Nystedt v. Nigro

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1245
DOUGLAS O. NYSTEDT, JR., individually and as
Administrator of the Estate of Evan T. Nystedt,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
EUGENE A. NIGRO ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
William P. Corbett, Jr., with whom The Corbett Law Firm was on
brief, for appellant.
Christopher R. Conroy, with whom Elizabeth A. Houlding and
Peabody & Arnold LLP were on brief, for appellees.
November 20, 2012
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This case requires us to explore
the parameters of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. The
underlying litigation is a will contest turned conspiracy case.
The plaintiff prevailed in probate court, but only after two and a
half years of pretrial discovery and legal wrangling. All the
while, the estate's assets waned and the legal fees waxed.
In the end, the plaintiff, although found to be the sole
lawful heir of the decedent, had little to show for his victory.
Seeking retribution, he sued a bevy of persons involved in the will
contest. The central theme of his suit was the allegation of a
wide-ranging conspiracy.
In a preliminary ruling, the district court found two of
the defendants (a lawyer who had served as a court-appointed
discovery master and the lawyer's firm) immune from suit by reason
of quasi-judicial immunity. The court certified this ruling as a
partial final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). After careful
consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
"Because this case was decided below on a motion to
dismiss, we rehearse the facts as revealed by the complaint and the
documents annexed thereto." Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69
(1st Cir. 2012).
This imbroglio began with the death of Evan Nystedt in
May of 2004. Soon thereafter, the decedent's attorney and friend,
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Earl Munroe, offered a purported will for probate. The probate
court provisionally appointed Munroe as executor. See Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 192, §§ 13-14 (repealed 2008). Munroe neglected to
provide the statutorily required notice to heirs, see id. § 13, and
used his position as temporary executor to squander estate
resources.
The decedent's closest living relative was plaintiff-
appellant Douglas Nystedt, who eventually learned of the probate
proceedings. He asserted his rights as heir at law and, in August
of 2004, initiated a will contest.
On December 17, 2004, the probate court appointed Eugene
Nigro, a practicing lawyer, as a special master "to monitor the
discovery process" and ensure "full[] compl[iance] with []
reasonable [discovery] requests" "on a timely basis." The court
authorized the special master to charge the parties, equally, his
usual and customary hourly rates. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 53(c);
Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 26(j).
The plaintiff alleges that the special master's
performance left much to be desired. He asserts that the special
master failed to respond to several letters imploring him to
schedule a discovery conference and compel Munroe to honor
discovery requests. He also asserts that the special master
engaged in ex parte communications with Munroe's counsel, George
Lordan. He laments that, after eighteen months of service, the
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special master had only two depositions and one hundred pages of
"generally irrelevant" documents to show for his efforts.
In May of 2006, the plaintiff sought to oust the special
master. The probate court rejected this entreaty. Discovery
continued until February of 2007, when trial commenced. Following
the trial, the probate court, noting that Munroe was both the
preparer of the will and the person who stood to inherit from it,
disallowed the will. The rejection of the will left the plaintiff
as the decedent's administrator and the sole beneficiary of the
estate. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190, §§ 2-3 (repealed 2008). On
appeal, the probate court's decision was affirmed. See Munroe v.
Nystedt, No. 07-P-944, 2008 WL 4778297 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 4,
2008).
The plaintiff's success was bittersweet. By the time
that he prevailed and took control of the assets, the value of the
estate had been greatly diminished. To make matters worse, he had
spent over $200,000 in waging the will contest.
Having been left holding a nearly empty bag, the
plaintiff, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the
decedent's estate, sued a phalanx of will-contest participants.
These defendants included the special master and the law firm in
which he was a partner, Nigro, Pettepit & Lucas, LLP (the Firm).
For ease in exposition, we refer to these two defendants,
collectively, as the Nigro defendants.
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After his suit was docketed in the federal district
court, the plaintiff twice amended his complaint. The operative
pleading for present purposes — the second amended complaint —
contains twenty-three counts against nine defendants.
