a February 16, 2011, deal, she
testified that she obtained crack from Robinson, which she gave to
Roman. She did not know the drugs' ultimate destination (i.e., the
CI), but at some time later Roman gave her some money, which she
turned over to Robinson. Rawlinson testified to similar goings-on
at Talu's on different dates during Payne's months-long
investigation, each one of which involved a sale of crack.
The last piece of the puzzle was testimony from the two
chemists who analyzed the drugs the CI bought at Talu's. The
chemists confirmed those substances tested positive for crack, and
stated the weight of the drugs.
Robinson--who represented himself throughout the trial--
cross-examined witnesses but did not call any of his own. The jury
returned guilty verdicts on all counts against Robinson.
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b. Pre-Trial Antics
Having summarized the evidence, we now turn our attention
to the happenings that led to Robinson undertaking his own defense
at trial. As we noted, Robinson was arrested in June of 2011. He
was charged by way of a criminal complaint filed on June 10.
i. Robinson's First Attorney and Initial Proceedings
Robinson hired Attorney Steven DiLibero to defend him.
After a couple of months, Robinson became dissatisfied with
DiLibero, and DiLibero ultimately filed a motion to withdraw due to
a "breakdown in communication." At a hearing in August 2011, a
magistrate judge told Robinson the pending criminal charges were "a
serious matter and it's important that you have a lawyer who is in
the case representing you every step of the way." After several
more status hearings regarding Robinson's representation, he
finally hired Attorney Matthew Smith, who entered his appearance on
October 7, 2011.
The district court initially set Robinson's case for
trial beginning December 8, but it was continued on multiple
occasions for reasons not germane here. Eventually, trial was
scheduled to begin Monday, June 18, 2012, with jury impanelment
taking place on June 12. The docket did not lie fallow during
these months of delay, as multiple discovery motions and a motion
to suppress were filed and ruled upon by the court. Robinson also
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tells us that plea negotiations were ongoing during these months too.
ii. Jury Selection - June 12, 2012
Jury selection did not go smoothly on June 12. First,
Robinson came to court in his prison clothes and refused to change
out of them. When the trial judge attempted to begin a discussion
about his wardrobe choice, instead of answering directly Robinson
claimed he did not know he "was picking a jury today." The trial
judge, who obviously had some off-the-record discussions with
counsel at some point, stated that Smith confirmed to her that he
had in fact told Robinson that they would be picking a jury that
morning. When she tried to get back to the matter at hand---that
is, Robinson's insistence on being presented to prospective jurors
in his prison garb--Robinson changed the subject again. This time,
he expressed displeasure with Smith's efforts on his behalf:
Well, when my lawyer came to see me over the
weekend on Friday, I refused to pick a jury
because I didn't know what was going on. And
I told him that, and I basically don't want
him to be my lawyer because we're not agreeing
on anything. He does things, and he doesn't
even let me know.
The trial judge pointed out that "we have 80 people here today to
pick a jury, so we'll be picking a jury." She then indicated that
"it's clear to me that you, for whatever reason, want to delay this
matter; but it's not going to be delayed." She again tried to
steer the conversation back to Robinson's get-up.
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Robinson persisted though, complaining now that Smith
waited until after a pre-trial conference to bring him up to speed
on the latest developments. Robinson advised the judge that he did
not feel Smith was "working for [him]." "Typical," however, is how
the trial judge characterized the nature of his communications with
his attorney. She also made sure Robinson knew his attorney had
filed a successful motion to suppress some of the statements
Robinson made to the police, as well as discovery motions that
"resulted in the Government providing him with a great deal of
information." She then attempted, yet again, to return the
discussion to Robinson's clothing.
Still refusing to be topically engaged, Robinson replied,
"what I don't understand is how if [sic] you want me to move
forward with a lawyer if I can't trust him," and intimated that
Smith had refused to "put a motion in to suppress the evidence."
At this point, the trial judge reiterated the fact that his
attorney did file a successful motion to suppress and asked him
directly, "[d]o you wish to proceed today wearing what you're
wearing or do you wish to take about a half hour so you can
change?" With the judge demanding a focused response, Robinson
accepted the half-hour break to change.
