Hensley v. Roden

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1147
KEVIN HENSLEY,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
GARY RODEN,
Superintendent, MCI Norfolk,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Stewart T. Graham, Jr., with whom Graham & Graham was on
brief, for appellant.
Jennifer L. Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Martha Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
June 20, 2014
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Kevin Hensley ("Hensley") was
convicted in Massachusetts state court of first degree murder after
killing his estranged wife, Nancy Hensley ("Nancy"). Hensley
appealed and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC")
affirmed. Hensley turned to the federal courts. Alleging
violations of his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and
effective assistance of counsel, he sought a writ of habeas corpus
in United States District Court. Unconvinced, the district court
denied the petition. After due consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
When we consider a state conviction on habeas review, we
presume the state court's factual findings to be correct. See
Abram v. Gerry, 672 F.3d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 2012). As a result, the
below facts are derived from the SJC decision, see Commonwealth v.
Hensley, 913 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 2009), and the district court's
decision, which itself drew from the SJC decision, see Hensley v.
Roden, 2013 WL 22081 (D. Mass. 2013).
A. The Crime
Hensley and Nancy were married in 1979 and over the years
they had four children together. By January 2002, the marriage was
in trouble. The pair argued about whether Nancy was spending
enough time at home or whether she was spending too much time at a
local gym, possibly in the company of men. Hensley decided to
investigate the latter possibility by donning a fake beard and
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following Nancy to the gym. Though he saw no sign of infidelity on
Nancy's part, Hensley saw her speak with other men and he
confronted her.
Shortly thereafter, on January 9, 2002, Nancy filed for
divorce and obtained a temporary abuse prevention order against
Hensley. The order required Hensley to leave the family's home,
which was located at 198 Byron Street in East Boston. He moved to
his sister's house in nearby Winthrop. As per the order, Nancy
retained custody of the children, whom Hensley was prohibited from
contacting pending further hearing.
On January 16 (the scheduled hearing date), the parties
entered into an agreement. The order, which was entered as a
temporary order in the divorce proceeding, provided that apart from
prearranged visitation with the children, Hensley would stay away
from the family's home. Hensley would have use of the couple's
1988 Plymouth Horizon automobile and Nancy would use their 2000
Buick LeSabre. They agreed that the children would remain in
Nancy's care.
Not happy with the turn his life had taken, Hensley
became despondent. According to his family, friends, and work
supervisor, Hensley appeared depressed and distraught over the
break-up of his family. He separately confided in two friends that
if he lost custody of his children, he would kill Nancy and then
himself.
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On January 22, Nancy filed a complaint for contempt in
family court, which alleged that Hensley was not complying with the
agreement they had entered into. A few days later, Hensley was
spotted by one of his neighbors jumping over a fence that
surrounded an empty lot that stood opposite his home at 198 Byron
Street. The neighbor reported this to Nancy. Hensley told a
friend that he had been attempting to see his children and that
Nancy had seen him and now she would try to take out another
restraining order against him.
A little over a week later, on January 31, Hensley
reported at 6:30 a.m. to his job at the Boston transportation
department. Around 8:00 a.m., Hensley informed his supervisor that
he was not "feeling right" and asked if he could use some vacation
time to head home. Hensley then went to his sister's house where
he stayed briefly before proceeding to 198 Byron Street. Hensley
parked his vehicle around the corner (and out of view) from the
house. He was next seen leaving the house around 11:45 a.m. He
left in Nancy's Buick LeSabre automobile.
That afternoon Hensley's oldest daughter returned from
school. The daughter, upon heading down to the basement to get
something to drink, found her mother's dead body. Nancy's body was
under her bedroom comforter; a blue necktie was tied tightly around
her neck. She had blood on her face and hands, and her left eye
was swollen. Nancy was wearing one sock and the other was in the
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kitchen with what appeared to be a bloodstain. There was no sign
of forced entry. Hensley's daughter called 911.
