United States v. Lamarre

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-2340
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
PATRICK J. GELIN,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 10-2486
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHELINE LAMARRE, a/k/a MICHELINE CHAMPAGNE,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Boudin,* Circuit Judges.
*
Judge Boudin heard oral argument in this matter and participated
in the semble, but he did not participate in the issuance of the
panel's opinion in this case. The remaining two panelists therefore
issued the opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Rudolph F. Miller, for appellant Gelin.
Nathalie R. Castor, for appellant Lamarre.
Daniel Steven Goodman, Assistant United States Attorney,
Criminal Division, Appellate Section, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz,
United States Attorney, James E. Arnold, Assistant United States
Attorney, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, and John D.
Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, was on brief for
appellee.
April 1, 2013
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Following a jury trial,
Defendant-Appellants Patrick J. Gelin ("Gelin") and Micheline
Lamarre ("Lamarre") were each convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347 and
1349 for making fraudulent claims to, and obtaining payment from,
insurance companies participating in Massachusetts' no-fault
automobile insurance program.1 They appeal their convictions,
arguing first that the district court erred in ruling that the
defrauded insurance companies constituted "health care benefit
programs" within the jurisdictional reach of § 1347. Gelin and
Lamarre also argue that the district court (1) erred in concluding
that their scheme affected interstate commerce as is required for
a constitutionally valid application of § 1347; and (2) abridged
their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in denying proposed voir
dire questions concerning the ethnic minority group to which they
belong. Finding no error by the district court, we affirm.
I. Background
Gelin was the owner of Premium Care Physical Therapy
("Premium"), a physical therapy clinic in Brockton, Massachusetts.
Lamarre worked as an "on-call" physical therapist at Premium and
was generally present at the clinic on Mondays and Wednesdays. The
1
Under Massachusetts law, everyone who registers a vehicle in the
state is required to have insurance coverage that pays for the
reasonable and necessary medical services that could arise in
connection with insured vehicle accidents, regardless of fault.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 34M.
-3-
sequence of events leading up to Gelin and Lamarre's convictions
follows.
In April 2002, Gelin hired Sharon Little ("Little") as
the marketing director for Premium. Little was responsible for
bringing new patients to Premium and for getting the clinic into
better functioning order. Eventually she also became Premium's
manager and Gelin's assistant, helping him with the billing of
insurance companies for treatments provided to clinic patients.
While discharging those duties, Little stumbled onto patient charts
indicating that Lamarre treated patients on days when Little knew
Lamarre was not at the clinic. When Little asked what was going
on, Gelin told her that Premium was submitting fraudulent charges
to insurance companies with the help of Lamarre. According to
Little's testimony, Gelin and Lamarre would submit fraudulent
claims to providers of Massachusetts' no-fault automobile insurance
and request payment for physical therapy that they never rendered.
If the fraudulent claims were paid, Lamarre would receive up to 15%
of the proceeds as a commission for her participation in the
scheme, and Gelin would keep the rest.
Between 2003 and 2004, Little heard Gelin instruct
Lamarre to "finish off" charts more than 20 times. She also saw
Lamarre forging patient charts that Gelin had given her, and saw
Gelin forging injury claim application forms on behalf of patients.
When Little protested to Gelin about their need to forge charts
-4-
given Premium's success, he responded that she was overreacting to
"a little white-collar crime" and told her not to worry about it.
Lamarre later told Little that the submission of fraudulent claims
was Gelin's idea, and while she was not happy with it, she did need
the extra money to pay off her student loans.
Little testified that Gelin eventually concluded that she
could not be trusted to keep quiet about Premium's billing
practices. He therefore hired a "general chief manager" and
instructed him to keep an eye on Little. By August 2004, Little
had had enough and told Gelin that she would not do "this illegal
shit" anymore, walked out of the office, and "never went back."
Sometime thereafter Little informed the National Insurance Crime
Bureau about the fraudulent scheme at Premium.
