United States v. Kenney

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ROBERT C. KENNEY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
W. Daniel Deane, with whom Nixon Peabody LLP was on brief, for
appellant.
Kelly Begg Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney and Michael J.
Crowley, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
June 25, 2014
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to drug
distribution, robbery, and firearm charges, Robert Kenney now seeks
withdrawal of his guilty plea. He argues that the district court
erred in failing to assess his competency, that it inadequately
assessed whether his plea was "knowing" and "voluntary" within the
meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and that his trial lawyer failed to
provide him with effective assistance. Kenney also challenges the
district court's imposition of a ten-year mandatory minimum
sentence, contending that the district court gave him inadequate
notice of the evidence on which it relied and that it incorrectly
evaluated his claim of sentencing factor manipulation. Finding no
error, we affirm.
I.
The morning of February 11, 2011 promised to be a busy
one for Kenney and his two co-conspirators, Christopher Littlejohn
and Ramone Arakelow. Well before dawn, the trio piled into
Kenney's truck and drove to a parking lot in Saugus, Massachusetts,
where a fourth conspirator awaited them. Posing as law enforcement
officers, the four would then break into the apartment of two
Brazilian drug dealers, restrain the occupants, and abscond with
five kilograms of cocaine and $200,000 in cash. In preparation for
the robbery, Kenney had obtained a Boston Police Department patch
and police light, along with knives, duct tape, and zip ties to
restrain the apartment's denizens. Kenney had also discussed the
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layout of the apartment with Littlejohn and the fourth conspirator,
and arranged to break in at a time when only one of the drug
dealers was home and when an associate would be present to open the
door.
Unfortunately for the would-be robbers, there was no
apartment, no cocaine, and no money. Worse still, there was not
even a fourth conspirator. Instead, the "co-conspirator" awaiting
them in the parking lot was a cooperating witness ("Informant 2").
After Kenney, Littlejohn, and Arakelow entered Informant 2's car
and reviewed their plans for the heist, Informant 2 signaled to law
enforcement and the three were arrested.
In reality, the planned burglary was a reverse sting
operation devised by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives ("ATF"), which had been investigating Kenney since the
spring of 2010 in connection with the illegal sale of firearms.
Between May and December 2010, an ATF informant ("Informant 1") had
arranged four firearm purchases with Kenney. When Kenney alluded
during one of these sales to a "safe job" he had previously
performed, Informant 1 told him about the Brazilian drug dealers'
stash-house, which Kenney expressed immediate interest in robbing.
Informant 1 continued to weave this fiction in subsequent meetings
with Kenney, introducing him to a "business partner" (in reality
Informant 2) with whom Kenney planned the robbery.
-3-
The robbery scheme may have been quixotic, but its
consequences were all too real for the conspirators. On March 16,
2011, a grand jury indicted Kenney, Littlejohn, and Arakelow for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five
kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and conspiracy
to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.1Kenney was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm in
four counts arising from his 2010 gun sales.
The primary issues on this appeal first surfaced at
Kenney's arraignment in April 2011, when defense counsel informed
the Magistrate Judge that Kenney "ha[d] a serious medical
condition," that he had undergone brain surgery, and that he was
not receiving medical treatment at the facility in which he was
being held. The Magistrate Judge replied that she would "address
any motion that [she] need[ed] to," but suggested that Kenney's
counsel "work with the Government and . . . see if something can be
done less formally."
Kenney soon entered into early plea negotiations with the
government. In a missive to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, defense
counsel indicated that "Mr. Kenny [sic] is suffering from ill
1
Littlejohn pleaded guilty to the robbery conspiracy count
in exchange for the government's dismissal of the drug conspiracy
charge, and was sentenced to 41 months' imprisonment. Arakelow
opted to go to trial, and in March 2012 was convicted of the
robbery conspiracy count and acquitted of the drug conspiracy
count, receiving a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment.
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health. His condition is deteriorating rapidly. Therefore, it
would be in everyone's best interest to come to an agreement sooner
rather than later." Toward that end, Kenney moved for the
preparation of a pre-plea presentence report ("PSR"), citing
"serious health issues" and indicating a desire to plead guilty.
The pre-plea PSR, issued in January 2012, stated that Kenney had
undergone brain surgery in 2009 to remove a tumor, that he was
taking several prescription medications, and that he reported no
mental, behavioral, or emotional problems. Kenney's girlfriend did
state, however, that he suffered from "some undiagnosed mental
health issues because his moods fluctuate[d] and he [could] be
temperamental" and that according to Kenney's relatives, "his mood
ha[d] changed since the surgery."