Meanwhile, Hensley drove Nancy's car to a ski resort in
New Hampshire. Hensley parked the car and ran a dryer vent hose
from the exhaust pipe into the car in an attempt to asphyxiate
himself. He was thwarted when New Hampshire police officers and
emergency personnel pulled Hensley from the vehicle around 9:00
p.m. and carried him to a nearby hospital. New Hampshire state
police quickly learned that Hensley was the suspect in a homicide
back in Massachusetts. Hensley was held on an involuntary
emergency hospitalization based on his suicide attempt, which
according to Hensley also included ingesting a bottle of sleeping
pills.
At 1:11 a.m., New Hampshire state police questioned a
Mirandized Hensley about Nancy's death. He admitted going to the
house, explaining that he wanted to get the Buick LeSabre
automobile and kill himself. When asked whether he went inside the
house, Hensley said "I think I did." Later in the interview he
changed his response to: "I don't remember, it's all a blur, I just
want to die." Hensley also claimed not to remember whether he saw
Nancy. He admitted having keys to both the house and the
automobile. Around 3:30 a.m., New Hampshire police learned that a
warrant had issued in Massachusetts for Hensley's arrest. Hensley
was then transported to jail.
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B. The Trial and Conviction
Hensley was indicted and tried for murder in the first
degree based on alternative theories of deliberate premeditation
and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Although Hensley did not take the
stand, his defense was clear; he claimed mental impairment. In
essence, defense counsel attempted to show that Hensley was
incapable of forming the mental state required for first degree
murder under either of the charged theories. A variety of
witnesses testified on this point. Hensley's sister testified that
Hensley had always been a wonderful man and a doting and involved
father. After he was served with the initial abuse prevention
order though, Hensley became a different person. According to
Hensley's sister, he "basically fell apart," alternating between
being depressed, hysterical, incoherent, and despondent. Hensley's
daughter painted a similar picture, describing her father as having
a "nervous breakdown" and not wanting to live anymore. Hensley's
supervisor echoed similar sentiments. His friends testified that
a barely functioning Hensley "looked like a zombie."
Testifying at trial, as a witness for the state, was Dr.
Mark Flomenbaum, the chief medical examiner in Massachusetts at the
time. Dr. Flomenbaum, who did not perform Nancy's autopsy, was
called to take the stand because Dr. William Zane, the medical
examiner who had performed the autopsy, was not available. Dr.
Flomenbaum, after speaking to his credentials and explaining the
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autopsy process in general, turned to Nancy's autopsy. He
explained that he had reviewed the autopsy report, supporting
materials, and photographs. Dr. Flomenbaum went on to opine that
the cause of Nancy's death was "ligature strangulation," the
mechanism being "blood starvation to the brain." He also testified
regarding some of Dr. Zane's findings, including the length of the
struggle, which was put at two to ten minutes, and the nature of
the struggle, e.g., the fact that it appeared that the abrasions on
Nancy's neck were caused by her trying to pull the ligature off
during strangulation. The autopsy report itself was not admitted
into evidence; however, Dr. Flomenbaum had the report with him on
the witness stand to refer to as needed.
Following closing arguments, during which defense counsel
conceded that Hensley killed Nancy but emphasized that he could not
have formed the mental state required for a first degree murder
conviction, the case went to the jury. On July 14, 2002, Hensley
was found guilty of first degree murder under both the theory of
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. He was
sentenced to life in prison.
C. The State Court Appeals
Hensley appealed his conviction to the SJC and filed a
motion for a new trial in Massachusetts Superior Court based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. His motion was denied; he
appealed that as well. The SJC consolidated the two appeals and it
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issued a decision on September 15, 2009. In it, the court rejected
Hensley's myriad challenges, affirming his conviction and the
denial of the motion for a new trial. We need not recount all of
Hensley's claims, or the SJC's conclusions, as only two are
relevant to this appeal.