Upon his return to the courtroom, Robinson lobbed a new
salvo, saying "I mean no disrespect to you or your courtroom, but
I feel there's a conflict between me and my lawyer, and I don't
-8-
wish to proceed with this. I want a new lawyer, and I feel like
I'm being forced to do this." The trial judge noted Robinson had
hired Smith and that Smith had been representing him "for several
months now." After some more back-and-forth between them, Smith
informed the court that he had met with Robinson at least twice to
discuss jury selection and to determine whether Robinson was
amenable to conducting it in front of the magistrate judge, which
he was not. Smith further reported that he had discussed pre-trial
motion strategies with Robinson, that he had provided Robinson with
copies of "every scrap of evidence" in his possession, and that
they went through the video recordings together. Smith confirmed
he was prepared to pick a jury that day and begin trial the
following Monday.
Robinson did not contradict any of his lawyer's
representations describing their interactions.2 Instead, he raised
yet new reasons for his dissatisfaction with Smith. Specifically,
he said that he asked Smith to file a motion to exclude testimony
from cooperating witnesses and seek a "reliability hearing" on that
topic. He also claimed Smith was supposed to do something with
respect to a previous "case that I had in the state," but had
failed to do so. He closed with the following statement:
Your Honor, like I said, I feel that a
conflict [sic] between me and Mr. Smith. I do
not want him as my attorney. I mean no
2
He does not attempt to do so now on appeal either.
-9-
disrespect to you or your courtroom, but I
feel I'm getting forced into doing this. I
don't want him as my attorney.
At no point during these proceedings did Robinson say he had
actually fired Smith.
In response to Robinson's ad hominems, the trial judge
stressed that Robinson's complaints were coming late in the day
given that the prospective jurors were about to be brought in. And
Smith had been doing good work on his behalf, she added.
Construing Robinson's complaints as a motion seeking a new
impanelment or new trial date, she denied it.
Although this put to bed Robinson's representation issue
for the time being, the trial judge still had one more thing to
take care of before taking a break and reconvening for impanelment.
She took a moment to acknowledge that on an earlier date she had
received a letter from Robinson asking her to recuse herself
because she had been involved with a criminal case against his
father, and stated that she would not do so. After the recess (in
which Robinson finally changed out of his prison clothes), the
trial judge explained her only contact with Robinson's father came
more than three decades ago when she represented him as a public
defender. She had "absolutely no relationship" with the Robinson
family after that time, and indicated she would not recuse herself.
Finally, jury selection began, with Smith representing
Robinson and consulting with him throughout the impanelment.
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iii. The Interregnum
Smith did not move to withdraw following jury selection.
However, a couple of days later, the district court received four
pro se motions from Robinson. One, entitled "Motion to
Disqualified [sic] for Bias and Conflict," again sought the trial
judge's recusal. The motion expressed dissatisfaction with the
jury selection proceedings3 and accused the trial judge of being
biased against Robinson because of her prior "relationship" with
his father.
The three remaining motions targeted Smith. A "Motion to
Dismiss Attorney" opened with Robinson's statement, "I would like
to fire my attorney Matthew B. Smith." With nary a peep about
finding another attorney, Robinson stated he would rather represent
himself than continue with Smith, "a lawyer I will never be able to
trust with my life!" In a similar vein, Robinson filed a "Motion
to Go Pro Se Faretta Hearing,"4 in which he stated he would rather
represent himself than proceed with Smith. Finally, he filed a
"Motion for Law Library" stating that he is "going pro se with my
case at trial and would like to request more time" to learn more
3
Note that although this motion--like the other three the
court received--was dated June 11, 2012, Robinson clearly wrote it
on or after June 12. He referred to jury selection in the past
tense and complained that the trial judge "picked a jury that was
not of my peers and none of them were of my nationality." These
objections were not raised at impanelment or, for that matter, here
on appeal.
4
More on Faretta later.
-11-
about his case and research his "rights and laws within our
system."
A magistrate judge returned all four of these motions to
Robinson, checking on a form order the reasons for the return:
they were not signed in accordance with the court's rules, they
lacked certificates of service, and Robinson was represented by
counsel.
iv. Day of Trial - June 18, 2012
The first day of trial began much like jury selection,
with Robinson again showing up in his prison garb. The discussion
was considerably shorter this time: the trial judge recommended
that he change into "street clothes" before the jury saw him, and
Robinson flat-out refused. The judge warned Robinson he was "going
to have to live with" his decision.
