Céspedes Rodríguez v. Rivera Hernandes

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2005
TOMÁS R. CÉSPEDES RODRÍGUEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
VÍCTOR RIVERA HERNANDES, in his official capacity as former
Puerto Rico Secretary of Labor and in his personal capacity, and
MARÍA ROSA ITURREGUI-GONZÁLEZ, in her official capacity as former
Administrator of the Puerto Rico Vocational Rehabilitation
Administration and in her personal capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Charles S. Hey-Maestre with whom DeJesús, Hey & Vargas,
Rosalinda Pesquera and Dávila, Pesquera & Murphy, were on brief,
for appellant.
Héctor J. Benítez Arraiza with whom Llovet Zurinaga & López,
P.S.C. was on brief, for appellee, María Rosa Iturregui-González,
in her individual capacity.
Juan M. Frontera Suau with whom Celina Romany, was on brief,
for Víctor Rivera Hernandes, both officially and personally and
María Rosa Iturregui, in her official capacity.
June 14, 2005
Per Curiam. Plaintiff Tomás Céspedes-Rodríguez appeals
from the entry of judgments as a matter of law in favor of
defendants Víctor Rivera Hernandez and María Rosa Iturregui-
González on his claims that he was the victim of unlawful political
discrimination, in violation of his First Amendment rights, and an
unlawful termination from tenured public employment, in violation
of his due process rights. Our consideration of the briefs and
record convinces us that there is little to add to the two
thoughtful opinions issued by the district court in support of its
rulings -- especially in view of the fact that the argument section
in plaintiff's brief (which contains only a few of the citations to
the record required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)) largely fails
to engage the court's reasoning. Consequently, we affirm largely
on the basis of the district court's opinions and keep our
additional remarks brief. See, e.g., Vargas-Ruiz v. Golden Arch
Dev., Inc., 368 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2004).
In July 1997, Céspedes, a member of Puerto Rico's New
Progressive Party, assumed a trust position -- that of special aide
in charge of Management Information Systems -- within the
Vocational Rehabilitation Administration of Puerto Rico ("VRA").
In May 2000, Céspedes was granted a probationary (because an
election was fewer than six months away) "transfer" to the career
position of Executive Director IV, but the evidence shows that he
retained his trust duties and, by special exception, his former
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level of pay (which was almost double the pay of a typical
Executive Director IV). This transfer was effectuated to protect
Céspedes' employment in the event of a change in administrations
-- an event which transpired in January 2001 after the Popular
Democratic Party won the November 2000 elections.
In January 2001, Rivera was appointed Puerto Rico's
Secretary of Labor and Human Resources, and Iturregui was appointed
administrator of the VRA (which falls under the auspices of the
Department of Labor and Human Resources). On February 5, 2001,
Iturregui confirmed Céspedes' appointment to the Executive Director
IV position, thus ending the probationary period. Thereafter,
however, Céspedes' employment situation began to sour as he lost
his office, access to a company car, and his former job duties.
(In September 2001, a new trust position of Director of Management
Information Services was created and awarded to one Ramón Burgos.
Céspedes was made Burgos' Deputy Director -- at the same salary --
but Burgos assumed many of the job duties that Céspedes formerly
performed.) Céspedes complained to the Personnel Administration
System Appeal Board that he was the victim of unlawful political
discrimination and sought a meeting with Iturregui, but his
complaints went nowhere. Céspedes felt ostracized at work and, in
March 2002, began three months of sick leave for depression.
On October 24, 2002, Céspedes was suspended from his
position after a general personnel records audit ordered by
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Iturregui allegedly uncovered evidence that Céspedes had falsified
his resumé and had obtained his salary exception by dishonestly
representing that he had a private sector offer at a high salary.
On November 22, 2002, Céspedes received an informal hearing before
an attorney. Céspedes denied the allegations and submitted
evidence that they were false but was dismissed anyway, on December
5, 2002. The present lawsuit followed, but judgments as a matter
of law in favor of Rivera and Iturregui were entered by the
district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 after the plaintiff rested.
The district court concluded, and we agree, that Céspedes
had failed to meet his "threshold burden to produce sufficient
direct or circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could
find that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor behind the adverse employment action [complained of]."
Rodriquez-Rios v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1998). While
this standard is necessarily imprecise, and evidentiary sufficiency
in close cases may reside in the eye of the beholder, the evidence
Céspedes submitted (which we have summarized in a light most
favorable to him, see Guilloty Perez v. Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 50
(1st Cir. 2003)), is insufficient.
Céspedes makes much of the fact that the supposedly less
qualified Burgos, who was a member of the Popular Democratic Party,
was assigned to assume the directorship duties that he formerly
exercised. But the record demonstrates that those duties were, in
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fact, trust duties which defendants were entitled to assign to a
political confidante. See Nieves-Luciano v. Hernández-Torres, 397
F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2005). Céspedes also highlights the evidence
that his termination was based on trumped-up charges, but even if
we accept for the sake of argument that there is a trialworthy
issue here, Céspedes still must show that the pretext masked
unlawful political discrimination on the part of defendants (and
not the "mere" desire to rid themselves of a vociferously unhappy
employee). Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 146-49 (2000) (pretext evidence in a Title VII case is
sufficient only if the factfinder may infer that the pretext masks
discrimination on the forbidden ground); Feliciano de la Cruz v. El
Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 6-9 (1st Cir. 2000)
(similar).1 Thus, the pretext evidence, while certainly probative,
channels our inquiry back to the basic question whether there is
enough evidence for the jury to have found that Céspedes was
terminated because of his political affiliation.
We share the district court's conviction that the answer
to this question is "no." No rational jury could find that
Céspedes' political affiliation (rather than his reaction to the
loss of the job duties and perquisites that accompanied his
1
In citing these cases, we do not imply that the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework applicable to Title VII cases
applies in the First Amendment political discrimination context.
Rather, we express no opinion on the issue.
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transfer from a supervisory trust position to a less prestigious
and demanding career position) was the real reason for the charges
against him. At most, the evidence tended to show only that
Céspedes was dismissed unfairly by people who knew him to be of a
different political affiliation than themselves more than a year
and a half after they took power. For the reasons set forth by the
district court, this is not enough.
Two final arguments advanced by Céspedes warrant only
brief responses. First, Céspedes contends that the district court
erroneously prevented him from introducing additional probative
evidence of discrimination in the form of a letter his father wrote
complaining about political discrimination at the VRA, and formal
complaints of discrimination filed before various tribunals by
Céspedes and other VRA employees. Such evidentiary determinations
are reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., United
States v. Mercado Irizarry, 404 F.3d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 2005), and
the court here reasonably concluded that this evidence, some of
which was hearsay, only tended to establish the authors' beliefs
and could not substitute for actual evidence of the events
described and the reasons those events occurred. Second, Céspedes
contends that the jury could have found that his dismissal
constituted a substantive due process violation. But the
substantive due process doctrine is reserved for truly outrageous
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government conduct, see, e.g., Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27,
36 (1st Cir. 2005), and this case does not merit that description.
Affirmed.
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