The first was Hensley's claim that the trial court
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it
admitted the testimony of Dr. Flomenbaum, who was not the medical
examiner who performed Nancy's autopsy. The SJC was not persuaded.
It found that Dr. Flomenbaum's opinion as to Nancy's cause of death
was admissible because the doctor opined, as an expert, based on
information properly and typically relied on by experts, and was
subject to cross-examination. As for Dr. Flomenbaum's testimony
regarding Dr. Zane's specific findings contained in the autopsy
report (on which Dr. Flomenbaum based his cause-of-death opinion),
the SJC concluded that "such testimony may not have been admissible
at that point in the trial" since Dr. Flomenbaum was not the one
who prepared the autopsy report. However, any such error was
harmless, said the SJC, since the cause of death was not contested
at trial. And, according to the SJC, to the extent the testimony
was contested at trial, such testimony went to whether Hensley was
guilty under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, e.g., the
testimony relating to the nature and extent of the struggle.
Therefore, the SJC concluded, because there was "more than
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sufficient evidence" to support Hensley's conviction under the
deliberate premeditation theory, it did not need to consider
whether any error in admitting Dr. Flomenbaum's testimony affected
the jury's verdict under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
The second argument made by Hensley, relevant to this
appeal, related to the performance of his trial counsel. Hensley
contended that counsel's failure to present expert testimony and
medical records pertinent to his mental impairment, and its effect
on his capacity, constituted ineffective assistance.
The expert Hensley was referring to was David Rosmarin,
M.D., a forensic psychiatrist whom Hensley's counsel had retained
and consulted. Dr. Rosmarin evaluated Hensley and was prepared to
testify at trial; however, defense counsel never called him. In
support of his appeals, Hensley had Dr. Rosmarin pen a written
report of his findings. Hensley pointed out that in it, Dr.
Rosmarin had made some favorable findings, namely that mental
impairment and dissociative symptoms precluded Hensley from
"form[ing] the intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm."
However, the SJC noted that the report was not all advantageous.
The report also contained damaging statements about Hensley's level
of criminal responsibility, as well as a gruesome description of
the murder, which included references to Hensley being angry and
blaming Nancy for his suicidal designs. Moreover, the SJC found it
significant that this was not a case in which defense counsel had
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failed to investigate a mental impairment defense. Rather, counsel
had thoroughly investigated (and ultimately presented) a mental
impairment defense, but counsel made the strategic decision not to
make Dr. Rosmarin part of that defense. Given the damaging
information contained in the report, the fact that calling Dr.
Rosmarin would have opened the door for the Commonwealth's expert
to testify, and the ample evidence of Hensley's severe depression
offered by family and friends, the SJC concluded that counsel was
not ineffective for failing to present Dr. Rosmarin's expert
testimony.
For similar reasons, the SJC was not persuaded that
counsel had bobbled things by not presenting medical record
evidence of Hensley's history of depression, in particular, records
from the East Boston Neighborhood Health Center where Hensley
treated from 1999 to 2002. While the records would have shown some
history of anxiety and depression, the SJC found that the records
may have brought some "unsympathetic facts" to light, such as
Hensley's lacking depressive symptoms and refusing counseling.
Again, given the abundance of evidence presented by family and
friends as to Hensley's mental state, the SJC saw no error in
counsel's decision not to introduce these medical records. As the
SJC said, Dr. Rosmarin and the medical records "may well have
adversely affected the trial strategy, which was to portray Hensley
as a suicidal, yet sympathetic family man."