Kenney also filed an ex parte motion requesting $10,000
in Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") funds to engage an expert witness
to testify about Kenney's mental health as it bore on culpability
for sentencing purposes. The motion alluded to Kenney's 2009 brain
surgery and further stated: "Based on observations of undersigned
counsel, as well as conversations with the Defendant's daughter, it
appears as though the Defendant suffers from one or more mental
diseases or defects," which had "never been properly diagnosed or
treated." It suggested that "several complex factors contributing
to [Kenney's] behavior leading up to the charged offenses could
only be determined by a forensic psychologist," and therefore that
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the proposed expert's testimony "would prove extremely helpful to
the Court in determining the appropriate sentence for the
Defendant." The district court denied this motion, finding the
requested sum "unreasonably high." Kenney filed a second such
motion in November 2011, this time seeking $7,000 and attaching a
letter from the putative expert deeming it "absolutely indicated to
conduct an evaluation of criminal responsibility as decision-
making, and/or other mental faculties, may have been affected" by
the brain surgery. The district court granted this motion in part,
allowing a maximum expenditure of $4,000.
In March 2012, Kenney signed a plea agreement with the
government, in which he agreed to provide substantial assistance in
the prosecution of Arakelow. In exchange, the government would
dismiss the robbery conspiracy charge, recommend a below-Guideline
sentence, and move under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for relief from the
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence on the drug conspiracy count.
At Kenney's change-of-plea hearing on March 15, however, defense
counsel informed the court that Kenney wished to withdraw from the
plea agreement and plead guilty to all counts without the benefit
of the agreement. Kenney made no objection to his lawyer's
statement, and the district court proceeded to accept his plea on
that basis.
Shortly thereafter, Kenney sent a letter to his attorney
claiming to have received threats and suggesting a desire to
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withdraw the guilty plea.2 On March 22, Kenney's lawyer brought
this letter to the court's attention at the final conference before
Arakelow's trial. While admitting that he was "confused by" the
letter, defense counsel took it to mean that Kenney "was forced to
not take the government deal because of what he [was] being labeled
[i.e., a cooperator], and . . . what he [was] having to endure in
jail." The district court responded that if Kenney wished to
withdraw his plea, it would allow him to do so and go to trial
alongside Arakelow in four days.
The following day, after meeting with Kenney, defense
counsel sent a letter to the government and the court stating that
Kenney was "adamant" that he did not wish to withdraw his guilty
plea. The letter also shed light on Kenney's sudden repudiation of
the plea agreement, explaining that Arakelow had been "tipped off
to the fact that Mr. Kenney was cooperating" with the government
and had accordingly made "veiled threats" to Kenney and, through
recently released inmates, to members of Kenney's family. Although
it was likely too late for Kenney to testify at Arakelow's trial
three days later, the letter beseeched the government to honor the
plea agreement notwithstanding Kenney's refusal to cooperate. The
government declined to do so, and three days later, Kenney appeared
2
The letter has apparently been lost, and its exact date is
uncertain. We assume for purposes of this appeal that it was sent
"[o]n or about March 21," as Kenney claims.
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before the court and confirmed that he did not wish to withdraw his
guilty plea.
The case proceeded to sentencing on November 29, 2012.3
In his sentencing memorandum, Kenney argued inter alia that the
district court should disregard as "sentencing factor manipulation"
the five kilograms of cocaine ATF added to the conspiracy, which
subjected Kenney to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The government sought to rebut this
argument by pointing to several recorded conversations involving
Kenney that were admitted into evidence at Arakelow's trial. At
sentencing, the court agreed with the government's interpretation
of the recordings, concluding that "Kenney was the ringleader, the
mastermind . . . the recruiter, and an enthusiastic participant in
this scheme." The court accordingly rejected Kenney's sentencing
factor manipulation argument and imposed the mandatory minimum
sentence of 120 months' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II.
A. Conviction
Kenney contends that his guilty plea must be vacated for
three reasons: because the district court 1) failed to evaluate sua
3
Prior to sentencing, Kenney filed a third motion for CJA
funds, seeking an additional $8,000 for a psychological evaluation
in aid of sentencing. The district court granted an additional
$2,000 in funds (raising the total allotted amount to $6,000), and
denied Kenney's motion for reconsideration, stating that it
"consider[ed] the amount excessive given the usual charges for
examinations of its type."
-8-
sponte his competency to plead guilty and 2) inadequately probed
whether his plea was "knowing" and "voluntary" as required under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and 3) because his trial counsel did not
provide the effective assistance guaranteed under the Sixth
Amendment. At a minimum, Kenney requests that we remand for an
evidentiary hearing on these issues. We address each of Kenney's
challenges in turn.