With that out of the way, and with Smith at his side,
Robinson announced he had fired his counsel the previous Friday and
wanted to go pro se. When the trial judge asked if he was prepared
to try the case himself, Robinson said he was not and asked for a
continuance so that he could hire an "assistant." Not
surprisingly, the trial judge did not go along with this latest
attempt at delay, and advised Robinson he does not "get to . . .
pick and choose when" he wants to go forward. She expressed what
appears to be at least a little skepticism over the veracity of
Robinson's claims, stating "[a]nd if you say you fired him on
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Friday, then what you should have been doing over the weekend was
preparing to try the case yourself."
Instead of responding, Robinson reverted to his tactic
from the previous week and changed the subject. He raised, once
again, the trial judge's purported conflict of interest, adding a
new wrinkle this time--the trial judge had had a closer
relationship with his father than she let on. "From my knowledge,
from what my family told me, that yous [sic] were dating while you
were his lawyer." The trial judge quickly debunked Robinson's
accusation.
Well, I must say that that's a new one, and I
must say that your family is absolutely
incorrect. No such relationship existed; and
the only times I ever met with your father,
frankly, were in the courtroom or in lockup.
So that's the end of that.
Trying to herd Robinson back to the issue of his request
to go pro se, she asked if he had any training in the law.
Robinson acknowledged he did not, and the judge warned that he
would be "making a huge mistake to proceed pro se" since he had no
legal training. Robinson maintained he would represent himself
better than could Smith, who he did not trust. In response, the
trial judge indicated she would have Smith act as "standby
counsel." While the reader is likely able to hazard a guess as to
Robinson's reaction, we set forth the ensuing exchange to remove
all doubt:
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The Defendant: I refuse to have Mr. Smith as
my standby counsel.
The Court: Well, I'm going to insist that he
remain as your standby counsel so that you
have someone at the table who can advise you
as to the rules of evidence and that sort of
thing. Otherwise, you're going to be walking
into a land mine because you don't know the
rules.
Smith spoke up to confirm Robinson was committed to representing
himself and opined, "I don't think either you, me or anybody else
is going to change his mind on that, your Honor." This matter
finally settled, trial began.
As standby counsel, Smith appears from the record to have
rendered Robinson a not insubstantial amount of assistance. When
the judge held bench conferences, Smith participated on Robinson's
behalf, and after the government rested Robinson allowed him to
make a Rule 29 motion for acquittal. Robinson also consulted Smith
when it came to making objections at trial and, occasionally, for
stating the basis of an objection. Smith also worked with Robinson
on his closing statement. Throughout the entire trial, Smith never
made an oral motion to withdraw as standby counsel based on his
supposed termination or any conflict.
Neither did he file a post-trial motion to withdraw.
Instead, Smith continued to work with Robinson despite the
purported firing. On October 12, 2012, Smith filed a sentencing
memorandum on Robinson's behalf. And he extensively represented
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Robinson at the sentencing hearing5 before the same trial judge
several weeks later, during the course of which neither he nor
Robinson complained of any conflict or disagreement between them.
The judge sentenced Robinson to twenty years on the drug charges,
and tacked on an additional two for violating the terms of his
supervised release.
This timely appeal of the judge's pre-trial rulings
followed.
II.
DISCUSSION
We are called upon to review Robinson's challenges to the
trial judge's June 12 and June 18 rulings, which he claims deprived
him of his right to counsel of his choice in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. As a general rule, the Sixth Amendment unambiguously
provides a criminal defendant with the right to the assistance of
counsel, providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The denial of a
motion to substitute counsel may carry with it particular
constitutional implications where a defendant has retained private
counsel, as opposed to being represented by a public defender. The
5
At sentencing, Smith confirmed that he discussed various
facets of sentencing with Robinson prior to the hearing. He then
placed objections to various recommended sentencing enhancements on
the record, and successfully argued for a 240-month sentence on the
drug charges instead of the 265 months the government sought.
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Supreme Court has recognized that "an element of this [Sixth
Amendment] right is the right of a defendant who does not require
appointed counsel to choose who will represent him." United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). Accordingly, such a
defendant "should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel
of his own choice." Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 (1932)). An erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of
choice requires a new trial, regardless of whether or not the
defendant can show that he suffered any prejudice. Id. at 146.
That being said, before we can take up Robinson's claims
of error we must address a preliminary matter. The parties do not
agree on the exact nature of what transpired before the court on
June 12 and June 18. It is left to us then, to review the record
and determine what motions Robinson actually made before proceeding
on.