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D. Habeas Petition
Refusing to be put off, Hensley filed a habeas corpus
petition in the federal district court, renewing just the arguments
chronicled above, i.e., that his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was violated when Dr. Flomenbaum's testimony was
admitted, and his attorney's failure to introduce certain mental
health related evidence transgressed his Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel. The district court denied the petition,
concluding that the SJC's decision did not run afoul of the
applicable federal law. Hensley now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A district court's decision to deny habeas relief
engenders de novo review. Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d 39, 46
(1st Cir. 2012). We, like the district court, are guided by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28
U.S.C. § 2254. In the case of claims adjudicated on the merits in
state court, AEDPA contemplates just two scenarios that warrant a
federal court granting habeas relief. Id. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
For one, a federal court may grant habeas relief if the
state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." Id. § 2254(d)(1). This means we look to the Supreme
Court's holdings, as opposed to dicta, at the time the state court
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rendered its decision, González-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864,
876 (1st Cir. 2010), while employing the following criteria.
An adjudication will be contrary to clearly established
law if the state court "'applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth' by the Supreme Court or 'confronts a set
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of
[the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different
from [its] precedent.'" Gomes v. Brady, 564 F.3d 532, 537 (1st
Cir. 2009) (alterations in original)(quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). On the other hand, a state court
adjudication constitutes an unreasonable application "if the state
court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the
Supreme Court's then-current decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Abrante v.
St. Amand, 595 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). An "'unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law,'" and a
state court is afforded deference and latitude. Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at
410).
The second scenario justifying habeas relief is if the
state court adjudication led to "a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
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Though this means that a federal court will be taking a closer look
at a state court's findings of fact, the fundamental principle of
deference to those findings still applies. See John v. Russo, 561
F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2009).
A "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision."
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The confines of our review clear, we proceed to Hensley's
claims.
A. Admission of Dr. Flomenbaum's Testimony
Hensley solely contends that the SJC's decision as to the
admission of Dr. Flomenbaum's testimony was contrary to governing
Supreme Court precedent, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), specifically
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). In Melendez-
Diaz, which was decided a few months before the SJC issued its
decision in this matter, the Supreme Court considered whether a
Massachusetts trial court's admission into evidence of certificates
of analysis, which reported the results of forensic analysis done
on seized drugs, violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
See 557 U.S. at 307. As phrased by the Court, the operative
question was whether the certificates were "'testimonial,'
rendering the affiant 'witnesses' subject to the defendant's right
of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment." Id.
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The court concluded that they were, finding that although
under Massachusetts law the moniker for the disputed documents was
"certificates," the so-called certificates were "quite plainly
affidavits." Id. at 310. Affidavits, the court explained, were
squarely within the core class of testimonial statements, which had
been previously chronicled in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
51-52 (2004).1 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309-10; see also
United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 640 (1st Cir. 2012)
(explaining that the Supreme Court ruled that admitting the
disputed certificates "violated the Confrontation Clause because
they fell into the 'core class of testimonial statements'
identified in Crawford" (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310)),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1845 (2013). Significantly, the
certificates of analysis were "'made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial,'" and, under
Massachusetts law, "the sole purpose" of the certificates was to
provide evidence about the particulars (composition, quantity) of
the analyzed substance. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (quoting
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant, pursuant to the
protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment, was entitled to be
1
Others included: prior testimony not subject to cross
examination, depositions, and confessions.
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confronted at trial with the analysts who had performed the
forensic testing, absent their unavailability and a prior cross-
examination opportunity. Id.
According to Hensley, Melendez-Diaz "clearly established"
that forensic documents, such as autopsy reports, prepared under
circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe the
statement would be available for use at a later trial, are
testimonial and not admissible absent confrontation. Since Dr.
Zane, the author of Nancy's autopsy report, did not testify,
Hensley claims that the autopsy report was non-admissible
testimonial hearsay. From this, Hensley extrapolates that it was
error for Dr. Flomenbaum to recite facts contained in the autopsy
report and to offer opinions based on the report.2 Hensley further
claims that the court's admission of the testimony was not, as the
SJC found, harmless error.
Unfortunately for Hensley, his Confrontation Clause claim
fails from its starting presumption. The "threshold question" in
these types of claims "is whether the challenged statement is
testimonial." United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85
(1st Cir. 2010). "If it is not, the Confrontation Clause 'has no
application.'" Id. (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406,
420 (2007)).