Gelin and Lamarre were each indicted on nine counts of
health care fraud, § 1347, and one count of conspiracy to commit
health care fraud, § 1349. During the voir dire, Gelin's counsel
requested that the court pose the following question to the venire:
"Patrick Gelin is a black Haitian-American. Do you have any
feelings about black Haitian-Americans or any other minority group
that might affect your ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror
in this case?" Lamarre, also a Haitian-American, joined Gelin's
request, advancing concerns regarding the racial overtone of
evidence the government intended to introduce at trial.
Specifically, Gelin and Lamarre pointed to Little's deposition
-5-
testimony, where she used derogatory terms to refer to Gelin's
Haitian background and made reference to voodoo and witch doctors.
She also referred to Gelin as the godfather of the Haitian
community.
The government did not object to the voir dire question
but stated that it was unnecessary, even though it anticipated that
Little would offer testimony concerning Gelin's statement that his
fraudulent activity was a "white person's crime," and that he was
"not doing what [African-Americans] do, selling drugs in the
street." The government also admitted that it would introduce
testimony of former employees who would state that Gelin treated
African-Americans differently than people from the Haitian
community.
The district court refused to pose the voir dire
question, stating that it was not aware of "anything in the facts
of the case that would suggest any potential for racial bias to be
a prominent feature of the case." The court also stated its view
that defense counsel "vastly overstated the danger of racial bias
in an average jury in 2010" and "presume[d] the existence of racial
bias in jurors the way we might have 50 years ago, maybe 25 years
ago." But in present times, the court then added, "we have to
acknowledge, I think, the reality of social progress. So it is --
just as a general matter against a social background that there's
no need to inject the issue into the case."
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Nevertheless, the court did emphasize to the venire the
need for a jury "that is composed of people who are completely
fair-minded and impartial as to the parties involved in the case
and as to the issues presented." It followed up with specific
inquiries about whether any juror was employed by law enforcement
or insurance companies, and whether any of them had been the victim
of fraud or other crimes. The court also asked potential jurors
whether they had "any personal belief, attitudes, experiences,
potential biases that would interfere with [their] ability to be a
fair-minded and impartial juror in this case."
At trial, the government introduced 16 witnesses,
including Little, several patients whose treatment charts Little
had identified as containing false entries, employees from the
defrauded insurance companies, several of Premium's employees, and
an FBI agent. Some of the witnesses testified that Gelin and
Lamarre had documented therapy sessions with car accident victims
when the patients were not in Massachusetts or when Lamarre, who
signed off on the treatments, was not in the clinic. For example,
one of the government's witnesses testified that Premium had
submitted a claim for 30 treatment days "provided" during a period
of time in which he was away attending college in Iowa.2
Furthermore, one of Premium's physical therapy assistants testified
2
The government's brief describes similar trial testimonies from
at least four of Premium's "patients."
-7-
that the charts reflecting treatments supposedly administered by
Lamarre were not consistent with the days that Lamarre actually
worked at the clinic. Another of Premium's employees testified
that Gelin told her about his agreement with Lamarre concerning
fraudulent charts and excessive billing.
The government also presented evidence regarding
Premium's transactions with the insurance companies themselves,
some of which were located outside Massachusetts and did business
nationally. This evidence included, for example, the testimony of
insurance company representatives that their policies provided
benefits for health care services rendered anywhere in the United
States, not only within Massachusetts. Additionally, it included
the insurance policies themselves, which confirm that they covered
both in- and out-of-state accidents. The government also
introduced several checks drawn on banks located in different
states as evidence of payments made by insurance companies to
Premium on account of fraudulent claims. Further, the government
introduced evidence showing Premium's use of the United States
Postal Service to mail fraudulent claims to the insurance
companies.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all but two counts.
Gelin and Lamarre then moved for acquittal, arguing that the
government had failed to establish that the defrauded insurance
companies were "health care benefit programs" as required for a
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conviction under § 1347. The district court initially denied Gelin
and Lamarre's motion without explanation, but following post-trial
briefing, rejected their claims by agreeing with the government's
arguments that the court should adopt the reasoning of a Second
Circuit decision, United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45, 50-52 (2d
Cir. 2003), which held that an automobile insurance contract that
provides for the reimbursement of medical services plainly meets
the statutory definition of a "health care benefit program" under
§ 1347. Gelin and Lamarre also raised a sufficiency of the
evidence claim, arguing that the government failed to show that
their fraud had affected interstate commerce as required under the
statute. The district court also rejected that claim, entering the
final judgments on appeal now.
