Summers v. City of Fitchburg

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1725
JEFFREY D. SUMMERS and JEFFREY'S HOUSE INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CITY OF FITCHBURG ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Selya, and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Marcus L. Scott, with whom Barbara Collins and ScottCollins,
LLP were on brief, for appellants.
Gregor A. Pagnini, with whom Leonard H. Kesten, Deidre Brennan
Regan, and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP were on brief,
for appellees.
Maura Healey, Attorney General, and Julie E. Green, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief for Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
amicus curiae.
October 8, 2019
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from the
enforcement of a state law by the City of Fitchburg (the City).
That law requires the plaintiffs to install sprinklers in the four
sober houses that they operate for recovering addicts. The
plaintiffs claim that the City's refusal to exempt the sober houses
from the sprinkler requirement violates the reasonable
accommodation provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(FHAA). The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants — the City and a coterie of municipal officials — on
the ground that the plaintiffs failed to show that an exemption
from the sprinkler requirement was either reasonable or necessary
to allow recovering addicts to live in and benefit from the sober
houses. Discerning no error in the district court's conclusion
that the requested accommodation was not reasonable, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly rehearse the relevant events and travel of
the case, taking the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most agreeable to the non-moving parties (here, the
plaintiffs). See Avery v. Hughes, 661 F.3d 690, 693 (1st Cir.
2011).
Plaintiffs-appellants Jeffrey D. Summers and his
nonprofit organization, Jeffrey's House, Inc., operate four sober
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houses in Fitchburg, Massachusetts. These facilities provide
supportive residences for individuals recovering from alcohol
and/or drug addiction. Starting in 2013, municipal officials began
to enforce a variety of zoning and building-code provisions that
they thought the plaintiffs were violating. As an example, at
least three of the sober houses were apparently operating in
violation of the use restrictions set forth in the City's zoning
ordinance. At the plaintiffs' request, the City granted an
accommodation under the ADA and the FHAA to allow the plaintiffs
to operate those sober houses despite the use restrictions.
In July of 2014, municipal officials informed the
plaintiffs that they were required, pursuant to a state law that
applies to lodging or boarding houses with six or more unrelated
residents, to install sprinkler systems in the three sober houses
they were then operating. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 148, § 26H (the
Sprinkler Law). The plaintiffs were given six months to bring
their sober houses into compliance but did not do so.
Consequently, the City fined them $1,000 and instituted an
enforcement action in the local housing court. Cf. id. § 27
(authorizing a fine for "[a]ny owner of a building who, within six
months after having received an order from the marshal under
section twenty-six, fails to comply with the requirement of such
order").
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At a housing court hearing in the summer of 2015, the
plaintiffs suggested that, pending resolution of the dispute over
the sprinkler requirement, they would reduce the occupancy of each
sober house to five or fewer residents (thus rendering the
Sprinkler Law inapplicable). Municipal officials asked the
plaintiffs to memorialize this suggestion in writing and agree to
allow sporadic inspections to verify the reduced occupancy. At
that point, the plaintiffs balked: they reneged on the offer,
asserting that the Sprinkler Law did not apply to sober houses,
that periodic inspections would disrupt the residents, and that
the cost of sprinklers would be prohibitive.
This dispute simmered until September 14, 2015, when the
plaintiffs sued the City and a number of municipal officials in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Their complaint raised a gallimaufry of federal and state claims
focused on the defendants' efforts to enforce the zoning ordinance
and building code. The district court dismissed most of the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
(including the claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact
under both the ADA and the FHAA) but allowed the plaintiffs to
proceed with their reasonable accommodation claims under the same
statutes.
After the completion of discovery, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
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remaining claims. As to the reasonable accommodation claims, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their
myriad concerns about the sprinkler requirement (including its
cost and the specter of disruption to residents from sporadic
inspections) rendered an accommodation to the Sprinkler Law either
reasonable or necessary. The court also determined that the
plaintiffs had voluntarily withdrawn any proposal to reduce
occupancy to fewer than six residents per sober house.
This timely appeal ensued. In it, the plaintiffs
challenge only the district court's entry of summary judgment on
their ADA and FHAA reasonable accommodation claims.