1. Competency
Supreme Court precedent has long made clear that "[a]
criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, and he
may not . . . plead guilty unless he does so 'competently and
intelligently.'" Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)
(citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468
(1938)); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970);
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). This requirement "has
a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that [the defendant] has the
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel."
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960). To safeguard this constitutional guarantee, a
court must, on either party's motion or sua sponte, order a
competency hearing "if there is reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
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against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. §
4241(a).
Neither Kenney nor the government requested a competency
hearing below; instead, Kenney avers that the court, presented with
various intimations of Kenney's mental health issues, should have
ordered such a hearing on its own initiative. The government
responds that Kenney has waived this argument because he declined
to withdraw his allegedly incompetent guilty plea when given the
opportunity to do so. We decline to find this claim waived,
however, because the very pith and marrow of Kenney's argument is
that he was incapable of understanding the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him, rendering intentional waiver an
impossibility. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 ("[I]t is contradictory
to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or
intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial."); United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 18
(1st Cir. 1995) ("For obvious reasons, competency claims are not
subject to ordinary waiver doctrine."). We accordingly review the
district court's decision not to hold a competency hearing for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Maryea, 704 F.3d 55, 69 (1st
Cir. 2013); United States v. Lebrón, 76 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.
1996).4
4
The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review.
The government avers that "[b]ecause Kenney neither requested a
competency hearing nor objected to the district court's failure to
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On appeal, Kenney points to several items of evidence
that he contends should have alerted the district court to the need
for a competency hearing: trial counsel's statement at arraignment
that Kenney had undergone brain surgery and was not receiving
medical treatment in jail; Kenney's citation of "serious health
issues" in his motion for a pre-plea PSR; Kenney's ex parte motions
seeking funds to retain a psychologist to assess his mental
capacity; the allusion in one of these motions to "mental diseases
or defects" that had "never been properly diagnosed or treated";
the putative psychological expert's opinion that it was "absolutely
indicated to conduct an evaluation of criminal responsibility as
decision-making, and/or other mental faculties, may have been
affected" by the 2009 brain surgery; the pre-plea PSR, which
chronicled Kenney's history of drug use and noted inter alia that
convene one, this claim is reviewed only for plain error."
Although we did review for plain error rather than abuse of
discretion in United States v. Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d 78, 80 (1st
Cir. 2000), that case dealt with the failure to hold a competency
hearing under a separate statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e),
which requires the court to hold a competency hearing after the
release of a defendant previously deemed incompetent and
hospitalized under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). The government cites no
cases for the proposition, contrary to Maryea and Lebrón, that
plain error review also applies under § 4241(a), and in any event
we find abuse of discretion review more appropriate given the
inherent contradiction recognized in Pate and Hurley. See United
States v. Lindsey, 339 F. App'x 956, 959 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that plain error review "would unduly cramp review of
the district court's obligation to determine for itself whether a
criminal defendant is mentally incompetent," and noting "that most
of our sister courts apply the abuse of discretion standard of
review to a district court's decision about whether to sua sponte
order a competency hearing").
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Kenney had experienced changes in mood and short-term memory loss
since his surgery; and Kenney's last-minute, and at the time
unexplained, withdrawal from the plea agreement.
These facts do indeed raise concerns about the general
state of Kenney's mental health -- concerns, we might add, that are
endemic to the criminal justice system. See generally James &
Glaze, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Mental Health
Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates 1 (2006) (reporting that 45% of
federal prisoners in 2005 suffered mental health problems). But
the question before us is more circumscribed: whether the facts
before the district court gave it "reasonable cause to believe"
that Kenney's mental illness rendered him "unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). As we stated in
United States v. Widi, 684 F.3d 216, 221 (1st Cir. 2012), "[a]
defendant may have serious mental illness while still being able to
understand the proceedings and rationally assist his counsel." The
district court was entitled to draw that conclusion here.
The allegedly impugning mental health evidence was either
too general (e.g., Kenney's complaint of "serious health issues"
and history of drug use) or else focused on issues distinct from
Kenney's competency. For instance, nothing in the ex parte motions
for funds or the putative expert's letter indicated concern about
Kenney's competency; instead, the stated rationale for the proposed
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expert evaluation was to "help[] . . . the Court in determining the
appropriate sentence for the Defendant" by, in the expert's words,
"address[ing] the question of criminal responsibility" (emphases
added). Concerns about distinct mental faculties (decision-making
and responsibility) at an earlier time (during the commission of
the offense) do not necessarily engender reasonable doubts about
Kenney's understanding and ability to assist counsel during the
criminal proceedings. As for Kenney's eleventh-hour repudiation of
the plea agreement, the subsequent revelation of Arakelow's threats
demonstrates that while Kenney's withdrawal may have been less than
entirely volitional, it was not necessarily indicative of
incompetency. The district court was entitled to conclude that
Kenney was if anything all too cognizant of the threats that he
faced and their possible consequences.
