United States v. Garcia-Camacho

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1303
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EVARIS NAOMI GARCÍA-CAMACHO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson, Selya, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Johnny Rivera-González on brief for appellant.
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Robert P. Coleman III, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
October 19, 2021
SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this sentencing appeal,
defendant-appellant Evaris Naomi García-Camacho strives to
persuade us that the district court procedurally and substantively
erred in imposing her sentence by focusing on aggravating factors
and disregarding mitigating factors. Because these claims of error
are not supported by the record, we summarily affirm the challenged
sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. "Where, as here, a sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea,
we glean the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the
unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report (PSI
Report), and the record of the disposition hearing." United States
v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009).
On February 25, 2019, Puerto Rico police officers
executed a search warrant at an apartment in San Juan. In the
apartment, they found the appellant and her boyfriend. They also
found a cache of firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances.
The appellant was arrested and — having waived her rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) — confessed that
she and her boyfriend were selling drugs.
On March 14, a federal grand jury sitting in the District
of Puerto Rico returned an indictment, which charged the appellant
with possession with intent to distribute a substance containing
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cocaine base and cocaine (Counts 1 and 2, respectively), see 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to
distribute a substance containing marijuana (Count 3), see id.§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime (Count 4), see 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The appellant initially maintained her innocence,
but later changed course and entered a guilty plea to Counts 2 and
4. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the government agreed to
dismiss Counts 1 and 3.
The PSI Report recommended a guideline sentencing range
of twelve to eighteen months in prison for Count 2. The statutory
minimum sentence and, thus, the guideline sentence for Count 4 was
sixty months (to run consecutive to any sentence imposed on Count
2). See id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (c)(1)(D)(ii). Neither side
objected to these guideline calculations.
At the disposition hearing, defense counsel advocated
for a twelve-month term of immurement on Count 2 and a sixty-month
term of immurement on Count 4. He described the appellant — then
age 21 — as "very young" and "very immature" and stated that she
was "in a very toxic relationship." He concluded by telling the
court that the appellant's sentencing memorandum "includes
everything."
The prosecutor took a different view, noting that the
appellant "was participating in a drug trafficking operation that
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was being run out of her apartment" and that there were many
firearms, ammunition, and controlled substances in the apartment.
She asked for an eighteen-month term of immurement on Count 2 and
a sixty-month term of immurement on Count 4.
The appellant allocuted. She stated that she was
"repentant" and asked the court for "a fair and reasonable
sentence."
After confirming that it had reviewed the appellant's
sentencing memorandum, the court adopted the guideline
calculations contained in the PSI Report. It then canvassed the
sentencing factors limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), discussing
(among other things) the appellant's age, education, former
employment, and substance-use history. Next, the court summarized
the facts pertaining to the offenses of conviction and described
the many incriminating items found in the apartment. The court
expressed the view that the parties' sentence recommendations
"d[id] not reflect the seriousness of the offenses, d[id] not
promote respect for the law, d[id] not protect the public from
further crimes by [the appellant], and d[id] not address the issues
of deterrence and punishment." It concluded that a twelve-month
prison sentence on Count 2, followed by a consecutive seventy-two-
month prison sentence on Count 4, was a condign punishment. The
court sentenced the appellant accordingly. After the court denied
her motion for reconsideration, this appeal ensued.
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II. ANALYSIS
The appellant contends that her sentence is both
"procedurally and substantively unreasonable."1 Despite this
duality, she combines both points in a unitary claim of error.
For ease in analysis, we examine her arguments through both
procedural and substantive lenses.
A. The Procedural Lens.
The appellant's principal claim of error is that the
district court failed adequately to balance the section 3553(a)
factors. Specifically, she asserts that the court "placed all
weight on the negative factors and disregarded the multiple
mitigating factors." Because this claim of error was not advanced
below, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Duarte,
246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). The appellant stumbles at the
first step of plain-error review because she cannot show that any
error occurred.