II. Discussion
A. The Statutory Interpretation Challenge
We begin with Gelin and Lamarre's contention that the
district court incorrectly determined that the defrauded insurance
companies were "health care benefit programs" under § 1347.
Because the analysis of such a claim involves statutory
construction, we apply de novo review. United States v. Troy, 618
F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2010). The starting point of our inquiry is
the text of the statute itself, "and 'if the meaning of the text is
unambiguous our task ends there as well.'" Mass. Museum of
Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir.
-9-
2010) (quoting United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir.
2008)). When interpreting an unambiguous statute, however, we may
also resort to legislative history to corroborate "that the
statute's plain meaning does not lead to absurd results." In re
Rudler, 576 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Lamie v. United
States, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)).
The relevant statutory provision in this case is 18
U.S.C. § 24(b), which defines the term "health care benefit
program" for purposes of § 1347 as "any public or private plan or
contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit,
item, or service is provided to any individual, and includes any
individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item, or
service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract."3
3
As stated previously, § 1347 sets forth one of the offenses for
which Gelin and Lamarre were convicted:
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to
execute, a scheme or artifice -- (1) to defraud any
health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under
the custody or control of, any health care benefit
program, in connection with the delivery of or payment
for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
(emphasis supplied). Section 1349 sets forth the other: "Any
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this
chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the
attempt or conspiracy."
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The crux of Gelin and Lamarre's challenge is that the
defrauded insurance companies do not fall within the statutory
definition of the term "health care benefit program" because they
(1) "did not serve as health insurance companies"; (2) did not
"identif[y] themselves as health insurance companies"; and (3)
covered medical expenses up to a maximum of $8,000 "if the victim
[did] not have health insurance." Gelin and Lamarre, however, fail
to direct us to any statutory language indicating that Congress
intended to limit the scope of the statute to health insurance
companies. Nor is there any requirement that an insurance company
identify itself as a health insurance company to fall within the
ambit of the statute. And the statute does not contain a threshold
premium amount.
In any event, the statutory definition at issue is simple
and broad: a "health care benefit program" is "any public or
private plan or contract . . . under which any medical benefit,
item, or service is provided . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 24(b) (emphasis
supplied). The common meaning of the adjective "any" as used in
this context is "regardless of sort, quantity, or number."
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, 115 (1984); see
also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943)
(noting the long-standing rule of statutory construction that
"courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context
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and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the word
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy"). In light of this language, we find
no room for the limited scope Gelin and Lamarre urge us to read
into the statute.4
The Second Circuit opinion in Lucien, 347 F.3d 45,
provides an on-point example of how other courts have addressed
contentions similar to those Gelin and Lamarre present. There,
defendants were convicted under § 1347 for defrauding private
insurance companies providing coverage under New York's no-fault
automobile insurance program. The fraudulent scheme involved an
elaborate ruse through which recruited "victims" of staged
automobile accidents would assign their no-fault insurance benefits
to participating health clinics. Id. at 49. The clinics, in turn,
would generate fictitious treatment records and make reimbursement
claims to the insurance companies for the medical services
"provided." Id.
4
Moreover, the statute's legislative history contains language
showing that in enacting § 1347, Congress considered fraudulent
schemes perpetrated on insurance companies of the type involved
here. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-747, at 9 (mentioning, as an
example of health care fraud in need of addressing, a scheme
involving "staged automobile accidents and related casualty and
health insurance fraud"); see also Gaming the Health Care System:
Trends in Health Care Fraud, at 12 (stating that fraudulent medical
treatment claims arising from phony car accidents "have resulted in
literally tens of billions of dollars in losses to insurers and
increased premiums to all policyholders," negatively impacting the
health care system).