Nor were allusions to Kenney's brain surgery, drug use,
and undiagnosed or untreated mental illnesses enough, ipso facto,
to necessitate a competency hearing. The defense never voiced any
specific concern about Kenney's competency; indeed, on the
contrary, Kenney informed the interviewing Probation Officer that
he was not experiencing, and never had experienced, any mental,
emotional, or behavioral problems. And as we discuss in greater
detail in section A.2 infra, Kenney reaffirmed this testimony at
his change-of-plea hearing, informing the district court that he
had never been treated for mental or psychological problems, that
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the brain surgery had slowed his mental processes but did not
otherwise impact his comprehension, and that he understood the
charges against him, the penalties he faced, and the rights he
relinquished by pleading guilty. Such affirmations of competency,
even if not conclusive, are entitled to some weight when the
defendant is not "plainly incoherent or irrational." Widi, 684
F.3d at 220. We also find it "significant that . . . [Kenney's]
attorney, who more than any other courtroom player 'enjoy[ed] a
unique vantage for observing whether his client [was] competent,'
did not raise any concern about [Kenney's] competency." United
States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Muriel-Cruz, 412 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 2005)) (internal
brackets omitted).5
In short, although the district court may have been on
notice that Kenney struggled with mental illness generally, we find
no abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to sua
sponte order a hearing on the specific issue of competency. As we
have stated in the past, a holding to the contrary "would 'come
close to requiring district courts to order competency hearings sua
sponte in every case where a defendant has some history of
psychiatric treatment and, even vaguely, mentions the problem.'"
5
That significance is only heightened by the fact that
defense counsel did raise concerns about Kenney's mental health in
other contexts (e.g., culpability), suggesting that Kenney's lawyer
did not simply turn a blind eye to these issues altogether.
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Lebrón, 76 F.3d at 33 (quoting Hernández-Hernández v. United
States, 904 F.2d 758, 760 (1st Cir. 1990)). We decline to impose
such a requirement and thereby establish the competency hearing as
"nearly a routine step between arraignment and trial." Figueroa-
Vazquez v. United States, 718 F.2d 511, 512 (1st Cir. 1983).
2. Plea Colloquy
Kenney next avers that his plea colloquy was deficient
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b), which requires a court to advise a
pleading defendant of his rights and determine that the defendant's
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Kenney concedes that plain
error review is proper due to his failure to raise this challenge
below. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002);
United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2008).6
We have explained that Rule 11 addresses three "core
concerns": "1) absence of coercion; 2) understanding of the
charges; and 3) knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea."
United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
Kenney alleges that his plea colloquy was marred by errors
implicating each of these concerns, rendering his plea neither
6
Once again, we decline the government's invitation to find
this claim waived altogether. Whether Kenney could be said to have
"intentionally relinquishe[d] or abandon[ed]" his Rule 11 claim by
refusing the district court's offer of withdrawal, which would have
required him to go to trial in four days, presents a closer
question than the substantive Rule 11 claim itself. United States
v. Rodríguez-León, 402 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2005). We therefore
resolve Kenney's claim on the latter basis.
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knowing nor voluntary. More specifically, Kenney contends that the
district court failed to adequately inquire into 1) the effect of
his various medications on his comprehension and 2) the reason for
his sudden renunciation of the plea agreement. We address each
argument separately.
i. Medication
In arguing that the district court inadequately assessed
his understanding and knowledge, Kenney points to the following
exchange at his change-of-plea hearing:
[COURT]: Have you ever been treated for any
mental or psychological problem?
[KENNEY]: No.
[COURT]: Are you presently taking any
prescription medication?
[KENNEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: Is it any kind of medication that
would affect your ability to understand this
proceeding? Is . . . your mind clear?
[KENNEY]: I think it is.
[COURT]: You're the best judge of that.
[KENNEY]: Yeah.
[COURT]: What, just generally, what type of
medication are you taking?
[KENNEY]: I take five or six of them. I know
a couple of them is like Altrum, stuff for my
-- I had brain surgery and nasal surgery. So
it might be to that effect. I'm not sure.
[COURT]: Are you recovering now from the
surgery or --
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[KENNEY]: I'm trying.
[COURT]: Trying?
[KENNEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: But you don't feel that that impacts
your ability to understand things?
[KENNEY]: Sometimes it takes me a little
longer to understand.
[COURT]: But your comprehension is there, it's
just that the mental processes go a little
more slowly?
[KENNEY]: Yes.
[COURT]: Mr. Kenney, if I start speaking too
quickly or if something seems to be passing by
too quickly, let me know, and I'll rephrase
it, okay?