JUNE 12, 2012
a. Identifying the Nature of Robinson's Motion
Robinson insists that what he presented on June 12 was an
oral motion to substitute counsel, and that by denying it the trial
judge deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his
choosing. According to his brief, he "unequivocally invoked his
right to representation of his choice of counsel" when he told the
judge that he had "previously discharged Attorney Smith" and that
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he wanted a new lawyer. Thus, he argues, the trial judge erred by
characterizing his request as a motion for a continuance. He then
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge
prohibited him from proceeding with counsel of his choice.
The government, unsurprisingly, asserts that Robinson
never actually requested to substitute counsel. In its view,
Robinson had no intention of hiring another attorney and his
maneuver was merely an attempt to delay the proceedings.
Furthermore, the government argues that Robinson's request may not
be viewed as a motion to substitute under any circumstances since
he stated only that he needed time to hire a new lawyer, not that
he had another one ready to step in and take over immediately.
This is not the first time that we have been called upon
to distinguish between a motion to substitute counsel and a run-of-
the-mill motion to continue proceedings. Our decision in United
States v. Gaffney, 469 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2006), also an appeal
from the Rhode Island district court, dealt with this precise
scenario. As we explain, we see no reason to depart from its
holding here.
Gaffney, facing charges related to several alleged drug
crimes, hired a private attorney to defend him. Id. at 213.
Matters continued in their usual course, and it was not until a
plea hearing that Gaffney first expressed dissatisfaction with his
attorney. Id. Counsel informed the court that his client had
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become "interested in hiring another counsel," as Gaffney did not
believe his current attorney was doing everything possible to
assist him. Id. The court asked to hear from Gaffney directly,
who proceeded to complain that the attorney he had actually paid to
represent him was on vacation and had sent an associate to handle
the plea hearing. Id. He also accused his attorney of failing to
give him copies of materials related to his case, leaving him
"unable to look up cases like his in the law library." Id. The
court ultimately treated Gaffney's request as one for a
continuance, and denied it. Id. at 214.
We affirmed. We first distinguished Gonzalez-Lopez,
explaining that the Supreme Court found an unconstitutional
deprivation of the right to counsel in that case because the
"defendant's privately retained counsel was present in the
courthouse and ready to try the case but was erroneously prevented
by the trial court from doing so." Id. at 216. This was not the
factual scenario in Gaffney or, for that matter, that confronts us
now. Although Gaffney's attorney stated his client wanted a new
lawyer, we noted that neither counsel nor Gaffney himself asked the
court to substitute one for another. Id. By this we meant that
Gaffney, unlike the defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez, did not have a new
attorney waiting in the wings, prepared to immediately appear on
his behalf. What Gaffney was really looking for was "more time to
explore the possibility of finding another privately retained
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attorney to replace his current one." Id. This type of request,
we said, is merely "preliminary to a formal request for
substitution of counsel, which would involve several steps." Id.
We proceeded to set them forth as follows:
In conjunction with filing a motion for
substitution of counsel, Gaffney would have to
fire his present attorney, hire a new one, and
cause his former attorney to move to withdraw.
None of these steps were taken here.
According to Rule 1.17 of the Rhode Island
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct,
which applied to Gaffney's attorney, an
attorney is required to withdraw if discharged
by his client.
Id. (footnote omitted). In sum, a party's complaints about his
attorney combined with an expression that he wants to change
counsel do not constitute a motion to substitute unless successor
counsel is standing by, "ready, willing, and able" to immediately
enter an appearance and take over.
The facts here are so similar to Gaffney that it controls
the result. Indeed, we adopt Gaffney's conclusion practically
verbatim:
The record indicates that [Robinson's]
attorney never filed a motion to withdraw. It
is equally clear from the record that
[Robinson] had not retained a substitute
attorney. Without these indicia of a motion
to substitute one privately retained counsel
for another, the court had no basis for
treating [Robinson's] request for a delay in
the [proceedings] as a motion for substitution
of counsel.
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Id. at 217. Accordingly, the trial judge correctly treated
Robinson's request as a motion to continue.
b. Propriety of the Denial of Robinson's Motion to Continue
Having established Robinson's request sought only to
continue the proceedings, we consider whether the judge erred in
denying it. We review the trial judge's decision on a motion to
continue for abuse of discretion. United States v. Maldonado, 708
F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2013). The trial judge's discretion in this
area is "broad" and the aggrieved party bears a "heavy burden" in
pressing an appeal. Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.