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On appeal, one of the defendants challenged his
conviction, arguing that New York's no-fault automobile insurance
program was not a "health care benefit program" under § 24(b)
because it did "not operate nationwide and it did not cover all
injuries and illnesses--only those resulting from automobile
accidents." Id. at 52. The Second Circuit disagreed, discarding
the distinctions advanced as irrelevant and noting, as we do above,
that the statutory definition unambiguously and broadly provides
that any private contract under which a medical service is provided
qualifies as a "health care benefit program." Id. The court also
noted as a dispositive fact that private insurers, participating in
New York's no-fault program, had "reimbursed various medical
providers for fraudulently billed medical expenses incurred on
behalf of defendants." Id. Other than the scope limitations
described above, Gelin and Lamarre advance no reason why a
different result is in order here, where the facts underlying their
convictions mirror so closely those at play in Lucien.
Gelin and Lamarre argue in the alternative that the verb
"provided" as used in § 24(b) means that medical benefits or
services must actually be rendered for the statutory definition to
apply. In other words, Gelin and Lamarre contend that the
defrauded insurance companies cannnot be deemed "health care
benefit program[s]" because they did not pay Premium for any actual
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medical benefits or services rendered, only for fictitious services
that were never "provided." We disagree.
Gelin and Lamarre construe the verb "provide" too
narrowly, fixing its meaning on only one of its possible
connotations -- that is, "to furnish." See Webster's New Riverside
University Dictionary, 948. But the verb "provide" is quite
versatile, and, among at least four different definitions, can mean
"make available." Id. In the context in which the verb "provide"
is used here -- that is, § 1347 which proscribes "fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises" in pursuing payment for
health care services -- we must favor the broader construction,
including the meaning "make available." See C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. at 350-51.
Indeed, it would be nothing short of absurd to adopt
Gelin and Lamarre's limitation on the construction of the statutory
definition. One of the most egregious and frequent expressions of
prohibited conduct is obtaining payment for health care services
never rendered. Accordingly, if the statute were construed to
exclude such conduct, it would defeat one of its most important
purposes. Convictions under § 1347 for fraud involving fictitious
medical services abound. See, e.g., United States v. McGovern, 329
F.3d 247, 249 (1st Cir. 2003) (conviction for Medicare and Medicaid
fraud involving the billing of medical services never rendered);
Lucien, 347 F.3d at 49 (same); United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d
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706, 709 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Franklin-El, 554
F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2009)(same). And we have been provided
with no valid reason to strike such a dissonant chord in this
appeal.5
B. The As-applied Constitutional Challenge
Next we turn to Gelin and Lamarre's as-applied
constitutional challenge. On this front, they argue that their
convictions under § 1347 resulted from an unconstitutional
application of the Commerce Clause because the underlying fraud
5
Our conclusion is not contradicted by the legislative history.
During the congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of
§ 1347, the Senate's Special Committee on Aging heard testimony
from several witnesses -- ranging from high-ranking government
officials to physicians and other private health care professionals
-- describing serious concerns with what appeared to be a growing
trend in the health care industry:
Throughout the United States we are seeing organized
criminal groups, compromising doctors, chiropractors,
attorneys, hospitals, and these groups establish store
front clinics, diagnostic testing companies, as well as
bogus law offices. They stage phony car accidents. Fake
patients visit the clinics where expensive medical
procedures like MRIs and x-rays are billed to insurers,
even though not provided to the persons posing as
patients. In addition, unfilled prescriptions are billed,
kickbacks are paid, and lawyers collect false personal
injury claims.
Gaming the Health Care System: Trends in Health Care Fraud, Hearing
Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. 12 (1995)
(emphasis supplied). The Committee on Governmental Reform and
Oversight documented similar fraudulent practices arising from
fictitious medical services and estimated the overall annual loses
to the health care system in the $100 billion range. See Comm. on
Gov't Reform and Oversight, Health Care Fraud: All Public and
Private Payers Need Federal Criminal Anti-Fraud Protections, H.R.
Rep. No. 104-747 (1996).
