O'Neil v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-2139
KEVIN O'NEIL AND NANCY O'NEIL, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE ESTATE OF LIAM E. O'NEIL,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Selya and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Roy A. Bourgeois, with whom Bourgeois, Dresser, White &
McGourthy, LLP was on brief, for appellants.
James M. Brogan, with whom Peter M. Durney, Gregg P.
Bailey, Cornell & Gollub, Nancy Shane Rappaport, and DLA Piper US,
LLP were on brief, for appellees.
June 15, 2011
Per Curiam. This is a wrongful death action that arises
out of the tragic death of a young boy in a power-mower accident.
The boy's parents sued those responsible for the manufacture,
design, and marketing of the riding mower.
The parties tried the case to a jury, primarily on a
design-defect theory. During its deliberations, the jury submitted
serial questions to the district court. The court responded to the
first question without incident. The dispute here involves the
handling of the second question.
After the court consulted with counsel, it gave a
supplemental instruction in reply to that question. The jurors
resumed deliberations briefly and then returned a take-nothing
verdict in favor of the defendants.
The district court subsequently denied the plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial. O'Neil v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.,
No. 1:06-cv-10433, 2010 WL 3504191 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2010). This
timely appeal followed.
The lone issue on appeal concerns the propriety of the
district court's supplemental jury instruction. The district court
revisited this issue and confronted it head-on when denying the
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
The applicable standard of appellate review is abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d
173, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23,
-2-
25 (1st Cir. 1992); see generally DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d
55, 61 (1st Cir. 2009). In applying this standard, we are mindful
that a material error of law is a per se abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., R&G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1,
7 (1st Cir. 2009).
The supplemental instruction mirrored the district
court's original instruction on the point (to which the plaintiffs
had not objected). It also tracked the requests to charge
submitted by the plaintiffs prior to trial. The district court's
rescript persuasively explains why, in the circumstances of this
case, this supplemental instruction was neither inappropriate nor
prejudicial. See O'Neil, 2010 WL 3504191, at *3-4. There is
little that we can add to this thoughtful explanation.
In the past, we frequently have acknowledged that when a
trial court addresses an issue squarely, faithfully applies the law
to the facts, articulates a convincing rationale for its decision,
and reaches a correct result, it would be folly for us to wax
longiloquent for no purpose other than to hear our own words
resonate. See, e.g., Eaton v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 626 F.3d 113, 114
(1st Cir. 2010); Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86
(1st Cir. 2002); Chico-Vélez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 58
(1st Cir. 1998); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas de P.R., 74 F.3d
344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). This is such a case.
-3-
We need go no further. We reject the plaintiffs' appeal
for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court's
cogently reasoned rescript and affirm the judgment below. See 1st
Cir. R. 27.0.
Affirmed.