2003). "Only 'an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay'
constitutes an abuse of that discretion." United States v.
Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). Thus, we will find an abuse of
discretion only "if no reasonable person could agree with the
judge's ruling." Maldonado, 708 F.3d at 42. Furthermore, "the
party denied the continuance must show that the judge's decision
caused specific, 'substantial prejudice.'" Id. (quoting Saccoccia,
58 F.3d at 770).
Robinson does not argue on appeal that the trial judge
erred in denying the motion to continue on June 12. This is
because he stakes his entire argument on the mistaken premise that
he had made a motion to substitute counsel. Accordingly, the cases
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he cites in his brief regarding improper denials of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice are inapposite here.
Further, although Robinson maintains that the judge
should have given him time to find and retain another attorney, he
fails to argue that the judge's denial of the motion to continue
prejudiced him in any way. He does not assert that another
attorney would have pursued a different avenue of investigation,
advanced a different theory of the case, or have obtained a
different outcome. Any potential argument has, therefore, been
waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
1990).
Because a showing that substantial prejudice inured as a
result of the denial of a motion to continue is required,
Robinson's failure to brief this issue is fatal. Accordingly, we
refuse to disturb the trial judge's denial of Robinson's June 12
motion to continue.
JUNE 18, 2012
We move on to consider the events of Monday, June 18, the
first day of trial. The parties do not dispute the nature of the
wrangling which occurred before the jury was shown in. Following
up on his written June 14 "Motion to Dismiss Attorney" and "Motion
to Go Pro Se Faretta Hearing," Robinson advised the trial judge he
had terminated Smith and asked for permission to represent himself
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at trial. Once the judge acceded to this request, Robinson again
attempted to secure a continuance of the trial, saying that he
required additional time to prepare to try the case himself.
On appeal, Robinson tries to convince us first that he
should get a new trial because the trial judge erred in granting
his request for pro se representation. Should we find that
argument unconvincing, Robinson's fall-back position is that the
trial judge reversibly prejudiced him by improperly refusing his
request for a continuance. We address each of these issues
separately.
a. Motion for Pro Se Representation
Robinson initially takes aim at the trial judge's
allowance of his request to represent himself. He posits that his
choice to proceed pro se was not voluntary because it was not that
he did not want to be represented by counsel, he just did not want
Smith representing him any longer. In essence, he claims that
because the trial judge denied him his right to proceed with
counsel of his choosing, her decision essentially forced him to go
it alone. Finally, Robinson argues that even setting these issues
aside, the trial judge failed to adequately warn him of the
specific dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the
seriousness of the charges, or the potential penalties he faced if
convicted.
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The government unsurprisingly takes a different view. In
its estimation, Robinson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel on June 18. It believes not only that the trial judge
adequately warned him against representing himself, but also that
Robinson was well-aware of the pro se pitfalls based on his prior
involvement with the criminal justice system. Further, the
government points out that the trial judge commented on Robinson's
high intelligence on more than one occasion, and believes her
impression is corroborated by Robinson's trial performance as "an
articulate and able advocate by pro se standards," factors which it
believes further demonstrate Robinson's valid waiver of his right
to counsel.
As we noted above, the Sixth Amendment provides a
criminal defendant the right to an attorney. A defendant, however,
may waive that right and represent himself. See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975) (recognizing the "nearly
universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our
courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is
contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to
do so"). Before allowing pro se representation, though, a trial
judge must make sure that certain prerequisites have been satisfied
because an individual who undertakes self-representation is at a
significant disadvantage compared to someone defended by counsel.
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First, a defendant's invocation of the right to self-
representation must be contained in "unequivocal language." United
States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 109 (1st Cir. 2002). This first
step is not at issue here. Second, and at issue herein, a waiver
of counsel must be "knowing, intelligent and voluntary." Id.; see
also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) ("Waiver of the right to
counsel, as of constitutional rights in the criminal process
generally, must be a 'knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances.'" (alteration
in original) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970))). Before accepting such a waiver, the trial judge is
required to "indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver
of the right to counsel" and "investigate as long and as thoroughly
as the circumstances of the case before him [or her] demand."
