Silva v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 08-1956, 08-2559
RICHARD A. SILVA, WALTER R. SILVA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, JUSTICES OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS LAND COURT, RUTH PELLEGRINI,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya, and Ebel, *
Circuit Judges.
William A. Hahn, with whom Hahn & Matkov was on the
briefs, for appellants.
David Aaron Guberman, Assistant Attorney General, with
whom Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was
on the briefs, for appellees Commonwealth of Massachusetts
and the Justices of the Massachusetts Land Court.
Paul R. Collier III, with whom Roger Bertling, Michael
Flannery and WilmerHale Legal Services Center were on the
briefs, for appellee Ruth Pellegrini.
September 11, 2009
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
EBEL, Circuit Judge. In these appeals,
Plaintiffs-Appellants Richard A. and Walter R. Silva
challenge the district court’s decisions dismissing two
federal actions by which the Silvas challenged foreclosure
proceedings occurring in Massachusetts state court. Having
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
The Silvas and Defendant-Appellee Ruth Pellegrini are
siblings. Their mother died in either 1975 or 1976. At the
time of their mother’s death, Pellegrini and her children
were living with her mother in the family home at 24
Clifford Street, Readville, Massachusetts. However, in her
will, the mother left the Readville home to the Silvas.
The Silvas, nonetheless, initially agreed that Pellegrini
could continue to live in the home. She did so, paying the
house taxes and utilities but no rent.
In 1976, the Silvas obtained a $25,000 loan from a
bank, securing that debt with a mortgage on the house at 24
Clifford Street. The bank recorded the mortgage in the
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.
In 1981, the Silvas tried unsuccessfully to evict
Pellegrini. Because she refused to vacate the house, the
Silvas stopped making payments on the mortgage. As a
result, the bank started foreclosure proceedings in February
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1981. In order “[t]o avoid losing her home, Ms. Pellegrini
purchased the note” from the bank in May 1981. Pellegrini
recorded the bank’s transfer of its note to her in the
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds. The Silvas never made any
mortgage payments to Pellegrini.
A. Pellegrini’s foreclosure and state action to quiet title
In 2000, Pellegrini sought to foreclose on the mortgage
she had purchased from the bank almost twenty years earlier.
Pellegrini did so using a non-judicial foreclosure mechanism
provided for under Massachusetts law — foreclosure by entry.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, §§ 1-2. 1 In compliance with
1
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 244, § 1 provides that
[a] mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a
mortgage of land, recover possession of the land
mortgaged by an open and peaceable entry thereon,
if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person
claiming it, or by action under this chapter; and
possession so obtained, if continued peaceably for
three years from the date of recording of the
memorandum or certificate as provided in section
two, shall forever foreclose the right of
redemption.
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 244, § 2 further provides:
If an entry for breach of condition is made without
a judgment, a memorandum of the entry shall be made
on the mortgage deed and signed by the mortgagor or
person claiming under him, or a certificate, under
oath, of two competent witnesses to prove the entry
shall be made. Such memorandum or certificate
shall after the entry, except as provided in
section seventy of chapter one hundred and
eighty-five, be recorded in the registry of deeds
(continued...)
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the Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute, Pellegrini
“entered” the home at 24 Clifford Street, observed by two
witnesses, and then recorded with the county registry of
deeds a notice of the foreclosure and a certificate from the
two witnesses attesting that the foreclosure by entry had
occurred. After the expiration of the three-year redemption
period that followed the foreclosure, see Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 244, § 1, Pellegrini filed an action in the
Massachusetts Land Court, on September 22, 2003, seeking to
remove any cloud on her title to 24 Clifford Street. 2 The
1
(...continued)
for the county or district where the land lies,
with a note of reference, if the mortgage is
recorded in the same registry, from each record to
the other. Unless such record is made, the entry
shall not be effectual for the purposes mentioned
in the preceding section.
(Emphasis added.)
2
Although Pellegrini had complied with all of the
state-law requirements for effecting a foreclosure by entry,
she failed to comply with the Massachusetts procedures
implementing the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 501-96 (Supp. 2009). See generally Beaton v.
Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Mass. 1975) (discussing
Massachusetts statutes implementing the federal Relief Act).
