Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1647
KAREN RODRÍGUEZ-REYES ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CARLOS M. MOLINA-RODRÍGUEZ ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Johanna M. Emmanuelli Huertas, with whom Pedro E. Ortiz
Álvarez, LLC was on brief, for appellants.
Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General,
with whom Luis R. Román-Negrón, Solicitor General, was on brief,
for appellees.
March 22, 2013
SELYA, Circuit Judge. We confront today a script that
has become all too familiar in Puerto Rico: employees of a
government agency decry as political discrimination adverse
employment actions taken in the wake of an election that produced
a regime change. The court below ruled, among other things, that
the complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it did not
assert facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
political discrimination.
The prima facie case is an evidentiary model, not a
pleading standard. For this reason, the interaction between the
prima facie case and the plausibility standard crafted by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), has created
some confusion. We now resolve that confusion and hold that the
prima facie case is not the appropriate benchmark for determining
whether a complaint has crossed the plausibility threshold.
Accordingly, that aspect of the district court's decision must be
annulled and the case remanded for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
We sketch the background, reserving salient details for
our subsequent discussion of the merits. Inasmuch as this appeal
follows the grant of a motion to dismiss, we glean the facts from
the plaintiffs' complaint. See Marek v. Rhode Island, 702 F.3d
650, 651-52 (1st Cir. 2012).
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The plaintiffs — Karen Rodríguez-Reyes, Carmen C. Rivera-
Rosado, Maria Torres-Plaza, Liz Katiria Fuentes-Rodríguez, and
Pilar Vega — are former employees of the Puerto Rico Administration
of Juvenile Institutions (AIJ). See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, §§ 551-
562. The institutions that fall within the purview of the AIJ
provide rehabilitative and educational services to detained minors.
Id. § 555. Vega, a member of the Puerto Rico Independence Party,
previously served as a teacher and a school director for the AIJ;
the remaining plaintiffs, all members of the Popular Democratic
Party (PDP), were teachers employed by the AIJ.
From 2001 through 2008, the PDP held the reins of power
in Puerto Rico. The PDP lost the 2008 general election; its main
rival, the New Progressive Party (NPP), assumed office and took
control of the AIJ in January of 2009. At some point thereafter,
the new administrators began to "talk about politics" and launched
a "witch-hunt" designed to obtain information about employees'
political affiliations.
At the earliest practical opportunity, the plaintiffs
were ousted from their positions, notwithstanding solid
qualifications and positive evaluations. Specifically, Vega was
told in 2009 that her position would be eliminated and, although
she was promised a more responsible post, that promise never
materialized. Torres — who was on a career track as a teacher —
was cashiered at the end of the 2009-2010 school year. The other
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three plaintiffs were so-called "transitory" employees; none of
them was asked back to fill her teaching post and no explanations
were offered. In every instance, a person affiliated with the NPP
was hired as a replacement.
Appalled by these events, the plaintiffs sued Carlos M.
Molina-Rodríguez, Secretary of the Puerto Rico Corrections and
Rehabilitation Department (CRD) and Administrator of the AIJ (an
agency within the CRD); Sonia Ríos, an AIJ hierarch; and two
unidentified AIJ officials (sued as "John Doe" defendants), both of
whom allegedly participated in the challenged personnel decisions.1
Their complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged discrimination
based on political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment.
They also lodged pendent claims under Puerto Rico law. See P.R.
Const. art. II, § 1; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142.2 Both
named defendants filed motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs opposed
these motions, but the court granted them, dismissing with
prejudice all federal claims against all defendants. See
Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 851 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383
1
The plaintiffs sued Molina, in his official capacity, for
injunctive relief. They sued all of the defendants in their
individual capacities for money damages.
2
Two of the plaintiffs added language that the district court
interpreted as embedded claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623. The district court
dismissed these embedded claims for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 851
F. Supp. 2d 375, 383 (D.P.R. 2012). No attempt is made on appeal
to resurrect these age discrimination claims.
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(D.P.R. 2012). The court then declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the pendent claims and dismissed them without
prejudice. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This timely
appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review de novo a district court's disposition of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v. Puerto
Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011). In conducting this
appraisal, "we accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
pleader's favor." Id. "We may augment these facts and inferences
with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference
into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible
to judicial notice." Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st
Cir. 2011).
We start our analysis with the shibboleth that a
complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
complaint nonetheless must contain more than a rote recital of the
elements of a cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Shay
v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2012). Rather, it "must
contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that
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is plausible on its face." Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d
40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012).