United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, 401-02 (1st Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We first consider whether Robinson's June 18 waiver of
counsel was voluntary. His argument that it was not is premised
entirely on his position that the trial judge denied him his right
to be represented by counsel of choice on June 12. We have already
considered and rejected the factual predicate of this argument and
affirmed the judge's denial of the motion to continue. Robinson's
June 12 statements simply did not implicate his Sixth Amendment
rights. We have previously determined that when a trial judge
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commits no error in denying a pre-trial motion whose allowance
would have required a "last-minute" continuance, a defendant's
subsequent waiver of counsel is not rendered involuntary by virtue
of that denial. See Woodard, 291 F.3d at 107-09, 109 n.5
("Because we hold that the district court did not err in denying
[pretrial motions], we conclude that the decision to proceed pro se
was not involuntary."). Accordingly, the trial judge's denial of
Robinson's June 12 motion to continue raises no issues with respect
to the voluntariness of Robinson's waiver of counsel the following
week.
What remains to be determined is whether Robinson's
waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. For it to be so, he
must have understood "the magnitude of the undertaking and the
disadvantages of self-representation, . . . [and] the seriousness
of the charge and of the penalties he may be exposed to." Maynard
v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
An understanding of the magnitude of the undertaking and the
disadvantages of self-representation is defined as having "an
awareness that there are technical rules governing the conduct of
a trial, and that presenting a defense is not a simple matter of
telling one's story." Id.
To ensure a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and
intelligent, a trial judge "must warn the defendant 'of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation.'" United States v.
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Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 30 (1st. Cir. 2013) (quoting Faretta, 422
U.S. at 835). We have referred to this cautionary advice as
"Faretta warnings," and to the judge's investigation into a
defendant's waiver as a "Faretta inquiry." Id. at 30 n.3. The
Supreme Court has declined to require a trial judge to intone any
specific magic words, opting instead to make clear that the
warnings should be such that "the record will establish that [the
defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)); Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88 ("We
have not . . . prescribed any formula or script to be read to a
defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.").
We too have declined to require a litany of specific warnings.
See, e.g., Woodard, 291 F.3d at 109-10 (examining the record to
determine whether a defendant's waiver of counsel was "knowingly
and intelligently made"); Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 30-31 (same).
The government does not dispute that the Faretta warnings
in this case were relatively brief. When Robinson told the trial
judge that he preferred to "go pro se" than have Smith represent
him, she said "all right" and asked if he was ready to proceed.
When Robinson responded in the negative because he needed time to
prepare, she advised Robinson to go forward with Smith. She added
that Robinson should have been preparing to try the case himself
over the weekend if he truly had fired his attorney. She then told
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Robinson he would be "making a huge mistake" in representing
himself since he was "not trained in the law." The trial judge
further ordered Smith to act as standby counsel to advise Robinson
as to "the rules of evidence and that sort of thing," and warned
Robinson that without counsel's assistance he would be "walking
into a land mine" because he did not know the rules of court.
We have previously held that a judge's Faretta warnings
must go beyond "dire generalizations." See Francois, 715 F.3d at
30. Although the trial judge here told Robinson that he did not
know the rules, she did not explicitly let him know that presenting
a defense was not as cut-and-dried as telling his side of the
story. See Maynard, 545 F.2d at 279. And, as we did in Francois,
we note that the trial judge did not discuss with Robinson the
possibility that he may have legal defenses of which he was not
aware due to his lack of legal training, nor did she warn Robinson
that she could not give him any assistance at trial or help him out
with making objections or entering his own evidence. See Francois,
715 F.3d at 30. Further, she did not "convey in concrete terms the
sentencing range [Robinson] would likely face if he were
convicted." See id.
Even though, ideally, the trial judge's Faretta warnings
could have been more specific,
where the court's Faretta warning is less
thorough than it might be, we may nevertheless
affirm a district court's decision to allow a
defendant to proceed pro se if "the record
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amply supports the lower court's conclusion
that [the defendant] was fully aware of the
disadvantages he would face as a pro se
defendant."
Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 12 (1st
Cir. 1998)). The record here shows Robinson knew just what he was
getting himself into. See United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838,
845-46 (1st Cir. 1989) (looking at the "totality of the evidence"
in the record in making this determination).
First, Robinson was no stranger to the federal criminal
justice system. Robinson had been arrested on federal drug charges
in the early 2000s and was ultimately sentenced to an 84-month
prison term after entering a plea. In fact, he was on supervised
release at the time of his arrest for the Woonsocket drug sales.