Among other things, the federal relief act protects military
personnel from foreclosure on their property while they are
on active duty. See 50 U.S.C. § 533(c) (as revised in
2003). Because there is no indication that either of the
Silvas fell under the protection provided by this federal
statute, however, Pellegrini’s failure to comply with the
Massachusetts procedures implementing the federal relief act
had no effect on the validity of the foreclosure. See
Beaton, 326 N.E.2d at 305 (noting that, “[i]f a foreclosure
(continued...)
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Silvas defended, arguing among other things that they were
being denied their property without due process. The Land
Court rejected that argument, concluding that the statutory
requirements for conducting a foreclosure by entry were
sufficient to satisfy due process and that Pellegrini had
complied with those statutory requirements. The Land Court,
therefore, entered judgment for Pellegrini, declaring that
she held title to 24 Clifford Street “free and clear of the
[Silvas’] claims.”
The Silvas filed a motion seeking reconsideration, which
the Land Court denied. But the Land Court apparently failed
to notify the parties of its decision, and the Silvas did
not discover the denial until four months later, after the
time to file an appeal had expired.
B. Silvas’ first federal action
Because it appeared that the Silvas would be unable to
pursue a timely appeal in the state-court action, they
instead filed a complaint in federal court, naming as
Defendants Pellegrini, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
2
(...continued)
were otherwise properly made, failure to comply with the
[Servicemembers Civil] Relief Act would not render the
foreclosure invalid as to anyone not entitled to the
protection of that act”). But there would remain a cloud on
Pellegrini’s title until she filed suit to establish that
neither Silva was entitled to relief under the federal
statute. See id.
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and the Justices of the Massachusetts Land Court. Soon
thereafter, the Massachusetts Appeals Court agreed to hear
the Silvas’ untimely appeal from the Land Court decision.
In light of that, the federal district court dismissed the
Silvas’ federal action, based upon the Younger abstention
doctrine. 3
C. State appeal of the Land Court’s decision
Before the Massachusetts Appeals Court, the Silvas
argued again, among other things, that they had been denied
their property without due process. That state appellate
court upheld the Land Court’s decision, concluding that the
Silvas had received notice of the foreclosure through
Pellegrini’s compliance with the requirements of the
Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute. See Pellegrini
v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Table), 2007 WL 3333247, at
*2-3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished). In light of that,
the Appeals Court further held that it need not address the
question of whether due process requirements even apply to
non-judicial foreclosures. See id. at *3.
3
“In the absence of extraordinary circumstances,
interests of comity and the respect for state processes
demand that federal courts should abstain from interfering
with ongoing state judicial proceedings.” Esso Standard Oil
Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2008)
(citing, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied further
review. See Pellegrini v. Silva, 880 N.E.2d 413 (Table)
(Mass. Jan. 31, 2008). Although the Silvas could have at
that point sought further relief by filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, see
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), 4 the Silvas did not pursue that avenue
of possible review.
D. Silvas’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reopen the first
federal action
In light of their final defeat in Massachusetts state
court, the Silvas filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
seeking relief from the district court’s earlier decision
dismissing their first federal action. The district court
denied that Rule 60(b) motion. In appeal No. 08-1956,
currently before this court, the Silvas challenge that
decision.
4
Section 1257(a), 28 U.S.C., provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had,
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States is drawn in question
or where the validity of a statute of any State is
drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of
the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or
statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.
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E. Silvas’ second federal action
Less than a week after the Silvas filed their Rule
60(b) motion seeking to reopen their first federal action,
the Silvas filed a second federal action. This time, the
Silvas sued Pellegrini and the Commonwealth, again
challenging the state-court foreclosure proceedings. The
district court dismissed this second federal action under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 5 The Silvas now appeal that
decision in appeal No. 08-2559.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appeal No. 08-2559
We first address appeal No. 08-2559, in which the Silvas
challenge the district court’s decision to dismiss their
second federal action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 6
1. Standard of review
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine implicates the district
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005);
see also Geiger v. Foley Hoag LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 65
(1st Cir. 2008). Therefore, we will review the district
5
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462(1983).
6
Although this is the Silvas’ second appeal in time, it
makes sense analytically to address it first.
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court’s dismissal de novo. See Federacion de Maestros de
Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto
Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Puerto
Ricans for Puerto Rico Party v. Dalmau 544 F.3d 58, 66 (1st
Cir. 2008).
2. Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests the United States Supreme Court
with exclusive “jurisdiction over appeals from final
state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463
(2006) (per curiam); see also Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at
291-92. In light of that exclusive jurisdictional grant,
“[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
‘state-court losers’ challenging state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’”
Id. at 460 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284)(emphasis
added). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, is “confined
to [1] ‘cases brought by state-court losers [2] complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and
[4] inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.’” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (numbering added)
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284); see also Coors
Brewing Co. v. Mendez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 19 (1st Cir.
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2009). Because it is clear in this case that the Silvas
were the unsuccessful parties in the state-court foreclosure
action, we focus on the remaining three factors set forth in
Lance.
a. Whether the Silvas’ second federal action
“complain[s] of injuries caused by state-court
judgments”
It is clear that the Silvas’ second federal action
complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment
entered in the Massachusetts foreclosure action. In the
complaint in their second federal action, the Silvas
alleged:
Pellegrini used a state statute (MGL c. 244) in
such a way as not to require actual notice of
proceedings depriving them of their title to their
property . . .
. . . .
28. The Silvas raised the federal constitutional
due process issue under the Fifth And Fourteenth
Amendments at every level of the Massachusetts
state courts, but such courts chose not to address
the constitutional questions.
29. There is a real and actual controversy between
the parties in that defendant Pellegrini takes the
position that the state statute (c. 244) provides
for and allows the deprivation of real property
without actual and personal notification to the
record title holders, and the Silvas contend that
any such state law would be unconstitutional on its
face and/or as applied to the Silvas or their real
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
30. Moreover, defendant Pellegrini is taking the
position that since she followed MGL c. 244, and
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even though the Silvas did not receive actual or
personal notification of what she was doing, that
under the state statute the Silvas have lost all
right, title and interest in their Readville house.
These alleged injuries stem directly from the judgment
entered in the state foreclosure action upholding the rights
of Ms. Pellegrini to take this very action. See Davison v.
Gov’t of Puerto Rico-Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps, 471
F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying
Rooker-Feldman doctrine where, regardless of how the claim
is phrased, “the only real injury to Plaintiffs is
ultimately still caused by a state-court judgment”); see
also Puerto Ricans for Puerto Rico Party, 544 F.3d at 68 (in
determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in
a given case, comparing the “core issues” raised in the
state-court action with those asserted in the federal
action).
b. Whether the state-court judgment in the
foreclosure proceeding “was rendered before”
the Silvas commenced their second federal
action
In determining whether the state-court judgment was
“rendered before the [federal] district court proceeding
commenced,” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, Exxon Mobil
directs that “a state court judgment is sufficiently final
for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[] when ‘the
state proceedings [have] ended,’” Federacion de Maestros,
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410 F.3d at 24 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291). The
First Circuit has further concluded that, for Rooker-Feldman
purposes, “when the highest state court in which review is
available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is
left to be resolved, then without a doubt the state court
proceedings have ‘ended.’” 7 Id., at 24.
In this case, the state foreclosure proceeding had
certainly “ended” by the time the state’s highest court, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, denied the Silvas
further review on January 31, 2008. See Pellegrini, 880
N.E.2d at 413 (Table). The Silvas initiated their second
federal action two months later, on March 25, 2008. Thus,
the state-court proceedings had ended, for Rooker-Feldman
purposes, before the Silvas commenced their second federal
action.
c. Whether the Silvas’ second federal action
“invit[ed] district court review and rejection
of [the state-court] judgments”
The Silvas asserted two claims in their second federal
action: 1) seeking a declaration that any state law that
7
The First Circuit has also recognized two other
circumstances, not relevant here, when a state-court
proceeding will have “ended” for Rooker-Feldman purposes:
1) “if the state action has reached a point where neither
party seeks further action”; and 2) “if the state court
proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions
in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions
(whether great or small) remain to be litigated.”
Federacion de Maestros, 410 F.3d at 24-25.
