Sanchez v. United States

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1733
JUAN R. SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Javier A. Morales Ramos with whom Juan F. Matos Bonet, was on
brief, for appellant.
Lisa E. Bhatia-Gautier, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney and Miguel A. Fernandez,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
June 3, 2005
Per Curiam. After a bench trial, the district court
entered judgment for the United States on Dr. Juan R. Sánchez
Infante's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28
U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., that certain Veteran's Administration ("VA")
physicians negligently failed to review his MRI, to discuss the MRI
results with him, and to prescribe an anticoagulant therapy that
would have averted his 1994 stroke. Sánchez appeals and we affirm.
I.
We present a brief overview of the case, saving a more
detailed recitation for our analysis. The following facts are
undisputed.
Sánchez began work at the San Juan Veterans
Administration Medical Center as a pathologist in 1991. During his
required physical examination, he was diagnosed with diabetes
mellitus type II, and placed on Glucotrol to control his elevated
blood sugar. Sánchez was 5'2" tall and weighed between 190 and 210
pounds during the relevant time period. He did not exercise, had
a poor diet and a family history of cardiac problems, and drank
socially nearly every day. Sánchez also worked long hours at the
hospital and characterized his duties as stressful. His medical
records from 1991 to 1994 show three blood pressure readings (one
normal and two borderline hypertensive by 1994 standards) and
consistent difficulties in controlling his blood sugar.
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In early 1994, one of Sánchez's colleagues, Dr. Angel
Noriega, noticed that Sánchez was falling asleep during the day,
and, fearing that Sánchez was suffering from sleep apnea,1 arranged
for an evaluation. Part of the evaluation consisted of a March 7,
1994 polysomnography,2 which revealed a significant number of apnea
episodes during the test period. Noriega also sent Sánchez for a
magnetic resonance imagining ("MRI") study, to check for brain
lesions indicative of a particularly serious form of sleep apnea.
On March 22, 1994, Sánchez had the MRI, which showed no brain
lesions and was essentially normal. However, the MRI report
included the notation: "Multiple hyperintense focci are seen within
the periventricular white matter suggestive of deep white matter
ischemic3 changes. Please, correlate clinically." The medical
records do not indicate whether Sánchez's physicians ever acted
upon the MRI or discussed it with him. Nonetheless, Sánchez was
successfully treated for his sleep apnea condition.
On August 31, 1994, Sánchez suffered a cerebrovascular
accident ("CVA"), a "stroke" in common parlance. The stroke left
1
A serious condition in which an individual stops breathing
while asleep. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 115-6
(30th ed. 2003).
2
A diagnostic test for sleep disorders that monitors the
patient's relevant physiological functions while he is asleep. See
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1485 (30th ed. 2003).
3
Indicating deficiency in blood flow. See Dorland's
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 954 (30th ed. 2003).
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him with significant paralysis of the right side of his body, which
has required him to walk with a cane or braces and learn to perform
his duties as a pathologist with his left hand. The stroke has
also caused emotional disturbances and depression. Sánchez was
placed on anticoagulant therapy immediately after the stroke. In
the following years, Sánchez suffered from a host of other health
problems, including two subsequent CVAs, and has been regularly
treated by VA physicians. Sánchez claims that, upon requesting his
medical records for a 1999 procedure, he learned of the 1994 MRI
report for the first time.
Sánchez filed his administrative claim in December 2000,
and, after it was denied, he filed this action in the district
court on April 17, 2002. As noted, he alleged that the treating VA
physicians failed to review the MRI, to discuss the MRI with him,
and to provide proper treatment to avert the stroke that he would
suffer five months later. The government moved to dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Sánchez failed to
file his administrative claim within two years of his 1994 stroke.
The court denied the motion because, on the pleading record, there
was no indication that Sánchez was aware of the alleged malpractice
until he saw the MRI report in October 1999. See generally
Gonzalez v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288-89 (1st Cir.
2002)(discovery rule tolls running of statute of limitations
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applicable to the filing of the administrative claim that is a
prerequisite to an FTCA action).
Six witnesses testified at the bench trial: Sánchez; his
medical expert, Dr. Angel Román Franco; two psychiatrists; the
original treating physician, Dr. Noriega; and the government's
expert, Dr. Antonio Alvarez Berdecía. The gist of Sánchez's claim
was that if he had been placed upon anticoagulants after the 1994
MRI, he would not have suffered his stroke.