The claims against the Nigro defendants are narrowly
focused. The complaint posits that the special master's delinquent
performance of his duties prolonged the will contest and, thus,
caused the value of the estate to plummet. The plaintiff frames
this plaint as both a racketeering conspiracy charge under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and a civil conspiracy charge under common
law. In essence, he avers that the special master's misdeeds
furthered a conspiracy crafted by Munroe and others. Viewed from
that coign of vantage, the dispatch of each of the fifty-five
invoices sent by the Nigro defendants was intended to "reap
illicit[] benefits" from the conspiracy. These mailings ostensibly
amounted to instances of mail fraud, which served as predicate acts
for the racketeering charge. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962. The
invoices and ex parte communications also allegedly abetted
Munroe's unlawful conversion of estate assets.
The Nigro defendants moved to dismiss the claims against
them on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The district court granted this motion by means of a
docket entry because, in its view, all of the Nigro defendants'
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actions "relate[d] to [Nigro's] quasi-judicial work as a discovery
master." The district court then certified its order of dismissal
as a final judgment. See Nystedt v. Munroe, No. 10-10754, 2012 WL
244939 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Before us, the plaintiff challenges both the
certification order and the order of dismissal. Without the
certification, we would lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
942 F.2d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we begin with the
certification order and then mull the dismissal order.
A. The Certification Order.
"When an action presents more than one claim for relief
. . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This procedure,
though sometimes useful, is in obvious tension with the "long-
settled and prudential policy against the scattershot disposition
of litigation." Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 42
(1st Cir. 1988). "It follows, then, that entry of judgment under
the rule should not be indulged as a matter of routine or as a
magnanimous accommodation to lawyers or litigants." Id. Rather,
Rule 54(b) should be applied sparingly and "only if the court
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expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b).
When contemplating Rule 54(b) certification, a trial
court first must ensure that the ruling underlying the proposed
judgment is final. Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 42. Such a determination
embodies a judgment about a matter of law and, thus, engenders de
novo review. González Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d
313, 317 (1st Cir. 2009). To qualify as final, a ruling must
"dispose[] completely either of all claims against a given
defendant or of some discrete substantive claim or set of claims
against the defendants generally." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-
Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1994). This requirement is
plainly satisfied here: the order granting the Nigro defendants'
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss terminated all of the plaintiff's
claims against them.
The plaintiff attempts to parry this thrust. He argues
that the dismissed claims against the Nigro defendants were part of
counts in which other defendants were also named. With this in
mind, he insists that the district court's order could not be
"final" as the counts at issue remained in the case.
This argument exalts form over substance. A single count
in a complaint may contain multiple claims and implicate multiple
defendants. By its terms, Rule 54(b) permits the entry of a final
judgment as to "one or more . . . parties," without reference to
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the fact that the pleader may have organized such claim or claims
within counts containing claims against other parties. See
Feinstein, 942 F.2d at 39-40 (upholding Rule 54(b) certification of
an order dismissing claims against some, but not all, defendants
named in a single RICO count).
In addition to finality, Rule 54(b) requires the trial
court to make an express determination that there is "no just
reason for delay." We examine the district court's evaluation of
the equities inherent in this determination with a deferential eye.
See Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 43-44.
In the case at hand, the district court focused on the
importance of protecting the Nigro defendants' reputation in the
legal community. Nystedt, 2012 WL 244939, at *1. The court noted
that pending RICO and conspiracy charges might well dissuade
potential clients from using their services. Id. To cinch
matters, the court found nothing to suggest that the immediate
entry of a partial final judgment would prejudice the rights of any
party. Id.We discern no error. We think that the district court's
assessment of the equities is reasonable, and that Rule 54(b)
certification is appropriate in the circumstances of this case. We
note, moreover, that the policy of the law favors the resolution of
immunity defenses as early in a lawsuit as may be practicable.
See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
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U.S. 139, 145 (1993); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). This factor, too, counsels in favor of immediate appellate
review.
B. The Dismissal Order.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground that Nigro, as a court-appointed discovery master, was
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. We review this
decision de novo. Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st
Cir. 2006). "In conducting that review, we accept as true all
well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." Santiago v. Puerto
Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011).