And lest we forget, one of Robinson's complaints about Smith was
his purported failure to reopen a case Robinson had in the state
courts, indicating that he had a history there too.6
Robinson was, therefore, a veteran of both federal and
state criminal proceedings. Because of his own criminal past,
Robinson had considerable opportunity to observe the inner-workings
of the federal and state courts. He was quite familiar with the
consequences attendant to a conviction. Unfortunately for
Robinson, his personal experience weighs in favor of our finding
6
The Pre-Sentence Report indicates Robinson entered no
contest pleas in two state cases. The first dealt with drug
charges, and the second with assaulting a police officer.
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his waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent. See United States
v. LeBare, 191 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 1999) (taking into account the
fact that the defendant was "not a novice" at the time he waived
his right to counsel).
The record also demonstrates that Robinson had an
appreciation of the seriousness of the charges against him. By the
time his case reached trial, Robinson had been represented by one
retained counsel or another for an entire year. It is quite likely
and we may presume, therefore, that his attorneys "had discussed
all relevant aspects of the case with him." Maynard, 545 F.2d at
279. Our conclusion is bolstered by Robinson's own admission in
his brief that he engaged in plea negotiations prior to trial,
which undoubtedly would have been focused--at least from Robinson's
perspective--on the amount of jail time he could expect.
Moreover, the record shows Robinson in fact knew the
severity of the penalties he faced. In his jailhouse interview,
Robinson maintained that he only sold powder cocaine and would
never sell crack because he has "seen the risks with that."7 Later
on he said, "if you got me with something I'll take the hit all day
with powder, but rock, I don't do rock man." While awaiting trial
Robinson penned a letter to Rawlinson in which he stated, "I am
facing 15 or 20 years if I lose trial." Finally, the government
7
A recording of this transcript was played for the jury at
trial.
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filed an Amended Information Charging Prior Conviction
approximately three months prior to trial, which set forth the
potential sentencing ranges for the various counts against him: 20
years to life on Count 1; 10 years to life on Counts 2, 9, 10, and
11; and up to 30 years on Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.8 Thus, we
are satisfied on this record that Robinson knew and appreciated the
seriousness of the charges against him, along with the potential
penalties should he lose his trial.
We further conclude Robinson had sufficient awareness of
the dangers of representing himself to render his waiver voluntary
and intelligent. First, his prior experience as a criminal
defendant gave him at least a general understanding of how the
system works and the types of things defense attorneys do. Also,
the magistrate judge warned Robinson at the beginning that the
charges were serious and that it was important for him to have a
lawyer every step of the way. He held several status reviews to
directly address the subject of Robinson's representation. Moving
on to June 18, the trial judge told him he was "walking into a land
mine" because he had no legal training and did not know the rules.
She explained that Smith would act as standby counsel to advise him
about the rules of evidence. That the trial judge commented
multiple times on Robinson's intelligence, an observation not
8
Recall that Smith told the trial judge he gave Robinson
"every scrap of evidence that I have in my possession," a statement
which Robinson did not contest when made or now on appeal.
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belied by anything we see in the transcript, further plays into our
finding that Robinson validly waived his right to counsel.
Finally, we would be remiss were we to fail to account
for Robinson's own "Motion to Go Pro Se Faretta Hearing."
Robinson's reference to Faretta in the title demonstrates he was
aware of the Supreme Court's decision and, presumably, its
discussion of the disadvantages of pro se representation.
Robinson's knowledge of Faretta's holding is yet another factor in
our determination that his waiver of counsel was knowing and
intelligent.
To sum things up, we conclude that although the trial
judge's Faretta warnings could certainly have been more detailed,
there are ample indications in the record demonstrating that
Robinson knew exactly what he was doing, and that he did so with
"eyes open." We are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in
allowing Robinson to represent himself at trial.
b. Motion to Continue
This brings us to Robinson's final argument, which is
that the trial judge prejudiced him by refusing to grant his
morning-of-trial request for a continuance so that he could prepare
to represent himself pro se. We have already discussed the factors
governing our analysis of such requests, so there is no need to
repeat them here.
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The lateness of Robinson's earlier request looms large
here. At jury impanelment, the trial judge told Robinson in no
uncertain terms that the prospective jurors were present and that
impanelment would proceed that day, with trial commencing the
following week. Considerations regarding the lateness of the hour
only became weightier over the intervening days as trial
approached. By the time Robinson made his second request, it was
the morning of trial, making it literally a last-minute request.