Dr. Román, a pathologist for the University of Puerto
Rico Medical School, testified that there would have been a good
chance of avoiding the stroke if Sánchez had been placed on
anticoagulants (such as aspirin) at the time of the MRI. Román
emphasized Sánchez's apnea, which significantly increased his heart
rate and blood pressure, and resulted in oxygen deprivation to his
brain that caused "cell death" (as revealed by the ischemic changes
in the brain shown in the MRI). Román asserted that the white
matter changes shown in the MRI were indicative of "mini strokes"
that had already occurred and were harbingers of a larger stroke to
come if not prevented with anticoagulant therapy. Román further
testified that Sánchez's other risk factors beyond apnea were
essentially inconsequential, as his diabetes mellitus had only been
present for a short time (as evidenced by his normal kidney
functions), his high blood pressure was only marginal and of recent
onset, and he had normal cholesterol and triglyceride levels.
-5-
Sánchez testified at length about his experiences,
medical treatment, level of disability, and rehabilitation. He
stated that he never inquired about the results of the MRI because
he had complete confidence in his colleagues. He also stated that
he could not have reviewed his own medical records, as that was
strictly forbidden by the hospital.
Dr. Noriega,4 a board certified neurologist, testified
that, while he could not specifically recall speaking with Sánchez
about the MRI, it was standard hospital practice to discuss test
results with patients, and no less so if they were also colleagues.
He further testified that he would never have begun Sánchez's sleep
apnea treatment without reviewing all test results and discussing
them with Sánchez. He also stated that all VA physicians have
access to all medical records, including their own, and that, on
one occasion, Sánchez brought his own medical records to Noriega.
He also testified that the phrase "correlate clinically" on the MRI
report meant to relate the radiological findings to any actual
physical manifestations in the patient. He stated that Sánchez had
no symptoms –- no evidence of "little strokes" -- so there was
nothing to treat. He further testified that nothing could have
4
Noriega had retired from his duties at the VA Hospital some
years before, and neither side had arranged for his testimony.
Mid-trial, the district judge decided that his testimony was
critical and ordered the parties to bring him in as a witness.
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been done to prevent this type of stroke, and that he would not
have prescribed aspirin out of a fear of hemorrhage.
Dr. Alvarez, a board certified neurologist, testified
that Sánchez's stroke was occasioned by small vessel disease that
was primarily caused by Sánchez's hypertension and diabetes.5 He
noted that the negative effects of diabetes and hypertension were
additive, with hypertension being the primary culprit for such
strokes in 70% of the cases. He further testified that Sánchez's
hypertension and diabetes were longstanding, as evidenced by
Sánchez's left ventricular hypertrophy and diabetic retinopathy.
Alvarez testified that the white matter lesions on the
MRI were only just beginning to be noted in 1994, and that their
meaning is still the subject of debate today. He was adamant that
the white matter changes were not "strokes," and that there was no
real treatment available, in 1994 or at present, other than to
control the major risk factors – hypertension, diabetes, and
obesity. As to risk factor management, Alvarez noted that Sánchez
appeared to take poor care of himself, noting his failure to
control his blood sugar, to follow a diet, and to monitor his blood
pressure. As to anticoagulant therapy, Alvarez emphasized that
there was no evidence that aspirin or other anticoagulants were
5
He also noted Sánchez's other risk factors –- obesity, poor
diet, lack of exercise, family history of heart problems, and
alcohol use.
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effective in the primary prevention6 of strokes. Indeed, he
asserted that the primary efficacy of such anticoagulants was in
secondary prevention of strokes. Further, he noted that aspirin
increased the risk of hemorrhagic strokes, which were typically
worse than ischemic strokes. Moreover, he stated that
anticoagulants would not have helped Sánchez because his stroke was
not caused by a clot. In support of this opinion, he observed that
an echocardiogram from the time of the stroke showed no embolic
source from the heart and normal blood flow in Sánchez's large
arteries. Alvarez also noted that Sánchez showed continued
evidence of CVAs even while he was on anticoagulants after his
first stroke.
The district court issued a memorandum order dismissing
the action as a "no-liability" case. See Sanchez v. United States,
No. 02-1590 (D.P.R. Apr. 12, 2004). Relying largely on Noriega's
testimony, the court concluded that Sánchez was made aware of the
MRI results at the time of his treatment for sleep apnea and had
access to his own medical records. Id. at 6. The court also
credited the testimony of Alvarez, accepting his conclusions that
the white matter lesions on the MRI were secondary to small vessel
disease brought about by Sánchez's hypertension and diabetes. Id.
6
The experts distinguished between primary prevention, which
they defined as efforts to prevent the initial stroke, and
secondary prevention, which they defined as efforts to prevent
additional strokes.
-8-
at 6-11. The court found that the VA physicians did not violate
any standard of care, Sánchez did nothing to control his risk
factors, and anticoagulants would not have been beneficial in
preventing Sánchez's stroke (but might have made it worse). Id.
