Garcia Quintero v. Commonweath of PR

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1770
MARIO GARCIA-QUINTERO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, Edda Serrano-Blasini,
Deputy Solicitor General, and Edgardo Rodriguez-Quilichini,
Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for appellants.
David P. Freedman, Mario J. Pab n and O'Neill & Borges on
brief for appellee First National Bank of Boston.
Jose M. Mu oz-Silva, Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez, Carlos A.
Surillo Pumarada and Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez Law Offices on
various briefs for appellee Northwestern Trading Co.
MARCH 11, 1997
Per Curiam. This case had its genesis in racketeering
Per Curiam.
charges filed by the Puerto Rico Department of Justice (PR-DOJ)
against, inter alia, Delta Petroleum (PR), Ltd., Delta's
president, (Mario O. Garcia-Quintero), and Northwestern Trading
Co. Coincident with the filing of those charges, PR-DOJ seized,
without prior judicial authorization, two bank accounts
maintained by Delta. One such account was held by Banco Central
Hispa o for the benefit of First National Bank of Boston (Bank of
Boston). The second was held directly by Bank of Boston.
Garcia-Quintero, Bank of Boston, and Northwestern
Trading pursued various avenues of relief. During this time
frame, however, Delta became the subject of Chapter 11
proceedings in the bankruptcy court; a trustee was appointed; and
Bank of Boston opted to remove an earlier-filed action from the
commonwealth courts to the bankruptcy court. In due season, Bank
of Boston cross-claimed against PR-DOJ, alleging that the
aforementioned seizures were illegal and should be nullified.1
After considerable procedural skirmishing, the district
court withdrew its earlier reference to the bankruptcy court and
assumed jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. Both Bank of
Boston and Northwestern Trading then moved for summary judgment.
PR-DOJ did not file an opposition to either motion. By order
dated August 9, 1995, the district court granted the motions.
1Throughout this opinion, we use "PR-DOJ" as a shorthand
reference for all appellants (who include not only PR-DOJ but
also the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and divers officers and
agents of the Commonwealth).
2
PR-DOJ moved for reconsideration, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), but the
court, by order dated February 5, 1996, refused to budge. PR-DOJ
now appeals. We summarily affirm.
The district court has written two orders explaining
its reasoning, and we see scant need to wax longiloquent. See
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 220
(1st Cir. 1996) (stating that "when a lower court produces a
comprehensive, well-reasoned decision, an appellate court should
refrain from writing at length to no other end than to hear its
own words resonate"); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) (similar). Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment for substantially the reasons elucidated
in the district court's orders, adding a few brief comments.
1. It is important to bear in mind that this appeal
1.
tests only the denial of PR-DOJ's motion for reconsideration. In
considering such an assignment of error, we will not reverse
unless the record displays a palpable abuse of discretion. See
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d
220, 227 (1st Cir. 1994); Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 888
(1st Cir. 1993). We detect none here.
2. PR-DOJ vigorously (if belatedly) contests the
2.
district court's jurisdiction, and urges that the court should
have reconsidered because the removed action should have been
remanded to the commonwealth courts. We need not address the
obvious question anent the existence of appellate jurisdiction
vis- -vis the denial of a motion to remand, see generally
3
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 350-52
(1976), inasmuch as the appellant's attacks on the district
court's subject matter jurisdiction fail.
A federal court appropriately exercises subject matter
jurisdiction over state court claims upon removal when the claims
are sufficiently "related" to bankruptcy proceedings. See 28
U.S.C. 1334, 1452 (1994). "[T]he test for determining whether
a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the
outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on
the estate being administered in bankruptcy." In re G.S.F.
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1475 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Pacor v.
Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). In this case, the
district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the claims to
compel the return of the seized property because those claims had
a direct and significant effect on the bankruptcy estate.2 See
United States v. Star Rte. Box 1328, 137 B.R. 802, 805 (D. Or.
1992) (holding that a case involving federal civil forfeitures
satisfied the relatedness test). Moreover, the claims were
properly withdrawn by the district court from the bankruptcy
court. See 28 U.S.C. 157(d) (1994).
3. PR-DOJ offers as an additional reason for
3.
2To be sure, PR-DOJ emphasizes that the issues concerning
the seized property depend primarily on Puerto Rico forfeiture
law. But "federal courts are not lightly to relinquish
jurisdiction, and . . . even a difficult issue of state law or
parallel pending state litigation is not automatically a warrant
to abstain." Lundborg v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 91 F.3d 265, 272
(1st Cir. 1996). Thus, the district court did not abuse its
considerable discretion by deeming itself competent to determine
straightforward issues of Puerto Rico law.
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reconsideration its complaint that the district court entered
summary judgment without offering it an opportunity to mount an
opposition. This is sheer persiflage. The record reveals that
PR-DOJ had ample opportunity to oppose the summary judgment
motions, and instead neglected to do so.3 What is more, the
district court did not grant the motions merely because they were
unopposed; rather, the court, following settled precedent, see,
e.g., Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1991);
Mendez v. Banco Popular, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1990),
considered the motions on their merits, in light of the record as
constituted, and determined that judgment in favor of the movants
was legally appropriate.
The sockdolager, of course, is that PR-DOJ, even now,
has not suggested any credible reason why Bank of Boston and/or
Northwestern Trading are not entitled to judgment. The claimants
are parties possessing cognizable interests in the seized
property. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, 1723 (1991). The
criminal proceedings fizzled out, and under the law of Puerto
Rico, acquittal on criminal charges renders a governmental
seizure of the acquitted person's property invalid. See Carlo
del Toro v. Secretario de Justicia, 7 P.R. Off. Trans. 392, 398-
99 (1982). In the face of clear precedent, the district court
3PR-DOJ's lament that it was lulled into a false sense of
security by a stay granted earlier in the proceedings by the
bankruptcy court holds little water. Given the record in this
case, no reasonable lawyer would have concluded that the stay
endured after the district court withdrew the reference and
assumed jurisdiction.
5
acted appropriately in noticing the acquittals and striking down
the seizures.
We need go no further. Concluding, as we do, that the
instant appeal is entirely without merit, we summarily affirm.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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