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“allows the deprivation of property without actual and
personal notice to the record title holders of real
estate . . . is defective and unconstitutional under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution”; and 2) alleging that Mass. Gen. Law ch. 244,
“to the extent that it does not require actual and personal
notification and a timely and meaningful opportunity to be
heard to protect one’s property, is unconstitutional on its
face and/or as applied to the Silvas and/or their real
estate.” As relief, the Silvas asked the district court to:
1. Enter a temporary restraining order enjoining
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its courts,
counties, towns and any other public officer from
in any way enforcing, carrying out or acting upon
MGL c. 244 generally or as it is applied to the
Silvas and their property.
2. After hearing, enter a preliminary injunction
consistent with prayer 1 above.
3. Enter a temporary restraining order enjoining
defendant Pellegrini from alienating or encumbering
the Silvas’ house at 24 Clifford Street, Readville
pending resolution of this action.
4. After hearing, enter a preliminary injunction
consistent with prayer 3 above.
5. Declare MGL c. 244 and/or the Massachusetts
state foreclosure procedure either on their face or
as applied to the Silvas and their property
violates the United States Constitution, Amendments
Five and Fourteen, and 42 USC sec. 1983.
6. Award the Silvas their damages for any
unconstitutional application of MGL c. 244 to their
real estate in Readville, Massachusetts.
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7. Award the Silvas their costs and legal fees
under 42 USC sec. 1988.
8. Such other relief as the Court deems just and
appropriate.
In order for the district court to grant the Silvas
this relief that they requested, the district court would
have “to declare that the state court wrongly decided [the
Silvas’] claim” in the state foreclosure action. Davison,
471 F.3d at 223. And “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prevents [the district court] from doing this.” Id. This
bar applies notwithstanding that the Silvas are asserting in
their federal action a federal constitutional claim pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Diva’s Inc. v. City of Bangor, 411
F.3d 30, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to § 1983 action, but concluding that doctrine did
not deprive the federal district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction in that particular case).
The Silvas contend that their second federal action
seeks different relief than that sought in the state-court
foreclosure proceedings because, in federal court, they are
challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts
foreclosure-by-entry statute. It may be true that, “if the
plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation by an adverse
party independent of the injury caused by the state court
judgment, the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not bar
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jurisdiction.” Davison, 471 F.3d at 222 (emphasis added).
But here, the Silvas themselves alleged in their federal
complaint that they “raised the federal constitutional due
process issue under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments at
every level of the Massachusetts state courts.” Thus, the
Silvas’ federal claim challenging the constitutionality of
the Massachusetts foreclosure-by-entry statute is not
“independent of the injury caused by the state court
judgment.” Davison, 471 F.3d at 222.
The Silvas counter that the state courts never addressed
the merits of their due process argument. But we cannot
agree. Both the Land Court and the Massachusetts Appeals
Court addressed and rejected the Silvas’ due process
argument.
The Massachusetts Land Court rejected the Silvas’ due
process argument by concluding that the recorded certificate
of entry was “adequate and proper notice, and the Silvas
cannot credibly claim that it violates due process.” This
conclusion was upheld by the Massachusetts Appeals Court,
which noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
previously ruled that the duly recorded entry under Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 2 provided “full and authoritative
notice, to all persons,” citing, e.g., Bennett v. Conant, 10
Cush. 163, 167 (Mass. 1852). Pellegrini, 2007 WL 3333247,
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at *2. Full and authoritative notice to all persons would
satisfy due process notice requirements and, accordingly,
the Massachusetts Appeals Court apparently felt it was not
necessary in this case to address whether or not the due
process clause was even applicable because of the
possibility that a foreclosure by entry and recorded notice
might not involve state action: “this case presents no
‘occasion to determine whether the due process clause even
has any applicability to nonjudicial mortgage
foreclosures.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Beaton, 326 N.E.2d at
307 n.6). Thus, the Massachusetts courts expressly rejected
the Silvas’ due process claim.