As to Román, the district court praised his credentials, but,
referring to his prior experience with him in other cases, deemed
his testimony unacceptable "Monday-morning quarterbacking" that
ignored this case's factual realities. Id. at 11-12.
II.
A district court's findings after a bench trial "shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is
only clearly erroneous if a review of the entire record leads to a
definite and firm conviction that an error has been made. See
Primus v. United States, 389 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2004). "When
the proof supports plausible but competing inferences, the trier's
choice cannot be clearly erroneous." Cape Fear, Inc. v. Martin,
312 F.3d 496, 500 (1st Cir. 2002)(internal citation and quotation
omitted). "That the evidence also might support a contrary finding
is often the inevitable reality when cases present difficult
factual questions; it is not, however, a basis for reversal." Id.
at 502. Further, a district court's credibility determinations are
only clearly erroneous when they are "based on testimony that was
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inherently implausible, internally inconsistent, or critically
impeached." Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.
1998).
In an action under the FTCA, the state law where the
alleged tort occurred provides the standard of liability.
Mitchell, 141 F.3d at 13. To establish a case of medical
malpractice under Puerto Rico law, a plaintiff must prove "(1) the
duty owed (i.e., the minimum standard of professional knowledge and
skill required in the relevant circumstances), (2) an act or
omission transgressing that duty, and (3) a sufficient causal nexus
between the breach and the claimed harm." Cortes-Irizarry v.
Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1997).
Puerto Rico law presumes that a treating physician observes a
reasonable standard of care in treating a patient, so a plaintiff
has the burden of refuting this presumption. Rolon-Alvarado v.
Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d 74,78 (1st Cir. 1993).
Although Sánchez asserts a host of overlapping errors by
the district court, his claims boil down to two significant issues:
(1) whether the court erred in concluding that Sánchez knew about
the MRI report in 1994; and (2) whether the court erred in
concluding that the failure to discuss the MRI with Sánchez and to
prescribe anticoagulant therapy was not the cause of the stroke.
We note at the outset that Sánchez is climbing a steep
hill. We must view the record as a whole, so that even if there is
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some evidence supporting Sánchez's contentions, we will still
affirm if there is evidence supporting the contrary view. See Cape
Fear, Inc., 312 F.3d at 500.
We first consider Sánchez's challenge to the district
court's conclusion that Sánchez was aware of his MRI results in
1994. Noriega testified that the standard VA hospital practice was
to discuss test results with patients,7 Sánchez had access to his
medical records, and Noriega would not have ordered treatment for
Sánchez's apnea without discussing all test results with him.
While Sánchez argues the truism that testimony regarding "standard
practice" must yield to actual events in a specific case, standard
practice evidence is nonetheless relevant and properly considered.
See generally Fed. R. Evid. 406. The contrary evidence was the
absence of notations in the medical record, which Román conceded
could occur by mistake, and Sánchez's testimony that the MRI was
not discussed with him, which the district court deemed not
credible. We cannot fault the district court for doubting
Sánchez's account. First, Sánchez's claimed indifference to his
test results is at best surprising. Alvarez testified that most
physician "patients" are very demanding about test results and tend
to read the MRI with the radiologist as soon as it is produced.
Second, Sánchez produced no evidence regarding the claimed hospital
7
Sánchez, Román, and Alvarez all confirmed this VA hospital
practice in the course of their own testimony.
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policy that a VA physician cannot review his own medical records.
Third, Sánchez's claim as to this policy was undercut by evidence
that he regularly returned his medical file to the records room and
could obtain copies of his records as he wished. Finally, there is
nothing innately suspicious about Noriega's inability to remember
a specific discussion about a specific MRI a decade after the fact.
In sum, the district court's conclusion is not clearly erroneous.8
The district court's conclusions regarding causation of
the stroke and possible preventive treatment implicate the experts'
differing views. As set forth above, Alvarez and Román disagreed
on the relative importance of Sánchez's diabetes and hypertension.
They also disagreed on the significance of the white matter changes
in the MRI and the appropriateness and likely efficacy of
anticoagulant therapy.9
8
At oral argument, Sánchez asserted that the record was
unclear as to the district court's ultimate finding regarding when
Sánchez saw his MRI. Sánchez maintains that the court's conclusion
in the memorandum order after the trial that he knew of his MRI
results in 1994 is in hopeless conflict with the district court's
prior conclusion that he did not see the MRI until 1999 in its
order denying the government's motion to dismiss. But the court's
initial assessment of the pleadings must of course give way to its
factual findings after a full trial on the merits.