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arose from intrastate transactions and was perpetrated against
intrastate parties. This is a constitutional twist to the
sufficiency of the evidence argument raised below.6 The applicable
standard of review is plain error. See United States v. Capozzi,
347 F.3d 327, 334 (1st Cir. 2003). This standard calls for a four-
pronged analysis where the first inquiry is limited to whether an
error occurred. Id. If an error is found, then the inquiry shifts
to whether such error (1) was clear and obvious; (2) affected
substantial rights; and (3) "seriously impaired the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United
States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). This multi-
factor analysis makes the road to success under the plain error
standard rather steep; hence, reversal constitutes a remedy that is
granted sparingly. United States v. Whitney, 524 F.3d 134, 140
(1st Cir. 2008).
Gelin and Lamarre fail to clear the first hurdle of the
foregoing requirements, as the facts of record show that the
underlying fraud sufficiently affected interstate commerce. As
just stated, Gelin and Lamarre argue that their fraudulent scheme
affected Massachusetts parties only. The record, however, contains
6
As stated above, Gelin and Lamarre moved for acquittal, arguing
that "[t]he trial presentation was completely and utterly void of
any evidence that the health care fraud, as charged, had an
[e]ffect on interstate commerce. Accordingly, the [g]overnment
failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove each and every element
of the offenses with which the defendant[s] w[ere] convicted."
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ample evidence that some of the defrauded insurance companies were
located outside Massachusetts and did business throughout the
United States. Similarly, while Gelin and Lamarre argue that the
transactions surrounding their fraudulent scheme occurred within
Massachusetts' borders, the record shows that many of the checks
Premium received as reimbursements for fraudulent claims were drawn
on banks outside of Massachusetts. See, e.g., Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954) (finding that negotiation of check
drawn on an out-of-state bank evinced an interstate transaction);
Ramsey v. United States, 332 F.2d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding
that a forged check drawn on an out-of-state bank was tantamount to
placing the check in interstate commerce). The record also shows
that Gelin and Lamarre used the United States Postal Service to
mail their fraudulent claims for reimbursements. Cf. R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where the
United States Postal Service had been used in fraudulent scheme
underlying violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act). Last but not least, the record shows that the
insurance policies under which fraudulent claims were paid extended
nationwide health care benefits and covered both in- and
out-of-state accidents. See United States v. Lucien, 78 F. App'x.
141, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that insurance policies covering
both in- and out-of-state accidents removed a disincentive for
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insureds to drive out of state and therefore affected interstate
commerce).
Together, the foregoing facts, which Gelin and Lamarre
omit from their analysis, comfortably exceed the showing of the de
minimis interstate effect required to reject their contentions on
this front. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrier, 669 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2011) ("Proving an effect on interstate commerce is not
too difficult . . . . [T]he government need not show a substantial
interference--a de minimis one will due. Certainty of a de minimis
effect is not required either. A 'realistic probability' suffices.
And 'even potential future effects' may be enough.") (quoting
United States v. Capozzi, 486 F.3d 711, 726 (1st Cir. 2007).
C. The Voir Dire Challenge
Gelin and Lamarre's last line of attack fares no better.
According to them, the district court committed reversible error
when it declined to ask a proposed question to the venire that
"would have displayed jurors' predispositions towards race . . . ."
An appellate challenge asserting an improper exclusion of voir dire
questions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Gordon, 634 F.2d 639, 641 (1st Cir. 1980). The dispositive
question under this standard of review is not whether "we, if
sitting as a court of first instance, would have weighed the
relevant considerations differently," Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago,
528 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2008), but rather whether our review of
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the record leaves us "with a definite and firm conviction that the
court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Schubert v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 148 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1998). "As the
Supreme Court has noted, 'deference . . . is the hallmark of abuse-
of-discretion review.'" Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.
2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 134, 143 (1997)). This is certainly so when reviewing a
trial judge's decisions during the venire, where she enjoys broad
latitude and "need not pursue any specific line of questioning
. . . provided it is probative on the issue of impartiality."
United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1st Cir. 1991); see
also Fed. R. Crim. P. 24.
We have more than once stated that a "voir dire
ordinarily need not include questions regarding racial prejudice,"
United States v. Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d 148, 165-66 (1st Cir.
1999); see also United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1485 (1st
Cir. 1991); United States v. Webb, 70 F. App'x. 2, 2-3 (1st Cir.