A plausibility inquiry is "a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "The plausibility standard
is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To this end, an inquiry into plausibility necessitates a
two-step pavane. See Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45. First, the court
must sift through the averments in the complaint, separating
conclusory legal allegations (which may be disregarded) from
allegations of fact (which must be credited). See Morales-Cruz v.
Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012). Second, the
court must consider whether the winnowed residue of factual
allegations gives rise to a plausible claim to relief. Id. "If
the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or
conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of
mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal." SEC v.
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc).
In this case, the district court tested the complaint in
a crucible hotter than the plausibility standard demands. It
repeatedly faulted the complaint for failing to "establish a prima
facie case of political discrimination." Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F.
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Supp. 2d at 381-82. The plaintiffs argue that this laser-like
focus on a prima facie case is misplaced at the pleading stage;
that requirement, they say, should be reserved for summary judgment
and trial. We agree.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the
Supreme Court negated any need to plead a prima facie case in the
discrimination context and emphasized that the prima facie model is
an evidentiary, not a pleading, standard. Id. at 510, 512; cf.
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standard for
section 1983 cases). Three years later, we confirmed the
applicability of Swierkiewicz to political discrimination cases.
See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61,
66 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004).
We recognize that these cases were decided before the
Supreme Court effected a sea change in the law of federal pleading
in Iqbal and Twombly. This gives rise to two questions. First,
does the hegemony of the Swierkiewicz/Leatherman/Educadores line of
cases continue in a post-Iqbal/Twombly world? Second, what is the
role, if any, of the prima facie case in determining plausibility
at the pleading stage?
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We answer the first question in the affirmative: the
Swierkiewicz holding remains good law.3 It is not necessary to
plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the
pleading stage. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Twombly Court, which
first authoritatively articulated the plausibility standard, cited
Swierkiewicz with approval. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70(discussing how the new pleading standard does not "run[] counter
to" Swierkiewicz).
Iqbal does not mention, but is wholly consistent with,
Swierkiewicz; there, the Court stressed that, notwithstanding the
neoteric plausibility standard, no "detailed factual allegations"
are required in a complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The prima facie standard is an
evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard, and there is no need
to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a complaint.
In answering the first question, we do not write on a
pristine page. Several other courts of appeals have considered the
question and concluded, as we do, that the Swierkiewicz Court's
treatment of the prima facie case in the pleading context remains
3
Our reference is to the Swierkiewicz Court's discussion of
the disconnect between the prima facie case and the rules of
pleading. To the extent that the Swierkiewicz Court relied on
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), to describe the pleading
standard, that description is no longer viable. See Twombly, 550
U.S. at 562-63 (abrogating Conley).
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the beacon by which we must steer. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana,
Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2012); Khalik v. United Air
Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2012); Coleman v. Md. Ct.
of App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010); Arista Records LLC v.
Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2010); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,
580 F.3d 949, 974 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S.
Ct. 2074 (2011).
This brings us to the second question. With respect to
this question, we do not mean to imply that the elements of the
prima facie case are irrelevant to a plausibility determination in
a discrimination suit. They are not. Those elements are part of
the background against which a plausibility determination should be
made. See, e.g., Grajales, 682 F.3d at 46; Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011). This approach is
fully consistent with Swierkiewicz's dictates, and none of our
post-Swierkiewicz cases have required the pleading of specific
facts sufficient to establish each and every element of a prima
facie case.
In a nutshell, the elements of a prima facie case may be
used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.
Although a plaintiff must plead enough facts to make entitlement to
relief plausible in light of the evidentiary standard that will
pertain at trial — in a discrimination case, the prima facie
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standard — she need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.
Having constructed this foundation, we turn to the order
of dismissal. In so doing, we limn the elements of a prima facie
political discrimination case as a backdrop against which we must
decide the plausibility of the claim.
Section 1983 is the conventional vehicle through which
relief is sought for claims of political discrimination by state
actors. For this purpose, Puerto Rico is the functional equivalent
of a state. See Grajales, 682 F.3d at 46. "There are two
essential elements of an action under section 1983: (i) that the
conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law,
and (ii) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Martínez v. Colón, 54
F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Within this rubric, a claim of political discrimination entails
four showings: "that the protagonists are members of opposing
political parties; that the defendant knows of the plaintiff's
political affiliation; that an adverse employment action occurred;
and that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor behind the adverse action." Grajales, 682 F.3d at 46.