[KENNEY]: Okay.
Kenney points out that the district court's compound
inquiry -- "Is it any kind of medication that would affect your
ability to understand this proceeding? Is . . . your mind clear?"
-- renders his response ("I think it is") ambiguous, as it is
unclear which question Kenney was answering. Because "I think it
is" could be taken as an affirmative answer to the first query,
Kenney suggests that this case is similar to United States v.
Parra-Ibañez, 936 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1991), in which the defendant
informed the district court at his Rule 11 hearing that he was
taking "Ativan, Halcion and Restoril" and that Ativan was "a drug
to control [his] nerves," id. at 591. We held that the court
violated Rule 11 by failing to further inquire "what effects, if
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any, such medications might be likely to have on [the defendant's]
clear-headedness." Id. at 596.
We agree with the government that Parra-Ibañez is
distinguishable and that our more recent decision in United States
v. Morrisette, 429 F.3d 318 (1st Cir. 2005), disposes of Kenney's
claim. In Morrisette, we found that the district court's
questioning was "not plainly inadequate" when the court
"specifically inquired whether [the defendant's named] medication
. . . prevented [the defendant] from understanding what was
happening during the hearing." Id. at 322. We noted that in
Parra-Ibañez, by contrast, the court failed to make any such
inquiry at all. Id.; see also Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47,
53 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the Parra-Ibañez court "failed to
follow up with any question whatsoever about whether the
defendant's medication affected his competence to plead").
Here, too, the district court's catechism was not plainly
inadequate. Admittedly, as Kenney points out, the court did not
seek to ascertain the name and dosage of each medication. Although
it might have been advisable to do so, we have recognized that
"there is certainly no settled rule that a hearing cannot proceed
unless precise names and quantities of drugs have been identified."
United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 2000).
After asking Kenney about his medications, the court proceeded to
ask him whether his recovery from brain surgery "impact[ed his]
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ability to understand things" and whether his "comprehension [was]
there," and Kenney responded that his mental processes had been
slowed but not otherwise impaired.7 In light of Kenney's
responses, and in the absence of other identifiable red flags in
Kenney's performance at the hearing, the district court did not
plainly err in opting not to inquire further. See id. at 269("Courts have commonly relied on the defendant's own assurance (and
assurances from counsel) that the defendant's mind is clear.").
7
We recognize that the district court did not explicitly ask
whether Kenney's medication impacted his understanding, and that
its inquiry ("you don't feel that that impacts your ability to
understand things?") was made in response to Kenney's testimony
that he was trying to recover from his brain surgery. While the
best practice is certainly to make a specific inquiry regarding the
effects of any medications, given the particular facts of this
case, Kenney cannot demonstrate plain error. Unlike Parra-Ibañez,
no competency hearing was required in Kenney's case, see section
A.1 supra, and Kenney told the district court that he had never
been treated for mental or psychological problems. The district
court thus had little "reason to suspect that the medications taken
by the accused might impinge upon the accused's capacity to enter
a voluntary and intelligent plea." Parra-Ibañez, 936 F.2d at 595(emphasizing defendant's testimony that he took medication in
connection with his treatment for a "mental or emotional
condition"). More significantly, the district court did not
abandon the impairment inquiry after learning that Kenney was
taking medication; it probed further. The district court
immediately followed the discussion of medications and surgery with
a question that fairly encompassed Kenney's mental impairment,
whether caused by medications or by the brain surgery itself ("your
comprehension is there, it's just that the mental processes go a
little more slowly?"). It repeatedly questioned Kenney's
understanding at each step of the hearing, and concluded by
verifying generally that it had not "confused [Kenney] by anything
[it] said or any question [it] asked." These facts, particularly
when considered together with the district court's express findings
that Kenney was well-oriented, competent, and responsive during the
change-of-plea hearing, do not support a finding of plain error for
lack of greater specificity in questioning.
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ii. Voluntariness
Kenney next contends that his guilty plea was coerced,
and therefore invalid, due to the threats he received from
Arakelow, which led him to withdraw from his plea agreement. See
United States v. Martínez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 732 (1st Cir. 1995)
("[A] guilty plea is involuntary and therefore invalid if it is
obtained 'by actual or threatened physical harm or by coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.'" (quoting Brady, 397 U.S.
at 750)). At the outset of the change-of-plea hearing, defense
counsel informed the court that Kenney was withdrawing from the
plea agreement, but that he would nevertheless "plead guilty and
admit responsibility for all of his own actions." Kenney avers
that the court, presented with this "sudden about-face," should
have "ask[ed] Kenney the obvious question--why are you renouncing
your plea deal only to plead guilty to everything?"