Moreover, even if we were to assume the truth of the
Silvas’ allegation that, although they “raised the federal
constitutional due process issue under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments at every level of the Massachusetts
state courts,” the state “courts chose not to address the
constitutional questions,” we would still conclude that
Rooker-Feldman bars the Silvas’ second federal action. This
court could not grant the Silvas the relief they request
without concluding that the Massachusetts state courts erred
in the decisions entered in the state foreclosure
proceedings. Cf. Davison, 471 F.3d at 223 (applying
Rooker-Feldman doctrine after rejecting federal plaintiffs’
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argument that they never got their “day in [state] court”
because of state court’s procedural ruling). The ruling of
the Massachusetts Appeals Court expressly rejected the
Silvas’ due process claim and no federal relief could be
granted without challenging that state court holding.
d. Conclusion as to the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court did
not err in dismissing the Silvas’ second federal action for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
3. Preclusion principles provide an alternate reason
to affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss
the Silvas’ second federal action
Even if the district court erred in dismissing the
Silvas’ second federal action based upon Rooker-Feldman
principles, which we do not conclude, dismissal was, in any
event, appropriate under preclusion principles. See Aguilar
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div., 510 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that an appellate court can affirm
the district court’s decision to dismiss an action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction “on any ground made apparent
by the record (whether or not relied upon by the lower
court)”); see also SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster,
547 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that appellate court
can “affirm a judgment of dismissal on any independently
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sufficient ground”) (quotation omitted); Hernandez-Santiago
v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (noting that appellate court “could still affirm if
dismissal of the complaint would be the obvious result of a
remand”).
“Under the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, a judgment rendered in a state court is entitled to
the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would be
given within the state in which it was rendered.”
Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2020 (2009).
Here, because the state foreclosure proceeding occurred in
Massachusetts courts, we will look to Massachusetts
preclusion principles. “Massachusetts recognizes two
distinct types of preclusion arising out of the maintenance
of prior litigation: res judicata (claim preclusion) and
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).” Andrew Robinson
Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 52 (1st
Cir. 2008). Both apply here.
a. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the
Silvas’ federal claims against Pellegrini
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “prevents the
relitigation of all claims that a litigant had the
opportunity and incentive to fully litigate in an earlier
action.” Giragosian, 547 F.3d at 63 (quotation, alterations
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omitted) (applying Massachusetts law). Under Massachusetts
law, “[t]he operation of res judicata requires the presence
of three elements: (1) the identity or privity of the
parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of
the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the
merits.” Andrews Robinson, 547 F.3d at 52 (quotation
omitted).
Those three elements are present here. First, the
Silvas’ federal claims asserted against Pellegrini involve
the same parties as were involved in the state foreclosure
proceeding.
Second, “Massachusetts deems causes of action identical
for claim preclusion purposes if they grow out of the same
transaction, act, or agreement, and seek redress for the
same wrong.” Id. (quotation, alterations omitted).
“Discrete theories of liability may constitute identical
causes of action for claim preclusion purposes if they are
based upon the same nucleus of operative facts.” Id.
(applying Massachusetts law). “Facts forming a common
nucleus are those meeting the following criteria: 1) whether
the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation;
2) whether the facts form a convenient trial unit; and
3) whether treating the facts as a unit conforms to the
parties’ expectations.” Herman v. Meiselman, 541 F.3d 59,
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62-63 & 62 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted) (applying
federal and Massachusetts preclusion principles, which the
court noted were the same). It is clear that the Silvas’
federal claims asserted against Pellegrini in the second
federal action stem from the same nucleus of operative facts
as the claims at issue in the state foreclosure
action — P e l l e g r ini’s use of Massachusetts’
foreclosure-by-entry mechanism to take clear title to the
house at 24 Clifford Lane.
Lastly, as previously discussed, the state foreclosure
action is final. And the state courts’ resolution of those
proceedings was based upon the merits of the issues
presented.
b. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars
the Silvas’ federal claims asserted against
the Commonwealth in the Silvas’ second federal
action
The Massachusetts courts use several
formulations interchangeably to describe the
prerequisites for issue preclusion, but the Supreme
Judicial Court recently stated that issue
preclusion applies when (1) there was a final
judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication;
(2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted
was a party (or in privity with a party) to the
prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior
adjudication was identical to the issue in the
current adjudication. Additionally, [4] the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must have been
essential to the earlier judgment. Massachusetts
courts also require that [5] appellate review must
have been available in the earlier case before
issue preclusion will arise.
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Pisnoy v. Ahmed (In re Sonus Networks, Inc., Shareholder
Derivative Litig.), 499 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quotations, citations omitted) (several numbers added).
Those elements are met here as to the Silvas’ federal claims
asserted against the Commonwealth in the second federal
action.