With this architecture in place, we first examine the
district court's conclusion that the complaint failed adequately to
establish that Molina (the de facto head of the agency) was aware
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of the plaintiffs' affiliations with opposing political parties.
Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 381. To be sure, the complaint
contains only a conclusory statement of Molina's knowledge. For
pleading purposes, however, knowledge may be inferable from other
allegations in the complaint. See Grajales, 682 F.3d at 47. So it
is here.
For one thing, the complaint alleges that the defendants,
including Molina, "engaged in a witch-hunt scheme to obtain
information as to the affiliation of each employee [of the AIJ] in
order to dismiss those who were not affiliated with the NPP." For
another thing, after the NPP took control of the agency, the new
leaders began to "talk about politics." The district court
believed that these assertions were immaterial because they did not
represent "discrete factual events." Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F. Supp.
2d at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted). We think that the
district court subjected the complaint to an overly stringent
pleading standard. An assertion that a defendant was affirmatively
seeking information about employees' political affiliations is more
than a bare legal conclusion. The plaintiffs' "witch-hunt" and
"talk[ing] about politics" averments, though general, are factual
assertions that must, at the pleading stage, be given credence.
See, e.g., Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 15 (holding similar
allegations to be factual, not conclusory).
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These statements anent the political atmosphere at the
AIJ and the frenzy to discover the political affiliations of agency
employees, when viewed in the light most flattering to the
plaintiffs' theory of the case, are adequate to ground a plausible
finding of Molina's knowledge. Indeed, it would be struthious to
assume that Molina did not acquire the information about the
plaintiffs' political leanings that he and other agency leaders
actively sought — information that seemed generally available due
to the AIJ's politically charged atmosphere.
The relevant question for a district court in assessing
plausibility is not whether the complaint makes any particular
factual allegations but, rather, whether "the complaint warrant[s]
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14.
There need not be a one-to-one relationship between any single
allegation and a necessary element of the cause of action. What
counts is the "cumulative effect of the [complaint's] factual
allegations." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 14. Here, the factual
allegations, taken in their entirety, plausibly support a finding
that Molina had acquired knowledge of the plaintiffs' political
affiliations.
The district court also held that the plaintiffs had
failed plausibly to allege Ríos's antagonistic political
affiliation. Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 382. The
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complaint does state, however, that the "[p]laintiffs belong to
political parties that espouse philosophies and ideas different to
those of the defendants" (including Ríos) and characterizes Ríos as
a high-ranking official in the revamped (NPP-appointed) AIJ
administration. A high degree of factual specificity is not
required at the pleading stage. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14.
Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is not necessary for a
plaintiff in a political discrimination case to bring forth
evidence that the defendant is a card-carrying member of the
opposition party. On this issue, the plaintiffs' factual
allegations are adequate for pleading purposes.
Our precedents illustrate this point. In an earlier
case, we upheld for pleading purposes the sufficiency of an
allegation "that the defendants all belong to the NPP." Ocasio-
Hernández, 640 F.3d at 13 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). In another case, we upheld for pleading purposes the
sufficiency of an allegation that each of the defendants "belong[s]
to a different [political] party than [the plaintiff]." Grajales,
682 F.3d at 47 (alterations in original and internal quotation
marks omitted). The allegations here are analogous and, therefore,
they plausibly allege Ríos's antagonistic political affiliation.
The last pillar on which the district court's order rests
involves what it concluded was the absence of any plausible
allegation that political affiliation was a substantial or
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motivating factor behind the adverse employment actions.
Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 382. Once again, it is
important to bear in mind that the plaintiffs, for pleading
purposes, need not establish this element; the facts contained in
the complaint need only show that the claim of causation is
plausible. Direct evidence of political animus is not a sine qua
non. See Grajales, 682 F.3d at 49 (explaining that "'[s]moking
gun' proof of discrimination is rarely available, especially at the
pleading stage").
In this instance, the plaintiffs' complaint noted that
"[o]nce the new administration arrived, its officers . . . made
expressions as to the fact that there would be NPP's very upset if
[the plaintiffs'] contracts would be renewed." This allegation
forms a part of the plausible basis for a finding as to the cause
of the ensuing adverse employment actions. In an environment in
which leaders of the AIJ were voicing a need to shed
nonpolicymaking employees who did not share their particular
political persuasion, it surely is plausible that the plaintiffs'
political affiliations became a substantial or motivating factor
behind their loss of employment.
For pleading purposes, circumstantial evidence often
suffices to clarify "a protean issue such as an actor's motive or
intent." Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1991).