II. ANALYSIS
We review the district court's entry of summary judgment
de novo. See Avery, 661 F.3d at 693. "We will affirm only if the
record reveals 'that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
In this instance, appellate review is simplified by the
procedural posture in which the appeal arrives on our doorstep.
The Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts provide in pertinent part:
Motions for summary judgment shall include a
concise statement of the material facts of
record as to which the moving party contends
there is no genuine issue to be tried, with
page references to affidavits, depositions and
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other documentation. . . . A party opposing
the motion shall include a concise statement
of the material facts of record as to which it
is contended that there exists a genuine issue
to be tried, with page references to
affidavits, depositions and other
documentation. . . . Material facts of record
set forth in the statement required to be
served by the moving party will be deemed for
purposes of the motion to be admitted by
opposing parties unless controverted by the
statement required to be served by opposing
parties.
D. Mass. R. 56.1. When the defendants moved for summary judgment,
they filed the required statement of undisputed material facts.
Although the plaintiffs filed a brief statement of their own with
their opposition, they did not respond to the vast majority of the
defendants' factual assertions and included only two citations to
documents in the record.
We have made it plain that "'[v]alid local rules are an
important vehicle by which courts operate' and 'carry the force of
law.'" Schiffmann v. United States, 811 F.3d 519, 525 (1st Cir.
2016) (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation,
Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994)). Rules like Local Rule
56.1 "were developed by the district courts in this circuit in
response to this court's concern that, absent such rules, summary
judgment practice could too easily become a game of cat-and-mouse,
giving rise to the 'specter of district court judges being unfairly
sandbagged by unadvertised factual issues.'" Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,
209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Stepanischen v. Merchs.
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Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir. 1983)). Here,
the plaintiffs flouted Local Rule 56.1 and allowed the defendants
to map the boundaries of the summary judgment record. Such actions
have consequences, and the district court deemed the defendants'
statement of undisputed material facts admitted. Given the clarity
of Local Rule 56.1 and the important function that it serves, the
district court was fully justified in limiting the summary judgment
record to the four corners of the defendants' statement of
undisputed material facts. See United States v. McNicol, 829 F.3d
77, 80-81 (1st Cir. 2016); Schiffmann, 811 F.3d at 524-25. For
the same reasons, we too deem the defendants' statement of
undisputed material facts admitted and, thus, treat those facts as
controlling.
Although the plaintiffs attempt to raise a plethora of
claims in this venue, their only preserved claims involve their
challenge to the City's refusal to exempt the sober houses from
the Sprinkler Law under the FHAA and the ADA. The FHAA bars
discriminatory housing practices based on an individual's
handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). Among other prohibitions, the
statute "outlaws discrimination 'in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because
of a handicap' of an individual." Astralis Condo. Ass'n v. Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2010)
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(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)). Title II of the ADA more broadly
prohibits public entities (such as the City) from discriminating
based on disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Both statutes apply
to municipal zoning and building-code decisions. See Valencia v.
City of Springfield, 883 F.3d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 2018).
As a general matter, three theories of liability are
cognizable under the FHAA and the ADA: disparate treatment,
disparate impact, and failure to make reasonable accommodations.
See Nunes v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 144-45 (1st Cir.
2014) (ADA); Astralis, 620 F.3d at 66 (FHAA). The plaintiffs'
arguments on appeal rest on the reasonable accommodation theory.
In this regard, the FHAA defines discrimination to include "a
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary
to afford [a handicapped individual] equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). To prevail on such
a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show a
qualifying handicap, the defendant's actual or constructive
knowledge of that handicap, a request for a specific accommodation
that is both reasonable and necessary to allow the handicapped
individual an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the particular
housing, and the defendant's refusal to make the requested
accommodation. See Astralis, 620 F.3d at 67. In a similar vein,
the ADA requires that a public entity "make reasonable
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modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when . . .
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). For present
purposes, the elements of reasonable accommodation claims under
the FHAA and the ADA do not differ in any meaningful respect. See
Valencia, 883 F.3d at 967 & n.9; cf. Astralis, 620 F.3d at 66
(explaining that case law under the ADA "is generally persuasive
in assessing handicapped discrimination claims under the FHAA").