Although the district court did not pose that question,
it did ask Kenney whether he was "pleading guilty willingly,
freely, and voluntarily"; whether anyone "coerced [him] in a
physical sense into pleading guilty"; and whether "any threats
[had] been made, other than the threat of being prosecuted."
Kenney's answers, which "carry a strong presumption of verity," did
not indicate any coercion. Id. at 733 (quoting Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court did not need to delve any deeper.
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We are not without sympathy for Kenney insofar as his co-
defendant's alleged threats may have driven him to forego the
benefit of a favorable plea agreement and resulted in a mandatory
minimum sentence he may not otherwise have faced. But whether
Kenney was coerced into withdrawing from the plea agreement is,
contrary to Kenney's suggestion, a wholly distinct question from
whether he was coerced into entering a guilty plea rather than
going to trial. Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561
(1977) ("[T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial."). Kenney
fails to show how Arakelow's threats coerced him not only into
withdrawing from the plea agreement but also into taking the next
step of entering a bare guilty plea.8 The district court was
accordingly under no obligation to inquire into Kenney's rationale
for withdrawing from the plea agreement.
3. Ineffective Assistance
Turning from the adequacy of the district court's Rule 11
inquiry to the performance of trial counsel, Kenney next argues
that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. Supreme Court precedent holds both that a
guilty plea may be set aside due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), and that "the
8
Indeed, coerced withdrawal from a favorable plea agreement
would if anything undermine a defendant's incentive to plead guilty
rather than go to trial.
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negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010); see also
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012). Kenney alleges
a number of failings on his lawyer's part: failure to raise an
entrapment defense before the court or in plea negotiations;
failure to move for a competency hearing; failure to identify
alternatives to the proposed expert evaluation of Kenney's mental
health when the court denied Kenney's requests for funding; failure
to question Kenney's decision to withdraw from the plea agreement;
failure to object during the plea colloquy; and (most critically in
Kenney's estimation) failure to advise Kenney to withdraw his
guilty plea when given the opportunity to do so.
Faced with ineffective assistance of counsel claims on
direct appeal, we have resorted to three distinct options. "First,
and most typically, we respond that such claims 'must originally be
presented to the district court' as a collateral attack under 28
U.S.C. § 2255" due to the paucity of the record and the district
court's "better position to adduce the relevant evidence" as to
whether counsel's performance was deficient and whether such
deficiency prejudiced the defendant. United States v. Colón-
Torres, 382 F.3d 76, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States
v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 221 (1st Cir. 1994)); see also
United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Alternatively, in the "comparatively rare situations" where the
critical facts are undisputed and the record is sufficiently
developed, we may resolve the merits of the claim on direct appeal.
Colón-Torres, 382 F.3d at 85. Finally, in the "gray area between
these two categories," where the record is embryonic but
"contain[s] sufficient indicia of ineffectiveness," we may opt to
remand for an evidentiary hearing without requiring the defendant
to bring a collateral challenge. Id.Unsurprisingly, Kenney endeavors to fit this case within
the second, or at least the third, of these categories. We,
however, are unpersuaded. Unlike some of the cases in which we
directly considered ineffective assistance claims, the alleged
deficiency here did not consist of an isolated and easily analyzed
trial decision. See, e.g., United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d
253, 265 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302,
310 (1st Cir. 1991). Nor is the prejudice analysis as
straightforward as in a case where overwhelming trial evidence
precludes any finding of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v.
LaPlante, 714 F.3d 641, 651 (1st Cir. 2013). On the contrary, in
this case we simply cannot know trial counsel's rationale, or lack
thereof, for the challenged decisions, nor can we know whether
Kenney was prejudiced by these alleged shortcomings. The record is
too fraught with uncertainty to warrant either appellate resolution
or remand for an evidentiary hearing. Kenney is free, however, to
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follow the more common avenue of review and raise these claims in
a § 2255 petition before the district court.9
B. Sentencing
In opposing the imposition of a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), Kenney argued
before the district court that the government had engaged in
improper sentencing factor manipulation. The crux of Kenney's
argument was that ATF improperly expanded the scope of the planned
robbery from $100,000 in cash (the amount that ATF informants
initially told Kenney was hidden in the fictive apartment) to
$200,000 plus five kilograms of cocaine worth up to $100,000,
thereby subjecting Kenney to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence
on the drug conspiracy count. The district court rejected this
claim, relying on recorded conversations between Kenney and an ATF
informant establishing Kenney's predisposition. On appeal, Kenney
raises both procedural and substantive challenges to this
conclusion, averring that the district court failed to provide him
sufficient notice of its reliance on the recordings and improperly
evaluated his sentencing factor manipulation claim. We address
each issue separately.
