L'Heureux v. Whitman

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1821
RONALD L'HEUREUX,
Petitioner,
v.
WALTER WHITMAN, WARDEN, ACI, ET AL.,
Defendants, Respondents.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Ronald L'Heureux on brief pro se.
Elisabeth A. Wallace, Special Assistant Attorney General, on
Memorandum in Support of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss Appeal or to
Summarily Affirm the Judgment Below, for appellees.
OCTOBER 9, 1997
Per Curiam. Appellant Ronald L'Heureux appeals the
dismissal by the district court of his complaint alleging
violation of his civil rights and seeking to hold defendants
in contempt for violation of the Morris and DeFusco consent
decrees. Having reviewed carefully the record in this case,
we vacate the dismissal in part and affirm it in part.
The district court in the instant case based its
dismissal on the report and recommendation of the magistrate
judge. That report found that the complaint should be
dismissed for three separate reasons. None, however,
suffices to sustain dismissal of the entire complaint.
First, the magistrate judge found that L'Heureux's
amended complaint violated a court order to file a short and
plain statement of his claim as required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a) and that violation of that order supported dismissal.
Yet, while L'Heureux's complaint is indeed long (15
handwritten single spaced pages) and at many times rambling,
it sufficiently fulfills the purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
so as not to be in violation of the previous court order.
The purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is to give "fair notice
[to the defendants] of the claim asserted." See Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Dismissal is usually
"reserved for those case in which the complaint is so
confused, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised." See Salahuddin v.
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Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). L'Heureux's complaint
seems to give fair notice of at least two claims, neither of
which appears frivolous on its face. First, he alleges
various violations of the DeFusco consent decree and seeks to
have defendants held in contempt, the appropriate means for
seeking to enforce compliance with a consent decree. See
Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993). Also,
he alleges several instances of defendants' retaliating
against him for the exercise of his right of access to the
courts. Therefore, dismissal of the complaint as a violation
of the order to comply with Rule 8(a) was improper. See
Simmons, 49 F.3d at 88 ("Dismissal with prejudice was
inappropriate because the amended complaint stated
nonfrivolous claims and sufficed to give notice of the
substance, and many of the details, of [defendant's]
claims.").
The magistrate judge also recommended dismissal on the
ground that L'Heureux had not opposed defendants' motion to
dismiss. However, the local rule on which the magistrate
judge relied for his recommendation allows for granting an
unopposed order only when to do is "just." For the reasons
elsewhere in this opinion, we do not find that dismissal of
the entire complaint in this case to have been just.
Finally, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal on
the basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In particular, he
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found that some of L'Heureux's complaints repetitious of
claims in other suits and others too insubstantial to state a
claim for relief. Both grounds are sufficient for dismissing
most claims. In particular, L'Heureux's retaliation claim
appears duplicative of another case currently pending in
federal court and thus properly subject to dismissal. See,
e.g., I.A. Durbin v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541,
1551 (11th Cir. 1986) ("it is well established that as
between federal district courts, the general principle is to
avoid duplicative litigation")(citing cases). However,
nothing in the record indicates that the alleged violations
of the consents decree are duplicative of claims in other
cases. Moreover, at least some of L'Heureux's claims of
consent decree violations seem supported with sufficiently
specific allegations to withstand dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), at least without further explication by the
district court.
We of course hazard no opinion as to the merits of
L'Heureux's claims.
The order of dismissal is vacated as far as it relates
to the claims of consent decree violations. The dismissal of
the other claims is affirmed. The case is remanded for
further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
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