There is a wrinkle here that potentially affects our
review. The plaintiff's complaint contains both federal and state
claims. Where, as here, a federal court proceeds to adjudicate
state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction, it is obliged to
apply state substantive law to those claims. Perry v. Blum, 629
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010). As a result, we must apply federal law
to some claims and state law to others. Here, however, this
dichotomy is more apparent than real. There are only minute
distinctions between the two bodies of immunity law, and no such
distinction is implicated in this case. Consequently, we rely
interchangeably on federal and state precedents with respect to the
scope of quasi-judicial immunity.
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The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity provides absolute
immunity for those who perform tasks that are inextricably
intertwined with the judicial function. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 200 (1985); Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. of Regis. of
Psychologists, 604 F.3d 658, 662-63 (1st Cir. 2010); LaLonde v.
Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Mass. 1989). This doctrine is
rooted in the wise idea that those who perform adjudicative
functions "require a full exemption from liability." Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
Court-appointed discovery masters plainly perform
judicial functions. Under accepted Massachusetts practice, they
"control the extent of discovery, including the scheduling and
oversight of depositions [and] the time for completion of
discovery, and [they] resolve any discovery disputes which may
arise during the course of the litigation." Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P.
26(j). During his performance of these duties, a master is
"functionally indistinguishable from a trial judge." AccuSoft
Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted). It follows inexorably, as night
follows day, that court-appointed discovery masters, acting in that
capacity, share a judge's immunity from suit. Cf. Brown v.
Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing acts of
court-appointed evaluators); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito
Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976) (discussing acts of
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court-appointed receiver). This immunity makes perfect sense; in
its absence, court-appointed discovery masters would become
"lightning rod[s] for harassing litigation aimed at judicial
orders." Kermit Constr., 547 F.2d at 3.
The plaintiff acknowledges the general proposition that
a court-appointed discovery master may be entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity. To avoid this dead end, however, he tries to
invoke two recognized exceptions to the general proposition. The
first of these exceptions relates to non-judicial acts, see, e.g.,
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993); Cok
v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989); the second relates to
acts, which, "though judicial in nature," are "taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction," Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11-12 (1991). We examine these claims separately.
The plaintiff argues that the Nigro defendants'
transmittal of invoices and the special master's ex parte
communications with Lordan are non-judicial acts sufficient to
trigger the first exception. This argument rests on a
misapprehension of the exception.
Judicial acts are those that are "intimately associated"
with the judicial function. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). For this purpose, the
judicial function has been defined as the adjudication of disputes
between parties. Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435. Nigro's performance of
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his duties as a court-appointed discovery master falls comfortably
within this sphere. This includes the sending of invoices for
services rendered and the alleged ex parte communications — acts
that were intimately associated with the adjudication of discovery
disputes.
As to the invoices, they were sent in furtherance of the
probate court's direction about how the special master should be
paid and were an unremarkable vehicle for securing that
compensation. As to the communications, the plaintiff has not
alleged — nor does the record in any way suggest — that they
pertain to anything other than Nigro's work as a court-appointed
discovery master. Indeed, the probate court denied the motion to
remove the special master, which was based on the same allegations
of ex parte communications. There is no reason to look behind that
ruling. In any event, a mere claim of ex parte contact, alleged to
be in violation of Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:09, canon 3(B)(7), does
not, without more, establish that the nature of the communication
was not inextricably intertwined with the judicial function. The
fact that a court-appointed discovery master performs a judicial
function in an imperfect (or even unethical) way does not, by
itself, dissolve his quasi-judicial immunity. See Cok, 876 F.2d at
3 (holding that "allegations of malice," "bad faith," or
"conspiracy" will not circumvent absolute quasi-judicial immunity).
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As a fallback position, the plaintiff avers that sending
an invoice is an "administrative," rather than a "judicial" act.
This averment suggests a false dichotomy. The administrative
character of an act might make a difference if the act was not
intimately associated with the performance of core judicial
functions. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)
(holding discriminatory dismissal of court employee to be a non-
judicial act). Here, however, the administrative act of sending
invoices was integrally related to Nigro's work as a court-
appointed discovery master and, therefore, the immunity attaches to
the act. Cf. New Eng. Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arbit. Ass'n,
199 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that administrative
tasks associated with processing a party's demand are arbitral acts
for purposes of arbitral immunity).