2
One opinion is excepted. Hensley does not contest on appeal
that Dr. Flomenbaum's opinion as to the cause of death was
admissible.
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Here, contrary to the position Hensley takes on appeal,
Melendez-Diaz did not say one way or the other whether autopsy
reports should be considered testimonial. Indeed, the only
allusion to autopsy reports in the majority opinion is in a
footnote. There, in response to the dissent's suggestion that the
Confrontation Clause is not designed to detect errors in scientific
tests, and that other methods such as a new test might better serve
that purpose, the majority provided autopsies as an example of a
forensic test that cannot be repeated. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S.
at 318 & n.5; see also id. at 337 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
Court in no way - explicitly or implicitly - indicated that autopsy
reports are testimonial in nature. It simply used autopsies as an
example of a forensic test where do-overs are not possible.
As the Supreme Court stated, Melendez-Diaz "involves
little more than the application of" the Crawford v. Washington
holding.3 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329. And notably, although
3
Given this characterization, it is worth mentioning that
post-Crawford and pre-Melendez-Diaz, the weight of the case law
appears to be against Hensley. See, e.g., United States v. De La
Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that an autopsy
report is a non-testimonial business record); United States v.
Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (same). Thus, courts
consistently rejected Crawford-based habeas petitions that relied
upon the supposedly erroneous admission of autopsy reports. See
Mitchell v. Kelly, 520 F. App'x 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (holding that the state court did not unreasonably apply
Crawford "given the lack of Supreme Court precedent establishing
that an autopsy report is testimonial"), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
312 (2013); Vega v. Walsh, 669 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (holding that the state court's decision was not contrary
to Crawford as reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether
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Crawford described a core class of testimonial statements (which
did not include autopsy reports), it was hardly definitive,
"leav[ing] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.'" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The
Supreme Court continued taking this approach, declining to "produce
an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . . as
either testimonial or nontestimonial" in Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 822 (2006). In other words, things are not as clear cut
as Hensley would make them out to be.
Further evidencing the unsettled nature of the issue at
hand is how courts have treated autopsy reports following Melendez-
Diaz. Most notably, this court in Nardi v. Pepe stated that "an
autopsy report can be distinguished from, or assimilated to, the
sworn documents in Melendez-Diaz." 662 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir.
2011). Referring to whether autopsy reports are covered by the
Confrontation Clause, we continued: "no one can be certain just
what the Supreme Court would say about that issue today."4 Id.;
autopsy reports came within Crawford's formulations); McNeiece v.
Lattimore, 501 F. App'x 634, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
because Crawford did not clearly establish that autopsy reports are
testimonial, the state court's decision that portions of an autopsy
report were admissible was not contrary to Supreme Court
precedent), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2357 (2013).
4
In Nardi, we added that even were the Supreme Court to
classify autopsy reports as testimonial, it is not clear whether
"the admissibility of in-court expert testimony that relied in some
measure on such a report would be affected." 662 F.3d at 112. We
noted the witness's ability to be cross-examined and the
longstanding tradition of allowing experts to rely on hearsay where
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see also United States v. McGhee, 627 F.3d 454, 459 (1st Cir. 2010)
(noting that the Melendez-Diaz Court was "sharply divided" and that
the Court's "new slant on the Confrontation Clause is likely to be
contested territory for some years"), vacated on reh'g on other
grounds, 651 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2011).
