IN RE: v. Cordova Gonzalez

July 30, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1756
IN RE: ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ,
Appellant.
No. 92-8038
IN RE:
ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ,
Petitioner.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this court issued on June 30, 1993, is
amended as follows:
On page 7, line 10: delete the word "his".
July 1, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1756
IN RE: ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ,
Appellant.
No. 92-8038
IN RE:
ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ
Petitioner.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this Court issued on June 30, 1993, is
amended as follows:
On cover sheet caption for No. 92-1756 change the name
"Antenio" to "Antonio".
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-1756
IN RE: ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ,
Appellant.
No. 92-8038
IN RE:
ANTONIO L. CORDOVA-GONZALEZ,
Petitioner.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Cordova-Gonzalez on brief pro se.
June 30, 1993
Per Curiam. Antonio Cordova Gonzalez was disbarred by
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico. Cordova appealed that decision. This court ordered
Cordova to show cause why we should not disbar him as well.
The matters were consolidated. We now affirm the district
court's order, and disbar Cordova from practice before this
court.
I
Cordova does not seriously dispute the facts as found by
Magistrate Arenas, the committee of lawyers appointed by
Judge Laffitte, and the district court. We agree with the
committee that, with respect to the first charge, involving
the provision of bail on behalf of Cordova's client Irma Cruz
Vazquez, Cordova may not "technically" have violated D.P.R.
Local Rule 401.1(C)(3). The rule prohibits a lawyer from
standing bail for his client, but in this case it appears
that Cordova's wife actually posted the bond, and it was
never conclusively determined that Cordova owned or had an
interest in the property that his wife put up to secure Cruz'
release. This technicality, however, does not absolve
Cordova of all culpability in the matter: the committee found
that Cordova's wife posted bail "under his auspices and with
his express concurrence," and did so by pledging property
that was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
Bankruptcy Court in bankruptcy proceedings that involved both
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Mr. and Mrs. Cordova. Cordova therefore connived at an
effort to deceive the district court by obtaining Cruz's
release through the pledge of property that was not the
pledgor's to give, and thus violated ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) by
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.1
With respect to the second charge, we agree with the
district court that Cordova violated ABA Model Rule 1.8(a)
when he borrowed $100,000 from his client Jose Lopez-Nieves.
Rule 1.8(a) prohibits a lawyer from entering into a business
transaction with a client unless, among other things, the
terms of the transaction are fair and reasonable and "are
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a
manner which can be reasonably understood by the client."
Cordova borrowed money from Lopez-Nieves without disclosing
to his client (a) that he did not own the property pledged as
collateral, (b) that his wife -- who did own the collateral -
- and he were involved in bankruptcy proceedings, and (c)
that the collateral was subject to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, which had not approved the pledge.
As to the third charge, that Cordova filed pleadings
containing vitriolic slurs on judges and lawyers that were
1. The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct govern the conduct of lawyers who practice before the
United States District Court in Puerto Rico. Local Rule
211.4(B).
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"degrading to the law, the bar and the Court," we will not
repeat Cordova's invective here. We do find the record
adequate legally to support the district court's conclusion
that the pleadings Cordova submitted "show an incessant
incorporation of abusive and disrespectful language against
judges and opposing counsel, replete with offensive and
vituperative statements in contravention of Rules 3.5(c) and
8.4(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."
II
We review the district court's decision to disbar
Cordova only for abuse of discretion, In re Grievance
Committee of United States District Court, 847 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1988); In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.
1986); In re Olkon, 795 F.2d 1379, 1381 (8th Cir. 1986);
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1172
(9th Cir. 1984), and we find none here. Cordova is a lawyer
of some thirty years experience, and no stranger to
disciplinary proceedings. See In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726
F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Antonio Cordova Gonzalez, 90
J.T.S. 28 (P.R. 1990). His dealings with his client Lopez-
Nieves show a lack of consideration for the duty of trust
between lawyer and client that finds expression in Model Rule
1.8(a). Standing alone, such a transgression would warrant
significant punishment. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 843
P.2d 1385, 1387 (Colo. 1993) (lawyer disbarred for borrowing
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from clients); Lipson v. State Bar, 810 P.2d 1007 (Cal. 1991)
(lawyer suspended). Here Cordova's misconduct toward his
client comes accompanied by his misconduct in the Cruz case
and his verbal attacks upon opposing counsel and the court.
Cordova had been warned on at least two occasions, by two
different courts, that further intemperate accusations would
expose him to disciplinary action. He continued to make
vitriolic and, as far as the record shows, unfounded personal
assaults. Attorneys have on a number of occasions been
disbarred for such conduct. See, e.g., In re Evans, 801 F.2d
at 706; In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1967); see
generally, ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct at
101:609 and cases cited therein. We therefore conclude that,
in this case, the punishment is not out of proportion to the
offense.
III
We reject Cordova's claim that he was denied due process
during the investigation and resolution of the charges
against him. Although attorney discipline proceedings have
been called "quasi-criminal," In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,
550 (1968), the due process rights of an attorney in a
disciplinary proceeding "do not extend so far as to guarantee
the full panoply of rights afforded to an accused in a
criminal case." Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d
1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting People v. Harfmann, 638
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P.2d 745, 747 (Col. 1981)). See also Rosenthal v. Justices
of Supreme Court, 910 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1990); In re
Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 1977) and cases cited at
footnote 6; Fitzsimmons v. State Bar of California, 667 P.2d
700, 703-4 (Cal. 1983). Rather, an attorney facing
discipline "is entitled to procedural due process, including
notice and an opportunity to be heard." Rosenthal v.
Justices of Supreme Court, 910 F.2d at 564. See also Lowe v.
Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 335 (1st Cir. 1992) (due process in
proceeding to revoke physician's license requires notice of
the charges and an opportunity to be heard). The record
shows that Cordova received notice of the charges against
him, and had an opportunity to respond to those charges, at
every stage of the proceedings.
We also reject Cordova's claim that two of the district
court judges who took part in the decision to disbar him
should have refrained from participation. At various times,
Cordova filed six motions to disqualify Judges Laffitte or
Perez-Gimenez.2 However, his subjective impressions of bias
or prejudice, no matter how vehemently expressed, find so
little, and such weak, objective corroboration in the record
that we see no reason to deem the judges' decision to take
part in the disciplinary proceedings an abuse of discretion.
2. Several of the motions also sought the disqualification
of Judge Fuste, who recused himself and did not sign the
opinion that disbarred Cordova.
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See Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (1st Cir.
1979).
IV
Under Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), when "it is shown to [a
court of appeals] that any member of its bar has been
suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court of
record . . ., the member will be subject to suspension or
disbarment by the court [of appeals]." "[T]he record of
prior disciplinary proceedings in district court are of
substantial relevance in determining whether an attorney
should be disbarred from practice before" a court of appeals.
In re Evans, 834 F.2d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1987). Cordova has
neither disproved the charges against him, nor explained, as
Rule 46(b) requires, why we should not impose the same
sanction as the district court. Cordova's misconduct in
dealings with his Lopez-Nieves and Cruz, and his flagrant,
repeated disrespect for the tribunals before which he has
practiced, warrant his disbarment.
The decision of the district court is affirmed. Cordova
is disbarred from practice before this court.
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