The plaintiff's attempt to invoke the second exception —
for actions taken in the absence of all jurisdiction — is equally
unavailing. He bases this argument on a number of perceived
procedural glitches, including the fact that the record does not
indicate any "special reasons" sufficient to justify the
appointment of a discovery master pursuant to former Mass. Prob.
Ct. R. 20 (amended 2011); the fact that Nigro neither lived nor
maintained an office in the county in which the probate court sat,
as required by that rule; the fact that the special master's
billings were in excess of the billings permitted by that rule; the
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fact that the appointment was not temporally limited, as required
by former Mass. Prob. Ct. R. 21 (amended 2011); and the fact that
the special master's ex parte communications with Lordan were
unethical.
We need not address these allegations item by item. Even
if procedural irregularities of this sort existed, they would not
strip Nigro of his jurisdiction to act as a court-appointed
discovery master.1 The Supreme Court has squarely held that
absolute judicial immunity is ineffaceable even in the presence of
"grave procedural errors." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359
(1978); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 357
(1871) (distinguishing the "validity of the act" from the question
of whether judicial immunity attaches); New Eng. Cleaning Servs.,
199 F.3d at 546 (similar). The errors here (if errors at all) were
not grave and, in all events, fall within the prophylaxis afforded
by Stump.
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — there is
an even more basic defect in the plaintiff's "absence of
1
We do not mean to imply that the alleged procedural flaws
were flaws at all. Although we need not (and do not) pass upon the
question, it seems likely that the probate court was applying Mass.
R. Dom. Rel. P. 26(j) rather than the probate court rules. See
generally Mass. Supp. Prob. & Fam. Ct. R. 20 reporter's notes
(2012) (noting that the 2011 amendment, which cross references the
Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, reflects the
"usual practice" of the probate courts). The appointment at issue
here appears to conform to the requirements of Mass. R. Dom. Rel.
P. 26(j).
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jurisdiction" argument. His claims amount to nothing more than
claims of error that could, and should, have been addressed in the
will contest itself. After all, "[w]ere collateral and
retrospective attacks on technical defects of court appointments
permitted, the court's work in an already difficult litigation
field would often be undone, with consequent uncertainty, delay,
and frustration." Brown, 291 F.3d at 94. The plaintiff could, for
example, have brought the alleged procedural flaws to the attention
of the probate court and, if that court denied relief, could have
raised the points on appeal. After all, one of the primary
purposes of judicial immunity is to "establish appellate procedures
as the standard system for correcting judicial error." Forrester,
484 U.S. at 225.
Here, too, the plaintiff has a fallback position. He
strives to persuade us that the special master acted in the
complete absence of jurisdiction because his failure to respond to
the plaintiff's letters anent discovery orders constituted an
abandonment of his office (and, hence, his jurisdiction to act).
We are not convinced.
The law is clear that even bad faith or malice will not
divest the cloak of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11. A fortiori, negligence in performing judicial duties
affects neither a defendant's immunity nor his jurisdiction; the
judicial officer (or the person performing tasks intimately
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associated with core judicial functions) retains the power, whether
or not negligent, to act in that capacity. See Cok, 876 F.2d at 4(holding that "negligent performance" or "dereliction of duty" does
not divest an individual of authority granted by the court).
The plaintiff's final argument is that the Firm, as
contrasted with Nigro himself, was not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. In this regard, he points out that the Firm was not
mentioned in the probate court's appointment order and had no
standing in the will contest.
This is whistling past the graveyard. The Firm had no
independent involvement in the will contest. From what the
complaint reveals, the Firm's only contribution was through the
special master's use of its resources (such as staff assistance,
stationery, and the like). This kind of support for the
performance of judicial acts warrants quasi-judicial immunity. See
Lewittes v. Lobis, 164 F. App'x 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); Quitoriano
v. Raff & Becker, LLP, 675 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
In much the same way that a law clerk who helps in the formulation
of an opinion is entitled to share in the judge's immunity, a law
firm whose partner enjoys quasi-judicial immunity is entitled to
share in that immunity for helping the partner to perform his
judicial tasks. Cf. Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regis. in Med., 904 F.2d
772, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of quasi-judicial
immunity to legal adviser to a board performing judicial
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functions). Any other result would render illusory the important
protections afforded by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
we affirm the district court's grant of dismissal.
Affirmed.
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