When other courts, post Melendez-Diaz, have been
confronted with the question of whether autopsy reports are
testimonial or not, disparity of treatment has reigned. On the one
hand, some courts have concluded that autopsy reports are not
testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99
(2d Cir. 2013) (deciding that the autopsy report at issue "was not
testimonial because it was not prepared primarily to create a
record for use at a criminal trial"), cert. denied, 2014 WL 2178370
(May 27, 2014); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 450 (Cal. 2012)
(finding that even though California's statutory scheme required
the reporting of suspicious autopsy findings to law enforcement, an
autopsy serves several purposes and the "autopsy report itself was
simply an official explanation of an unusual death, and such
official records are ordinarily not testimonial"); Banmah v. State,
87 So. 3d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that
autopsy reports are not testimonial because they are made pursuant
to a statutory duty and not, in all instances, used in
doing so is common practice. Id. Given our determination today
though, there is no need for us to wade into this thicket.
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prosecutions); People v. Cortez, 931 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (finding that Melendez-Diaz did not upset the court's prior
holdings that autopsy reports are business records without Crawford
implications).
On the flip side, courts have come down the other way,
finding autopsy reports testimonial and affording them the
protection of the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., United States
v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that,
applying the logic of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, the
autopsy reports at issue were testimonial); Commonwealth v. Avila,
912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029, 1030 n.20 (Mass. 2009) (finding that the
medical examiner's autopsy report statements were testimonial);
Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 241 P.3d 214, 228 (Okla. Crim. App.
2010) (holding that in light of Oklahoma's statutory scheme
relative to the medical examiner's duty in the case of a suspicious
death, an autopsy report in such cases would be testimonial); Wood
v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 209-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
although not all autopsy reports are testimonial, given the suspect
nature of the victim's death, the subject autopsy report was
testimonial).
Of course, for habeas purposes, the operative time period
for assessing whether or not a rule is clearly established is at
the time the state court renders its judgment, Greene v. Fisher,
132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011). However, highlighting later or present
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uncertainty of the law can help us gauge how unsettled the law was
at the time the operative state court decision was issued. See,
e.g., Nardi, 662 F.3d at 112 (stating that "we stress the present
uncertainty of the law only to emphasize that it was even more
unsettled at the time of Crawford just how far that decision would
be extended"). As the above cases make clear, even after Melendez-
Diaz had been around a little longer, it was still uncertain where
autopsy reports stood. This strongly undercuts Hensley's claim
that the testimonial nature of autopsy reports was clearly
established.
In an effort to get around this fact, Hensley urges us
away from the narrow issue of whether the Supreme Court had, at the
time of the SJC decision, determined that autopsy reports in
particular are testimonial and asks us instead to focus on the
general parameters set by Melendez-Diaz. He claims Melendez-Diaz
clearly established that a forensic document is testimonial if it
was prepared under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness to believe that it would be available for use at a later
trial. Because the Massachusetts statutory scheme requires (among
other things) that if a medical examiner suspects foul play, he or
she alert the district attorney and make available any records from
the investigation, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 38, § 7, Hensley claims
that an objective witness would believe that an autopsy report
might be used in later criminal proceedings.
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Even assuming Hensley has adequately characterized what
Melendez-Diaz says, his argument misses the mark. He is correct
that AEDPA does not require a "Supreme Court case directly on all
fours," and instead it is sufficient if the Court's "general
principles can be discerned." White v. Coplan, 399 F.3d 18, 25
(1st Cir. 2005). However, it is also true that the "contrary to"
habeas standard is a difficult one to meet; federal habeas relief
functions as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction."
Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
state court decision "must be substantially different from the
relevant precedent of [the Supreme] Court." Williams, 529 U.S. at
405.
Taken in this light, we cannot see how the SJC's
rejection of Hensley's Confrontation Clause argument was contrary
to governing Supreme Court precedent. As we hashed out above, at
the time the SJC issued its decision (and indeed well after that),
it was not settled that autopsy reports fell within the core class
of testimonial documents enumerated in Crawford, or within the
parameters set by Melendez-Diaz. Given that the Supreme Court had
given no clear answers relative to this issue, it cannot be said
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that the SJC's decision was contrary to clearly established law.5
Hensley's Confrontation Clause entreaty fails.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The other half of Hensley's appeal relates to his Sixth
Amendment right to effective representation. To remind the reader,
Hensley faults his counsel for not presenting David Rosmarin, M.D.