Because both the district court's rescript and the parties' briefs
discuss the plaintiffs' reasonable accommodation claims under the
rubric of the FHAA, we follow that path. Additionally, we assume
— solely for ease in exposition — that recovering addicts qualify
as handicapped individuals and that municipal officials knew of
the handicap at all times relevant to this litigation.1
The plaintiffs' argument proceeds along the following
lines. Installing sprinklers in the sober houses would be costly.
Without relief from this requirement, the plaintiffs would have to
either raise the prices charged to recovering addicts or reduce
1 The FHAA refers to an individual's "handicap" rather than
his "disability" (the term favored by the ADA). There is no
substantive difference between the two terms. See Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782
(7th Cir. 2002). In deference to the rubric of the FHAA, we use
the term "handicap" throughout this opinion.
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the occupancy of the sober houses. Either way, fewer individuals
would be able to enjoy the benefit of residing in the sober houses.
Enforcing the Sprinkler Law would, therefore, threaten the
recovery of the displaced residents and undermine the vital purpose
that sober houses serve.
This argument does not withstand scrutiny because the
plaintiffs fail to show that their request for an exemption from
the Sprinkler Law is reasonable. Inasmuch as the requested
accommodation fails the reasonableness requirement, we start — and
end — there.
The reasonableness requirement calls for a factbound
balancing of the benefits that would accrue to the handicapped
individual against the burdens that the accommodation would
entail. See Valencia, 883 F.3d at 968; Anderson v. City of Blue
Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 362 (6th Cir. 2015); Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing
Homeowners Ass'n, 718 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2013). The burdens
that may be given weight in this balancing include both financial
costs and practical detriments to the City, as well as less
tangible effects on the public. See Valencia, 883 F.3d at 968.
Typically, "[a]n accommodation is 'reasonable' when it imposes no
'fundamental alteration in the nature of the program' or 'undue
financial and administrative burdens'" on the defendant. Batista
v. Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de San Ignacio, 776 F.3d 38,
43 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276
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F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002)). Thus, a plaintiff is not entitled
to a waiver of a zoning or building-code rule if the waiver "is so
'at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a
fundamental and unreasonable change.'" Valencia, 883 F.3d at 968
(quoting Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002)).
That a requested accommodation poses a threat to public
safety has obvious relevance to the reasonableness of the
accommodation. See Scoggins, 718 F.3d at 272-73; Lapid-Laurel,
L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 462-63 (3d Cir.
2002). This case is a paradigmatic example of that principle:
exempting the plaintiffs from installing sprinklers would not be
a reasonable accommodation because such an exemption would thwart
the very salutary purpose of the Sprinkler Law. After all,
sprinkler laws play a critical role in fire prevention and, thus,
in public safety. Making this point, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has asserted, in an amicus brief, that exempting the
sober houses from the sprinkler requirement would create an
unacceptable safety risk to both the residents and the public.
The plaintiffs have offered us no reason to doubt the truth of
this commonsense assertion. Residents of a sober house and those
who live nearby are entitled to the same state-mandated level of
protection against fires as their fellow community members.
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The plaintiffs' argument for an exemption from the
Sprinkler Law fails in light of the City's strong interest in
protecting public safety. Many building-code rules with safety
justifications impose costs on the owner or occupant of a dwelling.
Without a specific showing that the financial burden of the
building-code rule outweighs its safety justification, the desire
to alleviate those costs is, on its own, insufficient to render an
accommodation reasonable. Here, the plaintiffs provide no basis
for finding that the financial burden of compliance with the
Sprinkler Law is somehow disproportionate to the public safety
gains that flow from requiring them to install sprinklers. The
closest that they come is their naked estimate that installing
sprinklers would cost between $35,000 - $40,000 for each sober
house. Yet there is no evidence as to the financial status of
either the plaintiffs or the residents. Nor is there any evidence
of the extent to which the cost of the sprinklers, amortized over
their useful life, would affect prices charged to residents. Seen
in this light, the plaintiffs' suggestion that the cost of
installing sprinklers is unreasonable is woven entirely out of
wispy strands of speculation and surmise. And beyond a temporary
disruption during construction, the record evidence does not show
that installing sprinklers would interfere with the therapeutic
benefits that the residents reap from living in the sober houses.