9
We direct the district court, if Kenney brings a § 2255
petition, requests counsel, and qualifies financially, to appoint
counsel for him under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). See United
States v. Ortiz-Graulau, 526 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2008); Mala, 7
F.3d at 1064.
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1. Notice
Both the Due Process Clause and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32
entitle a defendant to be sentenced on the basis of reliable and
accurate information. See United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 489
F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8,
18 (1st Cir. 1991). To effectuate that guarantee, we have held
that "a defendant may not be placed in a position where, because of
his ignorance of the information being used against him, he is
effectively denied an opportunity to comment on or otherwise
challenge material information considered by the district court."
Berzon, 941 F.2d at 21. Kenney claims to have been left in
precisely such a plight due to the district court's reliance on
recorded conversations between him and the ATF informants; although
these recordings were admitted into evidence at Arakelow's trial,
Kenney claims to have received insufficient notice of them because
"the first time [he] was alerted that the recordings might be used
at his sentencing was when he received the government's opposition
to his motion for downward departure," filed on the eve of
sentencing. As Kenney did not raise this argument below, we review
for plain error only.
Kenney characterizes this case as much like Berzon, where
we held that the district court's reliance on testimony from a co-
defendant's sentencing violated due process and Rule 32 where the
defendant was unaware of the testimony. In so holding, we
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distinguished two cases from other circuits in which the use of
evidence from a related trial was upheld, noting that in these
cases, with which we "agree[d] entirely," "the facts contained in
the testimony relied upon were included in the presentence report";
in Berzon, by contrast, "the testimony and argument at [the co-
defendant's] sentencing included information not in the [PSR] nor
otherwise in the record in Berzon's case." Id. at 19-20 (citing
United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1987)). More recently, we
adhered to this distinction in Rivera-Rodríguez, holding that the
district court could rely on testimony from a co-defendant's trial
where, unlike in Berzon, the information elicited at the trial
concerning drug quantity and the duration of the conspiracy was
"hardly new to [the defendant] and his counsel"; on the contrary,
"[t]he length of the conspiracy and quantity of drugs involved were
set forth in the indictment, plea agreement, and PSR." 489 F.3d at
55.
Berzon is distinguishable for the same reason here.
Notwithstanding Kenney's protestations to the contrary, our review
of the PSR and other documents in the record persuades us that the
information upon which the district court relied had long been
available to Kenney. The numerous recorded conversations between
Kenney and the ATF informants, which convinced the district court
that Kenney was the "ringleader" and "mastermind" of the planned
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heist, were mentioned as early as February 17, 2011, in an
affidavit by an ATF special agent attached to the criminal
complaint. The affidavit stated inter alia that in conversations
with Informant 2, "Kenney pushed to set up the armed robbery of the
drug traffickers"; that Kenney and Littlejohn asked Informant 2
"numerous questions about the location of the money in the
apartment, the number of people in the apartment . . . the location
of firearms and information about the neighbors"; that Kenney
suggested to Informant 2 that they disguise themselves as federal
agents, alluding to past robberies in which he and his "crew" had
impersonated law enforcement officers; that Kenney told Informant
2 "let's do it [i.e., the robbery], come on"; and that Kenney
assured Informant 2 "I got all the guys you need" and asked if
there were "anymore [sic] jobs [i.e., robberies] to do." Both the
pre-plea and final PSRs drew upon this affidavit, and the
government also cited these conversations in summarizing its
evidence at Kenney's change-of-plea hearing. This information
therefore could hardly have taken Kenney by surprise at his
sentencing. We accordingly find no error, plain or otherwise.
2. Sentencing Factor Manipulation
We have defined sentencing factor manipulation as the
"improper enlarge[ment of] the scope or scale of a crime" by the
government in order "to secure a longer sentence than would
otherwise obtain." West v. United States, 631 F.3d 563, 570 (1st
-27-
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25, 28-29
(1st Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005).10 A
successful claim of sentencing factor manipulation may entitle the
defendant to a sentence below the statutory minimum as an equitable
remedy. West, 631 F.3d at 570; Fontes, 415 F.3d at 180.
The defendant must establish sentencing factor
manipulation by a preponderance of the evidence. West, 631 F.3d at
570. We have consistently acknowledged the onerousness of that
task, describing the threshold as "very high," id. (quoting Fontes,
415 F.3d at 180) (internal quotation marks omitted), and
emphasizing that the claim is available only in "the extreme and
unusual case," involving, e.g., "outrageous or intolerable
pressure" or "illegitimate motive on the part of the agents,"
United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). Put
differently, in order to succeed "the defendant must show that 'the
agents overpowered [his] free will . . . and caused him to commit
a more serious offense than he was predisposed to commit.'" United
10
We have described sentencing factor manipulation as a
"kissing cousin" of the entrapment defense, United States v.
Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1994), and our precedent uses
interchangeably the terms "sentencing factor manipulation" and
"sentencing entrapment," which other circuits have distinguished.
DePierre, 599 F.3d at 29 n.2 (citing United States v. Garcia, 79
F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145,
1152-53 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)).
The inquiry thus focuses "primarily on the behavior and
motives of the government" in order to determine whether it engaged
in "extraordinary misconduct." Id. However, as the above quote
from Jaca-Nazario suggests, the defendant's predisposition to
commit the charged crimes is also relevant. Although we have
described predisposition as a "secondary consideration," West, 631
F.3d at 570, we have also recognized that "a finding that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crimes charged may overcome
even a finding of improper motive," Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 59
n.8 (citing Fontes, 415 F.3d at 181); see also West, 631 F.3d at
571 (holding that defendant's "inability to rebut the government's
evidence of predisposition . . . doomed his assertion of sentencing
factor manipulation").
In rejecting Kenney's sentencing factor manipulation
claim, the district court made no findings as to the propriety of
the government's conduct, stating only, "I heard the tapes. There
is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Kenney was the ringleader, the
mastermind, so to speak, the recruiter, and an enthusiastic
participant in the scheme." On appeal, Kenney contends that the
court erred in relying solely on his predisposition without making
any determination of whether the government had engaged in
"extraordinary misconduct" by upping the ante of the heist from
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$100,000 to $200,000 and five kilograms of cocaine, for which the
government in turn invented a prospective buyer willing to pay up
to $100,000.
Although an accompanying finding as to the government's
conduct might indeed have been preferable, the district court did
not err in rejecting Kenney's sentencing factor manipulation claim.
As we have already stated, our precedent recognizes that a finding
of predisposition, even though a "secondary" factor in the
analysis, may nevertheless trump a finding of improper governmental
conduct. See Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 59 n.8. Our decision in
Fontes is particularly instructive: although the district court
found improper motives on the part of the government (evinced by
the testimony of an FBI agent who "basically admitted that the
agents were trying to get a higher sentence" by purchasing crack
rather than powder cocaine), we nevertheless upheld its conclusion
that "evidence of [the defendant's] predisposition to sell crack
was . . . devastating to his claim of sentencing factor
manipulation." 415 F.3d at 181, 183 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). More specifically, the evidence of
predisposition demonstrated that "the government, while motivated
at least in part by an improper desire to increase [the
defendant's] sentencing exposure, exerted no undue pressure or
coercion sufficient to 'overbear the will of a person predisposed
only to committing a lesser crime.'" Id. at 183 (quoting United
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States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992)) (internal
brackets omitted). The same conclusion was justified here.11
Nor are we persuaded by Kenney's accompanying argument --
raised for the first time on appeal and therefore subject to plain
error review only -- that the district court's failure to account
for his "weakened mental state" undermined its finding of
predisposition. Although there may well be cases in which a
defendant is left particularly susceptible to governmental
inducement as a result of mental impairment, thereby affecting the
sentencing factor manipulation analysis, Kenney points to no
evidence that his is such a case. The only basis Kenney offers for
this argument is the district court's statement at sentencing that
it would "take into account" the evidence concerning changes in
Kenney's personality. But even if the district court agreed that
Kenney's mental state was relevant to his culpability, that alone
hardly compels the additional inference that Kenney's impairment
11
To the extent Kenney challenges the factual basis for the
district court's finding of predisposition, which we review for
clear error only, Fontes, 415 F.3d at 181, we find that Kenney's
recorded conversations (discussed at greater length in section B.1
supra) amply supported the district court's finding that Kenney was
predisposed to commit the crime. Among other things, Kenney
boasted of his previous participation in robberies; recruited
Arakelow and Littlejohn; asked the ATF informant about the presence
and location of cocaine in the apartment; and agreed to wait until
the arrival of the fictitious cocaine shipment before robbing the
apartment. The district court could certainly infer from this
evidence that Kenney's "actions were not the forced result of
intolerable pressure" and instead reflected his own predisposition.
West, 631 F.3d at 571.
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also rendered him more vulnerable to the sting operation or less
predisposed to the crime. We accordingly find no error, plain or
otherwise.12
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Kenney's conviction
and sentence.
12
We also reject Kenney's related argument that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider his
prior requests for CJA funding for a complete psychiatric
evaluation. The district court had already granted Kenney a total
of $6,000 to fund the examination; Kenney offers no rebuttal to the
district court's conclusion that his request for an additional
$6,000 (bringing the total amount to $12,000) was "excessive given
the usual charges for examinations of its type."
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