(the forensic psychiatry expert retained by the defense) as a
witness, and for not introducing into evidence medical records
pertinent to his mental impairment, and its effect on his capacity.
Hensley claims that the SJC's rebuke of his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as well as an
unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence
presented at trial, see id. § 2254(d)(2). We can make quick work
of the second part of his contention and so begin there.
i. Section 2254(d)(2) Claim
Hensley argues that the SJC's determination that counsel
was not deficient for failing to introduce his medical records was
based in part on clear factual error, which resulted in an
unreasonable determination of the facts. See id. In particular,
Hensley highlights some of the court's factual findings about
5
In light of our determination, there is no need to get into
whether it was error for Dr. Flomenbaum to testify about, and offer
opinions based on, Nancy's autopsy report. Similarly, delving into
the impact of the admission of the report on Hensley's case, i.e.,
whether it was harmless error, will not be required.
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portions of his medical records, which the court perceived could
have had a negative impact on the jury, thus validating counsel's
decision not to introduce the records.
The problem is that although Hensley frames this as a
fact-based habeas challenge, a review of his brief reveals that he
does not dispute the accuracy of any of the SJC's factual
determinations. Rather, Hensley quibbles with the emphasis the
court put on certain facts or the context in which the court placed
the facts. For example, Hensley complains that the SJC's finding
that "Hensley was greatly concerned that his depression medication
was impairing his sexual performance" bore no relevance. Hensley
also faults the district court for not mentioning - when it found
that Hensley "had showed no symptoms of depression during two
separate visits" - that those visits occurred back in 1999. In
other words, Hensley does not even allege that the court's factual
findings were erroneous, let alone furnish us with evidentiary
support to overcome the "fundamental principle of deference to
state court findings" that § 2254(d)(2) calls for. John, 561 F.3d
at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no more to be
said. Hensley's § 2254(d)(2) challenge fails.
ii. Section 2254(d)(1) Claim
The rest of Hensley's ineffective assistance habeas claim
goes like so. According to Hensley, the SJC's determination that
his Sixth Amendment right was not abridged - either by counsel's
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failure to call Dr. Rosmarin or introduce the medical records -
was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984).6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
For a defendant to be entitled to reversal of a
conviction pursuant to Strickland, he must make a two part showing.
466 U.S. at 687. The first piece is that defense counsel's
performance was deficient, that is, the attorney "made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. On top of
a flawed performance, there must also be prejudice to the defense.7
Id. It must be "reasonably likely" that the result of the criminal
proceeding would have been different, id. at 696, and that
likelihood "must be substantial, not just conceivable."
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 792. The defendant's burden is a heavy
one, Turner v. United States, 699 F.3d 578, 584 (1st Cir. 2012),
and an ineffective assistance of counsel showing is not an easy one
6
The SJC actually considered Hensley's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim under Commonwealth v. Williams, which, like
Strickland, places a dual focus on counsel's performance and
defendant's prejudice. See 900 N.E.2d 871, 874 (Mass. 2009)
(citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 584 N.E.2d. 621, 624 (Mass. 1992)).
The Massachusetts standard employed by the SJC is at least as
protective of defendants as the federal standard. See Yeboah-Sefah
v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 70 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009). Hensley does not
claim otherwise.
7
Given that neither the SJC nor the district court saw any
problem with how counsel comported himself, they did not consider
the prejudice prong.
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to make given our deferential review, United States v. Valerio, 676
F.3d 237, 246 (1st Cir. 2012).
Since we are considering a habeas challenge, we are not
actually tasked with deciding whether Hensley's counsel's
performance fell short of Strickland's requirements; rather the
"pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the
Strickland standard was unreasonable." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at
785. Here, it is clear, the SJC's application was not
unreasonable. We start with the retained (but not called) forensic
psychiatrist, Dr. Rosmarin.