On this record, there is no principled way for us to conclude that
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the sober house residents would accrue enough financial and/or
therapeutic benefits from a Sprinkler Law exemption to outweigh
the safety risks that they and the public would face if the
plaintiffs were allowed to forgo sprinklers.2
The plaintiffs have a fallback position. They argue
that the record reflects factual disputes as to whether municipal
officials engaged in good faith to reach an agreed-upon
accommodation with respect to the Sprinkler Law. The premise on
which this argument rests is sound: "[t]he HUD guidelines
contemplate that parties may engage in an 'interactive process' to
discuss the need for the accommodation and possible alternatives
if the [defendant] refuses to grant a requested accommodation on
the ground that it is not reasonable." Astralis, 620 F.3d at 68
n.3 (quoting Joint Statement of Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. & Dep't
of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act
7 (May 17, 2004)). Consequently, a party's decision to "short-
circuit[] the interactive process" may well be relevant in
determining liability under a reasonable accommodation theory.
Id. at 69.
Here, however, the conclusion that the plaintiffs draw
is unsupported. Accepting the defendants' statement of undisputed
2 Because the plaintiffs' request for an exemption from the
Sprinkler Law fails the reasonableness requirement, we need not
address the district court's additional conclusion that the
requested accommodation was also unnecessary.
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material facts, as we must, see D. Mass. R. 56.1, we discern no
evidentiary basis from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that municipal officials did not attempt in good faith to
resolve their differences with the plaintiffs. For instance,
municipal officials agreed to an exemption from the zoning
ordinance's use restrictions once the plaintiffs formally
requested an accommodation. So, too, the notice of the Sprinkler
Law violations gave the plaintiffs a six-month grace period to
achieve compliance. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 148, § 27. And in
response to the plaintiffs' proposal to reduce the occupancy of
each sober house to fewer than six residents, the City reasonably
requested that the plaintiffs memorialize such a commitment in
writing and allow periodic inspections. The plaintiffs then
withdrew their reduction-of-occupancy proposal rather than agree
to the City's conditions.3 These undisputed facts amply
demonstrate that municipal officials worked with the plaintiffs to
ensure that the sober houses complied with state and local laws
even in the face of the plaintiffs' intransigence.
To say more about the reasonable accommodation claim
would be to paint the lily. The record on appeal is defined by
3 The plaintiffs contend that the district court
misinterpreted the record in concluding that they withdrew their
reduction-of-occupancy proposal. Given the plaintiffs' failure to
contest the defendants' statement of undisputed material facts, we
reject this contention.
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the plaintiffs' failure to controvert the defendants' statement of
undisputed material facts, and nothing in that record supports the
plaintiffs' conclusory allegations that municipal officials either
harassed them for years or failed to give fair consideration to
their accommodation requests. The bare fact that the City did not
yield to the plaintiffs' entreaty for an exemption from the
Sprinkler Law does not, without more, evince a lack of good faith.4
In a last-ditch effort to salvage their case, the
plaintiffs claim that the Sprinkler Law discriminates against
disabled individuals because it exempts certain structures (e.g.,
buildings that house six or more family members, fraternity houses
and dormitories, rest homes, and licensed group homes). See id.
§ 26H; cf. Brockton Fire Dep't v. St. Mary Broad St., LLC, 181 F.
Supp. 3d 155, 157 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding application of Sprinkler
Law to sober houses violative of Massachusetts Zoning Act for this
reason). Fairly viewed, this argument is an attempt to challenge
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims. Withal, the argument is
4In their appellate briefing, the plaintiffs conflate the
distinct disputes that arose over the zoning ordinance and the
Sprinkler Law. The two disputes began at different times, and the
parties resolved the dispute over the zoning ordinance before the
City sent notice threatening to impose fines if the plaintiffs did
not install sprinklers. The City's decision to grant a reasonable
accommodation with respect to the zoning ordinance did not give
the plaintiffs carte blanche to ignore other zoning and building-
code provisions.
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not developed in any meaningful way and, thus, is waived. See
Campbell v. Ackerman, 903 F.3d 14, 18 n.4 (1st Cir. 2018) (deeming
waived any argument "made in a cursory manner bereft of any
developed rationale"); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 1990) (similar).
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
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