9
Sánchez's contention that the district court inappropriately
minimized the relationship between Sánchez's sleep apnea and the
stroke is a nonstarter. Both sides agree that he was successfully
treated for apnea in 1994. Further, if apnea was a factor in the
stroke, the blame would appear to fall on Sánchez, as he conceded
that he failed to follow the prescribed therapy prior to his
stroke.
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Sánchez claims that he was not hypertensive (or only
marginally so), and that his diabetes was of too recent an onset to
have factored in his stroke. This thesis is based upon the few
blood pressure readings for the relevant period in the record10 and
the 1991 diagnosis of diabetes mellitus. But Sánchez's argument
ignores the balance of the evidence. First, as to hypertension,
Alvarez testified, without significant challenge, that Sánchez had
left ventricular hypertrophy, a condition that can only exist with
longstanding hypertension. The fact that Sánchez might not have
been definitively diagnosed with hypertension does not mean that he
did not have it. Second, Sánchez himself conceded that, in 1994,
he was aware that he had untreated hypertension. Third, his
argument that his blood pressure was merely "borderline" (by 1994
standards) ignores the fact that both experts agreed that such
blood pressures were subsequently determined to be dangerously high
for diabetics.
As to diabetes, Sánchez ignores Alvarez's testimony that
Sánchez's diabetes retinopathy was indicative of longstanding
diabetes. While Sánchez attempted to undermine this conclusion by
pointing to test results showing normal kidney functions, Alvarez
testified, without significant contradiction, that some diabetics
have such results. The district court's choice between two
10
The doctors all agreed that one could not positively diagnose
hypertension from three scattered blood pressure readings.
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interpretations of the significance of Sánchez's diabetes, both
with record support, cannot be clear error. See Cape Fear, 312
F.3d at 500. Similarly, the district court's decision to credit
Alvarez's testimony over Román's regarding the significance of the
white matter changes in MRI, even if both experts' accounts had
support in the record, would not constitute clear error.11
As to the advisability of using anticoagulant therapy on
Sánchez, the balance of the evidence favors Alvarez's view. First,
Noriega supported Alvarez's conclusion that anticoagulants would
not have prevented a stroke of the type Sánchez suffered and would
have increased the risk of a hemorrhage. Second, Alvarez pointed
to an electrocardiogram at the time of the stroke, which supported
his view that a clot was not involved. Third, Sánchez and Román
conceded that Sánchez continued to have CVAs while on
anticoagulants. Finally, Román acknowledged that most of the
anticoagulant studies that he cited related to secondary rather
than primary prevention.
11
The district court did list hypercholesterolemia and
hypertriglyceridemia among the conditions that Román failed to
consider in rejecting Román's conclusions. Sánchez is correct that
Alvarez retreated from the conclusion in his initial report that
these maladies were additional contributors to the stroke and
acknowledged that most of the test results were normal. Thus, the
district court may have errantly included these secondary factors
based upon Alvarez's initial report. Nonetheless, Alvarez's thesis
was always that hypertension and diabetes were the primary causes,
and the district court supportably accepted this thesis, as
discussed above.
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Moreover, there were other more general factors that
justified the decision to accord Román's conclusions less weight.
Román conceded that hypertension and diabetes were significant
factors in strokes, but did not even mention these matters in his
report. His testimony also failed to take into account significant
medical evidence, such as Sánchez's left ventricular hypertrophy
and diabetic retinopathy, which should at least have warranted a
comment. Román also conceded that he had no personal experience
managing patients with sleep apnea or CVAs. In sum, the district
court accepted Alvarez's assessment on both causation and course of
treatment, and our review reveals nothing about his testimony that
was implausible, inconsistent, or critically impeached.12 See
generally Mitchell, 141 F.3d at 17.
Sánchez faults the district court for concluding that he
was a careless person who took inadequate care of himself. But to
prevail, Sánchez needed to prove that the VA physicians were
negligent and that their negligence caused his injury. The
12
In addressing the district court's decision to credit
Alvarez's testimony over Román's, Sánchez suggests that the
district court showed an improper bias against Román by commenting
on other cases in which Román testified as an expert. We disagree.
Prior judicial exposure to an individual is not by itself enough to
establish bias, see United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 27 (1st
Cir. 2002), and the weight accorded to the testimony of a physician
regarding an area outside his speciality can be adjusted
accordingly, see Mitchell, 141 F.3d at 15. The district judge
generally praised Román's credentials, and his criticism was far
less derogatory than other comments found not to amount to bias.
See, e.g., Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 973 (1st
Cir. 1991)("come-for-hire expert" and "Mr. So and So").
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district court supportably concluded that Sánchez did not meet this
burden, so any comments made by the court as to the true cause of
Sánchez's unfortunate illness are largely beside the point.
III.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
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