The jury members were waiting to be brought in and the prosecutor,
the witnesses, and the court were ready to go. It hardly needs be
said that Robinson's request would have resulted in inconvenience
to the government, the court, the witnesses, and, most importantly,
the jurors who had been required to put aside their private lives
and appear in court that morning specifically to hear Robinson's
case. Thus, the untimeliness of Robinson's request would likely be
sufficient by itself to sustain the trial court's decision. See
Maldonado, 708 F.3d at 42-43 (affirming denial of continuance
requested on the day of trial); accord Woodard, 291 F.3d at 107
(affirming denial of continuance to hire new attorney requested
thirteen days before trial); United States v. Brown, 495 F.2d 593,
600 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming denial of continuance to hire new
attorney where defendant sought to discharge counsel on the first
day of trial).
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Further, the record supports the judge's earlier
observation that Robinson's requests for continuances were nothing
more than attempts to delay the day of reckoning and, therefore,
that Robinson's was not a "justifiable request for delay." See
Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 770. Recall that the last two times he came
to court, Robinson showed up in prison garb, requiring the judge to
take time to discuss his choice of clothing with him. Robinson
also attempted to get the trial judge to recuse herself on more
than one occasion in the week leading up to trial, a gambit which
included frivolous aspersions against the trial judge. When this
combo failed, Robinson re-upped his complaining about his lawyer in
a last-ditch effort to stave off trial. Robinson's juvenile antics
support the trial judge's impression that there was no legitimate
basis for his requested continuance.
And, while Robinson informs us that other courts have
recognized that a defendant's incarceration may cut against a
finding that a requested continuance is motivated by delay, see
United States v. Williams, 576 F.3d 385, 390 (7th Cir. 2009), this
is by no means a blanket rule. In our circuit we look to the
circumstances present in each individual case to determine whether
a defendant's pre-trial antics represent anything more than an
attempt at delay. See Maldonado, 708 F.3d at 40-41 (discussing the
defendant's attempt to "[throw] a monkey wrench into proceedings by
refusing to leave his cell," amongst other stall tactics). Based
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on the circumstances revealed in this record, we will not second-
guess the trial judge's view of Robinson's request.
Furthermore, Robinson makes no effort to show prejudice
beyond a general contention that his performance was "woeful." He
does not even attempt to argue that he would have performed better
or pursued a different trial strategy had he been given more time
to prepare to represent himself at trial. Moreover, Robinson's
performance, while not the polished presentation of an experienced
trial attorney, was not atrocious. For example, his cross-
examination of Agent Payne was quite effective. He forced Agent
Payne to admit that he relied on a CI who tampered with evidence
(i.e., the drugs he bought from Robinson's associates) on at least
four separate occasions, that he allowed the CI to use a government
vehicle even though he knew the CI did not have a driver's license,
and that he allowed the CI to go into Talu's and consume alcohol
for two hours before getting behind the wheel of a government
vehicle and driving away. Robinson also advanced multiple, non-
frivolous objections at trial, and delivered a cogent closing
argument.
At bottom, Robinson's conviction is best explained not by
any deficiency in his self-representation, but by the mountain of
evidence against him. The evidence at trial was overwhelming and
included witness testimony, video surveillance, audio recordings of
multiple drug sales at Talu's and, most damning of all, the
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transcript and audio recording of the jailhouse interview in which
Robinson admitted he was a drug dealer. Robinson's conviction
hinged not on the trial judge's denial of his morning-of-trial
request for a continuance, but on the government's proof of his own
extensive criminal activities.
Based on this record, we are satisfied that Robinson has
failed to show he suffered any prejudice whatsoever as a result of
the denial of his motion to continue, let alone the type of
specific and substantial prejudice that would have been required in
order even to arguably entitle him to a new trial.
III.
CONCLUSION
Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the arguments
of counsel, we discern no error. The trial judge acted within her
discretion in denying both untimely motions to continue. And,
although her Faretta warnings could have been more explicit, she
did not err when she allowed Robinson to represent himself at
trial. That Robinson's attempts at delay came to naught and that
he now regrets getting exactly what he asked for--the opportunity
to represent himself--is no basis for reversal given that the
record shows he made the request with his eyes wide open.
Accordingly, we affirm Robinson's convictions in their entirety.
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