As the SJC noted, Dr. Rosmarin's testimony, according to
his later obtained affidavit, would have been a mixed bag. For
instance, Dr. Rosmarin concluded that Hensley suffered from Major
Depression, and in the moments before Nancy's killing, could not
"conceive of" killing Nancy or weigh such a decision or "act in
furtherance of this weighing." Hensley "was not able to form the
intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm" because mental
impairment and dissociative symptoms prevented him from doing so.
Not surprisingly, Hensley hones in on these statements; however,
Dr. Rosmarin's take was not all favorable. Dr. Rosmarin had also
determined that Hensley "did not lack criminal responsibility for
the killing." And Dr. Rosmarin relayed Hensley's grisly
description of the murder. Particularly, Hensley stated that he
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was "angry" and "afraid I might beat [Nancy] up." Hensley said he
started "choking her," stating "[y]ou destroyed me and my family."
"The decision whether to call a particular witness is
almost always strategic, requiring a balancing of the benefits and
risks of the anticipated testimony." Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75,
86 (1st Cir. 2004). Here, in addition to keeping out some
potentially nocuous testimony, trial counsel's decision not to call
Dr. Rosmarin meant that the state could not present the rebuttal
expert witness that it had retained. It is on Hensley to "overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is plain that
he has not done that here.
We reach the same conclusion as to Hensley's East Boston
Neighborhood Health Center medical records. As with Dr. Rosmarin's
testimony, it is possible the medical records would have done more
harm than good to Hensley's case. The records did evidence
Hensley's history of depression and anxiety. However, as the SJC
pointed out, a jury may not have looked favorably on other portions
of the records, e.g., many notations regarding Hensley's concern
with how his anti-anxiety medication was affecting his sexual
performance (albeit with a couple of mentions of how this was
impacting his marriage), a notation about Hensley's lack of
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depressive symptoms, as well as one regarding a refusal to go to
counseling.
To prevail under Strickland, counsel's choice must have
been "so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have made it." United States v. Rodriguez, 675 F.3d 48, 56 (1st
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the possible
negative impact of the medical records, and the fact that other
evidence (family and friend testimony) demonstrated Hensley's
depression, we find it hard to see how defense counsel's decision
not to introduce the East Boston Neighborhood Health Center medical
records was patently unreasonable.
To sum things up, the SJC reasonably determined that
defense counsel's decision not to call Dr. Rosmarin, or present the
subject medical records, was sound. Hensley's attorney clearly
investigated and pursued a mental incapacity defense. Counsel
retained Dr. Rosmarin and had him evaluate Hensley three times
prior to trial. Counsel obtained Hensley's East Boston
Neighborhood Health Center medical records and provided these
records to Dr. Rosmarin. Counsel then reasonably elected to try
and establish Hensley's mental impairment through testimony from
his friends and family, choosing not to introduce expert testimony
from a forensic psychiatrist or the medical records pertaining to
Hensley's mental health treatment. Counsel obtained a mental
impairment instruction and argued in summation that Hensley's
-27-
impairment made murder in the second degree the more appropriate
choice.
Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is not called
for when this court might merely have a differing opinion as to how
things should have turned out. See Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1,
13 (1st Cir. 2001). To the contrary, the "state court decision
must be so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record
support, or so arbitrary, as to indicate it is outside the universe
of plausible, credible options." Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted). This is a high hurdle, which we are not even close to
surmounting here. Hensley has failed to cast doubt on the SJC's
decision as to his Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The SJC did not unreasonably apply Strickland when
it concluded that Hensley's attorney's performance was not
deficient.8 Hensley's § 2254(d)(1) contest is without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
Both Hensley's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
offering, and right to effective representation imploration, fall
short. The district court's denial of Hensley's petition for
habeas relief is affirmed.
8
Because (as we see it) the SJC's determination regarding
counsel's performance was not unreasonable, we need not get into
Strickland's prejudice component.
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