2003), and that "the mere fact that a defendant is black does not
alone trigger [a] special questioning requirement . . . ." Brown,
938 F.3d at 1485; see also Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d at 165-66.7
7
Although there are certain cases in which special voir dire
questions regarding race are constitutionally required, this is not
one of them. See Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d at 165-66, for some
examples of the types of cases where special questions are
required.
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In fact, in the past, we have unequivocally and consistently abided
by the Supreme Court's plurality holding in United States v.
Rosales-López, 451 U.S. 182, 191 (1981), that a trial judge's
decision not to explore the possibility of racial or ethnic
prejudice during the voir dire constitutes "reversible error only
where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a
reasonable possibility that . . . prejudice might have influenced
the jury." See, e.g., Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d at 165-66.
Gelin and Lamarre's submissions fail to address the
preceding case law altogether. Rather, they posit that race became
a highly relevant issue through the trial because extensive
portions of the testimony pointed to their Haitian heritage "in [a]
very inflammatory manner." They further claim that "the core of
the government's case . . . was found in Little's testimony," which
cemented "the general idea that [Gelin] was bigoted against other
ethnicities and nationalities, particularly African-Americans."
Because Little's credibility was "completely destroyed throughout
the trial," Gelin and Lamarre continue, "it is likely that the
government's introduction of negative racial stereotypes was given
more weight than the actual evidence at trial."
An exhaustive review of the record proves Gelin and
Lamarre's fears to be misplaced. Among other things, the record
shows that Little was one of at least 16 witnesses the government
presented at trial. The other 15 witnesses -- among them,
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employees from the defrauded insurance companies, at least four
automobile accident victims "treated" at Premium, several of
Premium's employees, and an FBI agent -- provided testimony of
their own which explicated Gelin and Lamarre's fraudulent scheme.
The government also introduced extensive documentary evidence
supporting the charges brought, including copies of (1) fraudulent
claims filed; (2) fraudulent treatment charts; (3) the insurance
policies under which the defrauded companies paid fraudulent
claims; and (4) Premium's financial records. In other words, aside
from Little's testimony suggesting that Gelin was racist towards
African-Americans and limited evidence that Little herself was
derogatory towards Gelin on account of his national origin, the
other 15 witnesses who testified at length, as well as the
documentary evidence introduced at trial, concentrated exclusively
on the details of the underlying fraudulent scheme. This could
suffice to rule out the possibility that prejudice may have
influenced the jury in this case. Rosales-López, 451 U.S. at 191.
But there is more.
First, the jury acquitted Gelin and Lamarre of some of
the charges brought against them, which suggests that the evidence
adduced at trial was impartially considered. Second, other than
the racial overtones in Little's testimony, Gelin and Lamarre
advance nothing whatsoever to show a likelihood of racial or ethnic
prejudice that would have advised voir dire questions on the issue
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of race. See, e.g., Rosales-López, 451 U.S. at 192 ("[F]ederal
trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested by a
defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and
the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups.");
Brown, 938 F.2d at 1485 (finding that, where defendant was a black
male, and all of the government's witnesses and jurors were white,
voir dire inquiry about racial bias may be advisable, but not
required, absent special circumstances surrounding the case which
indicate the possibility of racial prejudice by the jury).
Third, as stated above, during the voir dire, the court
underscored the need for a jury "that is composed of people who are
completely fair-minded and impartial as to the parties involved in
the case and as to the issues presented." Though not with the
level of specificity Gelin and Lamarre sought, the court asked
prospective jurors questions to test their ability to render an
impartial verdict in light of the charges at play in the case.
Among other things, the court asked jurors whether they were
employed by law enforcement or insurance companies, and whether
they had been the victims of fraud or other crimes. The court also
asked potential jurors general questions about "any personal
belief, attitudes, experiences, potential biases that would
interfere with your ability to be a fair-minded and impartial juror
in this case." Under the circumstances at play here, this line of
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questioning in itself thwarts the type of challenge launched by
Gelin and Lamarre. See Brown, 938 F.2d at 1485-86.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Gelin and Lamarre's
convictions are affirmed.
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