The complaint here contains allegations that all of the plaintiffs
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were affiliated with political parties that opposed the NPP; that
none of them ever received a negative evaluation for her work at
the AIJ; that each was replaced by an NPP adherent; and that the
critical decisions were made by newly appointed officials loyal to
the NPP and in a politically charged atmosphere. The record
contains no nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse
employment actions.
The time line is also suggestive. While the defendants
argue that there is no temporal proximity between the regime change
and the adverse employment actions — the NPP assumed control of the
AIJ in the winter of 2009 and most of the plaintiffs had contracts
to work through the 2009-2010 school year — this argument overlooks
the nature of the contracts at issue. Teachers' contracts
presumably run from school year to school year. While it seems
likely that the 2009-2010 contracts were renewed sometime after the
NPP administration took office, one could infer that this renewal
occurred early in the administration. The NPP officials may have
had insufficient time and information to head off renewing the
2009-2010 contracts, and their earliest practical opportunity to
oust most of the plaintiffs may have been for the 2010-2011 school
year.4
4
Two of the plaintiffs present unique circumstances, but
these circumstances are not material to our analysis. Fuentes
alleges that she was not called back for the 2011-2012 school year;
but her employment at the AIJ was not continuous — she worked from
2006-2008 and then from 2009-2010 — and it is plausible that the
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The fact that the new NPP administration had to bide its
time before this opportunity arose may account for the longer
interval. At a minimum, such an inference is consistent with the
plausibility analysis. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
When all is said and done, we think that the array of
circumstances described in the complaint suffices to support an
inference of political animus. Indeed, we previously have found
similar compendia of allegations adequate to make out plausible
claims of political animus. See, e.g., Grajales, 682 F.3d at 49-
50; Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 17-18. The case at hand is cut
from the same cloth: the combination of the politically charged
questioning of the AIJ workforce, the statements of officials
indicating an intent not to renew the contracts of persons
affiliated with other political parties, the absence of any
nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse employment actions,
the temporal proximity of the regime change to the adverse
employment actions, and the replacement of the separated workers
with NPP adherents permits a plausible inference, at the pleading
2011-2012 school year was the earliest practical opportunity to
cashier her. Vega alleges that her position was eliminated in 2009
and that she was not called back after that date. Her termination
does not implicate the complications wrought by annual contracts
and her showing of close temporal proximity is compelling.
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stage, that political animus was a substantial or motivating factor
behind the adverse employment actions.5
There is one loose end. The complaint also attempts to
set forth claims against two unidentified "John Doe" defendants.
The district court dismissed these claims. Rodríguez-Reyes, 851 F.
Supp. 2d at 382-83.
Although the plaintiffs cast a few aspersions in this
direction, their appellate brief contains no developed
argumentation about the sufficiency of these claims. The claims
are, therefore, waived.6 See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,
17 (1st Cir. 1990). Consequently, we affirm this aspect of the
judgment below.
5
Our decision in Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d
592 (1st Cir. 2011), loudly bruited by the defendants, is not to
the contrary. In that case, we found the plaintiff's allegations
vis-à-vis the governor of Puerto Rico and two of his adjutants
lacking plausibility, as the complaint did not specifically connect
these defendants with the adverse employment action: the
plaintiff's complaint relied solely on the notion that the
defendants' positions afforded them the authority to make personnel
decisions and, therefore, the defendants' putative liability rested
on mere speculation that they were actually involved in the firing
of the plaintiff. Id. at 596. The complaint in this case does not
suffer from a comparable infirmity.
6
At any rate, a plaintiff may prosecute a section 1983 claim
against an unidentified party only if she can show that "a good-
faith investigation has failed to reveal the identity of the
relevant defendant and there is a reasonable likelihood that
discovery will provide that information." Martínez-Rivera v.
Sánchez Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). The plaintiffs have
not alleged facts plausibly showing compliance with these
prerequisites.
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III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. We hold that the factual
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint, taken as true, state
plausible section 1983 claims for political discrimination with
respect to Molina (in both his official and personal capacities)
and Ríos. We likewise hold that the pendent claims against Molina
and Ríos, which were dismissed without prejudice when the district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, must be
reinstated. In these respects, we reverse the judgment below. We
take no view as to whether the plaintiffs' evidence, when
presented, will prove sufficient either to withstand summary
judgment or to support a favorable jury verdict.
As to all claims asserted against the unidentified
defendants, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs shall be taxed in
favor of the plaintiffs.
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