Zhou Lu v. Mukasey

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1113
ZHOU LU,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Howard, Baldock, * and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Thomas V. Masssuci, on brief, for petitioner.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, Terri J. Scardon, Assistant Director, and
Manueal A. Palau, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, on brief, for respondent.
September 24, 2008
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The Department of
Homeland Security charged Petitioner Zhou Lu, a citizen of
the Peoples Republic of China, with unauthorized entry into
the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Petitioner admitted the charge’s factual allegations
(contained in a Notice to Appear) and filed an application
for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). 1 In her application, Petitioner
alleged a fear of persecution in China related to her
involvement with Falun Gong.
Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at
length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found her not credible.
See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing framework
for credibility determinations). Based on blanket findings,
the IJ first concluded Petitioner was not eligible for
asylum. The IJ explained that Petitioner did not meet her
burden of establishing that she was a “refugee” within the
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), i.e., having a well
founded fear of persecution based on membership in, among
other things, a religious or particular social group. See
id. § 1158(b) (requiring applicant for asylum to establish
refugee status). The IJ next concluded that Petitioner was
1
Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought relief under
the United Nations Convention Against Torture. That claim
is not before us on the Petition for Review.
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not entitled to withholding of removal because she did not
meet her burden of establishing her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of religion or membership in a
particular social group if removed to China. See id. §
1231(b)(3). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
In Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)
we set forth the standard of review applicable to the
present Petition:
This court reviews findings of fact in immigration
proceedings, including findings with respect to
credibility, to determine whether those findings
are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Under that standard, an adverse
credibility determination may stand if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.
(internal quotations and citation omitted). We need not
repeat Petitioner’s story here. We have carefully reviewed
the entire record and the parties’ briefs, and conclude that
the IJ and BIA reached a permissible result under the
applicable law. We have repeatedly opined that “‘when a
lower court accurately takes the measure of a case and
articulates a cogent rationale, it serves no useful purpose
for a reviewing court to write at length.’” Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005)
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(quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st
Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because the BIA’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, we deny the Petition for
Review for substantially the reasons set forth in that
decision. See Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
2008) (“Where the BIA does not [expressly] adopt the IJ’s
findings, we review the BIA’s decision rather than the
IJ’s.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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