Where, as here, a sentencing court has properly
calculated a defendant's guideline range, it becomes the court's
task "to sift" all the information furnished to it in the
sentencing memorandums and at the disposition hearing and to
The appellant is less than precise as to whether she is
1
challenging her twelve-month prison sentence on Count 2, her
seventy-two-month prison sentence on Count 4, or both. We read
the appellant's claim as being directed toward her seventy-two-
month prison sentence. After all, she received exactly the
sentence she requested on Count 2.
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balance the relevant sentencing factors. United States v. Madera-
Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). When explicating the
sentence imposed, the court "is not required to address [the
sentencing] factors, one by one, in some sort of rote incantation."
United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). It is
enough for the "court simply to identify the main factors driving
its determination." United States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 817
F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2016).
In the case at hand, the record makes manifest that the
sentencing court adequately considered all the relevant section
3553(a) factors. The court read the appellant's sentencing
memorandum and listened to defense counsel's arguments in
mitigation. The court discussed the appellant's age, education,
prior employment, substance-use history, and lack of any prior
criminal record. It also discussed the offenses of conviction,
describing in detail the firearms, ammunition, controlled
substances, and other items discovered in the appellant's
apartment. The court then factored in the gravity of the offenses,
the need for respect for the law, the need to protect the public
from further crimes by the appellant, and the goals of deterrence
and condign punishment. No more was exigible.
The appellant's contention that the court "failed to
take into consideration . . . [the a]ppellant's advanced
pregnancy, youth, complete[ly] dysfunctional up bringing, [and]
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spousal abuse syndrome" is without merit. These arguments were
brought to the court's attention with unmistakable clarity.
"[T]hat the district court did not explicitly mention them during
the sentencing hearing suggests they were unconvincing, not
ignored." United States v. Lozada-Aponte, 689 F.3d 791, 793 (1st
Cir. 2012). The claim of procedural error fails.
B. The Substantive Lens.
We next examine the appellant's claim of error through
a more substantive lens. With respect to the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence, our review is for abuse of
discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
762, 766 (2020); United States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d 801, 808
(1st Cir. 2020).
"In the sentencing context, 'reasonableness is a protean
concept.'" United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.
2011) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir.
2008)). Consequently, "[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in
any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing
outcomes." Id. Our task, then, is "to determine whether the
[challenged] sentence falls within this broad universe." United
States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020).
In making this determination, "we cannot substitute our
judgment of the appropriate sentence for that of the sentencing
court; to the contrary, we must accord significant deference to
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the court’s informed determination that the section 3553(a)
factors justify the sentence imposed." Id. In the end, "a
sentence is substantively reasonable so long as the sentencing
court offers a plausible rationale and the sentence represents a
defensible result." Id.The court below adequately articulated its sentencing
rationale. The court mulled the parties' arguments and considered
the relevant section 3553(a) factors. It then determined that the
gravity of the offenses, the need to protect the public, and a
constellation of similar considerations demanded substantial
punishment. We find its rationale plausible.
So, too, the challenged sentence represents a defensible
result. Given the gravity of the offenses and the types and kinds
of contraband involved, we cannot say that a seventy-two-month
term of immurement on Count 4 was an indefensible result. Serious
crimes warrant substantial punishment — and the district court
recognized as much. The mitigating factors emphasized by the
appellant do not tip the balance so heavily as to demand a
different result.
Finally, the appellant complains that the seventy-two-
month sentence was an upward variance and that she was given no
advance notice of the sentencing court's intent to vary upward.
There was nothing untoward about the court's deployment of an
upward variance. "[A] mandatory minimum sentence is just that:
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the lowest sentence that can lawfully be imposed. A sentencing
court may lawfully select a higher sentence up to the statutory
maximum."2 United States v. Rivera-González, 776 F.3d 45, 51-52
(1st Cir. 2015). And unlike a sentencing departure, an upward
variance from a properly calculated guideline range almost never
requires advance notice to a defendant. See United States v.
Daoust, 888 F.3d 571, 575 (1st Cir. 2018). No advance notice was
required here.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the challenged sentence is summarily
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
2 In this case, the statutory maximum sentence on Count 4 was
life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
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