First, as previously explained, there was a final
adjudication on the merits in the state foreclosure
proceeding. Second, clearly the parties against whom the
Commonwealth seeks to assert the prior state
adjudication — the Silvas — were parties to that prior state
proceeding.
Third, “[i]ssue preclusion prevents relitigation of the
same issues actually litigated in [the] earlier judgment.”
Id. at 62. “The question is whether there is anything in
the” Silvas’ second federal action “that amounts to a
significant change . . . from what was presented to the
state court.” Id. (quotation omitted.) There was not.
Fourth, the relevant issues adjudicated in the state
foreclosure proceeding — whether Pellegrini failed to give
the Silvas adequate notice of her foreclosure by entry, and
whether Pellegrini’s use of that state non-judicial
foreclosure mechanism deprived the Silvas of their property
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without due process — was essential to the state courts’
decisions upholding Pellegrini’s foreclosure by entry.
Lastly, appellate review was available and pursued by
the Silvas in the state foreclosure proceeding. For these
reasons, Massachusetts’ collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion principles bar the Silvas from pursuing the
claims they assert in their second federal action against
the Commonwealth.
c. Conclusion as to preclusion
As an alternative to dismissal on the basis of
Rooker-Feldman, we conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that
dismissal was appropriate based on preclusion principles.
B. Appeal No. 08-1956
Turning to appeal No. 08-1956, the Silvas challenge the
district court’s decision to deny their motion seeking
reconsideration, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6), of
the court’s earlier decision to dismiss their first federal
action.
1. Standard of review
This court generally will review the district court’s
decision denying the Silvas’ Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse
of discretion. See United States v. 6 Fox Street, 480 F.3d
38, 46 (1st Cir. 2007). Where “the district court’s
exercise of discretion is premised on an erroneous legal
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principle,” however, “we review that legal error de novo.”
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 272 F.3d 89, 100 (1st
Cir. 2001).
2. Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) relief
The district court dismissed the Silvas’ first federal
action based upon Younger abstention, in light of the
ongoing state foreclosure proceedings. After the
Massachusetts courts entered final judgment in the state
litigation, quieting title in 24 Clifford Street in
Pellegrini, the Silvas sought to reopen the first federal
action under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6).
In pertinent part, Rule 60(b) provides:
Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or
Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court
may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
. . . .
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Although many courts have indicated
that Rule 60(b) motions should be granted liberally, [the
First] Circuit has taken a harsher tack. Because Rule 60(b)
is a vehicle for extraordinary relief, motions invoking the
rule should be granted only under exceptional
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circumstances.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina
Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 63-64 (1st Cir.
2001) (quotations, citations, footnote omitted) (reading
this principle “with the gloss supplied by the Supreme Court
in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380 (1993) (addressing “excusable neglect” under
Bankr. Rule 9006 and, by analogy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b))).
Rule 60(b) “must be applied so as to recognize the
desirability of deciding disputes on their merits, while
also considering the importance of finality as applied to
court judgments.” Id. at 64 (quotation omitted).
Here, the Silvas have not shown that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to reopen their first
federal action. The Silvas contend that the district court
should have granted them Rule 60(b) relief for this reason:
According to the Silvas, the district court originally
dismissed their first federal action under Younger
abstention principles, believing that the Massachusetts
courts would provide the Silvas with a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their due process challenge to
Pellegrini’s foreclosure by entry. The Silvas assert,
however, that the Massachusetts Appeals Court never
addressed their due process argument. Therefore, the Silvas
claim that the federal district court should have granted
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them Rule 60(b) relief from the earlier dismissal of their
first federal action, reopened that federal action and
addressed the merits of their federal claims.
We disagree with the Silvas that the state courts did
not address the Silvas’ due process argument. As previously
explained, both the Massachusetts Land Court and the
Massachusetts Appeals Court rejected the Silvas’ due-process
arguments. In light of that, we cannot conclude the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen
the Silva’s first federal action. 8
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district
court’s decision to deny Rule 60(b) relief from its
dismissal of the Silvas’ first federal action, as well as
the district court’s decision to dismiss the Silvas’ second
federal action.
8
In light of our conclusion that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Silvas Rule 60(b)
relief, we need not address Appellees’ other arguments.
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